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In recent years, the global economy has undergone radical changes with important 
implications for future industrial development and for the operation of industrial 
enterprises in developing countries, particularly those of the ESCWA region. These 
changes include the transformation of most of the centrally planned economies into market 
economies, the establishment and strengthening of large regional economic blocs, the 
recently concluded intemational trade agreement leading to the globalization and 
liberalization of trade, and the increasingly rapid advances in the application of high 
technologies. Increased pressure to adhere to the requirements of Iso 9000 quality 
standards and related codes and specifications has amplified the impact of these changes, 
as has the introduction of other quality and environmental controls and specifications. 
Regional events, particularly the situation emerging as a result of the peace process, pose 
additional challenges; they are expected to lead to radical changes in economic and trade 
relations and hence have serious implications for the operation of companies and firms in 
Western Asia. 
In response to regional and global changes, most ESCWA member countries have 
begun to place greater emphasis on economic reforms and deregulation, industrial 
restructuring and the promotion of the private manufacturing sector. While new policies 
and policy measures are being formulated and implemented, the Governments of the 
region need to introduce far more radical changes in their industrial strategies and policies 
to allow them to cope more effectively with the challenges created by the new international 
environment and the new regional realities. At the firm level, managers need to review 
their traditional approaches and to restructure their companies and management systems 
in order to keep pace with fast-changing global and regional conditions and to facilitate 
the observance of new policy measures that may be introduced in their own countries. 
It is still too early to predict how deeply the emerging global and regional 
environment will affect the operation and performance of firms in most ESCWA member 
countries. Nor is much known about how managers will respond to cope with these 
radical changes. Firms cannot form appropriate responses in the absence of clearly 
formulated industrial strategies and policies that take into account global and regional 
realities or in the absence of specific government policies aimed at the enhancement of 
entrepreneurship and private enterprise. Through such policies, appropriate changes could 
be introduced at the national and enterprise levels which would enable entrepreneurs to 
deal with uncertainties and identify new business opportunities. The formulation of new 
industrial strategies and policies by ESCWA member countries requires, among other 
things, a review and analysis of the attitudes of managers towards current and expected 
future government policies in various related areas such as investment, trade, finance and 
fiscal and tariff policies. 
The liberalization of the international market, the potential emergence of Israel 
as a new economic and trading partner in the region and the proposed modalities for 
regional cooperation are major issues that can be expected to play a primary role in 
shaping the reformulation of industrial strategies and policies and the restructuring of the 
industrial sector all the way down to the firm level in the ESCWA region. Governments 
must formulate new industrial policies which are defined within the framework of overall 
economic development strategies, and the role of industrial sectors in economic 
development must be clearly determined. Equitable industrial growth which takes into 
account the eradication of poverty would be an essential component of new government 
strategies regarding industry. While most Governments in the ESCWA region have 
traditionally tended to favour the development of large industrial enterprises, paying 
relatively little attention to small and micro enterprises, the emerging socio-economic 
realities in the region may very well lead to a reversal of this trend. Industrial strategies 
and policies for regional cooperation will be more heavily influenced by the emerging 
bilateral and multilateraJ economic and trade agreements and the new global and regional 
arrangements. 
The current proceedings incorporates a series of papers selected from among 
those presented at the Two Concurrent Expert Group Meetings on Industrial Strategies 
and Policies, and Managerial and Entrepreneurial Skills, under Conditions of Global and 
Regional Change held in Manama, Bahrain, from 20 to 23 November 1995; it also 
includes a brief summary of the major conclusions and a list of recommendations. The 
meetings were co-sponsored by ESCWA, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the Economic Research Forum for the Arab countries, Iran 
and Turkey, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme Office in 
Bahrain, and were hosted by Bahrain's Ministry of Development and Industry. 
The objectives of the two concurrent meetings were as follows: 
To review the new global environment and its impact on the region 
within the context of major economic and political events such as the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the emergence of the Single 
European Market, the formation of other regional economic blocs and 
the transformation of the Eastern European countries, and in the light of 
increasing requests for adherence to ISO 9000 
• To discuss the impact of the peace agreement, particularly its effect on 
the region's industrial sector 
• To discuss new options for industrial strategies and policies in the 
region under conditions of change 
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• To formulate appropriate policies and measures to enhance the 
entrepreneurial skills of managers under conditions of uncertainty 
• To identify entrepreneurial characteristics in the region and to assess the 
capabilities and potential of entrepreneurs to deal with the effects 
changing regional and international conditions have on the operation of 
individual firms 
The papers presented at the two meetings centred around four major themes: 
• The changing international environment and its impact on the region 
• The changing regional environment, particularly the peace prospects and 
their implications 
• Industrial strategies and policies within the context of the changing 
international and regional environment 
• The operation of firms and the development of managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills under conditions of change 
The papers and related discussions emphasized the need for ESCWA member 
countries to build a competitive industrial sector to meet the challenges of the new, rapidly 
changing global and regional economic environment—mainly by adopting outward- 
oriented industrial strategies, accelerating human capital accumulation, broadening the 
industrial and technological base, and fostering broader intraregional economic 
cooperation. The ESCWA member countries need to develop and implement new 
economic and industrial strategies and policies that will enable them to move away from 
the rentier economies of the past into more productive economies based on high-value- 
added and sustainable production and on the building of competitive fundamentals and 
region-specific comparative advantages. 
The meetings called upon the ESCWA member countries to develop a stronger 
presence in the new knowledge- and information-based world economy and to build their 
innovative and entrepreneurial capabilities. More specifically, the ESCWA member 
countries need to stimulate high-value-added production, develop industrial linkages and 
networks among themselves, define a new role for their Governments, accelerate the 
development of local and regional technological capacities, empower and help restructure 
the private sector, and promote entrepreneurship in knowledge-based industries. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
OF THE MEETINGS 
A. BACKGROUND 
Arab countries are currently wrestling with some of the greatest economic 
challenges they have ever faced. The future of the Arab economies depends primarily on 
their ability to cooperate with one another and on how their Governments, business people, 
investors, workers, and communities respond to the challenges before them. 
There is a critical need for broad-based agreement among the Arabs on what has 
gone wrong in the past and on what it takes to succeed in the new global economy. The 
Arab countries need a common sense of purpose and a shared vision that will help them 
improve their productivity, competitiveness, structures, institutions, and overall standards 
of living. Individual countries, acting alone, cannot meet the challenges associated with 
today's global markets and giant transnationals. 
The need for a new industrial framework stems from the following basic factors: 
• The global and regional economic environment is changing rapidly. 
• The Arab economy must overcome some severe structural problems. 
• New competitive advantages must be identified and developed. 
• A critical mass of experts and researchers must be developed to establish 
viable and sustainable national capabilities in strategic economic 
domains. 
The international economic environment the Arab countries are facing in the 
1990s is dramatically different from that which existed in the 1950s or even the 1980s. 
International competition is intensifying and the basis of economic success is changing. 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), major changes are taking place in world trade, and the 
dominance of multinational corporations is increasing. Regional trading blocs dominated 
by the United States, Japan and the European Union are emerging and consolidating their 
markets. Newly industrialized countries are increasing the competitive pressure in many 
industries and are setting strong examples for others to follow. 
The pace of technological change has quickened, increasing the value and 
importance of research and development as the basis for competitiveness in world markets. 
New technologies are changing the nature of economic activities. Worldwide advances 
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in information technology are translating into improved productivity in all industries; 
further, such technology is widely accessible and relatively inexpensive. Software is now 
replacing hardware as the major ingredient in improving efficiency and achieving a 
competitive advantage. Furthermore, technological innovations have resulted in drastic 
declines in the resource intensities of products; Japan's industrial production almost tripled 
between 1965 and 1985, while its consumption of energy and raw materials increased very 
little. 
Worldwide concern for the environment is growing steadily. Governments in 
industrialized countries are strengthening environmental specifications and restrictions, 
and are adopting more efficient and cleaner technologies to conform with environmental 
regulations and to meet mounting consumer demands. 
Global finance, decoupled from production, is now virtually unregulated. A 
multi-country electronic fmancial network operates round the clock, with weekly transfers 
totalling multiples of the value of international trade over an entire year. Resources are 
exchanged freely across borders at lightning speed; in seconds, financial wizards in New 
York or Tokyo can be connected with even the most remote areas of the world. The 
network is centred in cities, not States, and has developed a supranational power of its 
own: Governments are increasingly beholden and accountable to external bond markets 
rather than to their own citizens. Their options in exchange-rate policy, fiscal and 
monetary policy, and industrial and trade policy have all become constrained by the 
linkage of their financial interests to the global economy. 
At the regional level, the Arab-Israeli peace process is creating new conditions and 
a new economic environment—and is also generating new challenges and new problems 
for the Arab economies that must be squarely confronted and dealt with. 
Widespread income and wealth disparities within and between Arab States 
continues to be manifested in social and political tensions and in limited domestic 
purchasing power. This reduces the capacity of local markets to sustain a viable local 
production sector and undermines health and education opportunities, thus hampering 
labour productivity growth. 
B. ELEMENTS OF A NEW MACROECONOMIC STRATEGY 
Building a competitive industrial sector is now the single most critical component 
of a vital strategy for survival and success in the rapidly changing new world economic 
environment. The following are among the most important aims of such a strategy: 
• Promoting outward-oriented industrialization 
• Raising domestic savings and investment levels 
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Deepening and broadening local and regional industrial and technological 
bases 
• Developing and enhancing the services sector 
• Accelerating human capital accumulation to accommodate labour market 
needs, primarily through the extensive review and possible restructuring 
of educational and vocational programmes and systems 
• Building and maintaining an efficient, production-linked infrastructure 
• Creating a sound and accommodating macroeconomic environment 
• Facilitating a more equitable distribution of income and wealth 
• Fostering broader economic cooperation among Arab countries within the 
framework of wider international cooperation 
The development of innovative and outward-looking industrial strategies and 
policies is part of a broader agenda for economic renewal which will allow the Arab 
countries to overcome severe structural problems resulting from weak and limited 
industrial bases and heavy dependence on oil and oil rents. The Arab response does not 
require elaborate blueprints for economic restructuring or the establishment of an array of 
expensive government programmes; all that is needed is a framework that enables all 
segments of society to work together as partners. Grand schemes and large government 
programmes in the Arab region have generally failed to bear the expected fruit, and while 
some of them may have been acceptable at the earlier stages of Arab development, they 
are no longer workable. Development is now too complex a process to be encompassed 
by a single blueprint or entrusted to a single social group. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The development of a new strategy requires efforts at the national and regional 
levels and also at the macro and enterprise levels. Bearing this in mind, the meetings 
called on Arab Governments, with the assistance of regional and international agencies and 
institutions, to develop and implement new economic and industrial strategies and policies 
that take the following recommendations into consideration. 
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1. The macro level 
Arab countries need to move away from the rentier economies of the past and 
concentrate on developing more productive economies based on high-value-added and 
sustainable production and on the building of region-specific comparative advantages. 
Success in shifting towards greater productivity will increasingly depend on the building 
of innovation capabilities and entrepreneurial and technical skills, and on the full-fledged 
and deliberate entiy into the new knowledge-based economy. To move into high-value- 
added and sustainable production, the Arab countries must build and strengthen their 
competitive fundamentals by means of the following: 
1. Industrial linkages and networks should be developed within each State 
and among Arab States, beginning with subregional cooperation among smaller groupings 
of States and working up to larger and broader regional cooperation. 
2. Greater economic cooperation with European and Mediterranean regions 
and with other regions of the world should be fostered in order to maximize Arab interests 
and to allow Arabs to voice their concerns and participate actively and effectively in 
shaping policy initiatives that affect the future of the region. 
3. A new role should be defined for Governments; action should be taken 
in several critical areas that can have the greatest impact on strengthening Arab 
competitive fundamentals, namely the following: 
• Placing strong emphasis on investing in people, training and knowledge 
• Emphasizing the development of sectoral strategies, strategic groups of 
companies, community initiatives and industrial entrepreneurship 
• Reforming the civil service in each country, stressing efficiency, merit, 
accountability, transparency and integrity 
• Changing the balance between the public sector and civil society by 
balancing fiscal and monetary policies; empowering the institutions that 
mediate between the State and citizens; and strengthening democratic 
institutions and practices 
• Building the State's capacity to design and implement industrial policies, 
and fostering a strong political commitment to development and a 
political will to override vested interest groups 
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• Building the State's capacity for flexibility in changing the nature, scope 
and extent of State intervention in response to new issues and challenges 
that emerge at different stages of industrialization 
• Diverting part of the current public expenditure allocated to the military 
and security sectors to enhance economic and industrial development, and 
increasing expenditure in the critical areas of health services, poverty 
eradication, research and development, and education. In other words, 
public expenditure should be rationalized and balanced. 
4. High-value-added production should be stimulated in the Arab region. 
It is essential to move away from the heavy dependence on oil and oil-related production, 
concentrating instead on the higher-value-added upstream and downstream oil processing. 
Arab countries should also gradually move away from oil and their dependence on natural 
resources; by diversifying their economic structures, markets, technological capabilities 
and skills, they can greatly reduce the rampant rentierism in the Arab economy while 
building up a dynamic comparative advantage. 
5. Arab countries should develop a stronger presence in the new economy 
(i.e., in knowledge- and information-based production). 
6. Investment development offices should be established and/or enhanced 
to coordinate, disseminate and facilitate the exchange of information, to reduce detrimental 
or injurious competition for investors, and to develop an investment climate that will 
benefit local economies (including, but not restricted to, "home-based manufacturing and 
product mandates"). 
7. Networks and linkages should be created among firms in the region 
operating in related fields to help them overcome size-related difficulties. Networks of 
linked firms, industries and institutions can work together to develop a competitive 
advantage that would be impossible for individual firms acting alone to achieve. Arab 
Govemments must foster cooperative relationships which help to create competitive 
advantage by stimulating technology transfer, continuous innovation, and skill 
development and training. There is also a need to build on the synergies generated through 
cooperation among firms and institutions—to spark new cooperative initiatives among 
Arab States, create a vested interest in regional cooperation, and cement the integration of 
markets and energies. 
8. Sector partnership funds and other sectoral initiatives should be developed 
among regional private-sector institutions and firms to facilitate networking and increase 
the intensity of their contacts. More public investment in network-specific types of 
infrastructure will be needed, particularly in the information infrastructure. 
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9. Small and micro enterprises face particular difficulties in building their 
international competitive capabilities, mainly owing to the lack of information, know-how 
and investment funds. The long-term success and growth of these firms frequently 
depends on whether they are able to take advantage of international trade, investment, and 
technology-acquisition opportunities. Arab Governments should make every effort to 
strengthen small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), in part through the establishment 
and/or enhancement of trade promotion offices in key international locations (embassies 
could also be used for this function). 
10. The development of local and regional technological capacities could be 
accelerated and Arab technological infrastructures strengthened through the establishment 
of national and regional "Arab centres for excellence" in technology, and through the 
development and diffusion of technology incubators. 
11. Arab Governments should attach greater importance to the social 
dimensions of industrialization, focusing on the following: 
• Increasing the participation of women in all aspects of the 
industrialization process within the context of the region's social and 
cultural environment 
• Contributing to poverty alleviation and the more equitable distribution of 
income through employment generation 
12. The private sector, NGOs and the community should be empowered to 
develop and carry out initiatives designed to increase productivity and competitiveness, 
and partnerships should be promoted between these groups and the public sector. Efforts 
should be made to promote increased cooperation and better working relationships among 
private-sector institutions at the regional level as well. 
13. Assistance should be provided in the restructuring of the private sector to 
facilitate the development of new attitudes and behaviour so that this sector can carry out 
its responsibilities. 
14. Environment-friendly industrialization should be promoted, with 
particular emphasis placed on cleaner production and greener industries. 
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2. The micro level 
15. Small entrepreneurial businesses are now responsible for creating the bulk 
of new employment opportunities the world over, and Arab Governments need to 
proactively promote such enterprises by establishing special training programmes, 
developing support mechanisms for financing, marketing and management, providing tax 
incentives, carrying out relevant studies, and setting up appropriate monitoring and 
information systems. 
16. Technology and business incubators can offer integrated support to 
promising innovative firms in one affordable package as part of a national SME strategy. 
Incubators and other such support mechanisms should initially be provided with State 
support as an investment in nurturing entrepreneurship. 
17. Chambers of industry and commerce and other private-sector institutions, 
when properly isolated from direct government interference, can effectively represent the 
interests of the private sector and enhance its participation in economic activities. These 
institutions need to be strengthened to enable them to provide training, advisory, 
information and promotional services. Other specialized private-sector institutions and 
mechanisms should be established and/or strengthened for this purpose as well. 
18. The entrepreneurship development programmes undertaken by ESCWA, 
often in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, should be raised to higher technical 
levels as the needs of managers and start-up companies become more sophisticated. 
19. Entrepreneurship programmes should be integrated into the overall 
educational system; efforts should begin at the primary level and continue through higher 
education, with specialized executive courses and training programmes provided as 
needed. 
20. ESCWA should initiate activities in new areas, focusing on the 
development of innovation strategies and consultancy capabilities, the management of 
technology, and the regular exchange of trade and technology information. 
21. Engineering and other technical programmes at colleges and universities 
have to be modified to provide training, research and consultancy (TRC) services so that 
graduates will be better prepared to meet societal needs in a rapidly changing global 
environment. 
22. Arab countries must mobilize their efforts and resources to progress 
beyond traditional industries (such as the garment, food and light mechanical industries) 
into selected higher, knowledge-based industries and services such as communications, 
computer software and hardware, micro-electronics, pharmaceuticals and new materials 
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technologies. Each country should identify and develop its comparative advantages based 
on its prevailing conditions and resources. 
23. The private sector in each country should play a leading role in selecting 
which knowledge-based industries and services to develop and which niche markets to 
enter. Partnerships and alliances are crucial for gaining access to foreign know-how and 
experience and for developing linkages (South-South as well as South-North) with key 
international players. The private sector is better equipped to identify and develop local 
capabilities in these advanced industries and services; however, government support is 
required to ensure the provision of a suitable business environment and to foster the 
necessary in-house research and development. 
24. Technology-based enterprises require access to risk (venture) capital. 
Financial markets in the countries of the region should be encouraged to support venture 
capital initiatives through the establishment and/or enhancement of innovative 
mechanisms. 
25. SMEs—and large enterprises—should be provided with the support they 
need to enhance and ensure product quality; in particular, the appropriate testing facilities 
and other types of assistance should be made available which will allow them to conform 
to international standards and intellectual property rights requirements. ESCWA 
initiatives developed to promote adherence to quality imperatives and 
practices—particularly efforts related to ISO 9000—should be enhanced through 
additional seminars, training, workshops and conferences. 
26. The rising concern over quality standards must be addressed and the 
impact of their application to manufactured products in industrialized countries evaluated. 
Attention must also be given to environmental concerns and to the emerging ISO 14000 
standard. The process of standardizing and harmonizing the specifications prevailing in 
Arab countries must be enhanced and supported. 
27. Expatriate nationals (Arab professionals now residing abroad) should be 
provided with encouragement and special incentives to re-transfer their skills—and 
capital—to their countries of origin and to participate in efforts to establish the new 
economy in the region. 
28. Business communities in the Arab countries must allocate the necessary 
(but limited and balanced) resources to investigate the perceived threat of massive Israeli 
encroachments into their markets. Thorough and in-depth studies of the various aspects 
of the Israeli market and economy must be undertaken so that Arab countries (particularly 
their industrial sectors) can develop and mobilize their comparative advantages in order 
to meet Israeli challenges. 
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29. Arab countries must exert serious efforts to create additional forums for 
discussion and interaction between entrepreneurs, private-sector institutions, decision 
makers, academicians and experts concerning the development and elaboration of new 
industrial strategies and policies and the requirements for their implementation. 
30. In-depth studies should be undertaken in selected industrial sectors at the 
commodity level to assess the impact and challenges of the Uruguay Round agreements 





I. INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES AND POLICIES IN THE ESCWA 
REGION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
by the ESCWA secretariat 
Introduction 
This study addresses issues relating to the emerging trends in economic 
development and industrialization in the ESCWA region under changing international and 
regional conditions. The study was presented as a background paper in the Expert Group 
Meetings on Industrial Strategies and Policies, and Managerial and Entrepreneurial Skills, 
under Conditions of Global and Regional Change that was held in Manama, Bahrain, from 
20 to 23 November 1995. The meeting was held under the joint sponsorship of ESCWA, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FIS), and the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, 
Iran and Turkey. 
Section one of the study is concerned with issues relating to major international 
and regional challenges facing industrial development in the ESCWA member countries. 
This includes the following: the Uruguay Round agreements; the formation of large 
regional economic groupings; international standardization and related specifications; 
advancement in the application of industrial technology; and economic implications of the 
peace process. 
The first part of the section presents a preliminary analytical review of the 
implications of the Uruguay Round agreements on industry, particularly on trade in 
manufacturing, and on selected major industrial commodity groups in the region. This 
part also examines briefly the various differential and more favourable treatment the 
Uruguay Round agreements grant to developing countries, including the ESCWA member 
countries, with respect to scope, longer transitional periods, flexibility and other factors. 
This is undertaken with the aim of highlighting the opportunities opened to member States 
to benefit during the transitional period from the special consideration given to developing 
countries. It also aims at emphasizing the opened opportunities that countries in the region 
should promptly prepare themselves to take advantage in the longer run of the wide range 
of concessions made by developed countries to other contracting members in the Uruguay 
Round agreements. Finally, this part briefly presents some options opened to member 
States to maximize their benefits and to minimize their losses under the Uruguay Round 
agreements. 
The second part of the section presents briefly the consequences of the formation 
of new large regional trading blocs for developing countries, including the ESCWA 
member countries, within the context of liberalization of international trade. It indicates 
15 
that greater internal efficiencies may affect traditional trade between the regional 
economic groupings and the third world, and may divert capital flows from these 
countries to the North. Trade blocs may also protect their trade in high-technology 
products but will not protect as vehemently their low- and intermediate-technology 
industries. The third part of the section introduces the concept of standardization and 
quality management under the systems of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 9000 and total quality management (TQM). It attempts to 
highlight the importance of the application of these standards for accessing world 
markets. The fourth part relates to advancement in industrial technology and deals with 
rapid technological change and its impact on industrial strategies and policies in 
developing countries. It briefly introduces the science and technology revolution (STR) 
and its elements, namely information technology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, 
and new materials. The ever-widening gap between industrialized and developing 
countries and the ever- increasing pressure of liberalization and globalization, induced 
at least partially by the STR, have been imposing on developing countries the necessity 
to review their industrial strategies and policies to take into consideration the main 
implications of rapid technological changes. 
The last part of this section presents some preliminary thoughts on the economic 
implications of the peace process. It briefly demonstrates that the economies as well as 
the manufacturing sectors of ESCWA member countries are less prepared to enter the 
international market than the more advanced Israeli manufacturing sector. It summarizes 
the anticipated effects of the peace process on the macroeconomic level and briefly 
discusses the various constraining factors limiting the development of economic relations 
and the diversion of trade in the short run. This part of the section concludes that 
detailed, in-depth studies need to be carried out to accurately identify possible areas of 
cooperation in manufacturing activities in the Arab and Middle East region, including 
not only Israel but other neighbouring countries as well such as Turkey, Cyprus and 
Iran, with a broad industrial coverage to create what is coming to be called the Middle 
East market. In-depth industrial studies also need to be carried out at the commodity 
level, to identify the comparative advantage of each country in the region in specific 
commodities, taking into consideration the increasingly competitive world market. 
Section two is concerned with issues relating to the reformulation of industrial 
strategies and policies in the region. This includes the role of the State, privatization, the 
outward-looking industrial strategy, and the role of private-sector institutions. The first 
part of this section is on the emerging new role of the State in industrial development. 
It gives an analytical review of relevant reform trends now under way in the ESCWA 
member countries, identifying the driving force behind these reforms, highlighting 
differences in the commitment to change in different countries. It then presents a con- 
ceptual analysis of the changing role of the State in the countries of the region, in which 
it emphasizes the institutional dimension. This part of the section briefly introduces a 
new dimension in economic development, namely institutional changes and their effects 
on economic performance. Selected aspects in the successful experience of East Asian 
16 
economies are highlighted, and an indigenous approach to treating the role of the State in 
the countries of the region is called for. 
The second part of this section deals with trends in privatization in the countries 
of the region. It shows that different countries have different commitments to the 
privatization of public enterprises. It briefly presents privatization policies in countries of 
the region and examines the extent of commitment in terms of actual sales of public 
enterprises. It then summarizes some of the constraints facing the privatization process. 
This part of the section indicates that in most countries, privatization is implicitly 
conceived of as the means of addressing the fiscal crisis facing the State, and not as a 
developmental question. Only three countries in the region have taken an outright decision 
to privatize large parts of public enterprises: Egypt, Kuwait and Yemen. In the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) subregion, most countries are still considering the issue, and 
tend to maintain public ownership in heavy and strategic industries. In the more 
diversified economies (MDEs), privatization has started only in Egypt, for which a more 
detailed analytical review is presented. Despite the positive effects of privatization, the 
negative effects of the process in the transitional period are forcing most countries in the 
region to take a gradual approach to privatization or to be cautious in introducing it. 
The third part of this section is on the emerging new outward-looking industrial 
strategy in the region. It presents some of the problems facing expansion in 
manufacturing, and focuses on some aspects of the challenges confronting this strategy. 
This includes: the comparative advantage of existing industries; export promotion centres 
and information technology; transparency of the economy; the regional market and 
neighbouring export markets; foreign direct investment (FDI); and the legal business 
system. Some of the problems mentioned relate to the sponsorship system in the GCC 
countries and high cost of production in the MDEs. This part of the section indicates that 
the strategy's success will greatly depend on investment expansion and on the anticipated 
participation of repatriated Arab capital and FDI. 
The last part of the section is concerned with the new role of private-sector 
institutions. It focuses on selected areas where private-sector institutions together with 
government institutions need to take action to assist industrial firms to cope with the new 
challenges. This includes: simplifying administrative procedures; designing specific 
financing schemes for small enterprises; establishing centres and networks of information 
services; and providing entrepreneurial encouragement, advisory services and training. 
This part of the section emphasizes that private-sector institutions must shoulder greater 
responsibilities in the industrialization process to compensate for the continuous decrease 
in the role of the State. 
Section three is an attempt to formulate a framework for industrial strategy in the 
ESCWA and Arab region. It briefly describes the challenges of the international 
economic environment that the region is confronting, contrasted against the structural 
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problems it is facing in its economy and in manufacturing. Elements of an industrial 
framework are drawn. These include: strengthening competitive fundamentals; increasing 
value added content; adopting a new policy towards transnationals; and strengthening 
regional cooperation; balancing production structures, regional allocations of investment, 
income and consumption, domestic savings and investment, and income and production 
are necessary conditions for a more secure and sustainable future. Reducing dependence 
on natural resources calls for exploiting other sources of income, particularly from 
renewable sources of production. Knowledge-based industries are key activities to 
consider for the future. 
A. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES 
FACING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE ESCWA REGION 
In recent years the global economy has undergone radical changes with important 
implications for future industrial development and for the operation of industrial 
enterprises in developing countries, particularly the countries of the ESCWA region. 
These changes include the transformation of most of centrally planned economies into 
market economies, the establishment and strengthening of large regional economic blocs, 
the recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements leading to the globalization and 
liberalization of trade, and increasingly rapid advances in the application of sophisticated 
technologies. The trends are emphasized even further with the implementation of ISO 
9000 standards and related codes and specifications, as well as with the introduction of 
other quality and environmental controls. Furthermore, regional events, particularly the 
emerging new situation in the region in the aftermath of the peace process, constitute yet 
more challenging issues that will bring about radical changes in economic and trade 
relations and hence in the operation of the companies and firms in the ESCWA region. 
The liberalization of the international market, the potential emergence of Israel as 
a new economic and trade partner in the region and the proposed new modalities for 
regional cooperation are major issues that will shape, to a great extent, industrial strategies 
and policies and the restructuring of the industrial sector down to the enterprise level in 
the ESCWA region. New government industrial policies, however, need to be clearly 
defined, within the framework of overall economic development strategies; the role of the 
State, as well as the industrial sector, in economic development needs to be explicitly 
determined. Industrial growth with equity, taking into account the eradication of poverty, 
would essentially be an important component of new government industrial strategies. 
While most Governments in the ESCWA region tended in the past to favour the 
development of large public industrial enterprises without due attention to small and micro 
enterprises, the emerging new socio-economic realities in the region may very well lead 
to reversed trends, shifting emphasis more towards the promotion of private small- and 
medium-scale manufacturing enterprises. In regional cooperation, industrial strategies and 
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policies will be influenced more by the emerging bilateral and multilateral economic and 
trade agreements, by new global and regional arrangements. 
In response to regional and global changes, most ESCWA member countries have 
already started to give more emphasis to economic reforms and deregulation, to industrial 
restructuring and to promoting of the private manufacturing sector. New policies and 
policy measures are being formulated and implemented, yet Governments of the region 
need to introduce far more radical changes in their industrial strategies and policies, in 
order to face the challenges and impact of the new international environment and the new 
regional realities. At the level of the firm, managers need to review their operations and 
to restructure their own companies in order to adapt to fast-changing global and regional 
conditions, as well as to the new policy measures that may be introduced in their own 
countries. 
However, little is yet known about the effects of the emerging global and regional 
environment on the performance and prospects of the industrial sector and the firm in most 
ESCWA member countries. Industrial managers need to introduce changes at the level 
of the firm to cope with expected radical changes. In this respect, firms cannot make 
appropriate responses in the absence of clear government industrial strategies and policies 
that would take into account recent global and regional realities. This study attempts to 
present a preliminary review of the new global environment as well as changes in regional 
conditions and their impact on the region. This is undertaken within the context of major 
economic and political events such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
application of ISO 9000, the formation of large economic blocs, and the challenges of the 
peace process. Against this background, the study addresses selected major industrial 
issues relating to the role of the State in industrial development, privatization, outward- 
looking industrial strategy and the role of private-sector institutions. Finally, an attempt 
is made to formulate a framework for a new industrial strategy for countries in the region 
which takes into account new options in the region and which would respond to global and 
regional challenges. 
1. The liberalization of global trade: preliminary notes 
According to a GATT Secretariat forecast (GATT, 1 994a), the Uruguay Round 
liberalization of goods and increased market access are expected to increase world income 
by $510 billion per year by the time the market access commitments are fully implemented 
in the year 2005. Of the projected income gains, more than 60% goes to the three 
developed countries and region, namely the EU ($164 billion), the United States ($122 
billion) and Japan ($27 billion). The developing countries' share, including ESCWA 
member countries and other Arab countries, is expected to be around 23% of total increase 
in income ($116 billion). For ESCWA oil-exporting countries, the increase in world 
income would increase demand for oil products, which would boost the growth of income 
in the oil-exporting economies, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
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countries. The GAIT Secretariat indicated that world income gains would reportedly be 
substantially greater, with other lasting effects related to higher investment, accelerated 
growth and a healthier climate for global research and development and new product 
development. In terms of international trade, the GATT Secretariat forecast that the 
volume of world trade would increase by 4.1% to 5% annually till the year 2005 and by 
12% annually thereafter.t 
Although part of the gains in this expansion would relate to exports of developing 
countries, including the ESCWA member countries, the decline in tariffs and the reduction 
in non-tariff barriers in goods such as food products and textiles would be to the advantage 
of countries most efficient in production, at the cost of countries whose exports depended 
more on most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and other restrictions to help them secure 
their share of the international market. Increased competitiveness of the European Union 
(EU), for instance, due to trade liberalization, would involve some transition costs to some 
Arab Mediterranean countries, as their competitiveness would be increasingly challenged 
by their competitors from other developing countries of Asia and Eastern Europe. If 
countries of the region are able to develop more diversified production structures and to 
improve productivity and product quality, they will benefit in the longer run from the wide 
range of concessions reached between developed countries and extended to all other 
contracting members in the Uruguay Round agreements. Nonetheless, as more than 93%2 
of world trade originates in World Trade Organization (WTO) Member countries, it is 
clear that it will now be very costly for any country, including ESCWA member countries, 
to be non-Members of the WTO and outside the multilateral trading system. Furthermore, 
to be outside the international multilateral trading system would make it more difficult for 
countries in the region to attract the needed foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
technological know-how associated with it to their industrial base and compete 
in the international market. 
Only a few countries in the ESCWA region became GATT Contracting Parties 
(Helal, 1995a), namely Bahrain (1993), Egypt (1963), Kuwait (1963), Qatar (1994) and 
the United Arab Emirates (1994), while two other ESCWA member countries, namely 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are in the process of acceding to the World Trade Organization. 
Yemen is a defacto WTO Member3 and can easily become a contracting Member. The 
rest, namely Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, were among the 23 establishing 
members of the GATT in 1947; both of them are currently considering rejoining the WTO, 
after withdrawing from GAIT in the 195 Os. However, whether Members or non-Members 
For more details of the results of the Uruguay Round, see GATT Secretariat, The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Geneva, November 1994) [GATT, I 994b]; and for details 
of the legal text, see GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
The Legal Texts (Geneva, June 1994) [GATT, 1994c]. 
2 ESCWA estimates. 
A founding member of GATT in 1947. 
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of the WTO, all countries in the region are expected to be affected in the short run (the 
transitional period) by the liberalization of world trade; already being a member of the 
WTO will only slightly reduce its effects. This is because the WTO has greatly expanded 
the scope of multilateral discipline with regard to developing countries, with the 
introduction of the trade-related investment measures (TRIMs), trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). As a result, the WTO will require its Member countries to introduce a 
considerable number of policy and institutional changes concerning, for example, product 
standards, services and intellectual property protection and customs. 
(a) Trade benefits in industry 
Benefits expected to be drawn from the liberalization of international trade in 
industrial products are related to notable tariff reductions and the phasing out of 
quantitative restrictions, including those falling under the Ararngement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles (also known as the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA), 
which would stimulate exports, particularly those of developing countries, including the 
ESCWA member countries. Under the Uruguay Round agreements, the average tariffs of 
developed countries on industrial products, with the exclusion of petroleum, dropped from 
6.3% before the Uruguay Round to 3.9% after the Uruguay Round, an average cut of 38%. 
The general reduction in tariffs on selected industrial products for all countries ranges from 
an average of 62% on metals, to the lowest cuts of 20% on textiles, garments and leather 
products and shoes. The deepest cuts (above average) generally affected seven groups of 
products: metals; minerals; precious metals and gemstones; electric machinery; wood, 
paper, pulp and furniture; non-electrical machinery; and chemicals. On the other hand, 
textiles and clothing, fish and fish-based products, and leather and footwear not only 
remain subjected to duties greater than the average in the developed countries, but the 
average cut was lower (Arab Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture, 1994; Namfua, 1994). 
None the less, under the Uruguay Round, the share of imports of industrial 
products that were allowed duty free into the developed countries has doubled from 20% 
to 43%, mainly owing to the increase in the share of imports of minerals (59% to 70%), 
wood, paper pulp and furniture (50% to 84%), and metals (36% to 70%). Although the 
share of imports of developed countries subject to "peak tariffs" (15% and above) in their 
overall imports declined from 7% to 5%, an important part (28%) of imports of textiles 
and clothing into developed countries, which are important exports for developing 
countries, falls into this category (Namflia, 1994). 
In developing countries, the general tariff on industrial products is reduced by 
34%, the highest being on metal products, at 70%, followed by metals at 67%, wood, pulp 
and furniture at 63%, non-electrical equipment at 60%, fabricated products at 48%, 
electrical equipment and chemicals at 44%, textiles and gannents at 21%, leather, rubber, 
21 
and rubber products at 19%, and transport equipment at 18%. Other aspects of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that will have important implications 
on manufacturing industries include agreements relating to TRIPs, TRIMs and GATS 
(Saudi Consulting House, 1995). 
Some of the reviews on the implications of the General Agreement indicate that, 
at least in the short run (transitional period), most developing countries will be facing 
losses as a result of the liberalization of global trade. Countries that enjoyed MFN 
treatment from developed countries and regions, such as the Mediterranean ESCWA 
member countries, or products that enjoyed the benefits of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), will gain less from the implementation of the General Agreement than 
other developing countries, as the former countries are liable to lose their privileges and 
will be exposed to tough competition from other exporting countries. The implementation 
of the agreement on intellectual property rights is expected to increase the cost of 
production for several industrial products (such as pharmaceuticals in Jordan) due to the 
relative increase in the fees of patent rights. 
Countries of the region have developed in the last 15 years some export industrial 
capacities, particularly in the GCC subregion, in petrochemicals, refining, fertilizers, 
aluminium, iron and steel. This is aside from expanding the region's export production in 
the textile and garment industries, particularly in the more diversified economies. 
Although exports of these industries will be affected by the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement, it is still not clear what the real effects will be. However, it is anticipated that 
while petrochemicals, chemicals, iron and steel, and food industries are expected to gain 
from the liberalization of world trade, the textile and garment industries may face very 
tough competition, and phosphate fertilizer exports to the EU may be reduced, mainly 
owing to environmental constraints. The findings of an ESCWA study on the implications 
of the Single European Market on manufacturing exports (ESCWA, 1 995a) indicate that, 
despite the conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements and their implications on the 
liberalization of global trade, it is likely that the EU, a major market neighbouring the 
ESCWA region with a huge absorptive capacity, will resort to various schemes to reduce 
competition in its high-technology and high-income-generating industries against imports 
from other regions, including those of the ESCWA region which might be developed 
jointly with other countries, and will not protect as vehemently its low-technology and 
low-income-generating industries. It adds that the EU is likely to protect its manufacturing 
production which is less harmful to the environment and will likely liberalize its trade in 
goods whose production is more harmful to the environment. 
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In petrochemicals, some products seem to have fewer chances than other products 
in the liberalization of barriers to trade.4 The main reason was that their inclusion was not 
requested by the main exporters during the Uruguay Round negotiations. This was 
because some of the main international producing and exporting countries of 
petrochemicals, such as the Arab Gulf countries, China, the Russian Federation, and some 
Eastern European countries, were not members of GATT at that time, and were not part 
of the negotiations. The trend in all these countries during 1994 and 1995 was to join the 
WTO. Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which have signed the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, are 
already applying for full membership in the WTO and can request to negotiate the part of 
the agreement relating to petrochemical products. This could help the petrochemical 
industry in the ESCWA region to prove its competitiveness. The application of fair trade 
rules, i.e., on national treatment, anti-dumping, and subsidies by exporters and importers, 
could help ESCWA member countries to enhance their export production capacity. The 
unilateral action that was taken previously by the EU against imports of petrochemical 
products from the GCC countries could be handled under the fair trade discipline of the 
WTO. 
Although the GATT Secretariat report on the evaluation of the Uruguay Round 
(GAIT, 1 994b) indicates that a horizontal reduction in some petrochemical product items 
has been introduced, in-depth studies at the commodity level are still needed to evaluate 
the impact of these reductions and their effects on various petrochemical products in the 
Arab Gulf States and their impact on this region's comparative advantage under changing 
global conditions. 
Although the GCC countries have a comparative advantage in a specific 
constellation of petrochemicals, petrochemical exports from the GCC countries could face 
some problems in the international market, as they are subsidized (in the form of interest- 
free loans, low utility prices and land leases for factory sites), and because they enjoy the 
benefit of cheaper inputs and energy prices. The reduction of subsidies in compliance with 
the terms of the Uruguay Round agreements will increase competition for this industry in 
the short run on the international market (especially the EU market), particularly from 
"Some recently published preliminary data on reductions in tariffs on petrochemical products show that 
the agreements provide for the gradual reduction of tariffs on imports of the products. The agreements stipulate 
a gradual reduction of tariffs in developed countries, from their existing levels of 10% to 15% to 5.5% to 6.5%. 
The allowed period for tariff reductions varies with the various tariff levels, starting from five years effective 
January 1995 for tariffs of less than 10%, to 15 years for countries with existing tariffs more than 25%. For more 
details see: (a) Richard Zind, "Impact of the GATT Uruguay Round on GCC trade in petrochemicals," Al Ta'awon 
Al Sina'e, Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC), Doha, No. 61 (July 1995); (b) Working papers 
of the Fifth Conference of Industrialists in Countries of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council: the Future of 
Industrialization in Countries of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council under the New World Trade Order, Bahrain 
Ministry of Development and Industry, Secretariat of the Gulf Cooperation Council, GOIC, and Bahrain Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, Manama, 15-16 May 1995; and (c) Henry Azzam, "Saudi Arabia's external sectors 
and the impact of GATT", The NCB Economist, vol. 5, No. 3 (Jeddali, April/May 1995). 
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countries such as China and the Republic of Korea. None the less, Arab primary 
petrochemicals are expected to continue to enjoy a comparative advantage due to their low 
cost of production and to their proximity to the European market. As mentioned earlier, 
with respect to the EU, despite the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the GCC exports of 
petrochemicals continue to be covered by certain arrangements under which 
petrochemicals are subject to tariffs of between 7% and 15% until the EU completes the 
rationalization of its petrochemical industries during the coming 10 years (ESCWA, 
I 995a). 
In the chemical industries, the reduction in tariffs on imports from developing 
countries, which is estimated to be around 44% (Saudi Consulting House, 1995; Arab 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 1994), is expected to 
open increased export prospects in chemical products for countries in the region, 
particularly Egypt. For chemical fertilizers, exports are anticipated to face some 
restrictions, particularly due to environmental constraints in the EU, the major 
neighbouring export market. 
In the basic iron and steel and aluminium industries, countries in the GCC 
subregion are expected to gain from the reduction of restrictions that were imposed by 
developed countries on imports from the ESCWA region, namely voluntary export 
restrictions. The energy-intensive industries of the region enjoy a comparative advantage 
in the low cost of production and the quality of the product. However, the issue of the 
pricing of energy consumption by producers in these industries may arise and will have 
to be negotiated. The region has great mining potentials in iron and steel and possibly in 
bauxite (in Saudi Arabia); if properly exploited, the backward integration of these 
industries could be expected to increase significantly the comparative advantage of these 
intermediate basic industries under liberalized world trade. 
In the textiles and garment industries, while the dismantling of the MFA will 
create new export opportunities, it may also enhance other problems by unleashing tougher 
competition, particularly from low-cost countries such as China and from the Eastern 
European and the Former Soviet Union countries. The major textiles and garment 
exporting countries in the ESCWA region are Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon 
and Iraq. Although in most cases, countries never exhausted their export quotas to the EU 
or the United States of America,5 the dismantling of the MFA will eliminate quota 
constraints in the future, seemingly creating new export opportunities, but also tougher 
competition. The exporters of textiles and garments in the ESCWA region should be able 
to benefit from the interim period allowed by the Uruguay Round to adjust their products 
partly to suit the needs and tastes of the .major developed markets, particularly the 
Partly because producers shied away from exporting to restricted markets, and partly because most 
of these countries were not export-oriented or dynamic enough to take advantage of these export outlets. 
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neighbouring EU market, which is the worlds largest importer of textiles and clothing. 
Furthermore, suppliers in the region will eventually have to face international 
standardization and quality requirements, even in their own domestic markets, in order to 
compete with foreign products (ESCWA, 1995a). 
Although the MFA will be dismantled under the Uruguay Round, this will be done 
at a slow pace, over a period of 10 years starting 1 January 1995. The Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, however, gives countries such as Egypt,6 with low 
levels of exports in textiles and garments (less than 1.2% of their total exports, base year 
beginning end-1991) higher rates of quota growth, averaging 25% starting the date of 
implementation of the Uruguay Round international trade agreements, followed by 27% 
at the beginning of the fourth year, compared to 16% and 25% respectively offered to 
other suppliers. The Uruguay Round agreements allow exporters of such countries to 
enjoy preferential treatment in the export markets, with the aim of developing their future 
export potentials and trade. The gradual phasing out of the MFA will be affected by the 
expansion of the EU and its trading agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, as most Arab exports in textiles and garments to the EU are 
admitted free of duty within bilateral preferential agreements (ESCWA, I 995a). 
In the food industries, the ESCWA study mentioned earlier indicates that the 
reduction of subsidized agricultural products in the developed countries (particularly in the 
EU) under the Uruguay Round agreements may tend to decrease levels of production of 
such products in the EU. This will encourage exports of agricultural products and related 
processed food products from non-EU countries. With respect to developing countries, 
including ESCWA member countries, opportunities may arise to export agricultural 
products and related processed food products in which they have comparative advantage. 
However, the food industry in the developed countries, particularly those of the EU, is a 
highly regulated industry, with specific high standards, as it affects public health and the 
environment. This makes it difficult for ESCWA region exporters to sell to the developed 
country markets, unless they meet the required standards. Consequently, competitiveness 
in the market will require a strict application of international standards, which means that 
the concerned Governments in the region must take positive action to ensure adherence 
to the required standards. 
(b) D?fferential and more favourable treatment 
In general, the Uruguay Round agreements grant developing countries differential 
and more favourable treatment, as indicated in the respective agreements. Least developed 
countries and countries with per capita gross national product (GNP) of less than $1,000, 
6 
The Syrian Arab Republic is not yet a Member of the WTO, and thus the importers' decision to 
continue imposing the quotas on non-Member countries may still prevail, reducing the chance of this country to 
benefit from the lifting of these quotas. 
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which includes many ESCWA member countries, are accorded treatment notably more 
favourable than that provided to other developing countries. Differential treatment mainly 
involves longer transitional periods, higher or lower thresholds for undertaking specific 
obligations and flexibility in commitments and procedures.7 The main task of producers 
and Governments in the ESCWA region is to take advantage of the transitional period and 
other differential treatments allowed to developing countries under the various Uruguay 
Round agreements. Producers may have to restructure their industries in order to improve 
their competitiveness in the international and domestic markets, while Governments may 
have to introduce policies and measures to support producers in this endeavour. 
(i) Safeguards 
The Uruguay Round agreements revised the rules on safeguards, in order to 
reinforce and clarify the rules drawn up to protect industries in difficulty; this was done 
by allowing temporary import restrictions. The new rules intend to discourage countries 
from using discretionary, uncontrolled and non-transparent measures of emergency 
protection. In this respect, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards eliminates the 
use of all voluntary export restraints (VERs) and similar unclear ("grey area") measures. 
According to the Agreement, Governments of contracting countries have the right to apply 
measures to protect a domestic industry against unexpectedly rapid import growth for a 
specific product which could cause a threat or a serious injury to this industry. In this case, 
the Agreement allows the importing country to apply one of the following measures: 
• Impose quantitative restrictions on imports of the product 
• Impose additional tariffs 
• Secure a tariff concession from the exporting country on the imported 
product, which would provide compensatory liberalization remedies 
The duration of safeguard measures is limited to four years, subject to an 
extension to eight years provided continued injury to industry is proven. For developing 
countries, the safeguard period can extend to 10 years (Helal, l995a; Helal, 1995b). The 
implications of the new Uruguay Round safeguards agreement for the manufacturing 
sector in the ESCWA member countries are not clear yet. In principle, the elimination of 
VERs should help countries in the region to enhance exports in petrochemical products, 
particularly to the EU. It should also allow countries in the region to provide protection 
to industries, particularly infant industries, during a specific period of time, from imports 
that could threaten or injure these industries. There are some fears that the use of 
For more details, see UNCTAD, The Outcome of the Uruguay Round: an Initial Assessment, 
Supporting Papers to the Trade and Development Report, 1994 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.94.Il.D.28). 
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safeguard measures may expand due to the fact that the agreement eases the non- 
discrimination and retaliation rule, and weakens the obligation to provide compensatory 
liberalization remedies. Other fears relate on the one hand to the emergence of measures 
that would have similar effects to those of VERs and on the other hand to other safeguard 
measures involving unfair trade treatment. In this case, the extent to which countries in 
the region can benefit from (or lose) their rights in the new safeguards under the agreement 
will greatly depend on the new rules on countervailing and anti-dumping duties and the 
strength of the new discipline in preventing the re-emergence of measures to substitute for 
VERs (Safadi, 1995). 
(ii) Anti-dumping 
The Uruguay Round agreements revised the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code 
with the aim of clarifying its rules and strengthening the requirement of importing 
countries to establish a clear relationship between dumped imports and injury to the 
domestic industry. Revised rules relate to the mode of identifying the dumped product, 
calculating the margin of dumping, determining the injury it causes to domestic industry, 
the defmition of domestic industry, standards of evidence, the anti-dumping measures and 
their implementation. However, the ability of a multilateral authority to challenge national 
anti-dumping laws through dispute settlement remains limited. The agreements allow, 
under specific conditions, for cumulative injury estimation arising from the aggregation 
of imports from several exporting countries. The duration of the imposition of anti- 
dumping duties should not last more than five years, unless it is proven that the elimination 
of the duty may result in the continuation of dumping and injury to domestic industry. In 
cases where the value of dumped imports from an exporting country represents less than 
3% of the domestic market for the product, anti-dumping procedures will be stopped. 
Additionally, the agreements introduce greater flexibility for developing countries, 
requiring an examination of the possibility of initially using positive remedies before 
applying anti-dumping measures against exports. 
The implications of the Uruguay Round anti-dumping rules for the manufacturing 
sector in the ESCWA member countries will greatly depend on the extent to which these 
rules will be subject to discretionary interpretations by national authorities. Since the real 
effects of the anti-dumping provisions greatly depend on national laws and administrative 
practices, countries in the region liberalizing their trade regimes need to review or 
introduce anti-dumping legislation to protect their domestic markets from anti-competitive 
practices. The question of anti-dumping measures under the Uruguay Round agreements 
needs to be studied thoroughly. This will help countries in the region to fully benefit from 
the new rules by protecting their domestic industries from dumping practices by other 
exporting countries, and by avoiding anti-dumping actions against their exports. 
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(iii) Subsidies 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures reached during the 
Uruguay Round aimed at protecting access commitments to the domestic as well as the 
foreign market. It restricts the use of subsidies and strengthens and improves the rules on 
countervailing duties. The Agreement applies only to industrial products and arranges 
subsidies into three groups: prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable subsidies. 
Prohibited subsidies are those subsidies that are totally banned and which are based on 
export performance or on local content requirements. Actionable subsidies are those 
subsidies that can be granted or maintained provided that they do not induce injury to the 
interests of other Members. Non-actionable subsidies are subsidies to industrial research 
and for pre-competitive development activities, disadvantaged regions, and environmental 
adaptation. Subsidies linked to privatization, which are non-recurring in nature, are not 
considered actionable. The Agreement gives special consideration to developing 
countries, where prohibited subsidies are not applied for five years from the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement, and to least developed countries for eight years. 
Additionally, countries with per capita GNP of less than $1,000 per annum, which is the 
case for many ESCWA member countries, are exempt from the requirement to remove 
such subsidies for products where their share in world trade is less than 3.25%. The 
prohibition of export subsidies based on export performance will not apply to the least 
developed countries and countries with per capita GNP of less than $1,000. When these 
countries reach export competitiveness in one or more products, export subsidies should 
be phased out within eight years. For developing countries other than the above, the 
export subsidy will be phased out in eight years, subject to extension under specific 
conditions, and in two years if export competitiveness is attained in any product 
(UNCTAD, 1994). 
(iv) Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures acknowledges that some 
investment measures can have distorting effects on trade. It is concerned only with 
investment measures relating to trade in goods and aims at abolishing some of the 
imposed restrictions which are in dispute with the GATT Articles. The Agreement 
stipulates equal treatment between foreign and national investment projects, and it annexes 
an illustrative list comprising the different kinds of banned TRIMs, namely, requirements 
relating to local content, trade balancing and measures restricting exports of a product. 
More flexibility is allowed with respect to the implementation of the Agreement for 
developing countries, whereby they are permitted to depart temporarily from a general 
provision requiring that no Member is allowed to apply any TRIMs inconsistent with the 
relevant provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Developing countries 
are allowed to apply TRiMs on a temporary basis and under specific conditions for reasons 
relating to balance of payments or infant industries. Furthermore, they are required to 
abolish existing non-conforming TRIMs over a period of five years, extendable under 
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certain conditions, and for least developed countries seven years, also extendable under 
certain conditions, as against two years for developed countries. 
(v) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) 
Negotiations during the Uruguay Round and the Agreement on TRIPs were 
directed at protecting intellectual property rights and contributing to the promotion of 
technological innovations and the transfer of technology, for the joint benefits of both 
producers and users of technological know-how. The Agreement provides a multilateral 
framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in imitated 
goods. It attempts to reduce distortions in the conditions of international competition 
arising from vastly different standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. The Agreement gives special consideration to developing countries, where 
it will be implemented within a transitional period of five years (for least developed 
countries 10 years), subject to further extension under certain conditions, as against one 
year for developed countries. Member countries in the WTO are required to develop 
procedures and remedies under their domestic laws to guarantee that protection of property 
rights of foreign right holders as well as of nationals can be effectively enforced. 
The impact that the Agreement on TRIPs will have on industry in the ESCWA 
member countries differs from one country to another. Those countries that adopt the 
Agreement will be creating the pre-conditions for the transfer of technology and may 
experience an increase in the flow of FDI in high-technology industries. Countries who 
have already started to develop and export technology-based industries may benefit from 
the Agreement as well. In the case of protection rights for inventions concerning 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, Jordan, like other developing 
countries, will still have to provide exclusive marketing rights. Benefits may be less for 
those countries that have limited potential to attract FDI and install technology-intensive 
industries (Safadi, 1995). 
(c) The Uruguay Round and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) option 
Detailed preliminary studies have been published on the future effects of Uruguay 
Round trade liberalization on manufacturing production and exports in developing 
countries in general and in the ESCWA region in particular (see UNCTAD, 1994; 
Namfua, 1994; Hoekman, 1995; and Dadush and others, 1995). Among the few studies 
published on this topic as it relates to the region, was an experimental study (see Diwan, 
Yang and Wang, 1995) on the implications of the Uruguay Round and the option being 
extended to Arab Middle East and North Africa countries (referred to here as the Arab 
region or Arab countries) to be part of the EU free-trade area. The study is based on three 
scenarios (see box 1). 
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Boi 1 Summary of scenarios from Arab economy, the Uruguay Round 
predicament and iheEU wild card 
In scenario 1, the Uruguay Round will have an ..unfavourable impact on the Arab 
region compared with other regions of the world, with changes in real. export flOws indicating 
that trade will be diverted away from the Arab region. Exports of the region to most other 
except. Japan :and the newly industrialized countries (NICs), decline in almost every 
sector (except machinery and marnifactüEed The NICs and East Asia obtain 
major benefits from the phasing out of the MFA, and there is a US$ billion increase in their 
net exports of wearing apparel, largely to the markets of North America and the EU, partly to 
replace more than US$ 0.5 billion of such goods originally exported from the region to those 
markets. Trade with the EU that will be diverted from the Arab region to other regions is 
estimated to be more than US$ 3 billion. The study partly attributes the net loss, in trade for the 
region to the fact that most countries in the region have not undertaken important tariff 
reductions under the Uruguay Round agreements; compared with prevailing tariff reductions in 
other coUntries, and in domestIc. policy reforms, they are considered far behind most other 
middle-income countries. Structural change in production in the Arab region caused by the 
Uruguay Round involves an expansion in capital-intensive and semi-skilled-intensive 
manufacturing sectors. Global competition increases as a result of the reduction of tariffs on 
industrial goods under the Uruguay Round. It also increases as developing low-income 
countries with cheaper unskilled labour become contracting members of GATT. This works to 
the detriment of light manufacturing sectors which use a large proportion of unskilled labour. 
The largest structural change caused the Uruguay Round is in the textiles and garment 
industries. In the past, most Arab countries exported below their MFA quotas, while exports of 
most Asian counterparts were limited by these quotas. 
In scenario H, where Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the EU establish a 
free trade area, the negative external environment changes for the Arab region will be magnified, 
and the structural adjustments of factors moving out from labour-intensive sectors in the region 
and entering the machinery and manufactured intermediate sectors will be rather stronger. 
In scenario III, in which the Arab region is assumed to join the enlarged EU free 
trade bloc, longer-term dynamic effects will create a significantly favourable shift in the trade 
and production the revival of preferential access to the EU market will spur the Arab 
region's exports to the EU in all sectors, especially in wearing apparel, manufactured 
Intermediate products (the natural-resource-based industries, mainly in petrochemicals, 
aluminium, and iron and steel), and manufactures that make intensive use of unskilled labour 
and semi-skilled labour. This scenario anticipates the total expansion in bilateral trade between 
the EU and the Arab region to be more than US$ 40 billion, The free trade association with the 
EU would give the countries of the region preferences relative to Asia, and give it opportunities 
equal to those of Eastern Europe and Turkey. Under this scenario, countries of the region are to 
pursue two policies simultaneously, namely domestic policy reforms and joining the EU free 
trade bloc. 
Scenario I considers the impact of the Uruguay Round on the Arab region; scenario II 
considers the impact of the Uruguay Round on the region if there is free trade between 
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Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with the EU, with the Arab region remaining 
outside this free-trade area; and scenario III considers the impact of the Arab region's 
becoming part of an enlarged EU free-trade area. It is to be noted that these empirical 
results should be dealt with cautiously as they are controlled experiments and not forecasts 
of performance of the Arab region. 
The study concludes that the region would experience a 0.6% loss in base year 
gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of the implementation of the Uruguay Round. 
These short-term losses could turn into long-term decreases for the region if Arab countries 
were to compete with East Asian countries on the basis of labour cost only, and they could 
be magnified if the region were to compete with the middle-income countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union as part of a free-trade area formed with the EU, with 
the Arab region outside this area. However, if the Arab region joins EFTA, the losses 
could be slightly reduced, to 0.5% of base year GDP, in which case, the Arab region must 
respond to policy issues, mainly to move ahead at a faster pace with its domestic policies 
and reforms. 
Joining the EU free-trade bloc, the study concludes, would help the region 
compensate for the loss of exports in other regions and would confer a preferential status 
on the EU market as against its Asian competitors. Joining the EU free-trade bloc would 
open opportunities for countries in the region, by preparing these countries to compete 
with the low-cost producers from East Asia. It would also give Arab countries the same 
market access enjoyed by their competitors from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union 
and Turkey. In the case of preferential access to the EU, Arab output in labour-intensive 
wearing apparel would increase by 9% and exports by 32%, while in the absence of 
preferential access, output would decline by 4% and exports by 12%. Furthermore, with 
this access, trade between the Arab region and the EU would increase by about $31 billion, 
while in its absence it would decrease by $5.5 billion. As part of the EU free-trade area, 
countries in the region could enhance the transfer of technology as part of larger and 
longer-term investments and could upgrade their medium-skilled labour.8 
(d) Concluding remarks 
A vital condition for Arab economies to minimize their losses and maximize their 
benefits from the Uruguay Round relates, as concluded by Marcel Namfua (1994), to the 
8 
Other studies reached somewhat similar conclusions, indicating the importance of the Arab region's 
going ahead with its domestic reform policies, and attempting not to fall too far behind, as most of the region's 
competitors will be more open and private-sector friendly and more dynamic. While it may not be possible for 
countries of the region to go ahead with their domestic reforms at the pace of other competitors, joining the EU 
free-trade area may help to assure investors of the region's far-reaching integration commitment with the EU. For 
more details see Bernard Hoekman, "The WTO, the EU and the Arab world: trade policy priorities and pitfalls," 
Workshop on Strategic Visions for the Middle East and North Africa", Economic Research Forum for the Arab 
Countries, Iran and Turkey, and the World Bank, Gammarth, Tunisia, 9-11 June 1995. 
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fundamental importance of the institution of a well-studied and feasible pan-Arab free- 
trade area in the region based on clearly defined mutual economic interests and not on 
rhetorical ambitions. This is becoming a very serious issue that needs to be addressed 
promptly under fast-changing global conditions, the emergence of powerful regional 
economic groupings, and the opportunity that countries of the region have to join the 
EFTA. According to the Uruguay Round, trade within an economic bloc is considered an 
internal rather than an external matter. This would help Arab members of the free-trade 
area negotiate greater accessibility to foreign markets for export-oriented products like 
aluminium and petrochemicals. Members of a free-trade area are still able to provide 
subsidies to their infant industries geared to the domestic markets or to a free-trade area 
or a unified regional market. There is a need for an empirical analytical study on the gains 
(and losses) to member countries (with projections at the regional, subregional and 
individual country levels) of forming (or not forming) such a regional economic grouping 
within the context ofjoining the WTO and EFTA. 
The establishment of a free-trade area in the region would strengthen the 
negotiating power of member States to achieve better terms in multilateral trade 
negotiations as well as in the prospective partnership association with the EU. Smaller 
units in such multilateral arrangements can better maintain their regional identity. As to 
the creation of a viable regional free-trade area, it should be at the pan-Arab level, large 
enough to ensure overall complementarity, and not limited to a number of countries whose 
production structure is competitive and who have the same comparative advantage. Such 
an entity would eventually develop conflicting economic interests instead of evolving into 
complementary production structures and economies. 
It is important to emphasize again here that the above findings are only 
preliminary results that need to be verified. Understanding properly the implications of 
the Uruguay Round agreements for the industrial sector of the region cannot be pursued 
without first understanding its implications for the individual branches of industries. 
Policy makers need first to comprehend the implications for manufacturing in order to 
formulate appropriate policy. This is to help the private sector cope with the liberalization 
of international trade and benefit from the interim period. For the Government to succeed 
in its job, in-depth empirical studies need to be undertaken at the micro level, addressing 
implications for individual branches of industries at the commodity level. To undertake 
this task, various advisory expert bodies in the various branches of industry may need to 
be formed. Their job would be to sponsor these studies and follow up on the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements and their implications in their 
respective fields. 
Industrialists in the region need to increase their efforts to improve their 
competitiveness in the international market, primarily by improving productivity and the 
quality of their products. This would help them cope with the increasingly tough 
competition in the international market and eventually in their own domestic markets. 
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Governments in the region need to introduce policies and measures to help industrialists, 
particularly private-sector SMEs, in this endeavour. 
2. The formation of large regional economic groupings 
Many new international developments are making it more difficult for the 
economy of the region to continue along its old development path. Among the most 
important developments to which the region must respond are the following. 
First, it is very likely that some of the traditional trade between the trading blocs 
and the third world may be diverted to countries in the North. These trading blocs will 
likely introduce developmental policies favourable to selective countries on which they 
have strategic dependence—Mexico, Chile and the Mediterranean and Eastern European 
States. To avoid excessive compensations to industries in southern and eastern Europe, 
the EU may impose some form of protection on goods produced in third-world countries, 
as the factor endowments of some countries in the third world may be similar to the 
endowments in these States. 
Second, the new trading blocs (the North American Free Trade Agreement 
[NAFTA] countries and the EU) are likely to bargain for favourable terms of trade and/or 
to restrict trade strategically with countries in the third world. 
Third, there are sufficient grounds for suggesting that the demand for third-world 
exports in these trading blocs may increase as the incomes of the latter rise. Market 
integration in these blocs will improve the efficiency of their internal markets. This will 
substantiate the growth rates in these blocs and sustain their future improvement. Due to 
the proximity of some third-world countries (primarily Arab North African and Western 
Asian countries) to the EU, Caribbean and Latin American countries to the NAFTA 
region, the demand for their exports in these blocs may increase. 
Fourth, trade flows are not the only balance-of-payments component that will 
improve with greater internal efficiencies. Capital flows are more likely to move to these 
giant trading blocs from third-world countries. There are two reasons for the emergence 
of this pattern of capital flows: 
• The rapid growth of the trading blocs1 economies must be sustained by a 
higher level of investment than in the past. 
• The formation of these blocs introduces market security for its members. 
Monetary integration further reduces the exchange rate risk within the 
trading blocs. As the domestic market in these economies becomes more 
secure than within its trading partners, investments will move towards the 
more stable market. Industries with high mobility costs, such as those 
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that are capital- and technology-intensive industries, are usually more 
sensitive to the security of their markets than others. This could cause an 
interest rate differential between the trading blocs and third-world 
countries. Interest rates (rates of return on invested capital) in the third- 
world countries will have to rise (as a risk premium) to compensate for 
the relative insecurity brought about by the improved market security in 
the EU and NAFTA regions. Foreign investors will demand this risk 
premium before they choose the ESCWA region instead of EU or the 
NAFTA region. 
Fifth, the migration of skilled workers will continue to flow from third-world 
countries to these trading blocs. The migration pattern of skilled workers will be similar 
to the pattern of capital flows, for similar reasons. Human capital is complementary to 
physical capital, particularly at the high end of the skill ladder. Less and less unskilled 
labour will be permitted to enter into these countries from the third world. There is strong 
preference now for the utilization of Eastern European labour. 
Sixth, the EU and the NAFTA region will protect their high-technology products 
against exports from the third world, and will liberalize their trade in low-technology 
products. Technology is quantified according to its intensity embodied in a product, and 
is viewed according to its position along a technological ladder. The ability to move up the 
technological ladder, according to the New Growth Theory, will depend on the industry's 
current position on the ladder. Hence, the EU and the NAFTA region will strategically 
protect their high-income-generating, high-technology industries. They will not protect 
as vehemently its low and intermediate technology. In some sense the argument here is 
that low and intermediate technologies will be complementary to the high technology, 
often supplying intermediate inputs for the higher stages of production using higher levels 
of technology. It is the contention of this study that the basic or low-technology products 
from third-world countries are less vulnerable to these trading blocs' protectionism and 
exclusion. It is believed that the elasticity of demand for lower-technology products by the 
EU is therefore low. Alternatively, the elasticities of import demands for high-technology 
products in the EU and the NAFTA region are high due to availability of alternative 
sources of production from within their blocs. The asymmetry of elasticities in the high- 
technology and low-technology products between these trading blocs and third-world 
countries leads to the proposition above. The above arguments imply that direct 
investments in high-technology products in the third world, together with the transfer of 
technology that they will bring about, will diminish. The lack of export demand for third- 
world products in the trading blocs will hold back the advancement of high technologies 
in these industries. 
Seventh, in some high-technology products, the possibility of intra-industry free 
trade exists. Some may argue correctly that trade between trading blocs and the third 
world in high-technology products can be in differentiated products: free trade can only 
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add to the product variety with a negligible sacrifice of demand for each product. 
However, in the theory of intra-industry trade, the pattern of trade is indeterminate: that 
is, which product a country will produce cannot be determined by economic factors, such 
as a country's comparative advantage. This means that the EU and the NAFTA region, 
with their strong bargaining power, can lay claims on those products that have a high 
technological advancement potential and exclude their deployment in the third world. 
3. Requirements of non-tar jff barriers to trade such as 
international standardization and related spec jfications 
(total quality management and quality standards) 
Summarizing the views of many economists concerned with "quality" in 
developing countries, Anwar El-Tawil states the following: 
"The improvement of quality of products and services is the key to the 
solution of economic difficulties encountered by most developing 
countries. Better quality of goods and services leads to customer 
satisfaction, permits substitution of imported products by local ones, and 
offers better chances of reaching export markets."9 
This statement echoes the rising concern in the past few years about quality, 
particularly with increasing requests by suppliers and customers for compliance with 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 and other quality standards. 
The concept of total quality management (TQM), which is becoming more and 
more a concern of managers in the region, has long been the top priority of managers and 
executive officers in industrialized countries and worldwide. A leading quality expert 
(Pike, 1994) summarized the reasons, or "quality imperatives", as follows: 
• Increasing competition and the loss of "sheltered markets" 
• Rising consumer expectations 
• "The demands of large consumers" for quality assurance, for example, 
adherence to ISO 9000 
• Advancing technology: extending what is possible 
Most information in this section is adapted from a paper by Anwar El-Tawil, "Role of ISO 9000 in 
improving quality in developing countries" (E/ESCWAIID/19951WG. 1/3) (Delivered at the Regional Seminar on 
Total Quality Management Based on ISO 9000, Beirut,17-19 January 1995). 
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• Concern for people and the environment: quality is everyone's 
responsibility 
• The cost of mistakes: the economics of quality 
(a) TQM and ISO 9000 
The basic management philosophies of TQM and ISO 9000 are the same. 
However, the major difference between ISO 9000 and TQM lies in the motivation to 
implement either ISO 9000 or TQM. The ISO 9000 is a standard that can be audited by 
a third-party accredited institution as requested by many customers. Many companies 
select to comply with ISO 9000 primarily to achieve certification, adopting a 
fundamentally different approach than companies adhering to the TQM approach, whose 
only goal is customer satisfaction. Having the certification as the primary objective may 
put the emphasis of the company's "quality system" on the certification procedure, creating 
an environment where customer satisfaction is second to certification. 
(b) The ISO 9000 standards 
ISO 9000 standards are practical standards for quality management systems that 
can be applied by all types of businesses including manufacturing, distribution and 
services. They have found wide application as a basis for agreement between buyers and 
suppliers. The standards are based on two main foundations: 
• Management responsibility and commitment to quality, expressed in a 
formal policy statement and implemented through appropriate measures 
• A set of requirements that deal with any aspect of company activity or 
organization that affects quality 
An important condition for conformance to the standards is the appropriate 
documentation of the quality system procedures and instructions which, put together, form 
the quality manual of the company. Observance by a company of the relevant ISO 9000 
standards is considered a necessary and sufficient condition for achieving adequate quality 
of the products or services offered by that company. 
(c) Applying ISO 9000 in industrialized and developing countries 
It is estimated that by the end of 1994 some 70 countries had adopted ISO 9000 
standards as national standards. It is estimated that some 70,000 companies are registered 
as applying the standards and that 150,000 more companies are in the process of 
implementing them. Unfortunately, the number of companies in developing countries that 
36 
have achieved registration with Iso 9000 accounts for less than 0.7% of the number 
mentioned above. 
With the continuing expansion of ISO 9000 implementation worldwide, those 
companies in developing countries that are not yet registered with ISO 9000 risk losing 
their share of the export markets. Managers in developing countries have to face up to the 
decision to adhere to ISO 9000—or to any other quality system—not only to keep their 
export market, but also to benefit from the advantages that such systems offer in improved 
productivity, efficiency, internal communication and personal involvement of all staff. 
Governments in developing countries also have to consider seriously the impact 
and implication of adhering to ISO 9000 in their manufacturing sectors. Acting to adopt 
these standards at the national level would enhance steps that may be taken by local firms 
to adhere to these standards. However Governments must also consider national plans to 
assist small- and medium-scale local industries in the transition stage, from the prevailing 
operation traditions to the more organized environment required by these standards, with 
all the expenses entailed for restructuring and for the rehabilitation of personnel. 
4. Advancement in the application of industrial technology 
Human civilization is now witnessing an era that may rightly be called the science 
and technology revolution (STR), or the Second Industrial Revolution, which has deeply 
and radically affected all aspects of life and all economic sectors. The economic structures 
of industrialized countries, as well as those of developing countries, are slowly being 
forced into fundamental changes by this revolution, characterized by the following signs: 
• A radical shift of the prime mover industries, from heavy industries to 
light, knowledge-based industries and to services 
• Globalization of markets and the means of production 
• Restructuring of production systems, through automation and flexible 
manufacturing 
• Stricter requirements of quality and environmental standards 
• A radical change in management systems and human relations within the 
firm 
Rapid technological changes and the resulting globalization of the economy have 
led to radical changes in the global division of labour, reshaping the geographic maps of 
production, investment and trade. New economic theories, and new economic development 
theories, are being elaborated to face the questions, problems and challenges brought about 
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by this revolution and by others, as radical global changes have led to the emergence of 
what may be called the new world order. 
The impact of the STR has not been limited to global changes in macroeconomic 
structures and policies. This revolution is having a deep-rooted impact, even in 
developing countries, and goes all the way down to the firm level, even within small- and 
medium-scale enterprises, owing to changes effected in the management systems and in 
the relation between the office/design floors and the shop floors, and to the radical changes 
in the means, methods and tools of production and manufacturing. 
The ever-widening gap between industrialized and developing countries, and the 
ever-increasing pressure of liberalization and globalization (induced at least partially by 
the STR) have been imposing on developing countries the necessity to review their 
industrial strategies and policies to take into consideration the most important implications 
of these changes, such as: 
• The growing role of science and technology in economic development 
• The changes in the elements and functions of production 
• The radical changes in the structure, system and relations of production 
The development objectives of industrial and technological strategies and policies, 
in developing countries, have been the following: 
• Acceleration of the industrialization process 
• The generation of employment 
• Better utilization of natural resources 
• Attainment of a higher level of technological self-reliance 
• The building up of national technological capabilities and a local 
industrial base 
The rapid nature of technological changes and their radical impact even at the firm 
level necessitate the continuous review of national plans to implement these objectives, 
particularly with the high cost of technology transfer and the difficulties of adaptation to 
local environments and needs. 
(a) The science and technology revolution 
Many economists previously viewed the STR as another link in the chain of 
technological changes that started with the invention of the steam engine. However, the 
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STR is radically different in its impact and its implications. The first revolution, or the 
"machine revolution," led to the amplification of the physical power of man, the 
mechanization of production and the facilitation of the transport of goods and services. 
To a great extent the machine revolution was considered a slow-working factor, exogenous 
to the production process and to the economic system. 
The STR, particularly the rapid explosion of information technology, is radically 
different, in that it is a rapid and ever-expanding amplification of the brainpower of man, 
with a deep impact on all factors of production. Besides the continuous change in 
production technology, it has led to the automation of production, closer relations between 
those involved in the production processes, and the facilitation of transport of information 
and goods across barriers, borders and distances. 
Thus, the most important implication of this revolution for economic and 
development theories is the necessity to integrate the technology factor, and technology 
change, into the production function and to consider its generic effect on all other elements 
of production, even in traditional and mature technologies. 
(b) Elements of the science and technology revolution 
The STR covers almost all branches of science, technology and industry. 
However, the most important and far-reaching innovations are those related to information 
technology and its applications. Innovations in biotechnology, genetic engineering and 
new materials have been picking up in the last decade or so, promising a profound and 
widening impact with the turn of the century. Other important innovations that may be 
considered include laser technology, space technologies, photovoltaic technologies and 
miniaturization technologies. 
Before considering the details of various technological innovations and their 
impact, it may be relevant to note that technology in this context must be given the widest 
possible interpretation: it is the state of the art relating to a given production process, that 
is, the best available know-how. Technological innovations thus mean any improvement 
on a given process that may lead to improvement in productivity, decrease in production 
cost, or improvement in the marketability/quality of the product or service. 
Technological innovations may lead to radical changes in products or processes 
and thus may have radical economic implications. They may, however, be only 
incremental in nature, leading essentially to a shift in the comparative advantages of 
competing producers. In this respect, it is important to note that while radical changes and 
innovations have serious impacts in both industrialized and developing countries, they are 
usually developed and exploited first in industrialized countries. Technological 
innovations in developing countries are usually incremental in nature and are related to 
improving the comparative advantages of those local producers capable of performing 
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specific technological tasks on acquired (and usually imported) technologies, to adapt 
these technologies to local conditions and/or to increase local technological input and local 
value added. This might involve the adjustment of equipment, substitution of certain raw 
materials for others, adaptation of the product to local values or local prevailing 
environmental conditions and so forth. 
The incremental innovation that may be developed in developing countries is of 
crucial economic importance, mostly because it may be just the right change for a 
developing country to gain the potentially available export market niche, or to recover the 
local consumer from an outside producer. Thus, the industrial strategy and policy 
questions to be asked related to technological changes can be stated as follows: 
• Which technology should be acquired? At what cost? 
• What level of effort and resources is to be allocated to developing 
innovations and to adapt transferred technologies to the local 
environment, or to better suit an export market niche? 
• How much should be spent on local R&D? And to develop local 
technological capabilities? 
The answers to all these questions must be country-specific, even firm-specific, 
so that resources expenditure on technological innovations can be commensurate with 
expected economic and social returns. 
(c) The impact of information technology 
Information technology (IT) has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the 
global economy in the past few decades, with a profound impact on the various social and 
economic sectors of societies. It includes various functional technologies related to the 
production, storage, processing, transmission, distribution, retrieval and display of all 
forms and content of information. These functional technologies were not always 
compatible and interrelated. It is the adaptation of fast-growing innovations in the 
microelectronics and computer industries that has enhanced integration within and 
between these functions. 
IT has had a profound effect on the ways in which people communicate: it has 
increased the amount of information being disseminated and provided rapid means of 
information exchange, which is now a crucial socio-economic resource. Societies are 
competing for access to vital information which facilitates decision-making. The increased 
role of information has forced most Governments (and firms) to establish programmes to 
plan and supervise the diffusion of IT. 
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IT is a balanced union of previously separate technologies and industries: 
microelectronics, computers, software, communications and materials. The rapid nature 
of innovations in most of these fields has led to cheaper and easier handling of IT and its 
applications and to increasingly larger and more diversified functions of IT. Development 
in the communications industry has linked computers in networks, providing end-users 
access to large databases and data banks, changing the whole concept of IT and promising 
even more radical revolution in the technical capabilities for long-distance transmission 
of large-volume and high-value information)0 
(d) Selected areas for information technology applications 
In manufacturing industries two trends are emerging: 
• Greater advances in production automation, leading to reduced prices and 
performance improvement 
• A growing tendency towards flexible manufacturing, to better suit end- 
user requirements through greater integration of computer applications 
Separate areas of office automation have developed, with an emerging trend 
towards integrating office functions into the "office of the future": multifunction work 
stations covering text, voice, data and picture processing and transmission, through local 
area networks (LAN), and through multi-user systems throughout the world with access 
shared resources and common databases. The ever-improving tools for office automation 
include word processors and microcomputers, electronic mail, facsimile, videotext, PAX, 
LAN, laser printers, multi-media display technologies and speech synthesis. 
(e) Genetic engineering and biotechnology 
After IT, biotechnology is one of the most promising of the advanced 
technologies, affecting radically many aspects of life, with generic applications in various 
fields: medical and health care, nutrition, agriculture, industry and environment. The last 
decade of the twentieth century is witnessing the marketing of an ever-increasing number 
of biotechnology-derived products, coexisting with conventional products or replacing 
them. 
The main driving force in biotechnology has been genetic engineering, that is, the 
manipulation of the genes of living cells in humans, animals and plants to inject more 
10 
See, for example, "The revolution begins, at last", the cover story of the 30 September 1995 issue of the 
Economist. 
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desirable traits so as to harness the capability of manipulated cells to synthesize and/or 
transform to produce new products or new processes. 
A unique feature distinguishing biotechnology-related activities is the high 
interaction between science and technology research on the one hand, and industrial 
commercialization on the other hand, as well as between academia and commercial finns. 
Universities have been the major sources of innovations, with their intensive R&D efforts 
heavily supported by public funds, as well as by private firms and by venture capital 
looking for equity and partnership in successful undertakings. Entrepreneurial 
intermediaries, through their establishment of small-scale enterprises, provided the 
successful links between researchers and universities on the one hand and sources of 
finance and industrialization firms on the other hand. 
Ct) New materials 
Materials processing can be defined as the art, technology and science of the 
control of inner structures to produce and exploit the desired properties and performance 
of materials in a cost-effective manner. Since the beginning of civilization, breakthroughs 
in materials exploitation and processing have significantly enhanced economic and 
technological progress: from stone, to bronze, to iron and more recently to plastics and 
semiconductors. 
In recent decades the pace of change in materials technology has broadened and 
accelerated. The global trend in this regard has been towards the development of materials 
with improved information/knowledge content of end-products, leading to a drastic shift 
away from conventional products based on natural raw materials, to quality materials 
manipulated to give them specific desirable qualities: smallness, lighter weight, strength, 
durability, recyclability, made from renewable or cheaper resources and so forth. The 
emerging and fast-growing materials industries is characterized by strong links to R&D 
and uses high information content to develop products and processes with a high degree 
of consistence, quality, reliability, durability and processability. 
It is to be noted, however, that many of the new materials are derived by 
systematic improvement of existing and conventional materials and by incremental 
improvements on natural properties. It is to be noted also that research in the usage of new 
materials has led to new opportunities for using the derived products in areas which are 
very different from those for which they were originally intended. 
All industrial sectors are more and more affected by the introduction of advanced 
materials, which are becoming widely used as substitutes for conventional materials or 
which are selectively used as basic components of complex systems and thus are critical 
to these systems' successful operation and performance. Some of the most successful 
usages of new materials are listed below: 
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• Structural materials: substitution of plastics for metals; use of composites 
and special alloys; and biomaterials 
• Functional materials, with unique specifications and with one or more 
functional properties: 
a. Electronics industries (silicon, gallium and arsenic alloys, as 
semiconductors) 
b. Communications (fibreglass for long-distance transmission) 
c. Automotive (ceramics for combustion engines) 
d. Environment (biodegradable and recyclable materials) 
5. Economic implications of the peace process: preliminary thoughts 
It must be emphasized that the subject matter of this section comprises only 
preliminary thoughts on the peace process and does not cover all its economic 
implications, but rather only some aspects of it. Furthermore, certain considerations need 
to be stressed from the outset, primarily that the type of peace that may be reached will to 
a great extent shape and chart the economic consequences at both the country level and 
the regional level. Also, the time factor, including the various phases that this process 
requires to arrive at a final peace settlement, is another important factor to be taken into 
consideration. In addition, internal economic policies in individual countries, particularly 
those related to making progress on economic reforms and restructuring, are vitally 
important in translating the potential peace dividends into concrete economic progress. 
Finally, the timing of the peace process by itself is important since it is being instituted 
when global trends in economic liberalization are gaining strength, particularly with the 
recent conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
(a) A brief contrast of the economies of the countries concerned's 
To begin with, the entry of Israel into the regional economy may add a sizeable 
economy and market. In 1992, Israel's GDP amounted to about $65 billion, an economy 
that is about 50% greater than that of Egypt and close to one half of that of Saudi Arabia, 
the largest economic entities in the ESCWA region. In terms of stages of economic and 
industrial development, Israel has reached a quasi-industrial stage, with its manufacturing 
This section and the following one (on anticipated effects of the peace process at the macroeconomic level) 
are excerpted from ESCWA, Review of Recent Development of Manufacturing Activities and Prospects in the 
ESCWA Region, 1993: Issues Related to the Peace Process and Regional Cooperation 
(E/ESCWA/ID/1993/1 I/Add. I). 
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sector contributing more than 21% of the country's GDP. In contrast, the contribution of 
manufacturing in ESCWA member countries to total GDP averaged about 10% in recent 
years. Although these figures are not strictly comparable, and the ESCWA average figure 
hides diversity among member States, with Egypt standing out, with a 20% share of 
industry in GDP, the fact remains that they reflect a decidedly high gap.'2 
Generally ESCWA member countries have been less prepared to enter the 
international market, since they have limited supplies and varieties of industrial products 
to export, as well as a limited ability to compete, both in term of quality and price. This 
contrasts with the more advanced Israeli manufacturing sector. The 1 970s witnessed the 
process of deepening the industrial development of Israel, a process that was given impetus 
by Israel's gaining preferential trade status with the EU, a privilege that is continuing. This 
is reflected in the increasing share, in total manufacturing output, of intermediate, 
engineering and capital goods industries, the backbone activities in the second or quasi- 
industrial stage.'3 In 1992, basic metals, metal products, machinery, electrical and 
electronic equipment, transport equipment and chemicals contributed about 50% of the 
industrial production in Israel. 
Since the 1 970s, Israel has been developing more export experience, especially 
the export of manufacturing products. Exports of manufacturing products have been 
gaining both in absolute and relative terms. Military products comprise a sizeable share 
in export as well, and are dominant in exports of metal products, electrical and electronic 
products, and transport equipment and machinery. Additionally, Israel has been 
developing high-tech industries, both software and hardware, in specific fields of micro- 
electronics and medical equipment. These high-tech industries, though modest (the total 
value of output was estimated at $3 billion in 1991, about 7% of GDP), have been growing 
in importance—particularly in the export market (Avishai, 1991). 
12 
The figure for Israel represents the share of industry in the "business sector," which excludes the "public 
sector." The latter sector comprises about one quarter of GDP in Israel. 
13 
These developments in the industrial sector were the subject of a number of studies. See table, Morris and 
others, "Learning and the rise of Israel's exports of sophisticated products," World Development, vol. 14, No. 12 
(1986); and Maurice Falk Institute, "Israel's changing industrial structure: years of growth and years of 
slowdown," Institute for Economic Research in Israel, David Horowitz programme on the Israeli Economy, 
Discussion paper No. 84, December 1984. Both studies classified branches of industries into conventional (C) and 
sophisticated (5). Broadly speaking, the former industries are usually developed at the first stage of 
industrialization while the second group of industries, which includes intermediate, engineering and capital goods 
industries, are developed in second stage. Other studies include: Naum Gutentag and A. Shaliv, Changes in the 
Structure of the Israel Industry following the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Agreement Between Israel and 
the EEC (Tel Aviv: David Horowitz Research Institute for Developing Countries, Tel Aviv University, 1979); and 
R.W.T. Pomfret, "Manufacturing export expansion in semi-developed economy: the Israel case," Economia 
Internazionale 23, Nos, 3-4 (August/November 1975). 
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(b) Anticipated effects of the peace process at the macroeconomic level 
An overview of the economic implications of a peace settlement in the region 
anticipates trade diversion to dominate, in the short-term period of five years, while trade 
creation is expected to play the more dominant role in the long-term phase extending over 
a time span of 10 years. The latter arises from expansion in existing production and the 
creation of new production capacities to accommodate an expanding market. 
Opening trade on an equal footing with neighbouring trade partners would, 
according to trade theory, allow trading in commodities having the advantages of 
geographic proximity. This qualifies for potential trading those products with a low 
transfer cost, arising from lower transport, marketing and services costs between border 
States. With the implementation of the WTO Agreement and the emergence of open 
markets, a trade diversion would be the first potential peace dividend, provided that traded 
manufacturing products are internationally competitive in both cost and quality terms and 
are able to compete with products of other more developed economies including 
neighbouring economies such as Turkey and Cyprus, who also enjoy some of the 
advantages of geographic proximity that other countries of the region have, as well as the 
advantage of cost and quality. 
Various constraining factors and administrative practices could continue to limit 
the development of economic relations and the diversion of trade in countries of the region 
in the short run, particularly between Israel, Jordan, and the occupied territories. Although 
political restrictions will be lifted between Israel and its neighbours after the signing of the 
Agreement, more difficulties will be faced in addressing the rigidities of the Israeli 
economy to promote free trade. Additionally, it is more likely in the short term that the 
manufacturing sector in the Arab countries will be slow in their restructuring efforts and 
in preparing to expand their exports to face competition with the generally more advanced 
manufacturing sector of Israel and other countries. Within the globally emerging open 
markets under the new WTO Agreement, more competitive products, in terms of cost and 
quality, would be flooding the Arab market, which would make it more difficult for the 
Israeli products to compete. Finally, Israeli and Arab exporters would need time to learn 
and adapt to the nuances and marketing needs of the other's market, i.e., product 
adaptation and learning about trading practices. These factors and other constraining and 
administrative practices are expected, in the immediate and short term, to limit trade 
diversion. 
In the intermediate and long term, greater trade potential may be expected as a 
result of overcoming some of the short-term factors, but more important, as a consequence 
of trade creation. The latter would arise from changes in the economic structure, which 
is expected to be enhanced in the concerned countries, including Israel, to take advantage 
of and adjust to expanded markets benefiting from the comparative advantage of 
specialization and economies of scale. The future economic outlook may be given further 
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impetus by gains from the ongoing economic reforms in ESCWA member States that 
include economic liberalization and the drive towards privatization. Similarly, the Israeli 
economy has been undergoing economic liberalization and privatization, as part of Israel's 
commitment to the EU and to the free-trade agreement with the United States. The 
recently signed agreement between EFTA and Israel that came into effect in January 1993 
is an added push in this direction. In Israel it is expected that by 1996 trade restrictions 
will be lifted, except on certain agricultural products (the latter may affect seriously trade 
growth with the occupied territories and other Arab States). 
An important long-run impact of the peace process will be the anticipated 
reduction in military expenditure. An equally important factor is expected to be an 
increase in internal investment and savings and in the flow of external investment arising 
from a long-term improvement in the political and economic environment. Military 
expenditure by Arab countries and Israel takes a high percentage of their national 
resources. Thus for the period 1972 to 1988, the direct military cost (excluding foreign- 
assistance-funded components), averaged about 10.1% of GDP for the countries of the 
region, or almost double the average rate (5.3%) recorded for developing countries in 
general. Higher figures are obtained when one adds indirect costs, which, according to 
one estimate made for Israel, accounted for an additional 50% of the direct expenditure 
(El-Naggar and El-Erian, 1993). 
There are fears, however, that most of the peace dividends under the new regional 
economic order could go to Israel, since it would help that country, with its stronger and 
more advanced economy, to optimize its exploitation of the economic and technological 
resources of the region. In this connection, a new division of labour may emerge within 
the Arab region and between the Arab economies and that of Israel in favour of the latter, 
whereby the Arab countries would become exporters of raw materials and intermediate 
goods to the Israeli economy through intra-industry trade, while Israel would export final 
products, including capital goods and high-tech products, to the Arab countries. This 
would further deepen the development gap between the Arab economies and that of Israel 
(Abdel Fadil, 1994). 
In this connection, detailed, in-depth studies need to be carried out to identify 
more accurately possible areas of cooperation that would include more countries and have 
a broader industrial coverage. This should be done, taking into consideration what 
comparative advantage each country would have within the increasingly competitive world 
market. Besides the traditional industries, the industrial coverage should include 
sophisticated industries (engineering and high-tech industries) to take advantage not only 
of the abundance of unskilled labour but also of the skilled manpower and high-level 
managerial capabilities available in, for example, Egypt, Lebanon and the occupied 
territories. 
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(c) Progress in the implementation of peace 
Although the initiation of the peace process in the Middle East raised some hopes 
for better future prospects for the manufacturing sector, particularly with anticipated 
regional cooperation, the delay in implementing the political and economic aspects of the 
peace process has led to delays in meeting the earlier expectations of growing economic 
development in the region; in particular, Israel's frequent closure of the occupied territories 
leads to much more difficult access between the territories and each of Jordan and Israel. 
Furthermore, economic agreements have been recently concluded between each of Jordan 
and Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. 
In-depth studies need to be undertaken with respect to these agreements, and their 
implementation requires further monitoring to identify their implications for the 
manufacturing sector in the countries concerned. These agreements and their 
implementation will either eventually cement or frustrate economic cooperation and 
integration among the three entities or between any two of them. It is to be noted that the 
agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Jordan goes against the expectations of 
an open market, as was anticipated during the earlier stages of the peace process. As a 
result of the above developments and the progress of peace negotiations, this will delay 
further the expected growth of economic cooperation in the region. 
Large inflows of capital into the occupied territories are anticipated, which might 
initially reach $2 billion to $3 billion in aid (though only to help cover initial current 
expenses and some infrastructure). Repatriated capital, as well as Arab and foreign 
capital, is expected to flow into the occupied territories for the implementation of the 
ambitious proposed seven-year Palestinian reconstruction plan ($1 1.6 billion). For its 
implementation, the plan counts to a large extent on migrant Palestinian funds, estimated 
at tens of billions of dollars, and the Palestinian expertise scattered worldwide. If 
expectations of improved economic and political stability materialize in the occupied 
territories, this would lead, in the short term, to some revival in the manufacturing sector, 
particularly in construction-related industries. The way in which the economic agreements 
among the three entities would be implemented would influence the movement of factors 
of production—capital, skilled labour and material inputs—for the undertaking of 
reconstruction works in the occupied territories, regarding whether the majority of these 
factors would have to pass through Jordan and/or Israel or not. 
Within the three entities of Jordan, the occupied territories and Israel, the 
immediate economic benefits of the peace process are expected to be more in the services 
than in the manufacturing sector, particularly when talking about the formulation of joint 
projects in tourism. There is need to include in the above-mentioned agreements the 
opening up of the Palestinian market to Jordanian products, and the provision of access 
through Jordan to the Arab inland for Palestinian products. There is talk about opening 
Mediterranean ports (Ashdod, Haifa and possibly Gaza) to Jordanian shipping, which 
might reduce transportation costs, specially to Europe, and thus industrial production and 
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services cost. Furthermore, the opening of the occupied territories would open notable 
investment opportunities in manufacturing to Jordanians and would present an important 
additional manufacturing export market, compared with the current situation where traffic 
is in one direction towards Jordan. This will be important enough, given the small size of 
the Jordanian economy. 
Detailed studies need to be made to identify possible areas of cooperation in 
manufacturing activities in the Arab and Middle East region, including not only Israel, but 
also other neighbouring countries as well such as Turkey, Cyprus, Iran and perhaps 
Greece, and having a broad industrial coverage, to create what is coming to be called a 
Middle East market. This should take into consideration what comparative advantage each 
country of the region would have within the increasingly competitive global market. 
B. TRENDS IN THE REFORMULATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
STRATEGIES AND POLICIES 
1. The emerging new role of the State in industrial development 
The industrialization effort in the region during the last three decades was led by 
the public sector. This is clearly indicated in the national economic plans and 
programmes, and by the levels of investment, output and employment in the public 
industry. The large oil revenues, particularly early in the 1980s, created good 
opportunities for Gulf economies (and indirectly the non-oil-based economies) to achieve 
rapid growth. They accelerated their industrialization process within a relatively short 
period of time. A relatively dominant public industrial sector emerged in most countries 
of the region, except Lebanon and increasingly Jordan. While the emergence of a 
dominant public sector was the result of an earlier political commitment to a more 
controlled economic system in some countries of the more diversified economies such as 
Egypt, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, in the GCC countries it was only a corollary of 
prevailing investment conditions in the subregion and the weakness of the private 
industrial sector, which had no traditions of risk-taking or long-term investment. 
The dominance of the public sector was accompanied in most of the countries by 
protection policies in regulated markets, and infant industry and import substitution 
policies. Controlled economies in which the State played a dominant role emerged in Iraq, 
Egypt (up to the 1 970s) and the Syrian Arab Republic. Egypt (since the I 980s), Jordan 
and the 0CC countries followed a more open economic system. In Jordan, the State 
played an important role in industrial development. In the GCC countries, it played a 
dominant role in establishing mainly capital- and energy-intensive industries. Subsidized 
production and investment policies emerged in the GCC subregion, to promote resource- 
based industries, enhancing further the weight of the State in the industrial sector. 
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During the I 980s, promotional laws and regulations were introduced and/or 
reformulated, including investment promotion laws and measures. In Egypt and the Syrian 
Arab Republic, investment promotion laws could not achieve the desired results in a 
public-sector-dominated economy. The controlled economies were an important deterrent 
to the expansion of domestic private-sector activities. Regulated markets and mismanaged 
economies in most of the rest of the countries were partly responsible for limiting 
expansion in private foreign investments, particularly in downstream industries. 
(a) Current reform trends in the ESCWA member countries 
(i) The driving force behind reform efforts 
From the mid-I980s until the beginning of the 1990s, the GCC countries 
experienced economic recession caused mainly by the sharp decline in oil prices and 
revenues. This reduced the funds available for industrial development in most GCC 
countries. Domestic demand for manufactured products in the Gulf countries declined, 
substantially reducing manufacturing exports of Jordan and Lebanon. Reduced oil 
revenues in the GCC countries also led to significant cuts in concessional aids and loans 
to most of the more diversified economies (MDEs) whose development efforts depended 
in varying degrees on grants from the GCC countries. A direct result of this has been 
further aggravation of the economic problems that were already facing many countries in 
the more diversified economies. In the Syrian Arab Republic, for instance, allocations for 
new industrial development projects and for maintaining existing public industries were 
substantially reduced. In the GCC countries, allocations to defence expenditures increased 
markedly, causing increased budget deficits in most of these economies. 
Inherent deficiencies in the industrialization process and in social evolution in 
most countries in the ESCWA region did not help these countries to manage suitably their 
deteriorating economic conditions. On the contrary, they have aggravated fiscal problems 
in these countries, more so in Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to a lesser extent 
in Jordan. This was reflected in the slow (and sometimes negative) economic growth, and 
deterioration in the balance of payments and budget deficits. Added to that, most of the 
MDE suffered from high inflation rates, depreciating currencies, heavy external debt and 
high levels of unemployment. 
Governments in many countries of the region recognized the need to redress the 
structural imbalances in their economies during the last decade. The current trend in 
liberalizing world trade has enforced the growing trend to curtail government intervention 
in the economy and has also helped to spread the economic reform process. It was with 
the aim of revitalizing private-sector activities, reforming the public sector and promoting 
its efficiency in production and economic management, that the GCC countries' economic 
deregulations concerning foreign investment were initiated early in the decade. These 
deregulations aimed at improving the operation of the market economy, especially in 
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helping to promote local and foreign private investment in manufacturing. In Egypt and 
the Syrian Arab Republic, new laws were legislated and old ones adjusted, as in the case 
of Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This should enhance the 
transformation of the economy into a more liberalized one, creating a new economic 
setting for a more favourable environment. 
(ii) A gradual change in the role of the State 
In the current reform efforts, particularly in the more diversified economies, a new 
role is being envisaged for the Government in industrial development, though it is 
emerging at a slow pace. In most countries, however, the transformation is being made 
gradually. Many Governments intend eventually to be less involved in the management 
of production, and more in the promotion of private-sector production, with more 
emphasis on the Government's role of providing support services and introducing 
incentives and promotional services, measures and legislation. There is, however, a need 
for a more concrete vision and time schedule for this transfer. The pace of transformation 
will also have to be faster, taking into consideration both domestic changes and rapid 
global changes, as well as the pace of transformation in the competing countries in other 
regions. 
In Egypt, the declared general intentions are to confme the role of Government in 
the coming period to the promotion of an investment climate commensurate with the needs 
of the private sector. In terms of policies and project management, this means trying to 
leave the management of production to the private sector. It seems, however, that there 
will remain a large portion of industries with the public sector. This includes the strategic 
industries of iron and steel—which require heavy investments and are less profitable. The 
Government aims to ensure that the management of the economy is guided by economic 
and not political objectives. 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Government has not yet formulated a new policy 
regarding the public sector, generally including the industrial sector. There is strong 
evidence that the State will continue, at least in the short term, to be involved in the 
management of industrial production. The modality of the new policy would be different, 
however. The Government has announced that no capacity expansions are to be 
undertaken in the public industrial enterprises. Increases in public industrial production 
are intended to be achieved mainly by improving production and management efficiency, 
partly through enterprise rehabilitation and restructuring. However, the transformation 
into a more market-oriented economy may continue to be undertaken at a slow pace, partly 
because an important sector of senior bureaucrats seems to support the established mode 
of public-sector ownership and operation. This is partly indicated in the delayed 
negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
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A committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, has 
recently been formed to study a new mechanism for the functioning of the public sector, 
including the public industrial sector. The Government has requested the Centre for the 
Development of Administration and Productivity in the Syrian Arab Republic to prepare 
a study on the restructuring of the Ministry of Industry and associated bodies; the first draft 
has just been finalized. It may be more appropriate to carry out this task in the light of the 
re-defined role of the State. 
The trend in the Syrian Arab Republic seems to promote the coexistence of the 
public, the private and the mixed sectors. The private industrial sector is now allowed to 
involve itself in most industrial activities except in basic heavy industries, like petroleum 
refining. However, private-sector involvement in industrial activities requires prior 
government approval. 
In the GCC countries, Governments continue to assume a major role in industrial 
activities, but are putting more emphasis on the private manufacturing sector, particularly 
the foreign sector, to make up for retrenchments in public industrial investments. 
In Lebanon, the industrial sector has emerged from 17 years of civil strife severely 
damaged, at a time when it also has to face the challenges of the dramatic changes taking 
place in the world economy. The Government, however, continues to advocate the same 
position as before the war, namely private-sector initiatives in a free market economy. 
(iii) The continued drain of military expenditures 
Increased priority continues to be given to defence expenditures in many countries 
in the region. This is the case despite the initiation of the peace process and the degree of 
progress being achieved in its implementation, and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
agreements and the strength it has given to economic liberalization in the region. 
Persistent increase in military expenditures will continue to divert an increasingly 
important part of resources away from development in many countries in the region, 
accentuating conditions of structural imbalances and tight budgets. It may also impede the 
required change in the role of the State and may continue to inhibit the required socio- 
economic changes. 
(b) Some of the socio-culturalparticularities of the ESCWA region 
(i) Industrial development pursued under special conditions 
At this point, it is important to point out the hardship conditions under which 
industrial development efforts have been pursued in the region. During the last two 
decades, political stress factors led to upheavals that added to the deteriorating conditions 
in the manufacturing sector, including the following: the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict; 
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the 17 years of civil war in Lebanon; the eight years Iraq-Iran regional war that drained 
earlier achievements in manufacturing efforts in both countries and had negative effects 
on industrial development efforts in the GCC countries; the embargo imposed on Egypt 
by the Arab States from 1978 until 1991, when the Camp David accords were signed; the 
destructive events of January 1986 in the former Democratic Republic of Yemen; the 
outbreak of the in in late 1987, leading to additional deterioration 
in the economy and manufacturing activities in the occupied territories; and more recently, 
the destructive events of the Gulf war in 1990, the civil strife in Yemen in 1994, and the 
embargo imposed on Iraq since 1990. 
(ii) Some of the socio-political results of these developments 
Aside from their devastating economic effects, these events had socio-political 
implications that were not conducive to the evolution of societies in these countries into 
more modem societies or to the emergence of more modem business communities and 
governance. At the same time, competitors in other developing regions were faster to 
adjust to a more modem community and State. 
In the ESCWA member countries, based on anecdotal evidence, modem industrial 
business communities that had been evolving for some time before the I 950s and I 960s, 
have either been partly destroyed or suppressed. The evolution of indigenous 
entrepreneurship was inhibited in many countries in the region. In some countries, many 
people have accumulated vast wealth from rents from significantly appreciated real estate. 
A profound "rentier" class was created from this process and other processes, bringing 
with it inherent "non-market practices".14 It was nurtured by the existing socio-economic 
system and benefited from "spilled over" business from government activities. This helped 
to distort well-established business practices in many countries in the region, and inhibited 
their evolution in others. In some instances, these events have justified the existence of 
a dominant but faltering public sector and sometimes helped in creating a bureaucratic 
class with vested interests not necessarily in harmony with national interest and 
development objectives. Under some extreme cases, former army officers turned into 
business, having a pre-capitalist business mentality, and added gravely to distortions in 
the operation of the market. 
In most cases, the business environment created did not foster the emergence of 
indigenous entrepreneurship or the conservation of existing entrepreneurs. In many 
instances, most of the people who owned significant amounts of wealth and enjoyed high 
levels of income were unfamiliar with the ways a productive system works and 
grows. The emergence of new business communities was, in most instances, the function 
of the prevailing dominance of the culture and norms of the tribe and family. This has 
Practices inconsistent with the expansion of productive investment. 
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negatively affected the nature of the governance that evolved over the years in some of 
these countries, the kind of civil service that was formed, and the developmental ability 
of the State. 
These conditions represent crucial impediments to the appropriate transfer of 
modem and civil ideologies and ideas into the culture of society and the State, and to the 
evolution of a development-oriented governance. Hence, reforms, including those in the 
legislative and the regulatoiy regimes in countries of the region, are not enough to bring 
about the desired change. The existing institutional environment continues to take its toll 
on the State and its ability to pursue its economic developments and reform objectives. 
A primary condition for the evolution of a modern society and State is the institution of 
political reforms geared towards deepening the process of democratization in countries of 
the region. 
(c) The need for a mod jfied approach in treating the role of the State in industrial 
development 
None of the member countries of ESCWA have so far visualized the importance 
of redefining the duties and functions of the State. Part of the institutional reform required 
is to change from traditional into more modem governance ideologies and ideas. 
However, this still seems to be far from being understood by many policy makers, 
particularly in developing countries such as the ESCWA member countries, which have 
their own web of social, cultural, political and economic conditions. 
It would be beneficial to draw on successful, relevant experiences in other 
developing as well as developed countries to help visualize some of the opened options to 
redefine the role of the State. In attempting to do so, however, caution should be applied 
concerning the socio-political and economic conditions that differentiate the ESCWA 
member countries from other regions. In undertaking this exercise, the particularities of 
the region should be taken into consideration and the specificities of each country should 
be weighed. In making the adjustment, member countries should keep in mind that 
the diversity of experiences and learning produced increasingly different societies and 
civilizations with very different degrees of success in solving the fundamental economic 
problems of scarcity" (North, 1994). 
(i) institutions and economic performance 
The importance of institutions and the effect of institutional changes on economic 
performance is a new dimension in economic development and has recently been the 
subject of in-depth studies. It emerged as a new field in economics known as "new 
institutional economics". It attempts to incorporate a theory of institutions into economics, 
53 
an approach that has been appreciably developed lately by Douglass C. North.'5 North has 
studied various explanations for the enormous differences in performances of economies 
over long periods of time: 
"That institutions affect the performance of economies is hardly 
controversial. That differential performance of economies over time is 
fundamentally influenced by the way institutions evolve is also not 
controversial. Yet neither current economic theory nor clinometric 
history shows many signs of appreciating the role of institutions in 
economic performance because there as yet has been no analytical 
framework to integrate institutional analysis into economics..." (North, 
1993). 
As defined by North, institutions in a country consist of informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), formal rules and 
regulations (the constitution, common law, regulations) and the enforcement characteristics 
of both (North, 1994). While formal law can be changed easily, informal norms and 
conventions can only be changed gradually. This should partly explain why applying the 
political and economic rules of successful market economies to third-world economies is 
not a sufficient condition for good economic performance. 
The emerging new economic theory of institutions builds on the neoclassical 
economic theory of scarcity of resources and competition but nullifies the assumption of 
instrumental rationality by adding institutions as a critical constraint. It studies the role of 
transaction costs as "the connection between institutions and the costs of production." 
Transaction costs consist of wages paid for services such as accounting, legal, security, 
fmance, insurance and sales services and relate to the processing of business documents, 
negotiation and conclusion of contracts, litigation of violated contracts, and so on. 
Transaction costs "consist of those costs that go through the market ... and therefore are 
measurable, and of hard-to-measure costs that include time acquiring information, 
queuing, bribery, and so forth, as well as the losses due to imperfect monitoring and 
enforcement ... In third world countries telephone systems that do not work, the inability 
to get spare parts, endless production interruptions, long queues and waiting time to get 
permits.. .are overwhelming evidence that an effective institutional infrastructure does not 
exist" (North, 1993). 
(ii) Transaction costs 
In the production process, the new theory indicates that inputs and outputs have 
to be traded among buyers and sellers in the local as well as the foreign markets. In the 
15 North is a Nobel prize winner for his pioneering work on institutional economics. 
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process, different kinds of costs are incurred in dealing with the established rules and 
regulations and other constraints defined as the institutions. In this process, transaction 
costs have significant effects on the performance of an economy, the form of its 
comparative advantage, and its competitiveness on the international market. Within this 
context, ideas and ideologies are incorporated into the economic analysis, considering the 
political process as a critical source of differences in the performance of economies and 
the reason for inefficient markets. This should lead to the conclusion that economic 
factors relating to highly skilled and educated manpower, motivated entrepreneurs, high 
rates of savings and investment, and high rates of technological change and innovation are 
all important for the performance level of an economy and the development of its 
competitiveness. They are not enough, however. The performance of the economy is 
significantly affected by the relationship among transaction costs, institutions and 
institutional change. 
(iii) Bargaining power 
According to North, institutions are not usually created to be socially efficient, but 
rather to serve the interest of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. In a 
world of positive transaction costs, bargaining strength affects the efficiency of outcomes 
and shapes the direction of long-run economic change (North, 1994). This is because what 
counts is the bargaining strength of the individuals and organizations, "hence, only when 
it is in the interest of those with sufficient bargaining strength to alter the formal rules will 
there be major changes in the formal institutional framework" (North, 1993). Economic 
reforms are important for achieving the goals of economic growth and industrialization, 
but they must be accompanied by institutional reforms in governance as well as in the 
society as a whole. 
(d) The role of the State: successful experiences in the East Asian countries 
The question of the relationship between active State intervention and economic 
development remains a controversial issue, particularly between development and 
neoclassical economists; both success stories and failures are associated with each school 
of thought. In this light, the successful experiences of the East Asian countries in their 
developmental efforts and growth have introduced a new element to this question which 
would be beneficial to highlight at this point. 
(z) The developmental versus the neoclassical approach 
Under the influence of development economists, most developing countries 
focused on the central role of the State in development in their economic development 
efforts of the I 950s and the I 970s. It was implicitly assumed that the State had an 
unlimited capacity to direct economic development. Economic development theory was 
based on the existence of market imperfections, whereas in real life there were many 
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"market failures" and externalities that prevented the smooth functioning of free market 
systems. As a result, countries could not achieve optimal allocation of their resources 
without government policy intervention. Development economists justified public 
intervention as being necessary for the removal of existing bottlenecks in an imperfect 
market to allow the market mechanism to function smoothly. 
Limited successes and in many instances failures in economic development efforts 
were partly attributed to the adoption of a wrong strategy, namely import substitution, 
which was concomitant with government strategy to dominate the economy. These 
failures have helped since the early 1980s to strengthen neoclassical thinking, advocating 
an economic development strategy that gives a central role to market forces and leaves 
only a marginal role for government intervention. Followers of this school express grave 
doubts about the ability of the State to intervene and remedy market failures. They believe 
that market imperfections by themselves are insufficient justification for public 
intervention. Economic development should therefore be pursued in a free market with 
minimum government intervention. They stress that State intervention not only cannot 
solve problems of market imperfections, but that it aggravates them. 
(ii) The East Asian approach 
East Asian countries have achieved miraculously high economic growth, which 
was mainly due to the adoption of the right industrial strategy, namely an export-oriented 
strategy, together with appropriate State intervention.16 It is true that ultimately the best 
system to instigate sustained industrial development and growth is the free-market and 
free-trade system. But the question that continues to raise strong debates is whether or not 
"getting prices right" is enough by itself to induce the functioning of market forces in 
developing countries, with all their existing market imperfections and market failures, and 
whether or not State intervention is justified for the elimination of market imperfections 
in order to lay the foundation for the operation of a free market at the early stages of 
industrialization. 
a. Active and systematic role of the State 
In most of these countries, there was active yet systematic intervention of the State 
in the economy in various forms, with the scope of intervention changing at the different 
stages of industrialization. State intervention targeted specific industries, including export 
16 
For detailed analysis of the experience of the East Asian countries, see World Bank. The East Asian 
Miracle; Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Se-Hark Park, 
"The East Asian Industrial Policy: Its Relevance and Lessons for Developing Countries". Two Concurrent Expert 
Group Meetings on Industrial Strategies and Policies and Managerial and Entrepreneurial Skills under Conditions 
of Global and Regional Change, ESCWA, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and Economic Research Forum for the 
Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, Manama, Bahrain, 20-23 November 1995. 
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industries, and provided them with export subsidies and other financial incentives, 
protecting these industries in the domestic market and manipulating relative prices to shift 
resources to the targeted sectors. Policies pursued in support of their strategy of high 
growth included the following: investment in human resources through quality education; 
the provision of a stable macroeconomic environment and a reliable legal framework; 
pursuing an outward-looking industrial strategy; and abolishing or reducing policies 
leading to price distortions. 
At the initial stage, State intervention was quite extensive, as it involved building 
up appropriate physical and social infrastructure and institutions, a precondition for 
building and promoting industrial capacity. At this stage, State intervention also involved 
direct investment in production activities including industrial activity. Public investment 
in industry was undertaken because the private sector was not yet capable of investing in 
large projects. As the countries advanced in their industrialization process, the scope of 
intervention diminished gradually, allowing the role of market forces to gain prominence. 
In the advanced stage, the role of the State became restricted to establishing and 
maintaining a competitive environment for the private sector. At this stage, the allocation 
of resources was basically directed by the pricing mechanism in the market and incentives 
(Park, 1995). 
b. Quality in State intervention 
It is to be noted, however, that the main lesson of the experiences of the East 
Asian economies is not whether or not State intervention is good, but rather whether it is 
efficient and effective. The quality and nature of the State intervention is most important. 
It is the crucial issue in "the capability of the State to initiate and guide market-friendly 
structural transformation" (Park, 1995). This requires political commitment to change. 
It also requires the presence of an efficient government machinery which is "capable of 
overriding the pressure of vested interest groups and of disciplining various economic 
actors to implement technocratic policies" (UNIDO, 1993). 
(e) The need for an indigenous approach in countries of the ESCWA and Arab 
region 
Within this context, lessons regarding the role of the State in industrial 
development should be drawn from experiences of the countries of the region, and not just 
from successful experiences in other regions. Research into the nature of the existing 
(formal and informal) institutional environment in each country, at the national level and 
for specific industries therefore needs to be carried out. This should be done with the 
objective of identifying and addressing the main institutional barriers to the developmental 
efforts of the State and the prevailing non-market practices associated with the operation 
of some business communities in the various countries in the region. 
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2. Privatization'7 
In order to prevent further deterioration in their economies, countries in the region 
are considering relinquishing control over a significant number of public industrial 
enterprises. Privatization is implicitly conceived of in most countries of the region as the 
only option for responding to the fiscal crisis facing the State. In some countries it is being 
pursued with the support and encouragement of international organizations and 
institutions. 
Nevertheless, in some of the more diversified economies, privatization is seen as 
part of a general process of liberalization and deregulation, a giving back to market forces 
their normal role, and limiting the role of the State. Privatization should be a means of 
alleviating the unemployment problem in the long run and widening the ownership base 
by increasing the role of the private sector in the ownership and management of the 
national economic resources. 
In some GCC countries whose economies are more market-oriented, privatization 
was initially conceived of as a means to improve the efficiency of the market economy. 
Since the Gulf war in 1991, it has been looked upon as a way of improving the 
Government's liquidity and reducing the budget deficit. In this subregion, where 
privatization is still in its infant stage and citizens are affluent, it seems to be an attractive 
government alternative for raising funds and more acceptable than imposing taxes where 
nationals are accustomed to a generous welfare system. However, privatization is 
considered to be a gradual and lengthy process, with some believing that implementation 
takes five to eight years on the average. 
Most GCC countries state that their manufacturing companies are efficient profit- 
making ventures representing a good source of income to the Government. Hence, their 
privatization would be more linked to widening the ownership base and attracting private 
investment in the manufacturing sector, thus increasing the role of the private sector in 
industrial development and, to a lesser extent, reducing the financial and administrative 
burdens on the State. This strategy comes at a time when the private sector has already 
accumulated large levels of liquidity compared to the limited domestic opportunities 
available for investment. 
Privatization should help reduce the excess liquidity in most markets in the region, 
and it should also affect the ability of some Governments to raise funds for the 
establishment (or initiation) of needed additional large industrial capacities. This is 
This section is mainly based on Section A of Chapter II of Review of Recent Development of 
Manufacturing Activities and Prospects in the ESCWA Region, 1994 (EIESCWAIID/1995/6). (See ESCWA, 
1995c.) 
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particularly true in the GCC subregion, where potentials for large industries exist, and 
from which the private sector still shies away. These additional capacities are required to 
widen the base of large industries operating in these countries, increasing the opportunities 
for a wider range of products that could be produced by small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Linking privatization to the offset programme may encourage FD1 
in viable industrial projects in the GCC countries. In the more diversified economies, part 
of the funds to be generated from privatization could be used to improve or expand 
government support services to promote private manufacturing. 
Different member countries have different levels of commitment to the 
privatization of public enterprises. While countries such as Egypt and Kuwait have 
already formulated their privatization policies and plans and have gone ahead with the 
implementation process, in Bahrain and the Syrian Arab Republic they are still exploring 
the options available. In Egypt, privatization is pursued within the framework of economic 
reforms and structural adjustment. In the Syrian Arab Republic, where the economy is 
dominated by the public sector, economic reforms are undertaken without a clear policy 
regarding privatization. in Saudi Arabia, there is reference to privatization in the current 
five-year development plan (1996 to 2000). Here, privatization is advocated through the 
objective of attracting the private sector to the ownership and management of basic public 
industries. Neither policy directives nor a schedule for privatizing industrial companies 
has been formulated yet, however. 
While there are positive effects of privatization, the negative effects of the process 
in the transitional period is making some countries in the region (including the GCC 
countries) hesitate. Most ESCWA member countries are reluctant to privatize public 
industrial enterprises or to enhance the privatization process for fear of causing 
unemployment. In the GCC countries there is a fear that nationals may lose their jobs, 
since the new private management may try to increase foreign workers at the expense of 
locals owing to wage and salary differentials and to more flexible labour laws governing 
expatriate labour. This is taking place at a time when most Governments of countries in 
the subregion are trying hard to persuade the private sector to employ more nationals and 
reduce reliance on expatriates. Another possible worry that should be mentioned is that 
Governments may be more hesitant to accept the loss of their control over an important 
segment of the economy. This could be one reason why some of them are reluctant to 
accelerate the privatization process, aside from the declared reason that it may lead to 
higher prices for consumers, as the switch to private-sector ownership would remove 
government subsidies. Other voiced concerns in some of the GCC countries relate to the 
question of how to value public-sector industries offered for sale and the likelihood that 
such offers may depress stock market prices. 
In the more diversified economies, the negative effects of the process are forcing 
Egypt to take a gradual approach to privatization, while the Syrian Arab Republic remains 
quite hesitant. The slow approach in Egypt may have been caused by other reasons as 
59 
well. The strategy regarding the tendering process has changed since 1994, setting higher 
privatization targets by changing methods of privatization from private bids to sales 
through the stock market. In this way, the ownership base in industry was widened. 
Internal adversaries to privatization are strengthened by the absence of new policies 
limiting the activities of the public sector in manufacturing. This raises fears among 
industrialists that the public sector may continue to dominate the growth of manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the success of privatization greatly depends on the availability of 
fully functioning stock markets supported with the necessary legislative infrastructure and 
by sophisticated financial services. This is another constraint imposed on the process of 
privatizing public industrial enterprises. However, company ownership in most countries 
is dominated by limited family partnerships, while corporate shareholding is still not 
favoured. The presence of fully functioning stock markets should provide efficient market 
vehicles for the transfer of ownership, while the privatization of public-sector enterprises 
would help provide depth for the stock markets in a region that suffers from the lack of a 
broad industrial base to support a strong equity market (The NCB Economist, 1994). 
(a) Privatizalion: policies and forms 
(i) The GCC countries 
Many GCC countries have shown some concern for maintaining public ownership 
in the heavy and strategic industries such as oil production and refining. The 
countries indicate that these industries require a long time to realize a return on investment, 
while the need of marketing and capital structure are beyond the present capabilities of the 
private sector. Strategic companies in Kuwait also include the Kuwait Flour Mills and 
Bakeries Company, of which the Government is planning to retain its ownership. Many 
Governments, however, have indicated that initially they are likely to start reducing public 
holdings in companies whose shares are listed and traded on the stock exchange. In Saudi 
Arabia, commercially viable public-sector establishments whose assets can be assessed to 
give estimates of share values will then follow. These reportedly would include various 
petrochemical plants and refineries (The NCB Economist, 1994). As to the forms of 
privatization, the GCC countries tend to favour two types, namely contracts granted to the 
private sector to manage government projects and the outright sale of publicly owned 
enterprises. Other schemes, namely build, operate and transfer (BOT) and subcontracting 
to the private sector, are being considered for utilities projects. This could prove to be a 
successful step to wider application, especially since Kuwait is currently considering using 
a BOT structure to fund the construction of its North Shuaiba power station (The NCB 
Economist, 1994). 
Kuwait was perhaps the first GCC country to take an outright policy decision in 
the wake of the Gulf war to privatize large parts of its public sector, including the 
manufacturing sector (box 2). In this connection, the Ministry of Finance, through a 
60 
ministerial committee, handles most sales involving government interests in privatized 
companies; the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) evaluates offers, while the World 
Bank assists the country with technical advice on the privatization programme. Sales of 
public enterprises take three main forms, sales through the establishment of holding 
companies, direct sales by auction in the financial market in Kuwait or through tendering, 
and sales through floating shares in the stock market. Government companies may be sold 
through tendering to a group of Kuwaiti or foreign investors, or to a group composed of 
Kuwaiti and foreign investors, on the basis of the best price offered. A percentage of the 
stake in these companies is to be allotted to sales to foreigners under established conditions 
preventing the emergence of monopolies. In addition, privatization on the basis of leasing 
companies to the private sector, including the foreign private sector, is also being 
considered in Kuwait; this involves operation and management contracts. 
Box 2. The privatization approach and procedures in Kuwait 
The general approach to privatization in Kuwait, which also applies to other GCC countries, 
includes privatization as part of a comprehensive economic reform programme. This is 
supported by the issuance of new legislation and the amendment of existing laws such as the 
commercial law, company law, agency law and tendering law, with the aim of 
these laws and addressing their shortcomings in areas relating to property rights, production 
rights, patent rights, attracting foreign investment, the different categories of shares, holding 
companies, and others. Subsidies will be abolished or at least their forms will be changed, and 
a strategy will be established that addresses the issue of employment. 
The procedural steps in the privatization process included the following: the initial 
transfer of the ownership of companies to a privatization office; rehabilitating companies and 
running them on a commercial basis; evaluating the assets of these companies in preparation 
for floating their shares on the market; negotiating with investors interested in acquiring a 
specific stake in these companies and providing the necessary information to them: in 
cooperation with other parties, drafting the law of privatization. revising and amending the 
laws concerning economic activities, and drafting the anti-dumping law; and seeking 
temporary technical assistance from consulting houses, as the need arises. 
Privatization policies are stated in the development plan of Saudi Arabia. The 
plan focuses on increasing efforts to attract private-sector investment in new government 
projects and related services in manufacturing, and in projects that are labour-saving and 
that conserve on the use of other limited input resources such as water. In this connection, 
the plan expects private sector's share in total planned manufacturing investment to be 
around 65%, amounting to more than $7 billion (28 billion Saudi Arabian riyals) during 
the plan period. Forecast participation of the private sector in the financing of 
manufacturing projects within the privatization process is around $17 billion, including 
$9 billion of private-sector anticipated participation in the offset programme. In the 
process, the private sector is expected to continue repatriating capital and balances of 
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funds held abroad, which is currently estimated to have reached around $100 billion 
(Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 1995). 
In Bahrain, where there is relatively quite a significant number of large public 
industrial enterprises, there is only talk about government policy regarding privatization. 
The manufacturing sector seems to be up till now low on the priority list, except for 
Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company (BALEXCO). Furthermore, government's policy 
is towards privatizing the management of public industrial companies. 
(ii) The more divers jf led economies 
Among the ESCWA member countries, Egypt and Yemen have each formulated 
a policy framework of privatization through the issuance of a law of privatization, in 1991 
in Egypt, and in 1995 in Yemen. While the latter is still in the policy formulation stage, 
the former has reached a relatively more advanced stage. Notwithstanding this, the process 
in Egypt has been gradual and rather slow, justified by the Public Enterprise Office (PEO) 
as a way to implement privatization in a well-studied way. 
The policy framework of privatization of manufacturing enterprises in Egypt was 
formulated in 1991, with the issuance of the law of privatization (Official Gazette, 1991). 
This law established the Public Enterprise Office (PEO), the Government's Technical 
Bureau for the Public Business Sector, responsible for the implementation of the 
privatization of the public sector. 
According to the PEO, the country's policy remains one of gradual privatization 
through the stock market, with the employees of the companies to maintain 10% 
ownership of the shares. Companies can, however, be sold to anchor investors, if 
acceptable and when available. The sales policy is to sell any company that is ready for 
sale, defined by the PEO as companies that have no problems, the market value of which 
can be identified, and which have achieved acceptable profits for buyers. Sales policy is 
based on studies undertaken by foreign consultants regarding the price ceiling of shares, 
the maximum number of shares to be floated at a time, sales through the stock market and 
outside the stock market, and conditions under which employees are to own shares. 
Sales of public industrial companies are undertaken through holding companies. 
This entailed the reorganization of the public sector, reducing the number of public 
enterprises and converting them into 17 holding companies with diversified portfolios. 
Nine of these companies are associated mainly with manufacturing subsidiary companies. 
According to the PEO, the estimated current book value of the total portfolio of holding 
companies amounts to $26.6 billion (89 billion Egyptian pounds [LE]), with an estimated 
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market value of $93.4 billion (LE 312 billion).'8 Of these, the book value of the total 
assets of 120 manufacturing subsidiary companies associated with seven manufacturing 
holding companies'9 amounts to $14.3 billion (LE 47.67 billion) with an estimated market 
value of around $36 billion (LE 120 billion).20 
In Yemen, the Council of Ministers issued resolutions No. 150 of 1994 and No. 
99 of 1995. These set policies and procedures for the privatization of public enterprises 
and established the Industrial Sector Committee to be in charge of matters relating to 
privatization. However, there seems to be no clear policy yet on the extent to which the 
Government is planning to relinquish its ownership in these industries. These resolutions 
were more concerned with improving the productivity and efficiency of public enterprises 
and with how to deal with enterprises recording losses; the solution here is either to 
transform them into shareholding companies or to liquidate them. The resolutions also ban 
extending subsidies to commercial enterprises. 
As Yemen is still in an early stage of industrialization, the privatization process 
has barely started, and the Government seems to be taking a flexible approach. It tends 
to adopt the different forms available, namely transferring ownership of public enterprises 
to the private sector or allowing the private sector to be involved in production activities 
previously confined to the public sector. Nevertheless, the Government gives more 
priority to encouraging joint private/public production projects, such as leasing assets of 
public enterprises to the private sector (ESCWA, 1995b). 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, the public industrial sector is expected to maintain 
its dominant role in strategic industrial areas. The private and mixed sectors will receive 
additional support and will basically be allowed to compete in the non-strategic industrial 
areas. There are no signs yet that the public industrial companies will be privatized, and 
there is only talk, so far, about reforming the public sector. 
The Government continues to favour the promotion of the coexistence of the 
public, the private and the mixed sectors. The public-sector companies are expected to be 
given more autonomy and more management responsibility. It was recently reported that 
downstream operations in the hydrocarbon sector (refining and distribution) could be 
18 
Based on PEO estimates, with the book values of companies being multiplied by a factor of 3 to 4 to obtain 
their market values. The calculations in this study used an average multiplier of 3.5. 
This does not include the Mining and Refractors Holding Company, which has 19 subsidiary companies, 
and the Rice and Flour Mills Holding Company, which has 20 subsidiary companies, most of which seem to fall 
under manufacturing, and the total value of the portfolio of which is not reported. 
20 
Based on PEO estimates, with the book values of manufacturing companies being multiplied by a factor 
of 2.5 to 3 to obtain their market values. In the calculations in the present study, an average multiplier of 2.5 was 
used. 
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opened up to private- and mixed-sector participation. Nevertheless, public industrial 
expansion continues to be planned within the framework of the five-year development 
plan of 1992 to 1996. 
The Government's conceived expansion in production is to be realized through 
improved efficiency and productivity rather than through adding new capacities. 
However, shortages of funds seem to be compelling the Government to freeze investment 
expenditures on the maintenance and modernization of many existing public 
manufacturing enterprises. In fact, with the trend of liberalization of trade and 
deregulation of the market, the Government is becoming more inclined to leave the task 
of overhauling and modernizing public enterprises to self-financing. Given the tight 
financial conditions of the public enterprises and the government policy regarding 
privatization, great concerns are raised regarding the future of these enterprises and their 
ability to keep abreast of rapid developments and to compete fairly with the more 
competent emerging private sector. The continued absence of a clear policy regarding 
the public manufacturing enterprises is delaying crucial decisions that need to be made 
promptly regarding badly needed reforms and overhauling these enterprises. This is 
increasing the risk that losses in the sector will be aggravated. 
(b) Commitment 
(i) The GCC countries 
Kuwait and Oman seem to be the only countries in the subregion that have 
formulated a programme for privatizing public enterprises. In Kuwait, a five-year 
privatization programme was proposed by the World Bank in late 1993 for the 
privatization of 74 enterprises, 10 of which are manufacturing companies, including the 
New Petrochemical Industries Company (NPIC). The ministerial committee on 
privatization contracted the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) to prepare a study to 
identify potential areas for privatization in Kuwait. This study reportedly produced 
results similar to that of the World Bank (Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
1995). 
The privatization of manufacturing companies has already started. Prominent 
amongst these is the joint venture, Equate, which will be building the $2.1 billion North 
Shuaiba petrochemical complex. It will be capitalized at $292.55 million, with the 
Kuwait Petrochemical Industries Company (PlC) and Union Carbide of the United States 
each having 45% of the capital. The remaining 10% will be offered to the private sector 
through the private company Bubiyan Petrochemical Company (BPC). The latter is the 
first private-sector petrochemical company and was established by decree in April 1995, 
with capital of $102 million. The founding members (basically PlC) hold 10% of capital, 
and the rest was put on sale on the stock market in April 1995 in the form of shares offer- 
ed to the public. In the petroleum industries, the Petroleum High Council approved the 
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privatization of the liquefied gas industry and the oil canning industry (Middle East 
Economic Survey, 1995). 
In Oman, a privatization programme was launched in 1993 with a total estimated 
value of assets of $650 million to $780 million belonging to public companies that are up 
for sale to Omani as well as private Gulf investors. Until recently, the only manufacturing 
company that had been privatized was the Oman Cement Company. This was done 
through increasing its equity capital by around $14 million (36 million rials Omani [RO]), 
of which around $6 million (RO 15 million) consisted of shares floated on the stock 
market. The production capacity of the company was expanded, and the company was 
partially privatized, with the Government maintaining majority shareholding in equity. In 
this connection, the Government is setting up jointly with the private sector a $700 million 
petrochemical complex and a $9 billion gas liquefaction plant (Oman Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 1995). 
In Saudi Arabia, no privatization programme has as yet been formulated, despite 
a government declaration in May 1994 on privatizing the Government's holdings in public 
enterprises. The Government has expressed enthusiasm for the participation of foreign 
companies in industrial ventures. The aim is to benefit from their management, marketing 
and technological expertise. In September 1994, the Government officially called upon 
the private including foreign sector to invest in petrochemicals. Actual sales of assets of 
industrial companies, however, have not started yet. It is also still not clear what the next 
step will be (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994). On the crucial issue of privatizing the 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the Government has not indicated yet its 
intention regarding the sales of its shares in the company (70%). There are, however, 
signs that private-sector ownership in the company will be increased. This is because the 
private sector seems to be more keen to acquire SABIC shares than to launch new 
petrochemical projects. 
In the United Arab Emirates, privatization by the federal Government is not full- 
fledged. In fact, only the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, where most of the large industries are 
located, is expected to see some progress in this direction. Feasibility studies are being 
prepared for the privatization of nine small and medium-sized industries associated with 
the Abu Dhabi Public Industrial Enterprise. The local government is considering the 
issuance of shares for sale to the private sector on the stock market, relinquishing 49% of 
its ownership in these enterprises and retaining the 51% controlling interest. 
In Bahrain, there are a relatively significant number of large public industrial 
companies, but no privatization programme has yet been announced regarding these 
companies. Privatizing manufacturing companies relates mainly to minor industries such 
as most of the food industries, where the Government has a minority share of 10%-20%. 
Only Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company (BALEXCO), a relatively large industrial 
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enterprise, is subject to privatization. Prior to the Gulf crisis, 20% of the company was 
privatized, and currently another 20%-30% is undergoing the same process. 
(ii) The more economies 
Except for Egypt (see box 3), only Yemen has made a relatively firm 
commitment to privatizing public industries. The Yemeni Government earlier identified 
14 public industrial enterprises for privatization, and the privatization committee at the 
Ministry of Industry has announced the soliciting of buyers with respect to privatizing 
the first batch of industrial enterprises. The industries to be tendered include the 
following: the Revolution Factory for Metal Products, the Leather Shoes Factory, the 
Public Bakery, the Losan Establishment for Biscuits and Sweets and Al Mansoura 
Automated Bakery, the Public Establishment for Dairy Products, and Al Mansoura 
Vegetable Oil Factory. Implementation of Yemen's privatization programme is receiving 
support from the various relevant international organizations, particularly the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). In this connection, the latter 
is helping the country in the privatization of a number of public industries in Aden. 
In the Syrian Arab Republic, de facto privatization may emerge, despite the 
Government's declared intentions not to relinquish its ownership (in part or in full) to the 
private sector. This development has its roots in activities of the private manufacturing 
sector, which has in recent years become more dynamic, with manufacturing value added 
increasing significantly, superseding by far that of the State. This has so far been 
achieved through the country's "cautious" liberalization policy which has been pursued 
since the mid-1980s, especially with the recent introduction of the investment promotion 
law of 1990 (Ayubi, 1995). 
(c) Constraints 
(,) The GCC countries 
The privatization process has been progressing at a relatively slow pace, and 
most Governments have not yet translated their privatization decision into concrete 
targets. Although most countries continue to advocate the need for economic austerity 
since the Gulf war, they do not seem to be facing a serious cash crisis, which is one of 
the main reasons that the privatization process is expected to continue at a slow pace. 
66 
Box 3. Progress in the sales of public companies in Egypt 
According to the Public Enterprise Office (PEO), there are 7 specialized manufacturing holding 
companies with 120 manufacturing subsidiaries associated with them. Very few manufacturing 
subsidiaries do not fall under these holding companies, for example, Abram Beverages and 
Egyptian Vineyards. Specialized holding companies have specialized subsidiary companies in the 
same field, representing not less than 65 per cent of the holding companies's portfolio. In the 
pharmaceuticals holding company, the pharmaceuticals subsidiaries represent 100 per cent of the 
company's portfolio, while for the holding company of Textiles Spinning and Weaving, textiles 
subsidiaries represent more than 70 per cent of its portfolio, the rest being subsidiary companies 
specialized in cotton ginning, trade and the distribution of consumer goods. 
In the process privatization, public companies were divided into three categories. The first 
included companies in good condition that could be directly sold to the public for a good price; this 
category of companies represented around 20 per cent of total public companies. The second 
category included those companies that needed restructuring and rehabilitation; this category 
represented the bulk of companies, 75 per cent. The rest were slated for liquidation. 
According to the PEO, of the 120 manufacturing subsidiary companies, 80 companies were 
subject to sale. Of these 80 companies, the Government was expecting 40 per cent to be sold over a 
period of three years and 60 per cent over a period of five years. However, as of 1993, only 13 
industrial companies had been sold. Presently, around half of the 120 manufacturing companies are 
ready for sale as long as their assets have been evaluated. 
Shares of manufacturing companies that were floated on the stock market represented around 30 
per cent of the total number of shares held by manufacturing holding companies, with a share of 10 
per cent being sold to each of the following groups: employees, investment funds, and to the public. 
Subsidiary companies whose shares were floated until June 1995 and sold on the stock market 
totalled twenty companies, including four companies in pharmaceuticals, three in food industries, 
three in chemical industries, three in textiles, three in non-metallic mineral products industries 
(cement), and one in engineering industries. In addition, Egyptian Bottling Company (Pepsi Cola), 
El Nasr Bottling Company (Coca Cola), and El .Nasr Boiler and Pressure Vessel Manufacturing 
Company were privatized by selling them to an anchor investor through private placement 
transactions. Although this way of selling does not activate the stock market, most of the shares of 
the two bottling companies were bought by foreigners, whereby the buyers agreed to expand 
production, to maintain present workforce levels, to float 20 per cent of equity on the stock market 
and to offer 10 per cent to workers in the following two to three years. Of all theabove companies, 
50 per cent of the book value of their assets was offered for sale, of which 20 per cent was floated as 
shares on the stock market, with a book value of $1.5. billion (LE 5 billion) and an estimated market 
value of $3.7 billion (LE 12,5 billion). 
CulTently, the Government's sales plans include an additional 25 sub3Idiaiy companies, on which 
preliminary agreement ofsaleshas been reached, and•.an additional 10 companies the sales of which. 
are under negotiation Presently the Suez Cement Company bemg prepared for sale while the 
capital of lEgyptalum is expected to be increased the evaluation of the company is completed 
by end-1995. . . . . . 
BOx 3. 
Manufacturing companies for which shares have already been floated on the stock market 
include, among. Others, thó TOrn Portland Cement, Alexandria Portland Cement 
Company,. Heiwan Cement Company, El Nasr Clothing and Textile Company 
(KABO), United Arab Spinning and Weaving Company (UNIRAB), Alexandria 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemical Industries Company, Arab Drug Company, Nile 
Company, Egyptian Electra Cables Company, Ex:tracted Oil and Dtrivatives 
Company, China/General Ceramics and Porcelain, Aracemco/Arab Ceramics, and El Nasr 
Glass and Crystal Company. 
To accelerate the pace of the privatization process, the Government recently announced its 
intention to offer 10 per cent stakes every two weeks in profitable public companies, including 
manufacturing companies, increasing the stake to 20 per cent at a later stage. Furthermore, in 
an attempt to streamline the operations of the public enterprises, the Government recently 
declared its intention to introduce strict measures against companies. 
These measures have helped the Government's plan to sell, by June 1995, public-sector 
shares in manufacturing companies worth around $3.7 billion (LE 12.3 billion). According to 
the PEO, of the total book value of the portfolio of all holding companies, 30 per cent are debts 
to banks, which leaves the Government with only 70 per cent of the book value of these 
companies. 
Another impediment to privatization is the inadequate legislative framework in 
some countries of the subregion. The complete success of the privatization process 
requires the introduction of new legislative frameworks and the provision of ownership 
transparency and accountability to the public sector. 
The form of ownership of most private companies also stands in the way of 
privatization. Most companies are individual, partnership, family or limited shareholding 
companies. The private sector still shies away from establishing large manufacturing 
projects, preferring to acquire shares in secured profitable ventures. This has prompted 
the Government in countries such as Oman to continue to launch manufacturing projects, 
with the aim of attracting private-sector investments in joint public/private ventures, to 
expand Oman's relatively limited industrial base, and encourage increased private-sector 
involvement. 
The success of privatization greatly depends on the ability of the State to promote 
the process of financial deepening, yet the region lacks efficient and fully operational stock 
markets. The private sector in the GCC countries has already accumulated significant 
amounts of wealth and liquidity over the years. Privatization could thus be a vehicle for 
the creation of new domestic investment opportunities for Gulf investors. This would 
partly be enhanced by establishing stock markets. The problem remains, however, that the 
public and private sectors are linked in a complex manner. In many instances, members 
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of powerful interest groups occupy positions in both public office and private business. 
A paradoxical situation may emerge where the private sector becomes the main factor 
constraining and slowing down the privatization process in these countries. 
In Kuwait, the sale of public-sector companies and government shares in 
companies has already been initiated, but not enough shares have been floated on the 
market. Demand has far exceeded supply, frustrating the investors and prompting the 
Government to increase the number of floated shares on the market. In some instances, 
the sales of equity or shares have been above the estimated value, with perhaps no relation 
to the future prospects or current returns of the company. The case of the National 
Industries Company (NIC), which is the country's largest industrial concern, is noted. In 
this respect, the Government recently announced that its returns on sales of 48.5% of its 
share in NIC were $640 million, around $375 million in excess of the original estimated 
value of the shares (Bureau of Lebanese and Arab Documentation, 1995). 
If this sales policy continues, it might cause distortions in the operation of the 
market. 
(ii) The more economies 
In the more diversified economies, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
public enterprise managers and technocrats (and enterprise employees and workers) 
continue to enjoy great political influence. Many of them are the main forces against the 
privatization process. Success in privatization efforts will greatly depend on the political 
and economic weight of supporters (interest groups in the public and private sectors) for 
the sale of public industrial enterprises. 
The only country that has real experience in privatization is Egypt. Reference will 
therefore be made to difficulties faced in the privatization process in that country. Initial 
difficulties encountered involved determining methods to evaluate the assets of 
manufacturing companies and securing good prices. These were the main factors that 
delayed sales of enterprises. Other difficulties encountered included the insufficient 
number of competent enterprise managers and the Government's justified worry regarding 
the implications of privatization, particularly on unemployment and social dislocation. 
The privatization process was slow, also because of the piecemeal method adopted by the 
holding companies. They offered only partial stakes in their affiliates. In the earlier 
stages, the main problem was in the tendering process itself, with some companies' 
privatization offer attracting hardly any bidders. 
The PEO follows a policy of gradually floating shares, in order to avoid the 
depreciation of the values of floated shares. Since the start of the selling off of public 
companies in late 1992, the pace of implementing the privatization programme of major 
manufacturing enterprises has been slow, according to the schedule agreed upon with the 
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World Bank. The Government's plan was to have the whole portfolio of 314 public 
enterprises ready for sale by end- 1994. The slow pace is justified by the limited absorptive 
capacity of the Egyptian market, particularly since government bonds and treasury bills are 
currently being offered. 
To improve efficiency in selling off public enterprises, Egypt has changed its 
privatization strategy since early 1994. It has set higher privatization targets, by changing 
its method of privatization from private bids to sales through the stock market. Initially, 
major investors were asked to tender for companies with only a small portion of the 
available stock reserved for a public issue. Sales of shares of industrial companies were 
made through contracts. The criteria in selecting the best bid did not depend only on the 
best price offered, but also on a proposal that ensured the company's sound economic 
value, as well as its continuity and its contribution to economic development. This method 
did not achieve the expected results, however. 
Now, available shares are to be offered through public issue. The aim of selling 
shares through the stock market is to ensure greater transparency of sales and to have a 
larger volume of shares listed on the stock exchange. In terms of demand for sales, the 
new selling strategy has so far proved to be more successful. Indeed, the demand for State 
shares has been excessive, in most instances resulting in heavy oversubscription. This is 
due to the relatively small number of shares offered on the stock market, disappointing 
investors (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). 
The extent of investor interest in acquiring the limited floated shares has been very 
promising; investors—particularly small investors—are very eager to find investment 
outlets. However, this has led to a phenomenal increase in the market prices of floated 
shares, reaching in some cases severalfold. Moreover, the floating companies have not 
increased the number of shares floated by their companies to meet the overwhelming 
market demand. The phenomenal increase in prices perhaps has no basis, either in terms 
of the rate of returns of these companies or in anticipated productivity. 
To accelerate the pace of the privatization process, the Government recently 
announced its intention to offer 10% stakes in profitable public companies, including 
manufacturing companies, every two weeks. The stake will increase to 20% at a later 
stage. Furthermore, in an attempt to streamline the operations of the public enterprises and 
thus accelerate the privatization process, the Government recently declared its intention 
to introduce strict measures against loss-making public-sector enterprises, and for the first 
time allowed foreign consultants to be appointed as board members. 
There is a need, however, for a more flexible policy in the sale of shares, whose 
volume must be commensurate with the market demand, to try to avoid undue increases 
in share prices and to allow market forces to determine the true value of company shares. 
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This would also help preserve stability in the stock market, which is an important aspect 
of the privatization process. 
The slowly unfolding process in Egypt may be partly attributed to the 
Government's continued reluctance to completely relinquish its ownership of the large 
public industrial enterprises. Instead, through the slow-paced process of fonnulating joint 
ventures between the public and the private sector, the State bureaucracy may be hoping 
to have more time to allow it to redistribute ownership in a way that would leave an 
important stake of the industries under State control. So far, the State continues to play 
a dominant role in these enterprises, with the State bureaucracy being quite large. This has 
raised some fears that the privatization process in Egypt remains a public policy adopted 
by the State for its own purpose, with privatization not necessarily involving deregulation, 
but rather becoming more concerned with re-regulation (Ayubi, 1995). 
3. The emerging new outward-looking industrial strategy 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, various national, regional and global 
developments have compelled most Governments in the ESCWA region to consider 
deregulating business activities and introducing economic and trade reforms. These 
Governments have also begun to support strategies of industrial export growth. In the 
GCC countries, a more aggressive manufacturing export strategy is being pursued. In 
some of the MDEs, the inward-looking industrialization strategy through aid is being 
supplemented by an outward-oriented industrialization strategy through trade. The success 
of this strategy will, in most countries, depend on investment expansion and on the 
anticipated participation of repatriated Arab capital and FDI. 
In the GCC countries, manufacturing exporters of basic industries in 
petrochemicals, fertilizers, aluminium, and iron and steel, and others have been facing 
increased difficulties in marketing their products, particularly in the very large 
neighbouring EU market. This has contributed to surplus capacities in these industries. 
As a result, levels of production, performance, and profits of manufacturing companies 
in the subregion have been affected. The focus is now shifting to the diversification of the 
export market and the development of new export products in the form ofjoint projects 
with foreign partners. 
Foreign partners are needed to provide access to know-how and marketing 
techniques, as well as guaranteed export markets and additional confidence in the 
manufactured products. Within this context, offset investment programmes were 
introduced in many GCC countries. Economic deregulations concerning foreign 
investments in manufacturing started to receive some attention early in the I 990s. These 
aimed at improving the operation of the market economy and at promoting national and 
foreign private investment. Improvement and continued development of the countries' 
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legal and institutional environment have been initiated; new rules and regulations have 
been introduced, and old ones have been revised. 
In the more diversified economies, the limited domestic market, caused by low 
purchasing power, particularly in Egypt and Lebanon, continued to limit manufacturing 
expansion. However, the introduction of economic reforms and market deregulation, 
particularly in Egypt and to a lesser extent the Syrian Arab Republic, have already had 
noticeable effects. These factors encouraged private producers to expand production for 
the export market, especially major sophisticated markets such as the EU and the United 
States of America. Some producers are already engaged in joint ventures with foreign 
partners. Many others, including SMEs, have engaged in contractual agreements to supply 
foreign customers with specific products. 
(a) Some of the problems facing expansion in manufacturing in the region 
(z) In the GCC countries 
Some of the problems just discussed continue to restrict manufacturing expansion 
in the countries of the subregion. This is particularly true regarding SMEs. Such 
problems include: 
• The absence of an appropriate institutional structure in industry itself, and 
the weakness of institutional infrastructure (support services) 
• The sponsorship system in foreign joint manufacturing ventures. On the 
one hand it discourages foreign investment in manufacturing projects, 
and on the other hand, although it yields a "rent" to the local "silent" 
partner, in many instances it discourages the development of indigenous 
entrepreneurship. Instead, the sponsorship system promotes the "rentier" 
business mentality, which limits the scope for future expansion in 
indigenous manufacturing activities 
• The dominance of trade capital 
• Constraints on FDI regarding investment in manufacturing SMEs 
Although there are efforts to deregulate foreign investment, constraints on FDI in 
general are caused by: 
• Limited national markets with continued non-tariff barriers among the 
GCC countries, and strong competition among them through the offset 
programmes 
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• Slow adaptability to new management systems and inadequate upgrading 
of technology and skills 
• The imposition of requirements for local control of capital (51 )% 
• Disallowing foreign investors to own property in some countries 
• Employment laws imposed on expatriates, and government policies to 
increase dependence on national labour 
• The family-owned limited partnership, which is the most common form 
of company in the Gulf subregion 
• The lack of proper transparency of the economy 
(ii) In the more divers ?f led economies 
Among the most important problems facing manufacturers are high production 
costs, which are attributed mainly to: 
• Shortages of water and electricity supplies and recurrent electricity cuts 
in some countries 
• High investment in warehousing 
• The high rate of self-financing 
• High labour cost (particularly in Lebanon), especially in relation to 
competitor countries such as China and other Far Eastern countries such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia 
• Limited industrial areas 
• Indirect expenses relating to complicated tax systems and customs, and 
complicated bureaucratic procedures 
• Underutilization of capacity, partly caused by electricity cuts, shortages 
in water and local supply inputs, and inappropriate maintenance 
To face the increasing price competition on the international market, many 
producers are trying to improve the productivity of their plants, particularly in Egypt, and 
are perhaps reducing profit margins. Exporters are also contemplating the shift in 
production into higher-quality, higher-value-added products, particularly in Lebanon and, 
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to a lesser extent, the Syrian Arab Republic. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round will 
result in increased competition, putting additional pressure on exporters in the subregion, 
even in their own markets, to improve productivity as well as quality of their products. 
The new international standardization and related specifications system should be looked 
upon by the MDE as opening good opportunities for viable exporting industries by 
improving the quality of their products to meet international standards. 
Exports in these countries are focused on resource-based agro-industries (food and 
textiles). Difficulties should be expected, however, in shifting to higher-quality products. 
These difficulties may be caused by several factors which have not yet been addressed 
adequately, among them: 
• The inferior quality of some of the local materials used in producing 
quality products for the export market, and the lack of variety in raw 
materials in the domestic market, compelling producers to import part of 
their supply needs, which increases production costs 
• Inconsistency in the quality and supply flow of certain local inputs, 
negatively affecting the ability of producers of exports to produce 
according to customer specifications and taste in foreign markets 
• Shortages in skilled labour, making it harder for industrialists to shift to 
higher-quality products in the short and medium term 
(b) Some of the challenges facing the emerging outward-looking industrial strategy 
Export awareness in the ESCWA member countries, particularly in the more 
diversified economies, is gaining momentum. This momentum needs to be strengthened. 
In pursuing the new outward-looking industrial strategy and accessing major markets, 
various challenges face countries in the region: identifying specific market needs and 
tastes for manufactured imports, particularly in major markets, including the neighbouring 
EU market; and improving the competitiveness of products destined for export and for the 
local market. This can be achieved by the following: adhering to international quality 
standardization and related specifications and requirements; developing more flexible 
production processes; and developing more sophisticated marketing techniques, with 
continued product development. These factors are further elaborated below. 
(i) Comparative advantage revisited 
Improved productivity may be one way to meet emerging competition. The basic 
issue, however, is the question of comparative advantage of existing industries. This 
should be considered within the context of changing global and regional conditions. In 
the past, many of the industries in the region thrived under protection, subsidies, and 
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provision of other facilities for exports. Now, however, liberalizing trade and deregulating 
the market may render industries less competitive, even in their domestic markets. 
Therefore, in-depth sectoral studies at the commodity level in the relevant branches of 
industry need to be undertaken to evaluate the competitiveness of these industries within 
the context of global liberalization of trade. In the more diversified economies, the 
industries that need to be addressed are mainly the labour-intensive industries of 
foodstuffs, textiles, garments and leather products. 
In some GCC countries the current trend is to promote SME feeder industries. 
These industries are believed to have a comparative advantage as they have local bases and 
service large, heavy industries that are located in the subregion. It is likely that large 
existing industries will provide a wide base for such SMEs, if they prove to be viable. 
This is an area that calls for in-depth study. Feeder industries could include those based 
on supplying industrial raw materials such as paint raw materials, oil-field chemicals, and 
engineering components such as pipes, fittings, pumps, fire extinguishers, and so forth. 
Furthermore, investors in the subregion will have to take into consideration the technology 
component of industry in identifying the products that they wish to manufacture. 
The GCC countries aim to improve the competitiveness of their industry by 
substituting locals for high-cost expatriate labour; the participation of women in 
knowledge-intensive industries with decent working environments could be promoted, 
taking into consideration the Gulf countries' web of social, cultural and economic 
conditions. This option has potential, particularly since more than 50% of women 
graduates in many GCC countries are graduates in the sciences but are unemployed (Qatar, 
unpublished). The issue becomes more critical, when the fact is taken into consideration 
that the pattern of choice of job by Gulf men is in general more oriented towards either 
running their own commercial business or working for a business company or in a 
government office. Possible areas for womens participation include those industries that 
are now being promoted, namely technology-based industries, which require higher 
educational achievements and specialized training. 
(ii) Export promotion centres and information technology 
Outward-looking industrial strategies need to be supported by export promotion 
centres in the countries of the region. Despite the dramatic developments that have been 
taking place in information technology, countries of the region are still far behind, 
particularly in the MDEs. Most of the countries are using outdated modes of collecting, 
processing and transmitting the information they require. Exporters should have easily 
accessible information on export markets. This is particularly critical to SME industries, 
as they, unlike large industries, do not have ready access to needed information. These 
industries also need support to build up capabilities to exploit marketing information. 
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Although some countries in the region have established trade information centres, 
they are exceptions. Only Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have established export 
promotion centres. Bahrain is currently considering establishing an export promotion 
centre. Export promotion centres could provide the following services: identify 
international marketing channels; provide information on specific markets regarding trade 
systems, supply and demand, customers and their tastes; serve as facilitators to export 
producers that have no experience in selling to foreign markets; help exporters strengthen 
their in-house export promotion capabilities, such as marketing techniques; and provide 
information to exporters about the underlying commercial and country risks involved in 
the transactions.2 
(ii:) Transparency of the economy 
The success of information and export promotion centres greatly depends on the 
availability and flow of a wide range of unrestricted and reliable, up-to-date industrial 
statistics and information. In this respect, despite efforts made to deregulate the business 
environment in the region, and to improve the efficiency of the market economy 
mechanism in the GCC subregion, there is still a long a way to go regarding availability 
of and easy access to information. It is hoped that the establishment of such centres in the 
new era of liberalization will help solve part of the problem regarding information and 
statistics and will improve the scope and reliability of published vital industrial statistics 
and deregulate their restrictiveness. 
Efficient functioning of market economy requires transparency of the economy 
and easy access to unrestricted, up-to-date economic and industrial information. 
Previously, the availability of information was not a serious problem, as expansion in most 
manufacturing activities was undertaken by the public sector (which was inward-looking 
in most MDEs). Promoting a private-sector-led outward-looking growth, particularly in 
SMEs, in addition to increased competition from more transparent economies, requires that 
the economies of the region become more transparent. 
21 Technical assistance should be sought from international organizations to provide expertise for the setting 
up and initial running of these centres. Export promotion centres should have in-house information centres linked 
whenever possible with the Internet and/or major international export information centres and networks in major 
export markets. They should be adequately equipped and supported with highly capable and well-trained staff. 
They should be provided with appropriate budget allocations for the continuous training of staff and upgrading 
of their capabilities, as well as for maintenance of equipment. Where such centres exist, they may need to be 
strengthened and upgraded. 
The experience of some Asian countries and areas such as Taiwan Province of China, in the 
establishment of export promotion complexes suggests another option for the GCC countries that is worth studying, 
as it may be more suited to the Gulfs socio-economic environment, and may appeal more to the temperament of 
Gulf producers. In these complexes, all facilities are located, including the hotel, the exhibition, and company 
offices, supporting and simplifying marketing efforts to producers and importers. 
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Industrial statistics in many countries of the region lack comprehensiveness and 
are not always reliable or up to date, nor are they collected on a continuous basis or 
published regularly in many countries of the region. They are also often restricted. 
(iv) Exploiting the "natural" neighbouring export market 
A sustainable export strategy will have to be able to meet some of the needs of the 
"natural" neighbouring export market. In the case of ESCWA member countries, this 
includes the region embracing Arab and other neighbouring countries. Thus, member 
States will have to consider that their competitive edge (particularly in downstream bulk 
product industries, on which they are focusing) lies in proximity markets. This is even 
more true with the global liberalization of trade whereby competition is becoming tougher 
in the other export markets. Furthermore, since FDI is usually associated with the 
promotion of export industries, investors will not be attracted by an improved investment 
climate alone, but also need to be assured concerning the prospects of export to the 
regional market. 
It is to be expected that the current economic reforms and trade liberalization 
should help eliminate some of the regional trade barriers. This, however, is a long process. 
There is an immediate need for a clear policy commitment to free intraregional 
merchandise trade in manufacturing. This can be done by introducing measures 
eliminating or reducing the various existing non-tariff barriers (for example, complicated 
trade procedures, undue delays of clearances for entry of shipments at borders). 
(v) Finding other export outlets 
For the outward-looking industrial strategy to succeed in the ESCWA region, new 
export outlets for the region's manufactured products in neighbouring major regions need 
to be found. The European Union and (for the GCC) the Far East are good outlets. 
Various challenges will be faced in accessing the European Union (and other major 
markets). Particular reference is made to the difficulty in adhering to the coming 
international standards22 and related tools and specifications and to other quality controls 
and environment considerations. This entails serious efforts on the part of exporters in the 
region to meet these requirements. 
As mentioned earlier in the section on the Uruguay Round agreements, one option 
for countries in the region is to consider joining the EU in a free-trade area, a proposed 
partnership association. This preferential access to the EU market, given to Eastern 
Europe and Turkey, would give preferences to exports from countries of the region relative 
to their Asian competitors. This could partly compensate for possible export losses that 
22 Including ISO 9000 and related standards. 
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may result from the liberalization of trade under the Uruguay Round. Under this 
partnership association, relations with each region are based on specific needs and 
capacities. The EU gives countries of the region a grace period of 10 years to adjust their 
socio-economic conditions to EU requirements. Countries of the region should investigate 
the possibility of maximizing their benefits in the negotiation of the proposed arrangement, 
as the EU has invariably declared that it has a vital interest in helping its neighbouring 
Mediterranean countries to overcome the difficulties they are facing. A free-trade 
arrangement with the EU may help the region in its economic revival in the long run and 
boost its manufacturing exports to the European market. This is an opportunity that should 
be given serious consideration from member States, because of its important socio- 
economic implications for the region. 
(vi) Attracting foreign direct investment 
The ability to attract foreign direct investment is becoming critically important in 
pursuing the new industrial export strategy, because competitive export industiy is usually 
built on foreign technology linked to FDI. Foreign firms, if well negotiated, not only bring 
with them capital and technical know-how, but also capabilities in marketing exports.2 
The success of the outward-looking industrial strategy in the region would greatly depend 
on accumulating marketing capabilities, particularly in the downstream industries. Exports 
of intermediate manufactured commodities greatly depend on price competitiveness and 
on product quality that meets world standards. Manufactured products with higher value 
added need to look for potential export markets. Exporters also need to identify and 
design the product for these markets, and this is a process that FDI usually facilitates 
(UNIDO, 1993). 
Countries in the region find it difficult now to attract FDI, as worldwide demand 
for foreign capital has increased, owing to increased trade liberalization and the 
introduction of economic reforms in other developing countries. Another factor is the 
transformation of the economies of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), and to a lesser extent China, into market economies. Added to this is the 
unification of the European market and the attraction it holds for foreign capital. These 
developments demonstrate how important it is for most countries of the region to improve 
the viability of their economic reform programmes and to implement them efficiently. 
They should aim at developing a more competitive and stable investment environment, 
particularly in regard to foreign investment. 
23 Export prospects and the transfer of technology are not automatic components of FDI. However, the 
receiving country can negotiate to include as a condition in the contract the export of products, the gradual transfer 
of technology and a gradual increase in local content. 
78 
(vii) Reforming the legal business system 
In line with GATI requirements, most of the countries in the region need to make 
their rules and regulations more transparent. Particularly, attention should be given to 
regulations relating to foreign investments, trade and property rights. Sound business 
conditions cannot exist unless the legal system is reformed to ensure the proper 
enforcement of contractual obligations, the protection of ownership rights, the guarantee 
of income repatriation, and provision for recourse against abuses. It should be noted that 
the ownership system in some countries of the region yields a "rent" to the local partner 
in a joint foreign partnership. Whether or not this discourages the development of 
manufacturing entrepreneurship and limits the expansion of manufacturing activities needs 
to be examined. 
4. The role ofprivate-sector institutions 
Private-sector institutions are expected to bear greater responsibilities in 
industrialization to compensate for the continuous decrease in the role of the State. 
In today's international environment, which is moving towards the liberalization 
of international trade and the deregulation of economies, industrial strategy and policies 
will no longer be shaped only by the State or be a monopoly of Governments. Until 
recently, industrial strategies, whether import-substitution and/or export-oriented, were 
formulated by Governments and implemented through policy measures and instruments 
such as subsidies, incentives, protection of industry, reduced tariffs and so forth. These 
promotional measures will be gradually phased out with the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round trade agreements. Private-sector firms and institutions must share more 
and more in the formulation and implementation of industrial strategy and industrial 
policies. Government, in cooperation with the private sector, will have to base its strategy 
on considerations oriented to market demand; it will be more interested in serving society's 
needs, rather than pursuing industrialization for industrialization's sake. 
However, the existing private-sector institutions are not yet prepared to cope with 
the increasing needs of private industrial firms, particularly small and medium-scale 
enterprises. These firms face considerable problems, mainly in the following four areas: 
• Administrative and bureaucratic procedures (registration, licensing, 
import-export regulations, tax and customs duties systems, etc.) 
• Access to finance (collateral, high cost incurred by financial institutions, 
etc.) 
• Access to information (on sources of raw and intermediate materials, on 
equipment and on technology, as well as on marketing outlets) 
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Management problems (entrepreneurial skills, lack of training, etc.) 
These problems require that private-sector institutions, together with government 
institutions, adopt policies and measures that may assist industrial firms in the following 
areas: simplifying administrative procedures; designing specific financing schemes for 
small enterprises; establishing centres and networks of information services; and 
entrepreneurial encouragement, advisory services and training. 
(a) Simplifying administrative procedures 
One of the most significant barriers to enterprise development in most ESCWA 
member countries is the complexity and number of procedures—forms and 
approvals—related to the establishment and operation of an industrial enterprise. This 
problem is made worse by the long delays that occur in the processing of the forms and the 
fact that several institutions and hidden intermediaries deal with the issuance of licences 
and approvals. Many entrepreneurs have difficulty obtaining information on what 
approvals and forms are required in establishing and running a business and on who the 
relevant authorities are to approach in this regard. In Egypt, for example, some private 
industrialists claim that it takes up to 30 official approvals and many intermediaries before 
a start-up is possible, with a resulting loss in time and money (ESCWA/UNDP, 1992). 
Thus, government bureaucracy and hidden intermediaries increases transaction costs for 
firms, and therefore reduces their competitiveness and discourages investors from starting 
up a business. 
Several attempts have been made by a number of countries to simplify 
administrative procedures or to establish one-stop shops for the administration of 
approvals. However, these attempts have not generally been successful, in view of the 
vested interests operating in many public institutions, and the considerable difficulty in 
reducing bureaucracy, which is inherent in the system of government institutions. 
In view of the above problems and facts, it is recommended that a private 
institution such as the chamber of industry and commerce take responsibility for handling 
all paperwork and whatever official approvals are required at the time. Such an institution 
should also provide the entrepreneur with the information related to the kind of approvals 
and forms required. A fee should be charged for the service provided by the private 
institution, but this fee should be lower than the costs that would be incurred by the 
entrepreneur if he or she handled his/her own paperwork. There is no doubt that such a 
service would greatly facilitate the operations of private firms and would encourage 
investors, particularly disadvantaged groups of the society (those who have no 
relations/connections with government officials), to start businesses. 
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(b) Designing financing schemes for small and medium-sized enterprises 
Lack of access to financing is considered one of the most important constraints on 
the industrial sector in the region, particularly in regard to small- and medium-scale 
business development projects. The difficulties facing industrial enterprises are not 
generally due to lack of funds in the region, but to four major reasons: The first is the 
relatively high costs that have to be borne by the financial institutions when administering 
loan financing, costs that are usually transmitted in an amplified form to industrial 
ventures. The second difficulty relates to the conditionalities imposed on credit by 
commercial banks as well as by most industrial and development banks. One of the most 
important conditions is the provision of collateral, which in most cases far exceeds the 
amount of the requested loan. This situation is further aggravated by the fact that 
machinery and equipment cannot generally be considered as part of the collateral. The 
third reason is that banks consider industrial enterprises, and even more so the small ones, 
as risky clients. The last reason involves the inexperience of small entrepreneurs in 
dealing with the complex procedures of the banks. 
Box 4. Financial support initiatives for small enterprises in Egypt 
Several initiatives have been made by institutions in the region, particularly in Egypt, to 
assist small industrial enterprises and meet their financial needs. The Social Fund for 
Development has a special programme for financing start-up and existing small and medium 
enterprises, where the lowest possible collateral requirement is imposed; equipment and final 
products can generally be considered part of the collateral. Two innovative schemes were 
introduced in the late 1980s: the first is the credit scheme of the Alexandria Businessmen's 
Association, which provides loans to small enterprises without collateral requirements; the 
second is the credit guarantee scheme introduced by the Credit Guarantee Corporation for 
Small-Scale Enterprises, whereby the Corporation guarantees up to 50 per cent of the total loan 
provided by commercial banks. 
Similar financial schemes have been established in several other countries: the 
Development and Employment Fund in Jordan, the Small Enterprise Development Unit in 
Yemen, credit institutions in the occupied territories and various international and local NGOs 
Innovative financial schemes need to be established and developed by private- 
sector initiatives. However, to have an effective impact on private-sector development, 
such schemes must: 
• Develop the capabilities of credit officers in the management of loans, 
and the evaluation and monitoring of industrial projects 
• Simplify the procedures followed by the credit institutions 
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• Promote the establishment of a credit guarantee scheme. Such schemes 
have the double advantage of solving the problems associated with 
collateral requirements for entrepreneurs and reducing the risk of non- 
payment of debts to credit institutions 
• Coordinate the institutions that provide fmancial support with institutions 
that provide non-financial support (training, counselling, management 
advice) 
• Assist entrepreneurs involved in new start-ups in improving their 
business plans 
(c) Establishing a network of information services 
In the modern business world it has become increasingly apparent that access to 
business information is a critical factor in the effective start-up and efficient operation of 
an industrial unit. Entrepreneurs in most ESCWA member countries lack ready access to 
information services and require information to enable them to make sound decisions on 
all facets of their operations. Small- and medium-scale businesses need: 
• Technical information on equipment and products 
• National and regional import and export statistics to guide investment and 
marketing decisions 
• Details on local, regional and international suppliers of equipment and 
raw materials 
• Information on regional and international companies offering technology 
transfer and product-licensing opportunities 
• Schedules of international trade fairs and exhibitions 
• Linkage and subcontracting information 
• Market statistics 
• Details on existing companies and competitors in the country where the 
business is operated and in the region 
• Lists of foreign buyers/importers 
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• Information on support institutions (training bodies, consultancy firms, 
etc.) in the region 
• Government regulations covering business activities 
• Sources of finance 
In the highly developed industrial economies of Europe and the United States, 
access to computerized databases on all kinds of business information is readily available. 
It is vitally important that ESCWA member countries act now to upgrade their sources of 
information, particularly for the small- and medium-scale enterprises who can least afford 
to waste scarce management time on lengthy searches for necessary information. It is 
recommended that a private-sector institution in each of the countries of the region 
establish a small-business information centre engaged in the collection and dissemination 
of relevant data, act as a "one-stop shop" for the provision of business information, and 
develop a working relationship (network) with similar private institutions in other ESCWA 
member countries in order to facilitate the flow of information among the countries of the 
region. 
The advantages of this proposed information network would be the following: 
Facilitating of access by small- and medium-scale enterprises in each 
country to the national-level information necessary to operate their 
businesses effectively 
Making possible a greater degree of regional cooperation by making 
available to companies in individual countries information from their 
neighbouring countries on: 
a. Suppliers of equipment and raw materials in the region 
b. Opportunities for regional linkage and subcontracting 
c. The availability of technical expertise in the region 
d. Support organizations in the region, for example training 
courses, consultancy firms 
e. Regional joint-venture, technology-transfer and licensing 
opportunities 
f. Import and export statistics 
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g. Trade fairs and exhibitions in the region 
Ensuring access by local companies to international sources of 
information 
(d) Entrepreneurial encouragement, advisory services and training 
The provision of advisory services, counselling and appropriate training to small- 
and medium-scale enterprises is an important ingredient of any national enterprise- 
development programme. The services being offered in most ESCWA member countries 
reveal the infrastructure for the provision of such services to be underdeveloped. 
As small enterprises are generally numerous and scattered, it would be difficult 
and costly to reach them all. The organization of SME into mutual support groups or 
associations based on occupation would facilitate the provision of consultancy and 
advisory services and the sharing of experiences among entrepreneurs. Common problems 
faced by the owners/managers could be addressed within the support group or association. 
When dealing with individual enterprise problems, counselling services need to be 
provided, preferably at the workplace. It is therefore recommended that associations of 
producers be established in all industrial branches, in order to facilitate the delivery of 
services to small and medium-scale enterprises. 
The problems encountered by SMEs need to be identified through an adequate 
survey of the target group of entrepreneurs. This should be undertaken before planning 
for or defming the services to be provided to entrepreneurs. A survey of this kind would 
make the entrepreneurs aware of their problems and their need for managerial and 
technical assistance. Many small entrepreneurs are not aware of their needs and or of the 
existence of small-business advisory agencies. 
Private-sector institutions are also required to secure the appropriate training 
courses for existing and potential entrepreneurs. Upgrading the managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills of enterprise owners constitutes an important factor in the survival 
and success of firms. As the countries of the region are undergoing drastic changes at the 
political and economic levels, it is essential to train entrepreneurs how to manage their 
enterprises under conditions of change, to enable them to cope with the new environment. 
Such training programmes would assist them at identifying and understanding the changes 
taking place at the national, regional and international levels. Training would also help 
them exploit the new opportunities brought about by these changes, and introduce the 
required changes in their own enterprises. 
The major problem faced in the provision of training courses would be to identify 
and locate these potential small-scale entrepreneurs. Start-Your-Own-Business (SYB) 
courses could be one of the means used to identify would-be entrepreneurs. SYB selects 
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individuals possessing certain character traits as potential entrepreneurs, through course 
promotion and selection interviews. SYB helps the selected individuals develop their 
entrepreneurial capabilities and transform their business ideas into real projects. It aims 
at increasing self-employment and the number of new businesses. It is important to note 
that without proper training, many new start-up businesses may fail. 
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR AN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 
The ideas presented here are an attempt to formulate a framework for a new 
industrial strategy for countries in the ESCWA region to help them face the challenges of 
the coming century. In a comparative assessment of the global economy and the capacities 
of States and societies to adjust to its endemic changes, the American historian Paul 
Kennedy observes that "more than any other developing region" the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa are the least prepared to meet the challenges of the next 
century (Kennedy, 1994). Equally pessimistic and critical of Arab chances in the next 
century is a 1995 World Bank study entitled Global Economic Prospects and the 
Developing Countries. It gives a bleak and pessimistic outlook for economic growth and 
development in the Middle East and North Africa. During the 1 980s, according to this 
study, the region's economic growth averaged less than I %, with the world average being 
over 3%. A combination of population growth rates of around 3%, faIling real oil 
revenues, dismal export performance, the terrible cost of two Gulf wars and several civil 
wars, and unending wasteful expenditure on military procurement have coalesced to 
undermine any meaningful future economic prospects for the region. 
While indeed the 1 980s represent a lost decade for the region and the early 1990s 
do not augur much improvement, the critics above fail to recognize the delimitating effects 
of hostile external influences, rapid and unpredictable structural changes in the new 
economy and some positive Arab achievements in the areas of education, health and basic 
infrastructural development. The real issues, however, remain: Why has development 
remained so illusive in the Arab world? What are the basic explanatory factors of this 
abysmally slow growth? What accounts for the success of the East Asians and many other 
developing regions that outperformed the Arabs? What is needed to reverse the economic 
slide? Can a collective Arab industrial strategy contribute to a brighter economic future 
for the region? Where does it begin? 
1. Anticipating global change 
The international economic environment that the region faces in the 1990s is 
dramatically different from the world of the 1950s or even the 1 980s. International 
competition is intensifying, and the basis of economic success is changing. Successive 
rounds of trade liberalization under GATT have led to major changes in world trade and 
to the rise of transnational corporations. Regional trading blocs dominated by the United 
States, Japan and the European Union are emerging and consolidating their markets. 
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Newly industrialized countries and areas such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province 
of China, Singapore and many others are increasing competitive pressures in many 
industries and setting strong examples for others to follow. 
The pace of technological change has also quickened and has increased the value 
and importance of research and development as the basis of competitiveness in the world 
markets. New technologies are changing the nature of economic activity. Worldwide 
advances in information technology are improving productivity in all industries. They are 
widely accessible and relatively inexpensive. Software has replaced hardware as the major 
ingredient for improving efficiency and realizing competitive advantage. Advanced 
materials are replacing natural resources, resulting in drastic declines in the resource 
intensities of products. Japan's industrial production almost tripled between 1965 and 
1985, while the consumption of energy and raw materials hardly increased. 
Concern for the environment has grown. Governments in the industrialized 
countries are strengthening environmental standards. More efficient and cleaner 
technologies are being adopted to meet mounting consumer demands and to satisfy 
regulations stipulating environmentally sound products and services. 
The personal computer, flexible manufacturing, the information highway of the 
INTERNET and the World Wide Web, telematics, fibre optics and bioengineering have 
transformed the classical international economy. The new economy in its most 
fundamental arrangement is global, just as the classical economy was in its essential aspect 
national. 
The new global economy comes in the wake of flexible, split and high-tech 
manufacturing replacing old Fordist economies of scale and smokestack integrated 
production. It is organized by transnational companies based on a web of relationships 
that run laterally across national boundaries, and it inverts the pyramidal structure of 
industrial decision-making and production cycles associated with the classical nation-State 
economy. Global manufacturing within the new arrangements takes advantage of split 
production runs to locate in different national jurisdictions, sets up one jurisdiction against 
another to maximize cost reductions, increases savings in taxes, avoids environmental 
regulations, enhances control and discipline over workers and unions, and offers political 
favours without demands for national accountability. 
Global finance, decoupled from production, is now virtually unregulated and 
maintains a multicountry round-the-clock electronic network transferring on a weekly basis 
multiples of the international volumes of trade over a whole year (Drucker, 1986). It 
moves freely across borders at lightning speed, bringing together remote Moroccan 
villages with financial wizards on Wall Street in New York or in Tokyo. The network is 
centred in cities and not States and has developed a supranational power of its own in 
which Governments are increasingly beholden and accountable to external bond markets 
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rather than their own citizens. Their options in exchange rate policy fiscal and monetary 
policy, and industrial and trade policy have all become constrained by financial interests 
linked to the global economy. 
A survey by the Bank of Canada of the Canadian foreign exchange market in 
April 1992 estimated average transactions in excess of $22 billion per business day. Put 
on a yearly basis, this amounts to $5.5 trillion. The value of all Canadian exports and 
imports in 1992 was approximately $304 billion. Seen in this light, financial dollar 
transactions are 18 times larger than trade. A decade earlier this ratio was less than 7 to 
1. Explosive growth in speculation in international currency exchange can also be traced 
to deregulation in financial markets and the prevailing system of floating (market- 
determined) exchange rates. Today, no country is immune from the speculators. Their 
reach is so pervasive that even the United States, the largest economy in world, has 
experienced pressure on its currency from speculators. There is an estimated trade of 
United States currency of one trillion dollars per business day. Prices of currencies no 
longer reflect cost or preference differentials or other relevant economic conditions but 
rather mirror the fancies of currency speculators. Reacting to rumours, these people can 
change the fate of a currency and with it the economic well-being of millions of people. 
Recent research has demonstrated that financial markets usually overreact to any new 
information. Overreacting means that the price fluctuation will be larger than what is 
warranted by economic conditions. On the other hand, multinational corporations have 
become more autonomous than Governments, while international finance looms 
autocratically over the real economy. 
The third-world debt problem will take precedence over other development 
difficulties. Under structural adjustment programmes, States are required to impose 
domestic austerity, which has the effect of raising unemployment, domestic prices and 
social tensions. Often the weakest groups in society are left to shoulder the brunt of the 
adjustment costs of these harsh measures that are ultimately designed to ensure that these 
countries can and will pay their debts to first-world banks and Governments. 
2. Structural problems of the ESCWA region economy and industry 
The structural weaknesses in the region's economy and industrial sector have been 
the main reason for its inability to adjust to global change. They may also impede the 
region's effort to meet the challenges of peace, as well as those posed by the changes in the 
international economic environment. During the 1970s and l980s the economic growth 
of the region masked many of its structural problems. These problems are now emerging 
with force and posing serious threats to future development. Below, a brief account of the 
salient problems in the economic structure and manufacturing sector is presented. 
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(a) Structural economic problems 
The following features characterize most of the economies of the ESCWA 
member States. 
Heavy reliance on revenues from oil. Often it is argued that the 
difficulties in the I 980s were caused by falling oil prices. However, the 
fact that oil prices can so adversely affect all economic indicators of 
performance is itself revealing. In this respect, the continuous heavy 
dependence on oil revenues is symptomatic of economic failure. This 
dependence has propagated an "Arab disease" that raised the exchange 
values of most currencies in the region to the detriment of effective 
manufacturing exports. It inflated costs of production and undermined 
local industry and agriculture. It flooded domestic markets with large 
volumes of cheap imports that ultimately compromised the balance of 
payments of even the richest States, and engendered unsustainably high 
consumption patterns divorced from high levels of production. It 
encouraged investments in large projects that were often unnecessary and 
unproductive, and ultimately saddled the economy with large 
maintenance costs. It also bloated the bureaucracies with overlapping 
rings of rent seekers, divorced income from production and exposed the 
domestic economies to the wide fluctuations of the world market for oil, 
over which the region had little control. 
• Income and wealth inequalities within and between countries of the 
region. This is manifested in limited domestic purchasing power, a 
phenomenon that has reduced the capacity of the local market to sustain 
local production. It has also undermined health and education 
opportunities for the masses, which hampers the growth of labour 
productivity. 
• Heavy reliance on precarious external sources offinance at the expense 
of developing domestic savings or developing effective vents for regional 
savings. Domestic savings are in fact exceptionally low. This 
phenomenon perhaps is the most visible drain on sustainable economic 
development in the region. No economy can enjoy continuous growth 
without strong domestic sources of development finance. All high- 
performing economies of the NICs enjoyed high savings ratios (in the 
Republic of Korea the savings ratio amounted to 3 7%). The oil 
producers in the ESCWA region had some very high savings ratios in the 
1970s and early 1980s, but these ratios have since dropped dramatically. 
Jordan shows a negative ratio; investment in Jordan is financed from 
external sources. The fact that for many Arab countries, domestic savings 
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ratios are below the investment shares in GDP signifies that they are 
resorting to foreign aid or borrowing to finance their investment activity. 
This recourse is surely unsustainable. 
It should not, therefore, be surprising to know that the ESCWA member 
countries are the recipient of the highest per capita official development 
assistance (ODA) in the world. As a percentage of GDP this aid is over 
3.4%. Only in sub-Saharan Africa is the share of ODA in GDP higher. 
Revenues from natural resources, foreign aid and other external sources 
of aid together reduced the incentive to develop savings from domestic 
and other sources of income. There is ample evidence that countries that 
depend on natural resources and unearned finance tend to behind 
economies that have to rely on domestic productive activities.2 
Dependence on external sources of finance is also manifested by a high 
level of indebtedness in the ESCWA member countries. Egypt's public 
foreign debt in 1990 was put modestly at $34.2 billion. This debt was 
less than $1.5 billion in 1970. It was twice as large as that of the 
Republic of Korea. By 1990, Kuwait accumulated a total external debt 
of $34 billion. The debt of the Syrian Arab Republic amounted to $16 
billion and that of Jordan to $7.5 billion. External debt as a ratio of 
exports is over 180% for all the Arab countries in 1990. It was over 
52.6% of the region's GNP in the same year. The latter ratio is the 
highest for all developing regions except sub-Saharan Africa. Servicing 
the debt exacts a heavy toll from the economy. Measured as a percentage 
of exports, it exceeded 24.4% in 1990, rising from 16.4% in 1980. 
Interest payments alone on this debt absorb 8.1% of the export proceeds 
of the region. The average effective interest rate on this debt was 7.7% 
in 1990; it was about one percentage point above the average interest rate 
charged on the external debts of low- and middle-income countries. The 
average maturity of Arab external debt was 13 years, compared with 18 
years for low- and middle-income countries in 1990. The maturity 
average was 17 years in 1970. This suggests that the burden of external 
indebtedness in the region is rising. Debts have to be paid more rapidly, 
the interest rates are higher and the export income from which payments 
can be effected is falling. 
24 
Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvards Institute for International Development document the 
evidence that over the long run, exports of natural resources are negatively correlated with high growth. The New 
York Times. 21 September 1995. 
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• High levels of illiteracy, particularly among females, as well as low 
levels of education among the labour force 
• Large, excessive and perhaps wasteful expenditures on military 
hardware and systems 
• Very high overall GDP growth rates in the ESCWA region between 1965 
and 1980. Only East Asia and the Pacific showed higher rates. These 
high rates were apparently triggered by high oil prices. GDP growth rates 
slipped to less than 0.5% between 1980 and 1990, the lowest 
performance among all regional groups of developing countries. Very 
low growth rates in industry are responsible for this dismal performance, 
but again, the main reason is the drastic fall in oil prices and the major 
declines in the incomes of the oil-rich Gulf States. 
• The food imports of the ESCWA region, the largest among all regions in 
the developing world. Most ESCWA member countries also received 
high levels of food aid. Fertilizer consumption per hectare, which proxies 
for modem agriculture, is below the average of low-and middle-income 
countries. Food production indices show below-average production 
increases in the region, with 1979/1 981 as the base. 
• Growth of public consumption at unprecedented rates in the 1970s, 
supported by oil revenues and aid from oil-rich countries. All these rates 
declined drastically between 1980 and 1990. Private consumption 
growth rates increased between 1965 and 1980, and then the rate of 
growth declined between 1980 and 1990. The rate of decline in private 
consumption was significantly less pronounced than that in public 
consumption during the same period. The most dramatic economic 
difficulty is reflected in the negative growth rates of gross domestic 
investment. The excessive reliance of most ESCWA member countries 
on external sources of finance to support their domestic investment is 
responsible for the negative growth rates in investment. 
• The export-oriented nature of all ESCWA region economies. The foreign 
trade percentage (exports plus imports as percentage of GDP) is very 
high. Arab oil-producing countries typically show export shares that 
exceed 40% and even 60%. Non-oil-based Arab economies are also 
highly exposed to trade. This exposure, measured by the share of exports 
of goods or nonfactor incomes (exporting the producer) in GDP, is also 
relatively high. It is perhaps important to note that the high share of 
exports to GDP is more the result of nonfactor incomes than the exports 
of merchandise. 
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Decline in the terms of trade and export. While exports from East Asia 
and the Pacific grew at 9.8% annually between 1980 and 1990, they 
declined in the Arab region at the rate of 1.1% per year. Taking 1987 as 
the base year, the terms of trade (ratio of export prices to import prices) 
declined from 130% in 1985 to 96% in 1990. The slide has continued 
into the mid-1990s. Most regions of the developing world experienced 
similar declines in their terms of trade but none as severe as that of the 
Arab region. 
(b) Structural problems in manufacturing 
The following can be said about the structural problems that have negatively 
affected the development of the manufacturing sector: 
• Low levels of research and development and slow rates of technological 
diffusion. Egypt is one Arab country that has mounted a credible research 
and development programme, but it underperforms its competitors in the 
third world and is far below the record of developed countries. ESCWA 
member countries have shown a perverse tendency to pursue turnkey 
technological projects with limited or no transfer of technical knowledge 
to the local labour market. There is also in several ESCWA member 
countries slowness in adopting new technologies. 
• Lack of established clusters offirms. It has become widely recognized 
that over the long run, sustainable competitive advantages develop in 
clusters of linked industries. The industrial structures of ESCWA 
member countries are typically fragmented and weakly articulated. There 
have been some successful attempts in building large industrial cities (for 
example, Yanbu and Jubeil in Saudi Arabia), but much more is needed 
than building on technical affinities. 
• A shortage of medium-sized and large firms with a home base in the 
ESCWA region. The branch plant organization of multinationals has 
often resulted in poor development of local skill and fewer spin-off 
industries than in other regions of the world. Small firms can not 
undertake research and development and are too fragile to compete in the 
increasingly globalized world markets. 
• Under-investment in training and slow adoption offlexible workplace 
organizations compared with other more advanced developing countries 
• Inadequate financing for technology- and export-oriented companies 
91 
• Lopsided industrial structures. Many of the region's economies cannot 
on their own provide for sustainable investment nor do they have the 
ability to create an environment that would provide local opportunities for 
local labour. 
• Relatively modest manufacturing activity in most ESCWA member 
countries. The region seems to depend rather strongly on primary 
production, and manufacturing activity has remained limited or stagnant. 
Primary products accounted for over 98% of ESCWA members' exports 
in 1965. This share declined to 87% in 1990. This very excessive 
proportion indicated reliance on the export of oil. Machinery and 
equipment were less than 1% of total exports in 1965 and in 1990. 
Chemicals and refined petroleum exports increased, and so did textiles 
and clothing, but these increases remained modest, particularly in 
comparison with other successful developing regions. For most regions, 
exports of machinery and transport equipment increased between 1965 
and 1990, but this was not true of the ESCWA region. 
• Per capita manufacturing value added in the region that is below the 
average of low- and middle-income countries. It is significantly below 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, for example. 
• Domination by textiles, clothing, agro -food and chemicals in the ESCWA 
region's manufacturing sector. Machinery and transport equipment 
manufacturing show very low shares by all standards. 
• Drastic drop in total factor productivity (residuals in production 
functions) and partial factor productivity (average input productivity) in 
textiles and in engineering manufacturing in Egypt between 1980 and 
1990. Both indicators were rising in the 1 970s. Comparable data in the 
rest of the Arab world is not available, but the experience of other Arab 
countries in this regard is likely to be the same as that of Egypt. 
In conclusion, the economies of the ESCWA member countries today, as in 1970, 
lack diversity. Oil exports are still the exclusive economic engine of the region. 
Rentierism is a widespread phenomenon and is not restricted to the oil-rich countries. 
There is now a secondary dependence on oil revenues throughout the region. Exports of 
manufactured renewable commodities and services contribute very modestly to the 
external sources of finance of all Arab countries. Non-oil-producing ESCWA member 
countries have exported their producers to the Gulf and have enjoyed the convenience of 
remittances at the expense of the development of domestic exports. Manufacturing 
activity outside oil is limited, disarticulated, traditional, inward-looking and 
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technologically dependent on outside sources. Only limited technological capabilities have 
developed within the region, and there is strong preference for turnkey projects. 
Expenditures on research and development are modest if not totally absent. Regional 
cooperation is a slogan without any real economic transactions behind it. Most ESCWA 
member countries are linking up with non-Arab economic centres with little or no concern 
for their Arab neighbours. External indebtedness is massive and is beginning to sap the 
energies of the region. The ESCWA region is still gambling on "sunset" industries and 
old Fordist and smokestack manufacturing activities. There is little evidence of the new 
economy in the industrial structures of most Western Asia economies. Domestic savings 
are inadequate; they rarely finance investment. High and unproductive consumption habits 
have been staunchly ingrained in the operating systems of most Arab societies. Illiteracy 
is still excessively high. Mean years of schooling have increased but remain far below 
other successful developing countries. Industrial policies are either too stringent or absent 
altogether. 
Surely these are serious problems, and there is little that an industrial policy 
framework can do to deal with them. However, an appreciation of what went wrong and 
the acknowledgement that simplistic and borrowed solutions will not suffice is critical for 
reversing the negative operating mechanism of the region's slow-down and 
underdevelopment. 
(c) A framework for an industrial strategy 
The future of the Western Asia economy depends on collective action and on how 
Governments, business, investors, workers and communities respond to the challenges 
before them. 
There is a critical need for broad-based agreement among the countries of the 
region on what it takes to succeed in the global economy. They need a common sense of 
purpose and a shared vision that will help them improve their productivity, their 
competitiveness in the world, their structures and institutions and the overall standard of 
living of the common people. Individual State action is necessary but not sufficient; it will 
always be small and insignificant in today's global world markets, next to today's giant 
multinationals. ESCWA member countries need a collective, cooperative and innovative 
industrial policy as part of a broader economic renewal agenda. This effort is not about 
setting out elaborate blueprints for the economy, nor is it about establishing an array of 
expensive government programmes. Rather, it is about providing a framework that 
enables all segments of society to work together as partners. Grand schemes and large 
government programmes did not bear the fruits they were supposed to in this region. 
While some of these blueprints and grand schemes were necessary at the earlier stages of 
development, they are no longer workable. Development is too complex a process for a 
single sector or scheme to carry through. 
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The need for a new industrial framework stems from four basic factors: 
• The global economic environment is changing. 
• The Arab economy must overcome some severe structural problems 
• New competitive advantages must be created 
• Critical masses in strategic domains must be established. 
(i) Strengthening compet itive fundamentals 
The ESCWA region needs to move away from the rentier economies that 
emerged from the increase in oil revenues in the 197 Os: what constituted an advantage in 
the past could become a constraining factor in the future. The economy of the region must 
be anchored on a diversified industrial structure and on high-productivity activities 
sustaining high-value-added and renewable production. This will increasingly depend on 
building capabilities for innovation, as well as entrepreneurial and technical skills, and on 
a frill-fledged and deliberate entry into the new economy. 
To move into high-value-added and renewable production, the countries 
of the region must build and strengthen their competitive fundamentals. These call for 
both macroeconomic and sectoral policies outside the industrial sector. The latter will not 
take root in the economy of the region without the accommodating influence of a 
favourable macroeconomic environment that includes: 
• Massive literacy campaigns 
• Improving, balancing and reforming the education systems 
• Serious de-bureaucratization and reduction of administrative procedures 
• Empowerment of the private sector and community initiatives through 
partnerships with the public sector 
• Effective policies and institution-building to encourage and develop 
domestic savings 
Raising skill levels (learning by doing and massive training programmes) 
Increasing domestic technological capabilities (building centres of 
excellence and technological incubators) 
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• Developing linkages and networks within each State and among Arab 
States 
• Building international capabilities 
• Increasing the share of the new economy 
• Continuous innovation 
Each one of these elements is a subject requiring extensive research. What is 
intended here is a general outline of the fundamentals that have to be debated. These 
variables have been selected because they are proven ingredients in the success of other 
advanced and rapidly developing countries: they address directly observed weaknesses in 
the Western Asia economies; they build on the region's strengths as a means to meet the 
challenges facing it; and they create large indirect and spin-off benefits throughout the 
region's economies. 
Focusing on the competitive fundamentals and increasing value-added activities 
that are divorced from natural resource dependency have implications for change 
throughout the economy—for business, for sectors, for individual State Governments, for 
regional institutions and for the region's economy and society as a whole. 
Governments will still have to act in the following critical areas that can make for 
a competitive society: 
Changing the role and composition of investment by placing more 
emphasis on investment in human resources: investing in people, training 
and knowledge 
Changing the way the public sector relates to the private sector: 
emphasizing development of sectoral strategies, strategic groups of 
companies, community initiatives and regional cooperation 
Changing methods of managing economic change: finding winners and 
creating flexible systems for a more adaptable economy 
Changing the structure of bureaucracy: emphasizing efficiency, merit, 
accountability, transparency and integrity 
Changing the balance of power between the public sector and civil 
society: emphasizing balance and empowerment of institutions that 
mediate between the State and the citizens 
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(ii) Increasing value-added content 
Although Governments have a vital role to play in the economic development 
process, they alone cannot make the policy work. There should be a collective approach 
in order to develop an economy with the capacity to upgrade and move continuously to 
higher value added so as to be compatible with the newer realms of the international 
economy. 
The industrial policy defined here is not a budget, nor a short-term stabilization 
policy nor even a plan. It is a framework that is intended to create a shared vision and a 
common sense of direction to shape the way all segments of the economy and society can 
work together. 
Value added is the difference between an industiy's total sales and the cost of raw 
materials and the goods and services it buys from other industries. The higher the value 
added, the larger the income that can be shared by business, labour and Government. 
Companies can increase their value added by becoming more efficient and reducing unit 
costs. Alternatively, they can produce something that is worth more to their customers. 
Higher value-added-activities include continuous improvements in design and engineering, 
research and development, training, marketing, quality control and customer service. 
Other activities such as organizational innovations, greater workplace flexibility, adoption 
of state-of-the-art technologies and reducing cycle times can dramatically reduce cost or 
material inputs and thereby increase value added. 
Moving into higher value added is not a one-time event or a destination. It is a 
process. Higher value added is the result of both doing different things and doing them 
differently. In the ESCWA region, moving into higher value added takes the following 
principal directions: 
Moving away from exclusive dependence on oil and oil-related 
production. There is indeed higher value added in moving upstream and 
downstream in oil processing, and this should be exploited. But the 
ESCWA region should also increasingly move away from oil and from 
its dependence on natural resources. This is needed to diversify 
economic structures, markets, technological capabilities and skills and to 
circumvent rampant rentierism in the Arab economy. 
• Developing a stronger presence in the new economy, where industries 
grow rapidly, are less volatile and create new knowledge 
• Emphasizing renewability (sustainability). It does not make any sense to 
build industrial foundations on a nonrenewable resource that will 
disappear in the lifetime of the present generation's grandchildren. 
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Moving into higher value added will require a great deal of research and 
development and an emphasis on technological capabilities. These are 
precisely the areas in which a fundamental structural weakness exists in 
the region's economy of today. 
• It is to be noted that depending on low wages to compete on the world 
market is no longer possible. Most wages in the region are under 
pressure from wages and alternative employment in the Gulf that are 
relatively high. 
Moving to a more diversified and higher-value-added economy is not a matter of 
Governments deciding which industries are going to be "winners" in the future and which 
are going to be "losers." The higher value added concept is relevant to all participants in 
the economy. Indeed, ESCWA member countries will have to encourage the shift to 
higher value added by strengthening their competitive fundamentals. This shift also 
depends on creating the appropriate economic environment for entrepreneurial growth and 
choice. It is promoted as well by increasing knowledge about the new economy, and also 
by furthering the development of local and regional technological capacities and 
strengthening the region's technological infrastructures by promoting Arab centres of 
excellence in technology. These centres can be housed in universities or even 
manufacturing institutes. Governments all over the world are nurturing and promoting the 
development and spread of technological incubators, where small inventions are developed 
and transferred to the market. Developing technological capabilities is not divorced from 
technological diffusion. It is typically the case even in the most advanced economies that 
individual companies do not invest in the R&D that is optimal for the economy. 
Governments are called upon to support these initiatives. Tax holidays have proven less 
efficient than direct support, including direct support for the creation of centres of 
excellence or technological incubators. 
(iii) Adopting a new policy towards transnationals 
Foreign investment may or may not be totally and unequivocally beneficial to the 
national economy. It is beneficial to the extent that it develops home-based activities for 
branch plants of transnationals in the region. Global corporations sometimes have multiple 
home bases—various countries are the home base for different lines of business. 
Transnationals should produce sufficient benefits in the domestic economy. These 
benefits tend to rise when these transnationals give "product mandates" or some similar 
arrangement to their branches in the region. In the absence of meaningful Arab economic 
cooperation and integration, there are no real chances for meaningful and productive 
foreign investment in the Arab world. 
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Split production (where developing countries obtain the manufacturing of a 
fraction of a product), the abuse of political favours, tax holidays, and treating developing 
countries as environmental sinks have reduced the benefits of foreign investment and 
transnationals in the pursuit of higher-value-added renewable production. It is hoped that 
countries of the region will insist on product mandates and home-based manufacturing 
from the transnationals. It is only then that branches of transnationals will accelerate 
economic development by expanding the pool of technology skills available to other 
industries in the ESCWA region. In addition, home-based companies help create strong 
linkages with other local or regional Arab companies and sectors in their drive to innovate 
continuously, and they are more likely to demand and support innovation from their local 
or regional Arab suppliers and to have valuable information on future industiy 
developments to share with other firms. 
An Arab investment development office should be established to negotiate with 
foreign investors on behalf of the region to reduce harmful and injurious competition 
among the Arabs for the same investors and to derive more accommodating conditions for 
the benefit of the local economies. 
(iv) Strengthening regional cooperation 
Medium- and large-sized enterprises have shown a stronger tendency to engage 
in R&D and to innovate. There are not many firms with the appropriate size in the 
ESCWA region. This is because most State economies among ESCWA member countries 
are too small to permit efficient scales of production. Enterprises in the region are small 
because state markets are small. Moving to world markets would require more than 
efficiencies in size, although this latter factor is also essential for other competitive 
advantages. Creating networks and linkages among firms can be an indirect way of 
overcoming size difficulties. Networks of linked firms, industries and institutions could 
achieve competitive advantage more readily than an individual firm or industry. Such 
networks would be characterized by an interplay of competitive and cooperative 
relationships, which would help to create competitive advantage by stimulating technology 
transfer, continuous innovation and skill development and training. The synergies 
generated through cooperation among firms and institutions could spark new cooperative 
initiatives among ESCWA member countries, create vested interest in regional cooperation 
and cement the integration of markets and energies. Through cooperation, companies 
could carry out projects or make investments that would be too large or ineffective for a 
single firm to tackle alone. Cooperation would enable firms to undertake complementary 
initiatives and make mutually reinforcing investments. Information flows that guide 
strategic decisions are also accelerated through linkages and networks. Networks tend to 
agglomerate together and spawn new supporting initiatives. Although linkages offer many 
benefits to companies, Arab companies have not fully capitalized on these potential 
benefits, as few linkages have been established so far. 
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The countries of the region should develop sector partnership funds and other 
sectoral initiatives among regional private sectors to consolidate their networks and 
intensify their contacts. More public investment in network-specific types of infrastructure 
will be needed, particularly in the informational infrastructure. 
Small enterprises face particular difficulties in building international capabilities 
because of the lack of information, know-how and investment funds. The long-term 
success and growth of these firms frequently depends on their taking advantage of 
international trade, investment and technology-acquisition opportunities. ESCWA 
member countries should therefore establish trade promotion offices in key international 
locations or use their embassies for such functions. However, this presupposes a 
development of alliances among companies across States to share marketing campaigns, 
know-how and information. Alliances here should involve foreign finns. It is these 
alliances that provide access to international markets and new technologies. 
(d) Summary and conclusion 
Natural resource dependency has reduced ESCWA member countries' incentive 
to diversify their economies, develop alternative manufacturing capacities, promote export- 
oriented industries, encourage domestic savings and anchor income on solid productivity 
grounds. Traditional economic activities and structures have been maintained. 
Dependence on external sources of fmance has deepened and economic performance has 
slipped. Although large oil revenues brought about significant improvements in health, 
education and infrastructure throughout the ESCWA region, they diminished the incentive 
to capitalize on these achievements. The region's economic performance in the I 980s is 
symptomatic of an "Arab disease" that is more fundamentally damaging than the "Dutch 
disease" that afflicted Holland in the 1 940s following the discovery and commercialization 
of natural gas. ESCWA member countries have weak manufacturing structures, high 
illiteracy rates, limited industrial skills, poor savings ratios, low levels of manufacturing 
exports, inadequate R&D, high indebtedness, small companies with limited international 
experience, limited regional cooperation and trade, heavy dependence on Government, 
inefficient bureaucracies, limited private-sector participation, and above all a very 
unfavourable and hostile international economic environment. The region's competitive 
fundamentals are weak and deficient. However, negative economic trends can be reversed; 
the required effort is massive and the conditions are unfavourable, but it can be done. 
The framework for an industrial strategy developed here calls for cooperative 
efforts among all participants in the economy and among ESCWA member countries. 
Regional cooperation is vital. Synergies among industries are critical. Moving into 
higher-value-added activities is imperative. Rentierism must be cleansed from the 
operating mechanisms of the society and economy. A necessary condition for a more 
secure and sustainable future is a proper balancing of production structures, regional 
allocations of investment, income and consumption, domestic savings and investment, and 
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incomes and production. Reducing dependence on natural resources calls for 
supplementing the rent on these resources with other sources of income, particularly from 
renewable sources of production. Knowledge-based industries are key activities to 
consider for the future. Networks and linkages must be forged among firms and States. 
Collective action in the face of the region's diminishing political and economic bargaining 
power is a prudent option. 
The framework is neither a blueprint for the economy nor a government 
programme. It is above all a brutal diagnosis of the region's economic failures of the 
1 980s and an attempt to sketch a vision of a common for all to work harmoniously 
together. ESCWA member countries have perfected individual action, particularistic 
pursuits and the fragmentation of effort. The challenges are difficult and many but the 
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II. THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON ESCWA 
MEMBER COUNTRIES 
by Mohsen Helal 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The decision to launch a new round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs) was taken in September 1986, when ministers meeting during a special session 
of the Contracting Parties at Punta del Este adopted the Ministerial Declaration on the 
Uruguay Round. This initiative was preceded by long and difficult preparatory 
negotiations. When the idea of embarking on a new round of MTNs emerged soon after 
the 1982 GAIT Ministerial Meeting, it was not favoured by developing countries, which 
saw the implementation of the commitments provided for in the 1982 work programme 
as a prerequisite for initiating a new negotiating process; they also opposed the 
introduction of services and other new issues and sectors under the aegis of GAY!'. It took 
the Contracting Parties several years of consultations, followed by tough bargaining in the 
Preparatory Committee (November 1985), to have their trade policy priorities included in 
the agenda and to reach a decision on the launching of a new round. 
The negotiating structure for the Uruguay Round reflected the complexity and 
variety of the issues to be addressed. At the top of the pyramid was the Trade Negotiating 
Committee (TNC), designated as the principal body for supervising the negotiations and 
providing guidelines for the activities of the Group for Negotiations on Goods (GNG) and 
the Group for Negotiations on Services (GNS). Actual negotiations on trade in goods 
were carried out by the Fourteen Individual Negotiating Groups, which covered each of 
the subjects listed in part one of the Uruguay Round Declaration; these groups reported 
to the GNG and sought its advice. Negotiations on trade in services, covered by part two 
of the Punta del Este mandate, were conducted by the GNS. It was also agreed that the 
implementation of the standstill and rollback commitments would be monitored by a 
surveillance body established for that purpose. 
The Uruguay Round was unique in the history of GAIT both in its coverage of 
issues and in the related complexity of its negotiating structure. The negotiations were 
launched against the background of commitments by all participants not to introduce new 
trade restriction measures (as per GAIT provisions) and to gradually phase out existing 
ones. The Uruguay Round inherited a number of deep-rooted problems which could not 
be effectively addressed at the Tokyo Round or in the subsequent work programmes 
adopted by the Contracting Parties. It was recognized that the lack or inadequacy of 
multilateral trade-related disciplines in such areas as agriculture, textiles and subsidies bore 
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heavily on multilateral relations and constituted one of the principle causes of the erosion 
of the multilateral trading system. 
The scope of the Uruguay Round extended beyond the traditional issues covered 
in previous multilateral trade negotiations, which primarily addressed the reduction of 
barriers against trade in goods at country borders. Sectors of particular and priority 
concern to developing countries were included in the negotiations, as were new sectors 
related to the evolving international structures of production and trade, including the 
movement of capital in the form of foreign investment, the development of new 
technologies, and the production of services including the movement of labour. The 
outcome has already significantly influenced the patterns of trade, competition, production, 
investments, domestic regulations and so on. The results of the Uruguay Round will 
therefore have a profound effect on developing country interests and on their prospects for 
accelerating their development processes. 
Contained in the ministerial declaration launching the Uruguay Round were a 
number of general principles governing negotiations (the need for transparency and for 
balanced concessions within a broad range of trade-related areas were underlined), but 
there were also several specific provisions incorporated to safeguard the interests of 
developing countries and to improve their negotiating prospects: 
• The principle of differential and more favourable treatment and other 
GATT provisions were applied to the outcome of the negotiations. 
• Developing countries were not expected to make concessions inconsistent 
with their individual development, financial or trade-related needs. 
• Any increases in a developing country's concessions would result in the 
progressive development of its economy and improvement in its trade 
situation. 
While the different developing countries emphasized individual subjects and 
issues of interest to them (including agriculture, textiles and services), they all accorded 
top priority to obtaining more liberal and secure access to the markets of developed 
countries, seeking specific concessions with respect to tariffs and non-tariff measures and 
the strengthening of multilateral rules, principles and disciplines to reduce restrictions on 
their trade. 
During the negotiations, developing countries emphasized the need to strengthen 
the multilateral trading system and protect trade liberalization through: 
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• Full respect for the principle of non-discrimination, including the 
automatic and unconditional application of most-favoured-nation 
treatment 
• The effective contribution of the international trading system to their 
development processes (allowing developing countries flexibility in 
their use of trade measures and allowing them to expand their exports 
in international markets) 
• The prohibition of market-sharing and managed trade arrangements 
• The prohibition of any unilateral actions outside the legal framework of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
• The strengthening of the dispute settlement system 
The Final Act Incorporating the Results of the Uruguay Round is the instrument 
which certifies that the entire set of agreements and schedules attached constitutes the 
results of the negotiations. By adopting the Final Act on 15 December 1993 and signing 
it at the ministerial level in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, the participating countries made 
a commitment to place the results before their national authorities for final approval and 
ratification according to their respective constitutional procedures. 
The implementation conference held on 8 December 1994 confirmed 1 January 
1995 as the date the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(the WTO Agreement) would enter into force. More than 100 countries, including 
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from the ESCWA region, 
completed this step necessary to become WTO Members. 
B. THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
1. The WTO Agreement 
The WTO Agreement creates a common institutional framework that 
encompasses the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as modified during the 
Uruguay Round (GATT 1994), all the agreements and instruments concluded under its 
auspices, and the comprehensive results of the Round. 
The highest-level body of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which meets 
at least once every two years. As provided for in the Agreement, the Ministerial 
Conference has established the Committee on Trade and Development, the Committee 
on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, and the Committee on Budget, Finance and 
Administration. It is important to mention that the Committee on Trade and Development 
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must periodically examine the special provisions in the agreements which favour least 
developed countries (LDCs) and submit reports to the General Council for the adoption 
of appropriate measures. 
The General Council is in charge of supervising the implementation of the WTO 
Agreement and the application of the ministerial decisions, and meets as appropriate. The 
General Council has the authority to deal with all trade-related issues covered by the Final 
Act and to set up subsidiaiy bodies. The Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for 
Trade in Services, and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights have been established and operate under the general guidance of the General 
Council. The General Council also discharges the responsibilities of the Dispute 
Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body. 
The main functions of the WTO are as follows: 
• To facilitate the implementation and administration of the WTO 
Agreement and to promote the achievement of its objectives 
• To provide a forum for future negotiations within the multilateral trading 
system 
• To administer the settlement of disputes 
• To administer the trade policy review mechanism 
• To cooperate with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
related bodies 
With the establishment of the WTO substantial modifications have been 
introduced in the overall system of rights and obligations. Contracting Parties to GATT 
1947 wishing to become Members of the WTO are required to accept all of the multilateral 
trade agreement& in the Final Act without reservation,2 and to submit country schedules 
of tariff concessions and specific sectoral concessions for trade in services. 
Most of the ESCWA member countries were not Contracting Parties to GAIT 
1947; before and during the Uruguay Round negotiations, Egypt and Kuwait were the only 
two. The main reason for this may be that the major countries of the region had no need 
to secure increased market access; most of them have traditionally relied upon crude oil, 
See annex Ito the present report. 
2 Except the four plurilateral agreements (see annex Ito the present report). 
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a few agricultural products, and a limited number of industrial items as their main export 
commodities. 
Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s most of the ESCWA 
member countries began to consider joining the multilateral trading system; many of them 
adopted market-oriented economic policies and started implementing national plans for 
economic reform. These plans aimed at the liberalization of foreign trade, with export 
promotion one of the main targets of the reform. In the meantime, the outcome of the 
Uruguay Round encouraged many countries in the region to apply for GATT/ WTO 
membership. 
Kuwait joined GATT' in 1963 and Egypt in 1970, and both countries participated 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations; Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were de 
facto members and joined GATT between the end of 1993 and early 1994. All five of 
these ESCWA member countries signed the Final Act in April of 1994. Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and Lebanon have applied to become WTO Members, and a working group has 
been established for the negotiation of their accession. Yemen has been considered a de 
facto GATT member for some time. 
2. Tariffs 
Tariffs are of particular interest to many developing and least developed countries, 
including those in the ESCWA region. 
A considerable number of ESCWA member countries have not joined the WTO. 
However, the issues of market access and international trade have a direct impact on all 
countries, and non-WTO Members may be more seriously affected than WTO Members 
by tariffs and non-tariff measures. All of the ESCWA member countries will be affected 
by the provisions of the agriculture, textile and clothing, and other Uruguay Round 
agreements. 
Previous rounds of GATT negotiations succeeded in reducing the import tariff 
levels maintained by industrialized countries. As a result of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, global tariff levels will be reduced by an estimated 33% to 40%, bringing the 
industrialized countries' tariff levels down from between 5% and 6% to an average of 3% 
to 4%. While this percentage reduction in the overall tariff level is large, the value of the 
actual tariffs in developed countries is quite low, so tariffs cannot be considered a trade 
barrier. The achievements of the Uruguay Round with respect to trade liberalization fall 
more in the area of non-tariff measures, whose incidence has been increasing in recent 
years (past negotiations failed to produce any satisfactory results in this regard). 
Preliminary studies have confirmed that some ESCWA member countries will 
experience an erosion of their preference margins for most of their exports to industrial 
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markets (under the Generalized System of Preferences, GSP); other countries have 
preferential agreements with the EU and will be similarly affected. 
3. (NTMs) 
During the Uruguay Round, the NTMs applied against certain product sectors 
(mainly agriculture and textiles) were dealt with, and the Tokyo Round Codes on NTMs 
such as subsidies and countervailing duties, technical barriers to trade, and customs 
valuation were revised. The Final Act contains separate agreements covering most of 
these issues, as well as two others related to rules of origin and preshipment inspection. 
The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection recognizes the need to establish an 
international framework for the rights and obligations of both importing and exporting 
Members, and provides for transparency in the operations, laws and regulations related 
to preshipment inspection. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 
contains an improved anti-dumping code which strengthens the requirement for 
importing countries to establish a clear causal relationship between dumped imports and 
injury to the domestic industry. It is important to mention that anti-dumping cases will 
be dropped (i.e., not considered by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) if the volume of 
dumped imports from the exporting country constitutes less than 3% of its exports of that 
commodity to a particular importing country. 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibits most types 
of export subsidies; however, there are certain exceptions. WTO Members whose per 
capita income levels amount to less than $1,000 a year are not required to remove such 
subsidies on products whose share in world trade is less than 3.25%; this applies to most 
of the countries of the ESCWA region and to a number of other developing countries as 
well. 
4. Agriculture 
One important output of the Uruguay Round was an agreement formulated to 
liberalize trade in agriculture, a sector which has been highly protected through the 
extensive use of subsidies, tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
There are commitments to reduce domestic support for agriculture. Domestic 
support for products, as determined by the aggregate measurement of support (AMS), 
should be reduced if it exceeds 5% of the value of production (10% for developing 
countries). It is important to mention that developing countries are exempt from this 
commitment in the areas of investment subsidies and agricultural input subsidies for low- 
income or poor producers. There are a number of domestic support policies to which 
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reduction commitments do not apply; the government service programmes included in 
this category relate to research, pest and disease control, training, extension and advisory 
services, inspection, marketing and promotion, and infrastructural services. 
There are specific commitments for countries to open up their import markets 
through tariff reductions and to eliminate all border measures which restrict imports. 
Developing countries have two thirds of the reduction commitments of developed 
countries and a longer application period (10 years instead of the six years for developed 
countries). 
Export subsidies on agricultural products have to be reduced over a six-year 
period to the extent of 36% on budgetary outlays and 21% on quantities benefiting from 
such subsidies. Developing countries have to undertake smaller reductions of 24% and 
16% respectively over a 10-year period and do not have to reduce subsidies related to 
export marketing costs. 
Most ESCWA member countries, as net importers of food and other agricultural 
products, will be affected by the agricultural reform programme: food import prices are 
expected to be higher over the short term owing to the reductions in domestic and export 
subsidies in developed countries. On the other hand, over the long term the programme 
may allow ESCWA member countries to enhance their production, which will affect 
price trends. After the Marrakesh meeting, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) began to review estimates of the additions to the food import bills 
for these countries. Previous studies conducted by international bodies and some 
individual countries need to be revised—with the final schedules of reduction 
commitments considered item by item—to reflect more realistic figures. The results of 
the revised studies are important for decision makers. 
A ministerial decision on measures concerning the possible negative effects of 
the Agreement on net food importing countries is intended to provide a mechanism to 
assist adversely affected countries. Although this decision lacks a concrete mechanism 
and operational guidelines, it is notable that the international community has recognized 
the problem and the need to negotiate related details during the implementation of this 
decision. Non-WTO Members will not be able to benefit from this compensation 
mechanism. 
5. Textiles and clothing 
International trade in textiles and clothing has been constrained for a number of 
decades by the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (also known as 
the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA), under which industrialized countries have 
protected their domestic textile and clothing sectors by imposing quotas on imports from 
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developing countries. Major textile exporters in the ESCWA region have quotas on 
some of their yarn, textile and clothing exports to the United States, the European 
Community and some of the other Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries. 
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round is the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing, which provides for the gradual integration of this sector into GATT. In other 
words, the MFA will be phased out, with integration occurring in four stages over a 
period of 10 years (1995-2000). The 10-year transition period provides some lead time 
for textile and clothing exporting countries in the ESCWA region—and those in other 
regions—to improve their competitiveness. Policy makers should take anticipatory steps 
during the transitional period, as they may not be able to take full advantage of certain 
opportunities once the MFA has been completely eliminated. All ESCWA member 
countries are small suppliers (the textile exports of each country do not amount to more 
than 1.2% of a country's imports of textiles), so they can benefit from the higher growth 
rate for the remaining quotas during the 10-year transition period. 
ESCWA member countries that have not joined the WTO are at a disadvantage, 
as the Uruguay Round agreements constitute commitments between Members only; for 
this reason, importers may not consider the elimination of quotas on textiles and clothing 
exported by non-WTO Members. 
6. Trade in services 
The objective of establishing a multilateral framework of principles and rules for 
trade in services and for the liberalization of trade in this sector was achieved through 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (OATS). The Agreement covers trade in 
services which occurs within the context of the following modes of delivery: 
• Cross-border supply 
• Consumption abroad 
• Commercial presence 
• The presence of natural persons 
An important general obligation under the GATS is the provision of most- 
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment for the services and service suppliers of any WTO 
Member country. Members have also agreed to progressively liberalize their imports of 
services to improve market access, and to make their laws and regulations relating to the 
services sector more transparent. The GATS provides for the progressive liberalization 
of trade in services through the scheduling of commitments. Market access and national 
treatment provisions apply to the service activities specified in the schedules of 
commitments and are subject to the terms and conditions specified therein. The GATS 
explicitly provides for future rounds of negotiations with a view to achieving 
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progressively higher levels of liberalization; the first round is to commence within five 
years of the entry into force of the Agreement. 
None of the services sectors are excluded from the scope of the Agreement; 
however, during the Uruguay Round negotiations the participants were free to specify 
the services for which they would provide market access and national treatment. As a 
result, there are important differences in the coverage of the various participants' 
schedules. The schedules of the major developed country participants, for example, 
cover almost all sectors, with exceptions in some areas such as maritime transport and 
audiovisual services. The sectoral coverage of commitments is generally lower for 
developing countries than it is for developed countries.3 Tourism-related services have 
the highest level of commitments, reflecting the current importance of this sector to the 
foreign exchange earnings of many developing countries. Some developing countries 
have also made commitments regarding financial services, business services and 
construction services. Negotiations are currently under way to expand existing 
commitments related to maritime transport, financial services and the movement of 
natural persons. Basic telecommunications, with respect to which it was generally 
agreed that commitments would not be made in this Round, are the subject of ongoing 
negotiations as well. 
7. Trade-related aspects of intellectual properly rights 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) was motivated by a desire to reduce distortions in international competition 
resulting from widely varying standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and from the lack of a multilateral framework of principles, rules and 
disciplines applicable to international trade in counterfeit goods. The TRIPs Agreement 
will be implemented during transition periods of one year for developed countries and 
five years for developing countries (a 10-year transition period also applies under 
particular circumstances outlined in the Agreement). 
Subject to limited exceptions, WTO Members must accord one another national 
and MFN treatment. The Agreement specifies minimum substantive standards of 
protection (building on those in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works) 
with respect to: copyright and related rights applicable to various types of works 
including computer programs, databases, sound recordings and films; trademarks and 
service marks; geographical indications including appellations of origin; patents; 
industrial designs; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed information 
including trade secrets. 
See annex II for the specific commitments of ESCWA member countries that belong to the 
WTO. 
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WTO Members must provide procedures and remedies under their domestic laws 
to ensure that intellectual property rights can be effectively enforced for both domestic 
and foreign rights holders; specifically required are provisions regarding evidence, 
damages, injunctions and other civil remedies including the right ofjudicial authorities 
to order emergency provisional action to be taken, special border measures against the 
importation of counterfeit (trademark) and pirated (copyrighted) goods, and criminal 
action including imprisonment and/or fines to deter wilful counterfeiting and piracy on 
a commercial scale. 
C. THE OUTCOME OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AND ITS PRELIMINARY 
IMPACT ON THE ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES 
The Final Act (28 texts) reflects the wide range of issues negotiated in the 
Uruguay Round and the comprehensive coverage they received; this Round clearly 
represented the most ambitious effort to negotiate the multilateral rules of international 
trade in the history of GATT. Uruguay Round coverage of the traditional area of trade 
in goods included sectors which had been accorded exceptional treatment in GATT for 
decades (agriculture and textiles), as well as completely new areas such as international 
trade in services and intellectual property rights. The new World Trade Organization is 
expected to establish and administer new international rules for these enlarged areas of 
activity. 
One of the main aims of this paper has been to provide a preliminary evaluation 
of the results of the Uruguay Round and their impact on ESCWA member countries. The 
most salient points in this regard include the following: 
• Some of the countries of the ESCWA region are Members of WTO, 
while others are not (see annex III); however, it should be noted that the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements will directly and/or 
indirectly affect both groups. 
Non-WTO Members will not be able to benefit from the increased 
market access associated with the tariff reductions and the elimination 
of non-tariff measures in sectors such as agriculture and textiles; in fact, 
they may even face more restrictions on their trade. 
Most of the ESCWA member countries are net food-importing countries 
and may therefore be negatively affected by the implementation of the 
Agreement on Agriculture in the short term, as the prices of agricultural 
products are expected to rise. However, the same countries are expected 
to gain from this scenario over the medium and the long term. 
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• All of the ESCWA member countries are either developing or least 
developed countries and are therefore eligible for special treatment in 
the provisions of all agreements. 
• The textile and clothing sector is important for some ESCWA member 
countries. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing aims to integrate 
this sector into the new world trading system, under which it is subject 
to the rules of fair competition. 
• The specific commitments related to GATS among WTO Member 
countries of the ESCWA region can lead to increased investments in 
these areas, and can also facilitate the transfer of technology. The 
countries of the region should study the specific commitments of other 
Members with a view to promoting market access for their services 
sectors in the international market. 
• The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights may have a negative impact on some industries in the ESCWA 
region (mainly in the area of patents, and particularly in relation to 
chemical and pharmaceutical products); however, it may also lead to 
increased foreign investments in these areas. 
In-depth studies must be carried out on the outcome of the Uruguay 
Round and its impact on various sectors of the economy in order to 
provide Governments and decision makers in the agriculture, industry 
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Annex II 
THE SUBJECTS OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS RELATED TO 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES AMONG 
THE ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE WTO 
Bahrain: Insurance, reinsurance 
Egypt: Construction and engineering 
Tourism 
Banking, insurance and reinsurance, and capital market services 
Maritime transport 
Kuwait: Business construction and engineering 
Environmental services 
Health-related services 
Tourism and travel 
Recreational and sporting services 
Qatar and 
United Arab 
Emirates: Business services 
Communication services 
Construction and related engineering 
Environmental services 
Financial services 
Tourism and related services 
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Annex III 
THE STATUS OF ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES VIS-A-VIS GATT/WTO 
Contracting Parties Requesting accession Non-Members 
Bahrain Jordan Iraq 
Egypt Lebanon Oman (observer) 
Kuwait Saudi Arabia Palestine 
Qatar Syrian Arab Republic 
United Arab Emirates Yemen (defacto) 
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III. THE IMPACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 
ON THE MANUFACTURED EXPORTS OF 
THE ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES 
by Raed Safadi 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Introduction 
The present paper assesses the impact of the Uruguay Round agreements on the 
ESCWA member countries' exports of manufactured products. The assessment is made 
with reference to the liberalization achievements in industrial countries, and explores the 
issue of whether the agreements will bring about changes that will effectively provide 
exporters of manufactured products in the ESCWA region with more markets in industrial 
countries. 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section establishes the baseline 
scenario by identifying and analysing the trends that have underlined the ESCWA member 
countries' manufactured and total exports. The second section reviews the principal 
elements of the Uruguay Round negotiations and agreements that may have an impact on 
trade in manufactured products. The analysis then focuses, in the third section, on a 
quantitative assessment of the potential benefits of these agreements for the ESCWA 
region's exporters of manufactured goods. The fourth section provides a more complete 
analysis of the effects of the Uruguay Round by considering the other elements that will 
have an impact on international trade in goods. The last section concludes the study and 
offers some suggestions for further research. 
The calculations done for this paper were carefully designed to reflect a 
comprehensive package of cuts in tariffs on trade in manufactured products in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) markets. The results 
suggest that the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements will lead to a net 
increase of $178 million in the manufactured exports of ESCWA member countries to the 
main OECD markets, which represents a 4% expansion over 1993 exports. The technical 
limitations inherent in all exercises of this type are such that the net benefits have almost 
certainly been underestimated. 
Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the benefits to ESCWA member 
countries from the Uruguay Round will go well beyond what is quantifiable. In particular, 
quantitative studies do not take into account the effects of strengthening and extending 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules and disciplines across new 
areas—thereby making competition fairer and more transparent, or the effects of easing 
bilateral trade tensions and associated political conflicts. Nor do they reflect the 
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advantages associated with the fuller integration of developing countries and former State 
trading economies into the multilateral system. Finally, the numerical results fail to reflect 
the benefits gained from the enhanced efficiency which will come about with the ESCWA 
member countries' own liberalization commitments (whether unilateral, regional or 
multilateral). The results here are reported with respect to gains in OECD markets, where 
ESCWA member countries exported some 42% of their combined 1992 total; excluded 
from the analysis are those countries for which reliable data are hard to come by. 
A. TRENDS IN THE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE ESCWA REGION'S EXPORTS 
Table I presents the trend for the ESCWA member countries' total exports from 
1950 to 1992. It shows that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been 
responsible for the bulk of the region's exports, with petroleum and related products 
dominating all other commodities. Moreover, the table reveals that the participation of 
ESCWA member countries in world trade did not change much between 1950 and 1992. 
In 1950, the ESCWA region's share in total world exports was 2.3%; this share remained 
reasonably steady throughout the years covered, except during short periods characterized 
by oil price booms. In contrast, the ESCWA member countries' share in total developing 
countly exports rose during the period 1950-1992. This indicates that the exports of 
ESCWA member countries were more dynamic than those of all developing countries 
taken together, but less so in comparison with those of industrialized countries. Table 2 
provides a clear indication of the underlying trends for the years 1980 and 1990, showing 
the number of commodities exported by selected ESCWA member countries,' the 
commodity diversification index, and the market concentration index (where 1 represents 
maximum concentration in both cases). 
The diversification index indicates the degree to which a particular country's 
commodity shares have deviated from the world commodity structure. This index 
discriminates more precisely between countries that are relatively more diversified. It is 
evident that between 1980 and 1990, all of the ESCWA member countries for which data 
were available experienced a deterioration in their commodity diversification, in spite of 
the general increase in the absolute number of products exported; the commodity structure 
of the ESCWA member countries has thus diverged from the trend underlying the 
structure of world exports. 
of products exported at the three-digit SITC, rev. 2 level; the figures include only those 
products which amounted to more than $50,000 in 1980 or $100,000 in 1991, or to more than 0.3% of the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Export concentration and divers (fication 
indices for selected ESCWA member countries, 1980 and 1990 
Country 
1980 1990 
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Bahrain 58 077 0.79 110 0.87 0.75 
Kuwait 189 0.70 0.73 79 0.71 0.51 
Qatar 3 0.79 0.93 34 0.87 0.7! 
Saudi Arabia 183 0.76 0.94 169 0.85 0.79 
United Arab Emirates 197 0.73 0.87 202 0.80 0.73 
Egypt 80 0.67 0.58 154 0.70 0.44 
SyrianArabRepublic 114 0.67 0.62 116 0.83 0.67 
(a) Number of commodities exported. 
(b) The diversification index calculates the absolute deviation of the country's commodity 
shares from the world structure, as follows: 
SI = 
2 
Where: = share of commodity i in total exports of countryj; and h, share of commodity i in 
total world exports. 
(c) The concentration index is the Herschmann index normalized to produce values 




Where: j = country index; x, = value of exports of commodity i and X the sum of i; and 239 
the number of products at the three-digit SITC, rev. 2 level. 
126 
The concentration index, on the other hand, discriminates more precisely between 
countries which are relatively more concentrated in their export structure. With the 
exception of the Syrian Arab Republic, all of the countries covered in the table 
experienced moderate improvement in their export concentration. This means that the 
countries concerned are moving away from their over-dependence on a relatively small 
number of commodities. Unlike the diversification index, the concentration index takes 
into account the number of commodities exported by any one country in addition to the 
share of those products in total world exports. 
Table 3 presents the 1992 distribution and destinations of the ESCWA member 
countries' exports by countly grouping. The figures show how important OECD markets 
have been to the ESCWA member countries in terms of exports. There are a number of 
specific observations. First, 55% of GCC exports found their way to OECD markets, as 
opposed to 42% of those of the other ESCWA member countries. Second, within the 
OECD markets, Japan bought the lion's share of GCC country exports (29% of the OECD 
total), while the European Union (EU) received the bulk of the non-GCC ESCWA 
member countries' exports (31% of the OECD total). Third, most of the exports of 
Bahrain (82%), Lebanon (63%), Jordan (62%), Yemen (62%) and Oman (51%) found 
their way to other developing countries, most of which were in the region or elsewhere in 
Asia. Finally, the export interests of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman were 
highest in the Japanese market, while Saudi Arabia's export interests were evenly 
distributed among the major OECD partners (16% for the EU, 14% for North America, 
and 20% for Japan). 
In 1993, OECD markets were the destination of some $61.6 billion worth of 
exports from ESCWA member countries (see table 4, part A). Japan led the OECD 
countries, with a total of $24.1 billion; the EU and the United States of America followed, 
with $20.4 billion and $12.7 billion respectively. Saudi Arabia contributed more than half 
($31.8 billion), followed by the United Arab Emirates ($11.8 billion) and Kuwait ($6 
billion) (see table 4, part B). The table makes it clear that the export interests of the 
ESCWA member countries are heavily dependent on developments in the OECD 
markets—mainly those in Japan, the EU and the United States. Therefore, the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and the EU expansion together with its enhancement through association 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of the total of $61 .6 billion worth of the ESCWA region's exports to OECD 
countries, only $5.1 billion, or 8%, were manufactured goods. Of these, 68% were 
destined for the EU market; the American market came in a distant second, with 18% of 
the OECD share (see table 5, part A). Once again, Saudi Arabia had the lion's share, with 
34% of the OECD total (see table 5, part B); Egypt came second with 20%, and the rest 
of the countries in the region, with the notable exception of Yemen, were more or less 
equally divided. 
The small share of ESCWA member countries' manufactured exports in their total 
exports to the OECD countries and to the world is directly related to the predominance of 
oil and oil products in the region: mineral fuels are by far the largest product group, 
accounting for approximately 74% of the region's total exports. This figure is roughly 
three times higher than the share of energy products in the exports of all developing 
countries combined. The export profiles of the largest exporters in the ESCWA region 
reveal the continuing over-reliance on mineral fuels for export earnings; it is extremely 
rare to fmd a non-mineral fuel product making it onto the list of the top 20 export products 
(see annex tables 1 to 9). Such a concentration limits the region's opportunities to reap 
larger benefits from the Uruguay Round agreements; equally importantly, it substantially 
reduces the scope for developing mutually beneficial intraregional trade. 
B. THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 
The Uruguay Round was the most comprehensive and hence the most complex 
round of GAIT multilateral trade (MTNs) ever undertaken. It had a big 
agenda which included, among other things, the mandate to deal with certain GAY!' 
shortcomings that were undermining the institution's systemic integrity. The venues for 
launching the Uruguay Round and for signing the Final Act had more than symbolic 
significance. Developing countries engaged more and more actively in the Round as their 
interest in its outcome heightened. At stake were issues that concerned the following: 
• Extending trade liberalization in both established (traditional) areas and 
areas not yet covered by GAIT 
• Bringing trade that had moved outside the multilateral framework back 
into GAIT 
• Bringing discipline to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights 
• Enhancing the provisions concerning trade-related investment measures 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































• Improving the rules and the dispute settlement system of GAYT' 
• Creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The Uruguay Round was also unique from the point of view of the ESCWA 
member countries. The ESCWA region's GATT Contracting Parties engaged ever more 
actively in the Round as their interests came into play.2 There were a number of important 
issues that the Uruguay Round sought to deal with, but the heightened interest among the 
ESCWA member countries was mainly related to their increasing emphasis on openness 
and market-based policy reform programmes (Egypt and Jordan) and to their increasing 
involvement in world trade and investment. Since the launching of the Uruguay Round 
in 1986, Egypt has unilaterally lowered its barriers to imports, mainly in conjunction with 
a reorientation of its domestic policies.3 Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar 
have since joined GATTIWTO, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are in the process of acceding, 
and the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon have expressed an interest in becoming 
members. 
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round is expected to bring about 
increases in the levels of trade, investment, income and welfare in most ESCWA member 
countries. Direct benefits will result from both increased market access to the developed 
countries' markets, and from enhanced efficiency related to the ESCWA member 
countries' own liberalization commitments. Benefits which are potentially even more 
important will accrue to these countries from the improved rules for trade and investment 
coupled with the stronger institutional reinforcement of these rules, and from the greater 
exposure to global competition within a more predictable, secure and credible international 
trading environment. 
The distribution of these benefits among the individual ESCWA member countries 
will, however, be uneven. ESCWA member countries with open domestic markets will 
be favoured, mainly because their openness implies a relatively greater capacity to adjust 
and adapt to new and emerging market opportunities. In the sphere of trade in 
manufactured products, some ESCWA member countries may lose their market share as 
2 
The countries in the ESCWA region which joined GATT include the following (date of accession 
in parentheses): Kuwait (May 1963), Egypt (May 1970), Bahrain (December 1993), United Arab Emirates 
(March 1994) and Qatar (April 1994). Other ESCWA member countries are either in the process of acceding 
to the WTO or have declared an interest in doing so. As of the end of October 1995, membership in the 
WTO included 110 countries, and another 28 are currently seeking membership in the Organization. 
It is worth noting that since the launching of the Uruguay Round in 1986, over 60 developing 
nations have unilaterally lowered their barriers to imports, generally in conjunction with a reorientation of 
their domestic policies. Twenty-six have since joined GATT/WTO, while more than 20 are in the process 
of acceding. 
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the result of an erosion in their trade preferences. However, even if such effects do exist, 
they must be weighed against the increased overall efficiency expected from the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements. Moreover, since the reforms agreed 
upon during the Uruguay Round will be instituted gradually, these countries should seize 
the opportunity in the interim to implement reform programmes designed to make their 
domestic economies more open and more flexible. 
Market access 
Ever since its inception, the GATT system has sought to establish non- 
discriminatory tariffs as the principle means of trade protection. The Uruguay Round 
marked the eighth time that the GATT Contracting Parties had negotiated the reduction 
of trade barriers in a multilateral framework. The success of these MTNs has been 
remarkable. The seven rounds of MTNs prior to the Uruguay Round succeeded in 
lowering the average (trade-weighted) most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rates on 
industrial goods from a high of 40% at the end of the Second World War to around 6% at 
the conclusion of the Tokyo Round (1974-1 In addition, these rounds brought about 
the dismantling of most of the import quotas on non-agricultural products in developed 
countries. 
Nevertheless, market access still represents perhaps the single most important 
trading issue between the developing and developed countries. The developing countries' 
strongest demands are not only for continued access to industrialized countries' markets, 
but also for increased access. Developed countries are demanding that developing 
countries participate more effectively in the negotiations, and that some of them contribute 
more and assume more GATT obligations; in other words, some developing countries 
should "graduate". For both groups of countries, market access has been hindered by 
tariffs, as well as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties, safeguards, and voluntary export restraints. 
(a) Tariff levels 
The objective of achieving a one-third tariff cut has been exceeded; the average 
trade-weighted tariff rate on all industrial products from all sources has been reduced by 
38%. However, the average trade-weighted tariff imposed by industrialized countries on 
developing countries' exports has been lowered by only 34%—four percentage points 
below the overall cuts by industrialized countries. Moreover, the average rate masks lower 
commitments with respect to three sensitive product categories in the manufacturing 
sector: transport equipment (where the reductions will average 23%); textiles and clothing 
The MFN principle is the cornerstone of the GAIT system—the basic provision guaranteeing 
non-discrimination. 
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(22%); and leather, rubber, footwear and travel goods (18%). Together, trade in these 
three products accounted for 24% of the total value of developed countries' imports in 
1993. However, as will be described later, these low cuts will be supplemented by the 
removal of NTBs resulting from the phasing out of the Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles (also called the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA) and 
from the elimination of VERs, especially on footwear, electronics and travel goods. Eight 
other industrial product groups with an import share in 1993 equal to the remaining 76% 
will experience reductions in their tariff levels that will exceed the target. For example, 
there will be a reduction in tariff rates of about 69% for wood, pulp, paper and furniture 
products. The corresponding reduction affecting metal products is 59%. Thus, the tariff 
cuts affecting all tropical and resource-based products in developed countries will exceed 
the overall target; the trade-weighted average cuts will be 45% and 34% respectively. The 
corresponding cuts affecting developing countries' exports to developed countries will be 
even higher, at 57% and 35% respectively. The lowering of tariff rates is being phased in 
through five equal annual reductions; the first occurred on the date of the entry in force of 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) on I 
January 1995. 
Zero-for-zero agreements in seven major industrial sectors will increase the share 
of developed countries' duty-free imports from 20% to 43%. It is interesting to note that 
the products marked for above-average tariff reductions will also experience a substantial 
rise in the level of duty-free trade; in contrast, those sensitive products with tariff 
reductions below the average will experience moderate changes in the distribution of 
tariffs. For example, the share of high duties or tariff peaks imposed by developed 
countries on imports of textiles and clothing will only be reduced from 38% to 28%. 
(b) Tariff peaks and escalation 
One method of increasing the proportion of developing countries' trade in 
fabricated goods is to increase the processing of natural-resource-based products now 
exported in primary form. However, a factor often cited as working against efforts to 
increase domestic processing is the structure of tariffs and other trade barriers in major 
import markets. Specifically, zero or low tariffs are generally applied to industrialized 
countries' imports of primary (unprocessed) commodities, with the duties increasing, or 
escalating, as the product experiences increased fabrication. Tariff escalation produces a 
trade bias against processed goods, as higher import duties are imposed on these items.5 
The result is increased protection of value added, "which twists the worldwide distribution 
of value added along processing chains in favour of the industrial countries" (Abreu, 
1989). 
5Representative studies that document the existence and impact of tariff escalation in developed 
countries include Yeats (1979) and Saladi and Yeats (1993). The analysis here is based on the latter. 
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The importance that developing countries attach to tariff escalation is reflected in 
the extensive policy debates on this subject that have occurred in major international 
forums. For example, developing countries were instrumental in having a clause inserted 
in the 1982 GAIT Ministerial Declaration (the forerunner of the Uruguay Round of 
MTNs) which stresses that "prompt attention should be given to the problem of escalation 
of tariffs on products with a view to effective action toward the elimination or reduction 
of such escalation where it inhibits international trade, taking into account the concerns 
relating to exports of developing countries." Further, the Punta del Este Declaration states 
that "negotiations shall aim to achieve the fullest liberalisation of trade in natural-resource- 
based products, including those in processed and semi-processed forms. The negotiations 
shall aim to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff measures, including tariff escalation." 
One way to a change in tariff escalation is to calculate the absolute change 
in tariffs, since what matters is the decline in the tariff-inclusive price in the importing 
country. For example, in principle, a 50% cut in a 2% tariff would lead to a 1% decline 
in the tariff-inclusive price, and a 25% reduction in a 36% tariff would result in a 9% 
reduction in the tariff-inclusive price. It is therefore instructive to conduct an analysis of 
tariff escalation with reference to absolute change in tariff. Table 6 shows pre- and post- 
Uruguay Round tariff levels for industrialized countries by product and processing stage, 
as well as the absolute differences in tariffs achieved during the Uruguay Round. It should 
be noted that tariffs increase significantly from the raw-material to the finished-product 
stage: the average post-Uruguay Round tariff for all industrial products climbs from 0.8% 
on raw materials to 4.8% on finished products. However, a product-by-product 
examination of the absolute differences between tariffs on goods at various processing 
stages reveals that de-escalation has occurred for almost all of the commodities analysed; 
jute and cocoa are the two exceptions, where the tariff reductions applied to intermediate 
products are larger than those for final-stage products. 
(c) Tariff bindings 
Prior to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, MFN tariffs in many 
sectors were not legally bound and could therefore be raised quite easily. This situation 
created a lack of security in market access, and may have had a detrimental effect on trade. 
A major goal of the Uruguay Round was to increase the proportion of industrial tariffs that 
were bound, thus providing added protection to trade liberalization commitments. This 
goal has been successfully met: the percentage of developed countries' imports of 
industrial goods under bound rates rose from 94% to 99%, leaving only 1% 
(corresponding to 1% of tariff lines) not bound; the corresponding figures for developing 
economies are 14% and 59% respectively; and those for economies in transition are 74% 
and 96% respectively. 
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Table 6. The effects of Uruguay Round concessions 



















and 5.2 4.2 1.0 
1 0.1 0.1 0 
2 4.5 3.5 1.1 2 with I Decreased 
products 3 8.7 7.3 1.5 3 with 2 Increased 
3.3 2.2 1.1 
I 0 0 0 
2 5.5 3.2 2.3 2 with 1 Decreased 
products 3 5.1 3.5 1.6 3 with 2 Decreased 
2.0 0.9 1.1 
1 0 0 0 
2 9.4 5.4 4.0 2 with I Decreased 
3 0.9 0.4 0.4 3 with 2 — 
articles 4 4.7 0.5 4.3 4 with 3 Decreased 
3.5 1.5 2.0 
1 0 0 0 
2 5.3 2.6 2.7 2 with 1 Decreased 
matter 3 1.7 0.3 1.4 3 with 2 — 
articles 4 7.3 1.9 5.4 4 with 3 Decreased 
5.1 1.8 3.2 
1 0 0 0 
ofjute 2 5.4 0.1 5.2 2 with 1 Decreased 
3 5.7 3.2 2.5 3 with 2 Increased 
4.4 2.5 1.9 
1 2.1 0 2.1 
powder and 2 4.6 2.8 1.8 2 with 1 Increased 
3 8.8 7.2 1.6 3 with 2 Increased 
17.3 11.2 6.1 
1 14.7 11.5 3.2 
2 22.1 10.7 11.4 2 with I Decreased 
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1.7 0.8 0.9 
1 0.9 0.5 0.4 
Semi-manufactures 2 4.3 2.0 2.3 2 with I Decreased 
0.7 0.3 0.4 
1 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Semi-manufactures 2 2.6 0.4 2.2 2 with 1 Decreased 
3.0 2.0 1.1 
1 2.1 1.6 0.5 
Semi-manufactures 2 5.9 3.1 2.8 2 with I Decreased 
2.4 0.9 1.6 
1 2.4 0.9 1.5 
Semi-manufactures 2 4.5 1.8 2.7 2with I Decreased 
2.2 0.4 1.8 
1 2.1 0.3 1.8 
Semi-manufactures 2 4.7 2.3 2.4 2 with I Decreased 
0.1 0 0.1 
1 0.1 0 0 
2 3.9 0.2 3.7 2 with I Decreased 
6.4 4.6 1.8 
1 1.8 0.8 1.0 
2 5.3 2.8 2.5 2 with I Decreased 
products 3 7.4 4.8 2.6 3 with 2 Decreased 
Source: A. Yeats, "A quantitative assessment of the Uruguay Rounds effects and their implications for 
developing countries, World Bank PRE Working Papers Series. Pre-Uruguay Round data were drawn from the World Bank- 
UNCTAD SMART Database. 
Notes: Two dashes (--) indicate that the item is nil or negligible. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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At the regional level, North America and Latin America were the greatest 
achievers, as all of their industrial imports as well as their corresponding tariff lines 
became bound. Asia remains the region least committed to binding its tariffs on industrial 
goods: only 67% of its tariff lines, which cover 70% of its industrial imports, are now 
bound. 
Increases in tariff binding have increased the security of market access; another 
positive step has been the reduction of bound tariff rates. Seventeen per cent of developed 
countries' tariff lines affecting imports of industrial goods are now bound at a duty-free 
rate; of the remaining 83%, 67% have been bound with reductions, another 10% have been 
bound without any reductions (and remain at their current levels), and the last 7% of 
currently dutiable industrial items have remained without any offer. Developing countries, 
where no item has been granted duty-free access, have bound 44% of their tariff lines with 
reductions and another 25% without reductions, leaving 31% of their tariff lines under the 
category of "no offer". 
(d) measures 
Aside from the phasing out of the MFA, the most important achievement of the 
Uruguay Round with respect to trade in industrial goods has been the almost complete 
elimination of VERs and other, similar measures affecting imports and/or exports (such 
as orderly marketing arrangements, discriminatory import systems, and consulting 
arrangements) whose unchecked proliferation would have meant the complete erosion of 
the non-discrimination principle.6 The economic effects of VERs, as well as the reasons 
behind their proliferation, have been well documented. Such arrangements have been said 
to constitute "first order" protectionism in the light of their unequivocal protectionist 
design and discriminatory nature.7 According to the World Bank-SMART Database, 
VERs covered some 400 tariff lines in the United States and about the same number in the 
EU in the pre-Uruguay Round trading environment, affecting such sectors as metals, 
transport equipment, footwear, and domestic appliances. 
The total elimination of VERs implies a significant relaxation of non-tariff 
barriers. Table 7 presents the incidence of all NTBs affecting developing countries' 
exports to industrialized countries' markets during the pre-Uruguay Round period, by type 
of NTB. 
6Only one VER arrangement remains in operation: the EU wishes to continue to restrict Japanese 
auto imports. However, this single exception, which is permitted to each party, will be in effect only until 
31 December 1999. 
7See, for example, Low (1993) and Wolf and others (1984), especially the tabular summary in the 
latter. 
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Table 7. Pre-Uruguay Round trade coverage ratios of 
industrialized countries' non-tariff measures against imports 
from developing countries, by type of barrier (NTB) 
Product group 
(SITC) 























10.0 0.1 0.5 5.5 6.5 0 
Iron and steel 
(67) 
35.6 0 1.0 20.2 23.6 0 
Non-ferrous 
metals (68) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mineralfuels 
(3) 
16.5 2.4 14.1 0 0 0 
Chemicals (5) 3.4 1.1 2.2 0.1 0 0 
Other 
manufactures 
(6 to 8 minus 
67 and 68) 
21.6 0.4 1.7 18.3 0.5 2.1 
Leather (61) 56.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 0 55.2 
Textile yarn 
and fabrics (65) 
52.1 1.7 6.2 49.0 0 0 
Clothing (84) 64.3 0.8 3.4 59.3 0 3.3 
Footwear (85) 34.0 1.2 1.0 29.9 0 3.3 
All items 
(0 to 9) 
18.0 2.0 5.0 9.5 1.2 1.8 
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD SMART Database. 
Non-tariff meastire (NTM) groups are defmed as follows: variable levies and surcharges include all variable 
Import levies (including variable components), product-specific surcharges, minimum, reference, or basic import price 
regulations, price surveillance and voluntary export price restraints; quantitative restrictions include prohibitions, quotas 
(global or country-specific), State monopolies and non-automatic licensing requirements; "voluntary" export restraints 
(VERs) include measures under the MFA and similar textile quotas as well as other VERs (on quantity) that were negotiated 
outside the textile and clothing sectors; and other entiy-conlrol measures include a variety of restrictions such as local content 
regulations. 
The coverage shares for the individual types of NTMs may add up to more than the total of the "all NTM" 
coverage ratio owing to "stacking" (the multiple application of NTMs on a specific product). Industrialized countries here 
refer to Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Union, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United States. 
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The table shows that VERs were among the most commonly used form of 
quantitative restrictions, accounting for more than half of all quantitative measures 
affecting the imports from developing countries. In descending order, the clothing, 
leather, textile, ferrous metals and footwear sectors were the most seriously affected by 
high NTB coverage, with figures ranging from 34% to 64%. 
The effect of pre-Uruguay Round non-tariff measures on various regional 
groupings is presented in table 8. Eastern Europe appears to have been the region most 
affected, with a coverage ratio exceeding 67%. The memo item in table 8 points to a 
major scaling down in the use ofNTBs following the conclusion of the Round. The trade 
coverage ratios for all regions (except Eastern Europe) will fall dramatically in the post- 
Uruguay Round trading environment. Ferrous metals are the products that give rise to 
the relatively high coverage ratio of 11% for Eastern Europe. As shown by table 8, 
products originating from the Middle East experienced a relatively lower incidence of 
NTBs than all other regions, with the notable exception of East Asia. As will be seen 
later, such low NTB coverage ratios limit the extent of benefits ESCWA member 
countries can hope to obtain as a result of the successful completion of the Uruguay 
Round. 
The accomplishments of the Uruguay Round in lowering and eliminating NTBs 
are significant not only in terms of their overall importance, but also in relation to the 
remaining types of trade-related measures and the sectors that will be affected; table 9 
provides a summary of these achievements. Quantitative restrictions are the only 
important non-tariff measures remaining; they are highest on coal and coke products 
(where the trade coverage ratio is 81%), followed by rubber manufactures (10%). 
(e) Elements of the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade in textiles and clothing 
Successive GAll' arrangements legitimized textile and clothing protection de 
facto under the rubric of the MFA. The MFA has essentially been used to select targets 
on a discriminatory basis, challenging one of the most basic tenets of GATI—the MFN 
rule. Unlike in other sectors such as steel, fair trade rhetoric has hardly ever been 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing provides for the phase- 
out of the MFA and the gradual integration of the textile and clothing sector into GATT 
1 
9948 This will be effected over a 10-year period under the supervision of the WTO 
Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). A minimum of 16% of the total 1990 volume of 
imports covered by the MFA was to be integrated into GATT 1994 upon the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement. A further (minimum of) 17% of the volume of 1990 
imports will be integrated at the beginning of the fourth year of the phase-out period. An 
additional minimum of 18% will follow at the beginning of the eighth year, while the 
remainder should be fully integrated by the end of the 10-year transition period. Each 
phase-out must include products from four different groups: tops and yarns, fabrics, made- 
up textile products, and clothing. 
The Agreement also provides for the expansion of outstanding quota restrictions 
by the prevailing quota growth rates plus 16% annually for the first three years. A further 
annual expansion of 25% will take place in the subsequent four years, and an additional 
27% per year during the fmal three years. This arrangement will tend to favour countries 
with high existing quota growth rates. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO may 
authorize adjustment to these annual quota growth rates in cases where country Members 
are not complying with their obligations. 
Transitional safeguards, which may be applied selectively to particular exports, 
may also apply to products not yet integrated into GATT 1994 at any stage. Safeguard 
actions may be taken only in cases where the importing country can demonstrate serious 
damage or the threat thereof. Safeguards can only be maintained for a maximum period 
of three years, during which time they must be phased out. Finally, the Agreement 
provides for anti-circumvention measures to deal with transshipment, rerouting, false 
declaration of origin and falsification of official documents. 
There has been a considerable amount of empirical research work done on the 
impact of the MFA and on the benefits resulting from its removal. Trela and Whalley 
(1990) put the benefits in terms of net world welfare gains arising from the liberalization 
of both quotas and tariffs at $23.4 billion, with about one third of the total accruing to 
developing countries as a group.9 For several developing economies the welfare gains 
would exceed $1 billion: China ($1.8 billion), the Republic of Korea ($1.6 billion), 
Taiwan Province of China ($1.2 billion), and Brazil ($1 .1 billion). If, on the other hand, 
the liberalization scenario were restricted to MFA quotas alone, world welfare gains would 
8 
Integration means that trade in these products will be governed by general GAIT rules and 
disciplines. 
A general equilibrium model was used. Results are based on 1986 data and cover quotas 
negotiated between the United States, Canada and the EU, and 34 developing-country suppliers under the 
provisions of MFA-III (see Trela and Whalley, 1990, for the results; especially tables 3 and 4). 
Unfortunately, the analysis did not examine the interests of ESCWA member countries in this sector. 
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total about $22 billion, only $3 billion of which would accrue to developing countries as 
a group. Under this scenario, some developing countries would stand to lose (through the 
loss of quota rents); among the major losers would be Hong Kong, Macao, Pakistan, 
Singapore and Thailand. 
In a 1984 study by Kirmani and others, it was predicted that if all trade barriers 
were removed, developing countries' exports of textiles to major industrialized countries' 
markets would expand by 82% and those of clothing by 93% under the assumption of 
infmitely elastic supply. In 1986, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) estimated that complete liberalization could raise developing 
countries' exports of clothing and textiles by 135% and 78% respectively. It should be 
noted that all these estimates can be considered at the low end, as they do not incorporate 
the existence of a significant degree of quota underutilization by many suppliers, including 
those in ESCWA member countries. Suppliers facing uncertainty about future quota 
levels may be reluctant to invest to increase their production capacity, especially in view 
of the fact that a significant amount of investment may be required to fill the remaining 
15% to 20% of unfilled quotas. 
Although the liberalization of trade in textile and clothing products will take some 
time to be phased in, it will go a long way towards levelling the playing field for ESCWA 
member countries. This is especially relevant in the light of the fact that many countries 
in the ESCWA region have a comparative advantage in the production of labour-intensive 
textiles and clothing. Furthermore, ESCWA member countries will experience large cost 
savings as a result of the removal of the discriminatory application of the MFA. 
C. PROJECTING THE URUGUAY ROUND'S TRADE-CREATION 
EFFECTS ON ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Many countries in the ESCWA region did not show much enthusiasm for the 
Uruguay Round. On the face of it, such an attitude is to be expected; after all, the exports 
of many countries (especially non-oil exporters) in the region enjoy special preferential 
treatment in the three major OECD markets (see table 10). Any reductions in MFN tariffs 
will necessarily cut the margin of preferences for preference-receiving countries. For the 
oil exporters in the region, border barriers do not present serious problems for market 
access into OECD countries; fuels, ores and non-ferrous metals are generally imported 
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duty-free or face relatively low OECD tariffs and non-tariff baniers.'° Given the 
importance many countries in the region attach to preferences, it is instructive to review 
the economic rationale behind such discriminatory schemes. 
Table 10. ESCWA member countries which are beneficiaries 





Bahram x x x 
Kuwait x x 
Oman x x x 
Qatar x x 
Saudi Arabia x x 
United Arab Emirates x x 
Egypt x x x 
Jordan x x x 
Lebanon x x x 
Syrian Arab Republic x x 
At the theoretical level, trade preferences and regional agreements can be 
examined within the same analytical setting; this is because both kinds of arrangements 
share discriminatory properties in that they involve geographically selective trade 
liberalization. The static trade and welfare effects of regional agreements and trade 
preferences have to be examined in a "second best" context, in which the final judgement 
as to any economic benefits that might accrue is based on empirical findings. The 
As an illustration, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia receive 
preferential treatment in the EU and Japan, although petroleum is excluded from Japan's preference scheme. 
Kuwait also gets preferential treatment in the United States. Crude oil and refined petroleum products enter 
the EU duty-free. In Japan, crude oil is charged a specific tariff of per kilolitre (y/kl), while refined 
products are taxed at 3,750 y/kl; the corresponding rates in the American market are S0.0525/barrel and 
$0.84/barrel (note the practice of tariff escalation). Saudi Arabian petrochemical exports enter the EU duty- 
free unless (a) the product is classified as "sensitive" or (b) the exporting country has more than a 20% market 
share; in addition, value limitations apply. Crude oil and refined petroleum products from the United Arab 
Emirates enter the EU duty-free. 
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Vinerian concepts of trade creation and trade diversion provide a comparative static partial 
equilibrium framework within which to consider the consequences of the removal of trade 
barriers on a preferential basis. Trade creation occurs when a preference involves trade 
liberalization that displaces less competitive production in the preference-giving country. 
Trade diversion occurs when a preference-giving country switches its imports to a 
preference-receiving country, thereby displacing imports from a producer that does not 
benefit from the preference. In this case, the preference margin is sufficient to divert trade 
from a more efficient to a less efficient producer. While this raises income in the 
preference-receiving country, it does so at the expense both of the preference-giving 
countiy and the third country outside the preferential arrangement. One might argue that 
trade diversion is itself a worthy goal of preferential trade schemes, as this allows the 
preference-giving countries to channel the benefits of trade in directions that are deemed 
desirable for foreign policy reasons. Whatever the merits of such a view may be from a 
political perspective, they are not consistent with the economic precepts of an open trading 
system. Deliberate efforts to manipulate the composition and direction of trade flows for 
non-economic reasons, however well-intentioned they may be, can quickly take the 
members of the trading community down a slippery slope towards managed trade. 
In order for the economic benefits of a preferential arrangement to be judged 
positive under this type of analysis, trade creation must exceed trade diversion. However, 
the picture becomes more clouded when possible dynamic effects are introduced. The 
argument is that trade liberalization, whether discriminatory or not, may unleash positive 
dynamic effects, leading to a virtuous circle of growth and development. Preferences may 
open up new market opportunities, attracting resources into export industries. Particularly 
where such investment comes from foreign sources, it may bring additional advantages 
such as new technologies and skills, and may contribute to productivity growth. 
Economies of scale may come into play, neutralizing the constraints of market size and 
further enhancing productivity growth. 
These kinds of arguments are closely related to the infant industry case for 
protection. The case for infant industry support is tied in with the existence of dynamic 
external economies, or more specifically, with learning-by-doing effects. According to this 
argument, the inability of investors to capture the full gains from the learning-by-doing 
that takes place in the initial stages of production means that there will be under- 
investment in the activity concerned. Strictly speaking, this is an argument not for tariff 
protection but for addressing capital market imperfections or for directly subsidizing 
labour." Awarding tariff preferences that provide a competitive margin for nascent 
industries in export markets can be regarded as an alternative means of protecting infant 
proposition derives from the optimal intervention theory, which holds that distortions (or 
market failures) should be addressed at the source of the problem (or as close to the source as possible). The 
use of tariffs for infant industry protection introduces an additional consumption problem. 
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industries, assuming that such arrangements do not involve the allocation of resources to 
industries which have no hope of being competitive once they face international 
competition in the absence of a preference margin. 
Another argument—one which does not rely on dynamic effects—is that 
preferences serve to diversify the economy and support industrialization. According to this 
line of reasoning, diversification is intrinsically desirable, principally because it helps 
countries move away from reliance on the production of primary goods, which over the 
long term have a low income elasticity of demand; countries relying on primary-product 
output thus face a decline in their terms of trade. It is further argued that primary products 
experience a high level of price volatility against which it is difficult to hedge. For various 
reasons, all of these arguments are the subject of some contention in the literature; the case 
for industrialization is easier to defend on theoretical grounds if it is presented as a 
dynamic learning-by-doing or infant industry argument. 
What are the economic arguments against preferences? One that has already been 
discussed is the possibility of trade diversion as a consequence of geographically selective 
trade liberalization. In general terms, the greater the substitutability of production between 
a preference-receiving and an MFA country, the more likely trade diversion is to outweigh 
trade creation. The reverse is true where there is less substitutability in production 
between the preference-receiving and the preference-giving country. 
Another, closely related reason for being cautious about the economic benefits of 
preferences is that unless preference margins benefit industries or sectors in respect of 
which a preference-receiving country enjoys a comparative advantage, any additional 
investment attributable to the preferences may prove to be suboptimal. This may seem 
unimportant to the beneficiary country while preferences are in place, but their eventual 
erosion or removal could give rise to adjustment costs. Finally, it has sometimes been 
argued that rather than inducing diversification, preferences may encourage specialization, 
leading beneficiary countries to maintain and even expand uncompetitive sectors that 
would otherwise have atrophied and died. The examples of sugar and banana production 
in certain beneficiary countries under the Lomé Convention are sometimes cited as cases 
where costly and inappropriate specialization has occurred. 
In determining the effect preferences have had on various countries, all analysts 
point to the difficulties associated with estimating their costs and benefits. Even the 
simplest calculations of trade diversion and trade creation require uncertain assumptions 
about supply, demand and substitution elasticities and can only be relied upon to indicate 
broad orders of magnitude. Dynamic estimates of gains and losses are even more fraught 
with difficulty. In looking at the relationship between investment and preferences, for 
example, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish the effect of preferences from the effects 
of a wide range of other factors that influence investment decisions. In some instances, 
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while the existence of preferences and increased investment may, on the face of it, appear 
to be linked, the presence of preferences may simply be irrelevant. 
Matters are further complicated by the need to identify who actually gains from 
preferences—importers or exporters. The answer to this question depends on the 
distribution of the scarcity rent associated with the preference margin, which in turn is 
influenced by institutional arrangements and the degree of monopolistic and 
monopsonistic power underlying particular transactions. If exporters receive little or none 
of the scarcity rent, the beneficial effects of preferences are likely to be correspondingly 
modest. Similarly, a careful analysis of the economic effects of preferences would need 
to take into account the full array of product-specific exclusions and limitations often 
associated with preference schemes, as well as the low level of utilization of preferences 
sometimes encountered under schemes such as the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP). 
In summary, economic arguments for and against preferences can readily be made, 
and the calculus of actual costs and benefits is specific to particular preferential 
arrangements, countries, and products. Potential dynamic and static effects both need to 
be taken into account, as well as the specific limitations of the arrangements. Even the 
best empirical estimates of the effects of preferential arrangements will be somewhat 
tentative. A review of the pertinent literature suggests that on the whole, the benefits for 
preference-receiving countries have been rather modest and have been severely 
constrained by exclusions and different kinds of conditionality. The evidence also 
suggests that the absence of a significant trade response to preferences in some beneficiary 
countries reflects a limited capacity to attract investment and increase production. 
With the above-mentioned arguments and qualifications in mind, an attempt is 
made here to quantify the likely magnitude of the ESCWA member countries' export gains 
from manufactured goods following the successful implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements. Towards that end, the previously described partial equilibrium analysis 
(Viner's framework) is employed to simulate the impact of the tariff and NTB reductions. 
The model is similar to that used by Cline for evaluating the Tokyo Round. In particular, 
two separate reduced form equations are used to calculate trade creation and trade 
diversion respectively for each market at the most detailed tariff-line level.'2 In MFN- 
based liberalization, exporters who previously enjoyed preferences suffer an erosion in 
tariff margins, while other exporters enjoy improved market access. The trade creation 
effect is the increased demand in country] for commodity i from exporting country k 
resulting from the price decrease associated with the assumed full transmission of price 
t2See IMF (1984) and Sapir and Baldwin (1983) as well for similar model applications. Within 
these specifications, trade creation is the increase in total trade that comes about as a result of lower prices 
from reduced protection. Trade diversion is the substitution among suppliers as a result of changes in prices. 
The summation of trade creation and trade diversion gives the net trade effect for each market. 
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changes when tariffs or NTB distortions are reduced or eliminated altogether. The formula 
used is as follows: 
t,jk 
________ 




= imports of countryj of commodity i from exporter k 
£m = elasticity of import demand with respect to domestic price 
tgk = ad valorem tariff rate imposed by countryj on the imports of commodity 
from country k 
= elasticity of export supply with respect to export price 
On the other hand, the trade diversion effect reflects the tendency of importers to 
substitute goods from one source with goods from another in response to a change in the 
import price of the goods from the first source but not from the alternative source. The 
formula used to measure trade diversion is expressed as follows: 
*V *c' 
C.. L.. - 
Tfl = M,,& * / P,,k * / P,,k) I LJq* 
E + + c * M.,,. P.,& / 
Equation 2 
Where: 
MiJk = imports from non-preference-receiving country k 
= elasticity of between preference-receiving and other goods 
= prices of goods in the preference-receiving country 
= prices of goods in the non-preference-receiving countries 
1. Elasticities 
As is evident from equations 1 and 2 above, the key inputs to the model—besides 
trade flows, tariffs, and NTBs—are three sets of elasticities: import (price) demand 
elasticities; elasticities of supply; and cross (price) elasticities of substitution. 
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For import demand elasticities, what were judged to be the best estimates 
available were used.'3 These estimates did not constitute a consistent set, in tenns of 
estimation methods or the markets or specific years they pertained to. In spite of this, the 
elasticities broadly reflect the differences across products. As an added precaution, 
however, the sensitivity of the results was tested by modifying the vector of elasticities to 
reflect low- and high-case assumptions. 
The scenario uses an infmite elasticity of supply across the board. As long as 
increases in exports are incremental, this may be a reasonable assumption. For large 
increases, especially in small countries, obviously this is not realistic; in the absence of any 
reasonable estimate for such cases, the present author checked this assumption by doing 
sensitivity analysis with a unitary and a fmite elasticity within generally accepted ranges. 
A critical input is the cross elasticity of substitution, which determines the scope 
of trade diversion. This elasticity was asswned to be 1.5 for all products. Estimates of this 
elasticity are sparse, and in any case, as any estimate is specific to the product and to the 
pairs or groups of countries in question, there is an enormous number of possible 
combinations. In adopting a value for the present scenario, the author's judgement was 
based on a survey of the literature, particularly the work done by Cline. 
2. The treatment of NTBs 
For the Uruguay Round liberalization scenario, estimates of the ad valorem 
equivalents of NTBs were incorporated directly into the database. The primary source of 
data on NTB ad valorem equivalents was a 1990 survey by Laird and Yeats, supplemented 
by information drawn from several United States International Trade Commission studies. 
3. Time horizon 
A static model measures the impact of an exogenous change—in this case MFN 
liberalization—in terms of short-term adjustments. These adjustments typically exclude 
the instalment of new capacity, efficiency gains in existing production activities, and the 
development of new exports. It is customary to assume that the time horizon for these 
shorter-term adjustments is not much longer than a year. 
See Cline (1978), Laird and Yeats (1986), and Stern (1975). 
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4. Shortcomings of the model 
When interpreting the results, it is useful to keep in mind the following limitations 
of the partial equilibrium model: 
• It omits economy-wide and international interactions through 
production activities. 
• As a static framework, it excludes investment, technological changes, and 
new product lines, and is relevant only to the short term. 
• The crucial elasticities used are rough estimates. 
• It essentially deals with tariff cuts alone; the impact of changes in NTBs 
are incorporated in a rudimentary fashion. 
Given these drawbacks, one might enquire as to the usefulness of the exercise. 
While the computation is basically an accounting or "summing up" exercise, it does 
provide an idea of the magnitude of the Uruguay Round agreements' short-term impact 
on the ESCWA member countries' exports of manufactured goods. This is of some value, 
given the large number of products involved and the diversity of tariff rates and preference 
margins. 
Table 11 presents the projections derived from the model for most of the countries 
in the region relative to the three most important OECD markets (the EU, Japan and the 
United States). It is expected that the combined manufactured exports of the ESCWA 
member countries will expand by $180 million as a result of tariff and NTB reductions—a 
mere 4% increase over their 1993 manufactured exports to the three largest OECD 
markets. It is predicted that the largest potential gain in manufactured exports will go to 
the United Arab Emirates, especially in Japan's market. Next in line are the manufactured 
exports of Egypt, which are expected to increase by about $43 million. The increase for 
Egypt will likely be highest in the American market ($25 million), reflecting the 
expectation that Egyptian manufactured exports will become more competitive owing to 
reductions in tariffs and NTBs, and despite the fact that the preference margins accorded 
to Egypt's exports in the United States are to be eroded. The reason for such an apparent 
anomaly is simple: on the one hand, Egypt will experience a loss in manufactured exports 
as a result of the erosion of its preference; on the other hand, such a loss will be more than 
compensated for by export gains Egypt will experience as a result of the erosion of 
preferences for other countries that have enjoyed relatively larger preferences in OECD 
markets than Egypt has. Next in line comes Saudi Arabia, with a potential net benefit of 
about $36 million; however, Saudi Arabia seems positioned to experience the largest loss 
in any one single market (the EU) owing to the erosion of preference in that market. 
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Table 11. Projected effects of Uruguay Round tar jff 
cuts on ESCWA member countries' manufactured exports 











GCCcowitries 3416880 (1802) 42179 72154 112532 
Bahrain 235387 2636 17466 989 21091 
Kuwait 235 648 (330) (377) (1 909) (2616) 
Oman 186 406 1 640 1 734 5 667 9 041 
Qatar 121 206 12 1 576 3 563 5 151 
SaudiArabia 1761358 (14091) 8102 42273 36284 
UnitedArabEmirates 876875 8330 13679 21571 43581 
OtherESCWA member 
countries 
1670772 17373 27445 22461 67279 
Egypt 1031719 3095 24864 14650 42610 
Jordan 344909 (1897) 2621 — 7933 8657 
Lebanon 206 441 16350 (330) (227) iS 793 
Syrian Arab Republic 87703 (175) 289 105 219 
Total 5087652 15571 69624 94615 179811 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
The estimations above notwithstanding, perhaps the most important impact the 
Uruguay Round agreements relating to market access will have on ESCWA member 
countries will be generated by these countries' own liberalization drives and commitments. 
Should the countries in the region commit themselves to lowering tariffs, binding most of 
their tariff lines, and effecting some significant scaling down of their NTBs, their 
economies will go a long way towards supporting the shift of incentives in the direction 
of tradeables, especially exportables, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
D. THE WIDER PICTURE 
All of the Uruguay Round agreements were approved as a single block. As discussed 
earlier, the quantitative estimates presented in the previous section understate the full 
potential effects of the Round; far more than cuts in tariffs and NTBs were covered. The 
Uruguay Round negotiations were undertaken with the aim of producing a fairer, more 
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a fairer, more transparent multilateral trading system. It is therefore necessary to take into 
account intangibles such as greater competition, the existence of a much more predictable 
trading system and enviromnent, and the increased exposure to scrutiny of less transparent 
NTBs. Of major importance are the liberalization achievements in the new areas (which 
for technical reasons could not be included in the calculations) and the extension of GAIT 
disciplines to these areas. In what follows, an attempt is made to explain those 
achievements relevant to the manufacturing sector and to analyse their likely impact. 
1. Rules 
(a) Safeguards 
Under the old rules, the application of measures against imports, including 
quantitative restrictions, were based on the GAIT safeguard provision (Article XIX: 
Emergency Action on hnports of Particular Products). Safeguards were permitted when 
unexpectedly rapid import growth caused or threatened serious injury to a domestic 
industry as the consequence of obligations assumed under GAIT. However, import- 
restricting measures under the safeguard provision were temporary in nature; affected 
parties were expected to be compensated through additional trade liberalization 
commitments. Although there was no clear statement on the matter, it was generally 
accepted that Article XIX should be applied on a non-discriminatory basis. 
The compensation principle, as well as the implicit non-discriminatory application 
of import-restricting measures, may have been among the most important elements which 
discouraged Governments from using the safeguard provision. The availability of other, 
less burdensome and more popular means of protection may also have contributed to their 
less frequent use. Among these other measures were VERs (which offered exporters the 
opportunity to avoid the inferior outcome of import restrictions and to extract economic 
rents from the restrictions) as well as anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The 
unwillingness of countries to observe the safeguard rules constituted a major breach of 
GAIT disciplines. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations on safeguards aimed to strengthen and 
the rules that had been established to protect industries in difficulty—rules relating to 
temporary import restrictions (which might include tariffs or NTBs). A second objective 
was to deter countries from using other "grey area" measures to restrict imports.'4 
14 
Aside from VERs, grey area measures include orderly marketing arrangements, export 
moderation, export-price or import-price monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, compulsory 
cartels, and discretionary export or import licensing schemes. 
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The Agreement on Safeguards provides for a more flexible use of safeguards 
under tighter disciplines. It eliminates the use of all VERs and similar "grey area" 
measures that may restrict imports or exports within a period of not more than four years 
following the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. All existing safeguard measures 
are to be eliminated within five to eight years. A country wishing to apply any new 
safeguard measure must demonstrate serious injury or the threat thereof, and must 
immediately such measures to the WTO Committee on Safeguards; after reviewing 
the case and consulting with the concerned parties, the Committee will decide whether a 
safeguard measure should be applied. 
Overall, the Agreement is a mixed blessing. Safeguards may discriminate among 
suppliers, but only in exceptional cases, where imports from a country Member increase 
disproportionately. Under such circumstances, the country applying the restrictions may 
seek agreement with respect to the allocation of the quota among Members with 
substantial interest in the affected product, or, alternatively, the restricting country may 
allot shares to the Members concerned which reflect the latter's historical performance. 
Furthermore, no compensation or retaliation is foreseen during the first three years that a 
measure is applied. 
On the positive side, the duration of safeguard measures is limited; further, a 
measure cannot be renewed for a period of time equal to that during which it was 
originally applied, and in any event not until two years has elapsed since the previous 
application of the measure.'5 Additionally, safeguard measures must be progressively 
liberalized during their application and are subject to surveillance and review if they last 
for more than three years. 
The Agreement contains three special provisions that provide developing countries 
with greater flexibility. First, developing countries can maintain safeguard measures for 
a period often years instead of eight. Second, they may reimpose safeguard measures after 
half the time of a previous application, as long as the minimum two-year period of non- 
application has elapsed. Third, developing country exports which account for less than 
3% of a country's imports of a specific product are exempted from safeguard action, 
provided that all developing country Members with less than a 3% share account for less 
than a 9% share overall. 
The Agreement tightens procedures in significant ways, adding greater 
accountability and discipline in the use of safeguard measures. Its commitment to 
eliminating all VERs is perhaps one of its most important components. However, on the 
15The application of safeguard measures is limited to four years initially but can be extended for 
an additional (maximum) period of four years, provided conditions warrant this and there is evidence that 
the concerned industiy is adjusting. Developing countries can maintain safeguard measures for a maximum 
of 10 years. 
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less positive side, the Agreement weakens the obligation to provide compensatory 
liberalization remedies once a safeguard measure is taken. Also of concern is the fact that 
the Agreement relaxes both the non-discrimination and retaliation rules. The combination 
of these factors could lead to the more widespread use of safeguard measures. (One 
should note, however, that a primary goal of the revised rules on safeguards has been to 
push countries away from using discretionary, non-transparent and largely uncontrolled 
measures of contingency protection.) 
Allowing quota allocations to be discriminatory under certain circumstances 
deprives GATT of one of its most important pillars: the MFN clause. Perhaps equally 
serious is the issue of allowing quota allocations to be agreed upon between the importing 
and exporting countries. Within such a context, there is a risk that concealed VER-type 
measures could re-emerge. 
The net impact these diverse elements will have on ESCWA member countries 
is hard to predict at this stage. Indeed, much will depend on the extent to which 
Governments take advantage of their new rights under the Agreement to apply quantitative 
restrictions rather than price-based measures when they take safeguard actions. The 
impact on ESCWA member countries will also depend on whether the new disciplines 
relating to anti-dumping and countervailing duties are strong enough to prevent the de 
facto substitution of VERs and other safeguard measures with unfair trade remedies. 
Further research on this topic will be warranted as events unfold. 
(b) Anti-dumping 
The anti-dumping code, formally called the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI, allows for the imposition of anti-dumping duties following proof that dumping 
has taken place and a domestic industry has been injured, and that the dumped imports are 
the cause of injury. Under the old rules, anti-dumping duties against unfair trade practices 
have increasingly lent themselves to protectionist ends. The code's detailed and complex 
procedures have left many issues lacking in clarity. Thus, national statutes have 
increasingly developed beyond the reach of the code, and may have conveniently served 
as surrogates for selective safeguards. 
The Agreement seeks to strengthen the rules on anti-dumping, and contains some 
improved provisions with respect to dumping-margin calculations, injury determination, 
the defmition of domestic industry, investigation procedures, and standards of evidence; 
further, it imposes disciplines with regard to the transparency of anti-dumping procedures. 
The Agreement contains a specification of de minimis provisions related to the 
margin and volume of dumping for terminating proceedings: anti-dumping cases are to 
be dropped if the margin of dumping is less than 2% (of the export price), or if the volume 
of dumped imports from a particular country represents less than 3% of imports of the 
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same product in the importing Member country (or less than 7% collectively among 
exporters that each supply less than a 3% share). Under such provisions, the cumulation 
of imports from more than one country in an injury investigation is not permitted. 
Otherwise, the Agreement allows for "cumulation"—the assessment of injury by 
aggregating imports across several exporting countries. 
The Agreement requires that anti-dumping duties remain in place for no longer 
than five years unless a review demonstrates that the removal of duty would likely lead to 
the continuation of dumping and injury. Moreover, it limits the freedom of WTO dispute 
settlement panels to examine the merits of disputes concerning anti-dumping actions. The 
panels are limited to a consideration of "whether the authorities' establishment of the facts 
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective" 
(Article 17, paragraph 6, of the Agreement). If these standards are satisfied, a decision by 
a national authority cannot be overturned, even in cases where the panel might have 
reached a different conclusion. Furthermore, the Agreement does not include any 
provisions for anti-circumvention measures designed to penalize exporters who shift the 
location of production in order to avoid anti-dumping duties. However, the Ministerial 
Declaration on Anti-Circumvention was issued in recognition of the problem and the need 
to develop appropriate rules as soon as possible. 
Finally, the Agreement stipulates that developing countries are to be given special 
consideration, stressing that the possibility of constructive remedies should be explored 
prior to the initiation of anti-dumping actions against their exports. 
Although the Agreement provides clearer and firmer rules in many instances, it 
remains to be seen whether these rules will continue to be subject to discretionary 
interpretations by national authorities. This is especially relevant in view of the limited 
extent to which a multilateral authority can challenge national anti-dumping laws through 
its own dispute settlement procedures. 
The number of anti-dumping cases brought against ESCWA member countries' 
exports has grown lately—as has the tendency for these countries to resort to anti-dumping 
actions of their own. These trends may undermine the expected gains from trade 
liberalization. This issue merits further exploration as new anti-dumping measures are 
initiated. 
(c) Subsidies and countervailing measures 
The code on subsidies and countervailing duties is formally known as the 
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII. The code 
provides rules that are intended to protect access commitments with respect to domestic 
markets and to control intrusions into foreign markets via government assistance (through 
subsidy payments). 
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In the pre-Uruguay Round trading environment, the code outlawed export 
subsidies on manufactured products and indicated that subsidies on primary products 
should be avoided. In cases where primary products were being subsidized, a country was 
not to acquire more than a fair share of trade in the subsidized product. The rules and 
disciplines for production subsidies were regarded as being weak; the only stipulation was 
that such subsidies could not be used in ways that adversely affected the industry of 
another country or that nullified or impaired in any way the benefits that would otherwise 
accrue under the GATT provisions. 
The aims of the Uruguay Round negotiations were to restrain the use of all 
subsidies and to improve the rules on countervailing duties. The resulting Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures has gone a long way towards clarifying the rules 
and disciplines in both areas. 
Rules on subsidies are now classified under three different categories: prohibited, 
actionable, and non-actionable. Prohibited subsidies include all non-agricultural subsidies 
and subsidies contingent upon domestic content requirements. They will be subject to new 
dispute settlement procedures, the main feature of which is an expedited timetable for 
action by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Actionable subsidies are those that 
cause injury, the nullification or impairment of benefits, or serious prejudice;'6 matters 
related to this category of subsidies may also be referred to the DSB. Finally, non- 
actionable subsidies include specific subsidies or non-specific subsidies which help 
support industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, those which 
constitute assistance to disadvantaged regions, and those used for environmental 
adaptation. Agricultural subsidies are not covered by the provisions of this Agreement. 
The Agreement also: sets out disciplines relating to the initiation of countervailing 
cases, investigations by national authorities, and rules of evidence; outlines disciplines for 
the calculation of subsidy; and establishes the basis for the determination of injury to 
domestic industry. It provides for the termination of countervailing investigations in cases 
where the amount of subsidy is less than 1% on an ad valorem basis. In general, all 
countervailing investigations must be concluded within one year, and in no case can the 
proceedings stretch beyond 18 months. Finally, all countervailing duties are to be 
terminated within five years of their imposition, unless such an action could lead to the 
continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury. 
Several provisions in the Agreement introduce greater flexibility for developing 
countries. Any developing country with an annual per capita income of less than $1,000 
is allowed to maintain export subsidies. Furthermore, non-recurring subsidies in 
16 
Serious prejudice occurs in cases where the amount of the total ad valorem subsidy exceeds 5%, 
where subsidies are used to cover operating losses, or where there is direct debt forgiveness. 
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developing countries which are linked to privatization programmes are not actionable 
under this Agreement. Once a developing country graduates (i.e., when its per capita 
income exceeds $1,000), that country is given a maximum of eight years to phase out 
export subsidies (there is, however, some provision for extension). Economies in 
transition are given a maximum of seven years to do the same. The prohibition of 
subsidies linked to domestic content requirements will not apply to developing countries 
for five years, or to least-developed countries (LDCs) for eight years. Finally, de minimis 
provisions exempt developing countries from countervailing duties when their subsidy 
levels do not exceed 2% (or 3% in countries accelerating the timetable for eliminating 
export subsidies), or when their import shares represent less than 4% of a particular 
product (or less than 9%, cumulatively, among the countries benefiting from this 
provision). - 
Table 9 presents some evidence with respect to the sectors that remain subject to 
post-Uruguay Round measures affecting developing countries' exports into developed 
country markets; among such measures, anti-dumping actions and countervailing duties 
have become the most important. Their trade-coverage ratios (based on 1992 trade flows) 
are as high as 16.5% for iron and steel products and 12.8% for both travel goods and 
plastic materials. However, it should be understood that anti-dumping actions and 
countervailing duties can be justified by unfair behaviour on the part of foreign 
suppliers—unlike safeguards, which carry with them a domestic industry's implicit 
admission that it is unable to compete. The Agreement contains incentives for developing 
countries to curtail the practice of offsetting domestic protection with export subsidies; this 
should contribute greatly towards curbing their open-ended use. Further, under the 
provisions of the Agreement, it is now much harder for certain industrial markets to use 
countervailing duties for protectionist purposes. The combination of these factors will do 
much to reduce friction in this area. 
2. New areas 
The Uruguay Round dealt with a number of traditional and contentious issues 
affecting the multilateral trading system, but it also took on other challenges. The new 
issues it sought to bring under the GATT umbrella included trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights, trade-related investment measures, and trade in services. 
Bringing these issues under GATT was regarded as necessary to keep the system relevant 
in the face of widespread changes in international economic relations. Globalization 
trends in the world economy have made it imperative to search for international rules and 
regulations to address the new realities. Their introduction has extended the purview of 
the trading system beyond goods markets to include factor and services markets as well. 
Some of these new issues are discussed below. 
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(a) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights can be 
described as far-reaching, given that it covers substantive issues related to intellectual 
property rights and contains specific measures for their enforcement. It develops rules 
designed to extend the protection of such rights to all participating countries. The 
Agreement establishes that national treatment and MFN treatment are to apply with respect 
to all intellectual property rights covered by the Agreement. It also establishes minimum 
standards for the protection of these rights, provisions for their enforcement and for 
dispute settlement and prevention, and transitional arrangements. The minimum standards 
of protection cover seven areas: copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. The 
Agreement also addresses matters relating to the control of anti-competitive practices in 
connection with contractual licences; it calls for consultations among Governments, 
stressing that remedies against such abuses must be consistent with other provisions of the 
Agreement. 
The enforcement provisions are designed to ensure that the intellectual property 
rights recognized under the Agreement can be effectively enforced by foreign rights 
holders as well as by a country's own nationals. Consultations and the settlement of 
disputes are to be handled according to WTO dispute settlement procedures; however, 
under the dispute settlement provisions, non-violation complaints are excluded for a period 
of five years. 
Developed countries were given one year following the establishment of the WTO 
to implement the Agreement, while developing countries and economies in transition are 
given a five-year transition period (except with respect to national treatment and MFN 
commitments). Least-developed economies are afforded up to 11 years to follow suit, with 
the possibility of further extensions. No action is to be taken during the transition period 
changes in laws, regulations or practices) that may result in lessening the degree of 
consistency with the provisions of the Agreement. Moreover, all inventions relating to 
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products which are patented after the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement are protected regardless of any transitional commitments, 
except in least-developed countries; however, LDCs will still be required to provide 
exclusive marketing rights. 
Benefits from the Agreement will accrue to those ESCWA member countries that 
have already started to develop and export technology-intensive products and services. 
Some ESCWA member countries may experience a rise in foreign direct investment in 
high-technology industries resulting from their adoption of the Agreement—a substantial 
benefit in the light of the fact that this may be regarded as a precondition for the transfer 
of technology. The potential benefits for ESCWA member countries will also depend on 
the extent to which the absence of intellectual property protection affects the supply of 
162 
research and development (R&D) in their own countries. Moreover, to the extent that a 
particular country or countries have been penalized for property rights infringements, the 
Agreement will further serve to reduce tensions. 
The impact may be different for those ESCWA member countries that have less 
scope for attracting technology-intensive investments or exporting technology-intensive 
products and services, or whose market size precludes their benefiting from the protection 
of intellectual property rights. Empirical research in this area is of paramount importance; 
it would be useful to conduct an industry-by-industry analysis, and to match each industry 
with particular patterns of consumption in the ESCWA member countries and determine 
their respective market sizes. 
(b) Trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures explicitly acknowledges 
that certain measures governing the treatment of investment have restrictive or distorting 
effects on trade. The Agreement, which applies only to investment measures related to 
trade in goods, provides that no signatories shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with 
Articles III (on national treatment) and XI (on the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. An illustrative list of 
TRIMs considered inconsistent with these articles has been annexed to the Agreement; the 
list covers the following types of prohibited TRIMs: 
• Those that require particular levels of local sourcing by an enterprise (i.e., 
local content requirements) 
• Those which restrict the volume or value of imports which an enterprise 
can buy or use to the volume or value of products it exports (i.e., trade- 
balancing requirements) 
• Those that restrict the volume of imports to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows attributable to an enterprise 
• Those which restrict the export of products by an enterprise, whether 
specified in terms of the particular type, volume or value of products or 
in terms of a proportion of volume or value of local production 
Prohibited practices under the Agreement include both those that are mandatory in nature 
and those with which compliance is necessary to obtain an advantage. 
The Agreement requires that Members the WTO Council on Trade in 
Goods of all TRIMs they are applying that are not in conformance with the provisions of 
the Agreement (notification was to be made within 90 days of the entry into force of the 
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WTO Agreement). Such TRIMs must be eliminated over transition periods of two years 
from the entry into force of the WTO Agreement for developed countries, five years for 
developing countries, and seven years for least-developed countries. The Agreement 
provides for the establishment of a Committee on TRIMs to monitor the implementation 
of commitments. Consultations and the settlement of disputes under the Agreement are 
to be handled within the integrated WTO dispute settlement system. No later than five 
years following its entry into force, the Agreement is to be reviewed with a view to 
proposing, as appropriate, amendments to its text (including a broadening of the 
illustrative list) and considering the scope for complementary provisions on investment and 
competition policy. 
Developing countries have the option of temporarily applying TRIMs contained 
in the illustrative list, but only in accordance with the provisions outlined in Article 4 of 
the Agreement. 
Limiting the use of measures relating to both local-content and trade-balancing 
requirements will serve the interests of those ESCWA member countries that are most 
committed to creating a neutral trading and investment environment. Perfonnance 
requirements not only have trade-distorting effects; they also create disincentives for 
foreign firms, because they act as an implicit tax. In attempting to counterbalance these 
disincentives, countries more often than not grant investment incentives; however, the 
latter distort the free-trade pattern of investment in the same way tariffs do. In most cases, 
the overall impact of such practices has been welfare-reducing. Curtailing their use will 
therefore save ESCWA member countries lost income and opportunities. Further research 
is warranted on the nature and sectoral incidence of the remaining TRIMs in ESCWA 
member countries, as well as on the broad typology of investment barriers which would 
likely be the object of more comprehensive rule-making in the future. 
3. Institutional arrangements 
(a) An integrated dispute settlement system 
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) brings the GAIT dispute settlement system up to date by building upon 
existing GAIT practices and extending them in significant ways. This has been achieved 
through the introduction of greater speed and automaticity into dispute settlement 
procedures—and the consequent elimination of competing forums within the system. The 
integrated system was set up to ensure procedural and interpretative consistency in dispute 
settlement practices across all issues. It provides for greater automaticity in the following 
areas: 
The establishment of a dispute settlement panel if bilateral consultations 
fail 
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• The adoption of reports by dispute settlement panels 
• The right of retaliation in the event of non-compliance with adopted panel 
recommendations. Adoption of panel reports has been changed from 
"consensus to accept" to "consensus to reject"; in other words, the 
arrangements virtually guarantee the adoption of panel fmdings, which 
can only be blocked by a consensus decision. 
Furthermore, the Understanding establishes an appellate review body whose rulings are 
binding, as are the fmdings of adopted panel reports. The Understanding also provides for 
a system of surveillance and follow-up of the implementation of dispute settlement 
decisions. 
Under prescribed conditions, the Understanding also allows for the possibility of 
cross-sectoral retaliation in the areas of goods, services and intellectual property rights. 
All of these steps are governed by strict timetables, as the entire proceedings must be 
completed within 18 months of the first request for consultation. Moreover, the 
Understanding limits unilateral actions by requiring that multilateral dispute settlement 
procedures be followed; unilateral determinations must not be made on whether a violation 
has occurred or whether benefits have been nullified or impaired. Finally, the 
Understanding establishes that central Governments are responsible for the actions of local 
authorities and must pay compensation or face retaliation in the event that the latter violate 
any WTO provision(s). 
The automatic panel adoption provisions (which make it procedurally difficult to 
block findings) and the limitations imposed on unilateral actions will serve the interests 
of the ESCWA member countries. Both will go a long way towards reducing trade 
friction, and will therefore contribute to a more stable trading environment. Finally, the 
more demanding rules leave less room for manoeuvring and pressure on countries 
to comply with rulings. 
(b) The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization—more 
commonly known as the WTO Agreement—is one of the most important achievements 
of the Uruguay Round. It enhances GATT surveillance mechanisms (through regular 
reviews of Members' trade policies and annual review of international trade), improves the 
overall effectiveness of the institution (through regular ministerial meetings), and increases 
its contribution to coherence in policy-making (through collaboration between the WTO, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). 
165 
The WTO brings all the Uruguay Round agreements, among them GATT 994 
and four plurilateral agreements,'7 under one umbrella. The WTO replaces the provisional 
accession instruments through which countries joined GATT from 1947 onward; this 
implies the elimination of the grandfather clause contained in the provisional accession 
protocols, under which countries could avoid any GATT discipline that contradicted pre- 
existing mandatory legislation. 
Under the WTO, the new multilateral trading system is legally established as a 
single, indivisible undertaking. WTO membership is conditional upon countries having 
schedules of concessions and commitments on market access for industrial and agricultural 
products and for services; it also implies acceptance of GATT 1994 (which comprises 
GATT 1947 and all amendments to it, including the Marrakesh Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994) as well as all of the other Uruguay Round 
agreements. This concept of a single undertaking underlying the WTO means that 
developing countries are assuming more extensive and higher levels of obligations than 
ever before (notwithstanding special provisions of the various agreements which allow for 
longer transitions, extensions, waivers and so on). 
The tendency of the multilateral trading system to splinter into different layers is 
held in check under this new, unified structure. The ESCWA member countries that 
belong to the WTO must make every effort to exercise their rights and fulfil their 
obligations within this context; countries that do so may be expected to benefit greatly. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
The present paper assesses the impact of the Uruguay Round agreements on the 
ESCWA member countries' exports of manufactured products. The assessment is made 
with reference to liberalization achievements relating to tariff and NTB reductions in the 
three main OECD markets; also considered are the "intangibles" that may affect trade in 
manufactured goods. 
The empirical results suggest that the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements will lead to a net increase of $178 million in the ESCWA member countries' 
manufactured exports to the main OECD markets, which represents a 4% expansion over 
1993 exports. The technical limitations inherent in all exercises of this type are such that 
the net benefits have almost certainly been underestimated. 
17 
These include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, the International Dairy Arrangement, and the International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
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Indeed, there are good reasons for believing that the benefits accruing to ESCWA 
member countries from the Uruguay Round negotiations and agreements will go well 
beyond what is quantifiable. In particular, quantitative studies do not take into account the 
effects of strengthening and extending GAiT rules and disciplines across new areas 
(thereby making competition fairer and more transparent) or the effects of easing bilateral 
trade tensions and associated political conflict. Nor do they reflect the advantages 
associated with the fuller integration of developing countries and former State trading 
economies into the multilateral system. Finally, the results fail to reflect the benefits from 
enhanced efficiency evolving from ESCWA member countries' own unilateral, regional 
and multilateral liberalization commitments. As mentioned before, the results are reported 
with respect to gains in OECD markets, where ESCWA member countries exported some 
42% of their combined 1992 total (gains in developing countries where reliable data are 
hard to come by are excluded from the analysis). 
Various sections of the paper call for additional research as events unfold. Certain 
topics merit further detailed analysis, so that appropriate sets of policies can be developed 
which will allow the ESCWA member countries to take full advantage of the achievements 
of the Uruguay Round; since many of the agreements will be phased in over an extended 




Annex table 1. Export profile of Bahrain 
1990-1991 value 












All commodities 3 635 411 100.00 0.53 0.11 
Petroleum products, refined 2 808 082 . 77.24 7.72 3.03 
Aluminium 436 534 12.01 9.12 1.51 
Inorganic elements 60794 1.67 2.75 0.48 
Alcohol, phenols, etc. 50466 1.39 3.43 0.63 
Pearls, precious, semi-precious 37 362 1.03 0.69 0.14 
Gas, natural and manufactured 35 861 0.99 0.26 0.10 
Crude petroleum 23 986 0.66 0.02 0.01 
Hydrocarbons 18341 0.50 1.05 0.12 
Electrical equipment 15042 0.41 0.64 0.11 
Aircraft, etc. 14 574 0.40 0.75 0.02 
Measuring, controlling instruments 12 364 0.34 0.82 0.03 
9 585 0.26 0.24 0.06 
Rubber tyres 9219 0.25 0.40 0.06 
Gold, silverware 8629 0.24 0.23 0.06 
Womens outerwear, non-knit 8 383 0.23 0.08 0.03 
Structures and parts n.e.s. 7596 0.21 0.92 0.08 
Remainder 78 593 2.17 
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Annex fable 2. Export profile of Egypt 
1990-1991 













All commodities 3 137 320 10000 0.45 0.09 
Crude petroleum I 088 458 34.69 0.75 0.56 
Textile yam 350 956 11.19 5.00 1.49 
Petroleum products, refined 200 227 6.38 0.55 0.22 
Aluminium 183 617 5.85 3.84 0.64 
Cotton 134815 4.30 3.53 1.49 
Cotton fabrics, woven 96 127 3.06 2.07 0.63 
Vegetables, fresh, simply preserved 74 827 2.39 1.74 0.41 
Gas, natural and manufactured 66108 2.11 0.48 0.19 
Fruits, nuts, fresh, dried 60021 1.91 0.82 0.30 
Men's outerwear, non-knit 58276 1.86 0.76 0.32 
Outerwear, knit, non-elastic 51 069 1.63 0.45 0.19 
Furniture, parts thereof 49942 1.59 1.25 0.16 
Perfumery, cosmetics 37410 1.19 3.72 0.36 
Textile articles n.e.s. 36 064 1.15 1.28 0.42 
Rice 29553 0.94 1.44 0.72 
Floor coverings, etc. 27887 0.89 1.41 0.33 
Remainder 591 963 18.87 
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Annex table 3. Export profile of Jordan 
1990-1991 













All commodities 900 325 100.00 0.13 0.03 
Fertilizers, crude 332 417 36.92 27.29 20.44 
Fertilizers, manufactured 123 209 - 13.68 5.23 0.84 
Vegetables, fresh, simply preserved 59262 6.58 1.38 0.33 
Medicinal, pharmaceutical products 55714 6.19 2.39 0.14 
Lime, cement, building products 38 557 4.28 2.53 0.51 
Polymerization (etc.) products 22 805 2.53 0.38 0.05 
Soap, cleansing (etc.) preparations 20091 2.23 2.49 0.29 
Other inorganic chemicals, etc. 19 259 2.14 2.42 0.24 
Fruits, nuts, fresh, dried 13546 1.50 0.19 0.07 
Textile yarn 13403 1.49 0.19 0.06 
Eggs, birds, fresh, preserved 11 290 1.25 12.24 0.87 
Gold, silverware, jewellery 9230 1.03 0.25 0.07 
Paper (etc.), precut, arts 8 251 0.92 0 59 0.06 
Live animals for food 7695 0.85 0.51 0.09 
Articles of plastic n.e.s. 7294 0.81 0.14 0.02 
Pesticides, disinfectants 6 890 0.77 1.29 0.10 
Remainder 151 412 16.82 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 4. Export profile of Kuwait 
1990-1991 













All commodities 3 914 837 100.0 0.57 0.12 
Fertilizers, crude 1 940 453 49.57 1.34 1.00 
Fertilizers, manufactured 1 422 640 36.34 3.91 1.53 
Vegetables, fresh, simply preserved 140 111 3.58 1.01 0.41 
Medical, pharmaceutical products 35 197 0.90 1.81 0.05 
Lime, cement, buildingproducts 32 678 0.83 4.45 0.64 
Polymerization (etc.) products 25 781 0.66 1.09 0.18 
Soap, cleansing (etc.) preparations 24 850 0.63 0.39 0.01 
Other inorganic chemicals, etc. 21 963 0.56 1.40 0.12 
Fruits, nuts, fresh, dried 18 727 0.48 2.40 0.08 
Textileyarn 17075 0.44 0.35 0.03 
Eggs, birds, fresh, preserved 15 002 0.38 3.93 1.00 
Gold, silverware, jewelleiy 12 928 0.33 0.55 0.09 
Paper(etc.),precut,arts 12407 0.32 1.55 0.11 
Live animals for food 12169 0.31 0.55 0.10 
Articles of plastic n.e.s. 11 979 0.31 0.85 0.09 
Pesticides, disinfectants 10891 0.28 1.32 0.11 
Remainder 159 985 4.09 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 5. Export profile of Oman 
1990-1991 













Allcommodities 5044498 100.00 0.73 0.15 
Crude petroleum 4497794 89.16 3.10 2.33 
Passenger motor vehicles, excluding 
buses 
116411 - 2.31 1.81 0.07 
Aircraft, etc. 40 400 0.80 2.08 0.06 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories n.e.s. 36748 0.73 1.13 0.04 
Copper, excluding cement copper 30812 0.61 043 0.14 
Fish, fresh, chilled, frozen 29051 0.58 0.72 0.19 
Civil engineering equipment 19 197 0.38 1.86 0.11 
Tobacco, manufactured 18859 0.37 1.22 0.16 
Petroleum products, refined 16 603 0.33 0.05 0.02 
Zoo animals, pets, etc. 14 926 0.30 19.83 5.30 
Special transactions 12 865 0.26 0.26 0.02 
Watches and clocks 11397 0.23 0.31 0.08 
Aluminium 10903 0.22 0.23 0.04 
Undergarments, non-knit 10245 0.20 0.24 0.14 
Outerwear, knit, non-elastic 10 177 0.20 0.09 0.04 
Shellfish, fresh, frozen 9394 0.19 0.14 0.08 
Remainder 158715 3.15 
Vote Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 6. Export profile of Qatar 
1990-1991 













All commodities 3317968 100.00 0.48 0.10 
Crude petroleum 2508940 75.62 1.73 1.30 
Petroleum products, refined 186 820 5.63 0.51 0.20 
Iron, steel shapes, etc. 158 074 4.76 5.34 0.84 
Polymerization (etc.) products 142 391 4.29 2.37 0 29 
Gas, natural and manufactured 111 677 3.37 0.81 0.33 
Fertilizers, manufactured 97 054 2.93 4.12 0.67 
Hydrocarbons n.e.s., derivatives 37634 1.13 2.16 0.24 
Inorganic elements, oxides, etc. 26098 0.79 1.18 0.21 
Products of condensation, etc. 18 824 0.57 1.41 0.12 
Men's outerwear, non-knit 7 736 0.23 0.10 0.04 
Soap, cleansing (etc.) preparations 3 730 0 11 0.46 0.05 
Sulphur, unrstd irn pyrte 3 655 0.11 0.96 0.24 
Meat, fresh, chilled, frozen 2 386 0.07 0.07 0.01 
Hides, skins, excluding furs 2 151 0.06 0.45 0.04 
Gold, silverware, jewellery 1 617 0.05 0.04 0.01 
Structures and parts n.e.s. 1428 0.04 0.17 0.02 
Remainder 7 753 0.23 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 7. Export profile of SaudiArabia 
1990-1991 













All commodities 45 784 351 100.00 6.63 1.36 
Crude petroleum 34 497 894 75.35 23.76 17.85 
Petroleum products, refined 4 539 971 9.92 12.49 4.89 
Gas, natural and manufactured 1 946 642 4.25 14.04 5.70 
Polymerization (etc.) products 794 932 1.74 13.21 1.64 
Alcohol, phenols, etc. 410 914 0.90 27.97 5.13 
Hydrocarbons n.e.s., derivatives 293 422 0.64 16.86 1.91 
Inorganic elements, oxides, etc. 187 105 0.41 8.46 1.49 
Wheat (etc.), unmilled 154 329 0.34 14.58 1.05 
Other organic chemicals 106 035 0.23 20.58 1.50 
Sulphur, unrstd irn pyrte 105 416 0.23 27.61 7.03 
Fertilizers, manufactured 89217 0.19 3.79 0.61 
Gold, silverware, jewellery 81 036 0.18 2.20 0.60 
Engines and motors n.e.s. 72265 0.16 9.27 0.32 
Residual petroleum products n.e.s. 71111 0.16 9.69 1.39 
Iron, steel shapes, etc. 70667 0.15 2.39 0.38 
Lime, cement, building products 60745 0.13 3.99 0.80 
Remainder 2 302 650 5.03 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 8. Export profile of the Syrian Arab Republic 
1990-1991 













All commodilies 3822020 100.00 0.55 0.11 
Crude petroleum 1 902 339 49.77 1.31 0.98 
Petroleum products, refined 342 816 8.97 0.94 0.37 
Perfumery, cosmetics, etc. 249 080 6.52 24.80 2.39 
Cotton 194648 5.09 5.10 2.16 
Live animals for food 190 407 4.98 12.69 2.16 
Fabric, woven, man-made fibre 173 874 4.55 2.13 0.77 
Outerwear, knit, non-elastic 92672 2.42 0.81 0.35 
Vegetables (etc.) fresh, simply preserved 85318 2.23 1.99 0.47 
Fabrics, knit, etc. 73 609 1.93 2.75 1.14 
Fertilizers, crude 48 751 1.28 4.00 3.00 
Undergarments, knit 39547 1.03 0.64 0.30 
Women's outerwear, non-knit 33 345 0.87 0.30 0.12 
Fruits, nuts, fresh, dried 32589 0.85 0.45 0.16 
Men's outerwear, non-knit 28616 0.75 0.37 0.16 
Fruits, preserved, prepared 22 677 0.59 0.69 0.25 
Cereal (etc.) preparations 18008 0.47 2.18 0.18 
Remainder 293 724 7.69 
Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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Annex table 9. Export profile of the United Arab Emirates 













All commodities 16013 959 100.00 2.32 0.48 
Crude petroleum 11909687 74.37 8.20 6.16 
Gas, natural and manufactured 1 053 371 . 6.58 7.60 3.08 
Petroleum products, refined 1 015 536 6.34 2.79 1.09 
Aluminium 248 797 1.55 5.20 0.86 
Residual petroleum products n.e.s. 106 973 0.67 14.57 2.09 
Gold, non-monetary n.e.s. 81 486 0.51 4.40 0.54 
Gold, silverware, jewellery 66814 0.42 1.82 0.49 
Undergarments, knit 58 234 0.36 0.95 0.44 
Special transactions 56293 0.35 1.15 0.09 
Fruits, nuts, fresh, dried 54 352 0.34 0.74 0.27 
Women's outwear, non-knit 53 606 0.33 0.49 0.20 
Undergarments non-knit 51 930 0.32 1.21 0.70 
Lime, cement, building products 50463 0.32 3.31 0.66 
Fertilizers, manufactured 43455 0.27 1.84 0.30 
Engines and motors n.e.s. 42 136 0.26 5.41 0.18 
Nonferrous metals, scrap n.e.s. 41 812 0.26 6.10 0.69 
Remainder 1 079 014 6.74 
Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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IV. A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
by the UNCTAD secretariat 
Introduction 
International trade in textiles and clothing has been governed for decades by a 
special trade regime. After the inception of the cotton textile arrangement in the early 
1 960s, this regime progressively increased its product and countly coverage and intensified 
its discriminatory character. While developing countries have gained an important share 
in world trade in textiles and clothing, the opportunities for export growth have been 
seriously restricted by the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (also 
known as the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA). In 1992, the value of world trade in 
textiles and clothing amounted to $285 billion, which was equivalent to about 8% of total 
world trade in goods. Textiles and clothing accounted for nearly 26% of developing 
countries' exports of manufactures and 15.5% of their total exports of goods. 
In the sections that follow, the paper summarizes the main provisions and elements 
of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (also referred to here as the Agreement or the 
ATC); identifies the trading opportunities and improvements in market-access conditions 
in this sector resulting from the implementation of the ATC, including tariff reductions and 
other trade-liberalization measures undertaken by all countries; examines measures and 
issues that may affect the implementation of the ATC; and assesses the implications of the 
ATC for the international trading system as a whole. 
A. MAIN FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENT ON 
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is not merely a plan for phasing out the 
MFA; it is also an integral part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (the WTO Agreement). The ATC is applicable to all WTO Members, 
whether signatories to the MFA or not; all their trade in textiles and clothing is subject to 
the provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of those products phased into the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 under the integration programme 
described below. In contrast, the MFA was only applicable to trade in textiles and 
clothing among MFA signatories, and thus could only be legally applied against those 
exporting countries which had agreed to be subject to its provisions. 
First and foremost, the Agreement provides for the phasing out of the MFA, 
leading to the complete integration of the textile and clothing sector into GATT by the end 
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of the 10-year transition period. The phasing-out process comprises two aspects: the 
integration of the sector into GATT through the gradual elimination of the export restraints 
contained in bilateral agreements; and the increases in growth rates for the quotas of the 
products still remaining under restriction during the 10-year transition period. 
The main market-access elements of the ATC are summarized below. 
1. Integration programme 
The Agreement requires that the products listed in its annex (in terms of 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System [HS] lines and categories), 
including those subject to MFA restrictions, be integrated into GATT 1994 in four stages, 
as follows: 
• Stage one: by 1 January 1995, not less than 16% of the total volume of 
the Member's 1990 imports of the products listed in the annex 
• Stage two: by 1 January 1998, not less than an additional 17% of the 
total volume of the Member's 1990 imports of the products listed in the 
annex 
• Stage three: by 1 January 2002, not less than an additional 18% of the 
total volume of the Member's 1990 imports of the products listed in the 
annex 
• Stage four. by 1 January 2005, the textiles and clothing sector shall stand 
integrated into GATI' 1994, all restrictions under this Agreement having 
been eliminated. 
The Agreement stipulates that the integration at each stage must include products 
from each of the four groups of tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products and 
clothing. The selection of products is left up to the importing countries. 
2. Increases in growth rates for MFA quotas 
Article 2, paragraphs 13 and 14, of the ATC provides for an annual increase of the 
established growth rate (i.e., that of the former MFA restraints carried over into this 
Agreement) for the remaining restrictions during each of the first three stages of the 
integration programme, as follows: 
• For stage one (1 January 1995 to 31 December 1997), "the level of each 
restriction under MFA bilateral agreements in force for the 12-month 
period prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall 
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be increased annually by not less than the growth rate established for the 
respective restrictions, increased by 16%" 
• For stage two (1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001), "the growth rate 
for the respective restrictions during stage one, increased by 25%" 
• For stage three (1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004), "the growth rate 
for the respective restrictions during stage two, increased by 27%" 
(GATT, 1 994b) 
3. Increases In growth rates for MFA quotas for small suppliers 
Under Article 2, paragraph 18, of the ATC, small suppliers whose exports subject 
to restrictions represented 1.2% or less of the total volume of the restrictions applied by 
an importing Member as of 31 December 1991 shall be granted meaningful improvement 
in access for their exports during the duration of this Agreement, through the &Ivancement 
by one stage of the growth rates; in other words, their growth rates shall be increased at 
the beginning of each stage by 25%, 27%, and 27% respectively, instead of 16%, 25%, 
and 27%. 
4. The phasing out of other non-MFA restrictions 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing also stipulates that all GAIT- 
inconsistent non-MFA restrictions shall be either brought into conformance with GATT 
1994 within one year of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement or phased out 
progressively under a programme during the period covered by the ATC. 
5. The transitional safeguards mechanism 
Parallel to the progressive phasing out of both MFA and GATI'-inconsistent non- 
MFA quantitative restrictions, the Agreement (under Article 6) permits the continued 
imposition of new quantitative restrictions by all WTO Members on a product or products 
(i.e., those listed in the annex that have not yet been integrated into GATT 1994 under the 
integration programme) of a specific Member or Members on a discriminatory basis for 
up to three years during the transition period under the so-called transitional safeguards 
mechanism. Members which were signatories to the MFA but not maintaining MFA 
restrictions were permitted to retain the right to use the transitional safeguards as long as 
they notified the WTO Textiles Monitoring Body (1MB) of their intention within 60 days 
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Members which were not signatories to 
the MFA after 1986 were required to notify the TMB within six months of the entry into 
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force of the WTO Agreement of their intention in this regard.' If Members from either 
group chose not to do so, their trade in textiles was considered to have been integrated into 
GATT 1994 at a stroke. However, if a Member decided to retain the right to use the 
transitional safeguards, that Member had to notify the TMB of its intention within 12 
months of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, providing full details with regard 
to which products were to be integrated into GAIT 1994 during the first stage (Article 2, 
paragraph 7 [b]).2 
With the eventual elimination of MFA quotas and other non-MFA restrictions, 
tariffs will become the main instrument of border protection in this sector, and textiles and 
clothing will thus be accorded the same treatment as other industrial products. In this 
sense, the tariff reductions made by the major developed countries will, in the long run, 
effectively improve the access conditions of developing countries to their markets and 
provide increased security and predictability for developing countries' trade in textiles and 
clothing. However, in the short run, the MFA quotas will remain a real obstacle. 
B. TRADING OPPORTUNITIES ARISING FROM THE MAIN PROVISIONS 
OF THE AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
1. The phasing out of MFA restrictions 
Market-access opportunities in the textiles and clothing sector can be expected to 
expand with the implementation of the integration programmes designed to progressively 
abolish MFA quotas, as referred to above. Several studies following different 
methodologies have estimated the likely volume of trade expansion resulting from the 
dismantling of the MFA. For example, a recent study projects that without the MFA, 
exports from MFA exporters to MFA importers will increase by 26% for clothing and 10% 
for textiles (Yang, 1993). According to a recent United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) report, the ATC will have a greater impact on the American textile 
and clothing sector than any of the other Uruguay Round agreements. It projects that 
American textiles imports are likely to increase by between 5% and 15% and imports of 
clothing by over 15%. The increase in American imports is expected to be greatest from 
developing countries subject to MFA restrictions (USITC, 1994). 
'In other words, non-MFA-signatoiy Members of the WTO that were not currently maintaining 
any quantitative restrictions but wished to retain the right to use the transitional safeguards had to the 
1MB of their intention to do so by 1 July 1995. 
2When Members chose to retain the right to use the transitional safeguards, their trade in textiles 
and cloth iñg as defined in the annex to the Agreement was considered completely outside of GAiT 1994; 
such trade must therefore be gradually integrated into GAIT 1994 under the four-stage integration 
programme outlined above. By 1 January 1996, these Members had to notify the full details of 16% of the 
total volume of their 1990 imports of textiles and clothing to the TMB for integration into GAIT 1994. In 
future, such notification should be made 12 months prior to the beginning of each integration stage. 
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The integration programmes may not bring about any immediate trade 
liberalization, however, mainly because the annex to the ATC contains many HS lines 
which have never been specifically restricted in any country; it is estimated by S. Bagchi 
(1994) that such lines accounted for 47% of total 1990 imports in Canada, 34% in the 
European Union (EU), and 37% in the United States, and for as much as 93% in Austria, 
81% in Finland, and 83% in Norway. Since Austria and Finland became Members of the 
EU on 1 January 1995, their integration programmes are covered by that of the EU.3 
Given such a situation, the major restraining countries can fulfil their obligations 
under the Agreement in the first two stages without touching MFA quotas. Trade 
opportunities (on a modest scale) may therefore only become perceptible from the 
beginning of the third stage, in the year 2002. 
(a) Stage-one integration programmes 
As required by Article 2, paragraph 6, of the ATC and by the provisions of the 
associated Ministerial Decision taken at Marrakesh in April Austria, Canada, the 
EU, Finland, Norway and the United States submitted their lists of products scheduled to 
be integrated during the first stage of the programme. A preliminary analysis has been 
carried out with respect to the lists of Canada, the EU, Norway and the United States; the 
findings are summarized in the paragraphs that follow. 
For Canada, the import value of the products integrated in the first stage is around 
$650 million, or nearly 13% of its total 1990 imports of textiles and clothing as defined 
in the annex to the ATC.5 As Canada has not provided a description of the correlation 
between the HS lines and the categories integrated, it is not possible to ascertain whether 
its first stage will have any impact on world trade in general, or on its imports from 
developing countries in particular. 
The EU has apparently met the 16% requirement in volume terms, but only 
because some "ex-items" have been included in the product list.6 Although in many cases 
these ex-items constitute only a fraction of the HS lines at the six-digit level, the EU added 
3The implications of the new framework of EU restrictions for developing exporting countries are 
still unknown, as the consultations with regard to the base levels of restrictions of the enlarged EU-IS are still 
under way. The new base levels of restrictions of the EU must also reflect the levels of restrictions in both 
Austria and Sweden was not maintaining any MFA restrictions by 31 December 1994. 
4The Decision on Notification of First Integration under Article 2, paragraph 6, of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (see GAIT, 1994b, p. 450). 
5The integration list of Canada was given at the HS 10-digit level. Because data for 1990 were 
not available, data for 1991 at the HS eight-digit level were used, possibly resulting in an overestimate. 
6"Ex-item" refers to an excerpt (i.e., part) ofan HS six-digit code (or line). For example, of the 
products covered by HS line 6406.10. only the sub-item "footwear uppers and parts. of which 50% or more 
of the external surface area is textile material" is covered by the ATC as defined in its annex. 
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the full HS six-digit volume when calculating the amount of imports integrated. When 
these lines are disaggregated at the eight-digit level, in most cases it is difficult to identify 
the textile material sub-items. Therefore, if only a percentage of the HS six-digit trade is 
included, say, for example, 50%, then the share of trade (the percentage volume) 
integrated amounts to less than the 16% required by the Agreement. It should be noted 
that none of the 10 product categories included in the EU list was subject to an MFA quota 
in 1994. Although products of two categories were subject to EU regional quotas for a 
few exporting countries in 1990, these quotas were later eliminated with the creation of 
the Single European Market in 1992. 
The products integrated by the EU in the first stage have a 1990 import value of 
$3.7 billion, or 8.7% of total EU imports of textiles and clothing for 1990 as defined in the 
annex to the ATC. However, if consideration is limited to Section XI of the HS 
nomenclature (textiles and textile articles including clothing), the products integrated 
represent less than 2.3% of EU textile and clothing imports. The import value of the 
products integrated by the EU in the first stage represents less than 8% of developing 
countries' 1990 exports of textiles and clothing to the EU.7 
The first-stage integration list of the United States does not include any products 
covered by MFA restrictions.8 The 1990 import value of the products integrated is $2.3 
billion, or 6.9% of the United States' total imports of textiles and clothing for that year. 
The import value represents less than 5% of developing countries' 1990 exports of textiles 
and clothing to the United States. Among the products integrated, 40% fall outside 
Section XI of the HS nomenclature and are mainly from the made-up textile products and 
clothing segments. Ex-items can also be found in the segment of made-up textile products. 
Norway's integration list is based on HS lines and contains a number of ex-items, 
many of which represent only a fraction of the full HS lines at the six-digit level. Like the 
EU, Norway added the volume of imports for the full HS six-digit lines when computing 
the amount of imports integrated. If only a portion of the HS six-digit trade has been 
included, say 50%, then the volume of trade actually integrated is less than the 16% 
required by the Agreement. In value terms, the products integrated in the first stage are 
equivalent to $143 million worth of imports, or 7.4% of Norway's total imports of textiles 
and clothing in 1990. It is important to note that among the products integrated, only 
about 2% fall within Section XI of the HS nomenclature. 
To summarize, products that have not been subject to restrictions have been 
integrated first, while the integration of the more sensitive products in each category has 
This is also confirmed by D. Spinanger, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. See WTO, 1995, 
table AV.4, p. 202. 
8The United States' list was given at the HS 10-digit level, which allowed for the fine-tuning of 
product selection for the first stage of integration. 
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been postponed. Furthermore, the products integrated in the first stage from each of the 
four groups (tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products and clothing) by the EU, 
Norway and the United States are uneven. For example, the share of clothing is minimal: 
in the EU list, clothing accounts for less than 3.1% of the total volume of developing 
countries' exports of that segment to the EU in 1990; for Norway, this figure is only 1%; 
and for the United States, 1.72%. The analysis included the following conclusions: 
• The integration target was set in volume terms; the products integrated so 
far have been high in volume and low in value; further... 
• None of the products integrated into GAIT 1994 by the EU, the United 
States, Norway or (perhaps) Canada was covered by the quantitative 
restrictions under the MFA; therefore... 
• The first stage of the integration programme will not lead to any trade 
liberalization; therefore, it will have no impact on world trade in textiles 
and clothing and will offer no new market-access opportunities to 
developing countries. 
A recent analysis carried out by the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau 
(ITCB, 1994) also finds that the first-stage integration programmes of Canada, the EU and 
the United States have not provided meaningful market-access opportunities for 
developing countries, as a result of the following: 
• Most of the product groups chosen from the annex to the Agreement are 
those outside Section XI of the HS nomenclature (i.e., products not 
subject to MFA restrictions); they have been included merely to inflate 
the total volume of imports for integration. 
• None of the 280 H5 lines in the United States' list is included in its 
traditional textile category system. 
• Tops and yams have been given priority in Canada and the United States 
and account for more than 50% of their integration items. The fabric 
group constitutes a significant portion in the EU integration programme 
owing to the inclusion of jute fabrics, laminated fabrics and luggage. 
Clothing has been given minimal attention in all three countries (very few 
clothing items have been included). 
The ITCB analysis also refers to a positive development related to the removal of 
some residual EU restrictions on jute products, luggage, umbrellas, parachutes and watch 
straps; this might benefit developing countries such as Bangladesh and India, which supply 
some jute products. 
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It was projected early on that the products that had never been subject to 
restrictions would be integrated first, while the integration of more sensitive products in 
each category would be postponed as long as possible (UNCTAD, 1994). Indeed, there 
were indications that the EU was contemplating taking only token steps towards the first 
stage of the integration programme (Financial Times, 17-18 September 1994). These 
programmes were not designed to phase out the MFA restrictions in the first stage of 
integration; taking full advantage of this, the United States in its Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act requires the Administration, in determining which products should be 
integrated, to ensure that the integration of the most sensitive products be deferred until 
the end of the 10-year period.9 In the light of all this, the first stage of integration is not 
expected to bring about any material change in the protection of domestic industries in the 
restraining countries. Consequently, it is not likely to entail any need for structural 
adjustment. However, it could make the process of adjustment more painful in the 
subsequent stages. 
(b) The American integration programmes for stages two and three 
Article 2, paragraph 11, of the ATC stipulates that products to be integrated at the 
second and third stages must be notified in detail to the TMB 12 months before the 
beginning of each stage. However, as outlined in Section 331 of its Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994, the United States decided to publish a list of the products it 
intended to integrate in the second and third stages no later than 120 days after the WTO 
Agreement entered into force for the United States, and to notify this list to the TMB no 
later than 30 days after its publication (United States, 1994). Accordingly, on 1 May 1995, 
this list was published in the United States Federal Register (vol. 60, No. 183). '° 
According to an estimation made by the UNClAD secretariat, the American programme 
of integration in the second and third stages represents 10.7% and 11.3% of the total 1990 
import values respectively. As a result, more than 70% of the 1990 value and nearly 50% 
of the 1990 volume of American imports will not be integrated until the very end of the 
10-year transition period. 
As to which exporting countries are expected to gain from the above-mentioned 
American programme in the second and third stages, the estimation shows that the benefits 
of integration will very much depend upon the scope of the restrictions imposed by the 
developed importing countries on the developing exporting countries. Among such 
Indeed, the United States Congress, in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, has also required 
the Administration to determine which products should be integrated in order to ensure that the integration 
of the most sensitive products is defened until the end of the 10-year period (see United States, 1994), p. 771. 
Prior to the publication of the final list, a proposed list was published (at the end of January 
1995) in the Federal Register for comments from all interested parties including individuals, trade 
associations, certified firms and recognized unions, groups of workers, and representatives of foreign 
Governments from exporting countries. 
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exporting countries, those that are faced with a much larger number of restrictions, such 
as China (if it becomes a WTO Member), Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan 
Province of China (if it becomes a WTO Member), Pakistan, the Philippines and 
Singapore, will probably benefit from the liberalization of a few marginal restrictions (on 
babies' garments, down-filled coats and hosiery, for example) at the beginning of the 
second stage. The beneficiaries in the third stage will mainly be the large- and medium- 
scale exporting countries, including Bangladesh, Brazil, China (if it becomes a WTO 
Member), Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, Macau, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan Province of China (if it becomes a WTO Member), Thailand, Turkey and the 
United Arab Emirates. Countries that are small exporters will likely have to wait until the 
very end of the 10-year transition period to realize any benefits (for details, see table 1). 
Table 1. The United States' programme of integration 
under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
Stages 
Products for which MFA restrictions will 
be phased out Beneficiaries 
I None None 
11 Baby garments and related parts (except cotton 
diapers); down-filled coats; and hosiery 
China (if it becomes a WTO Member), Hong 
Kong, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan Province 
of China (if it becomes a WTO Member) 
Ill Knit fabrics; gloves and mittens (except non- 
unit); dressing gowns; headwear, dish towels; 
handbags; luggage; bar mop; other staple fibre 
yarn; brassieres; polybag; WG coats; MB suit- 
type coats; dresses; skirts and gloves not knit; 
skirts, MB suits; trousers, breeches and shorts; 
nightwear, etc. 
Bangladesh, Brazil, China (if it becomes a 
W1'O Member), Haiti, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, 
Macau, Malaysia, Mauritius, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province of 
China (if it becomes a WTO Member), 
Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates 
Source: UNCTAD/ITCB estimation based on information provided by the United States (a) to the Preparatory 
Committee of the WTO in October 1994 and (b) in the United Stales Federal Register, vol. 60, No. 83(1 May 1995). 
2. Increases in annual growth rates and other flexibility provisions 
Parallel to the integration programme, the Agreement provides for increases in the 
growth rates of the remaining quotas during the transition period. This will result in 
substantial improvements in developing countries' access to markets in the sector of 
textiles and clothing—particularly for small suppliers, given their entitlement to the 
advancement of growth rates by one stage. Because the growth rates are calculated as 
percentages of percentages (see table 2), the increases will be meaningful to the extent that 
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significant growth rates were incorporated in the bilateral agreements existing the day 
before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
The MFA quota-weighted average growth rate for all the restraining countries was 
around 3%; however, by the beginning of the third phase of the transition period, the 
growth rate could rise to 5.52%. Thus, by the end of the 10-year period, quotas may have 
increased by as much as 54%. Certain exporting countries enjoyed higher growth rates 
under the MFA; by the beginning of the third phase, a 6% growth rate could rise to about 
11%, resulting in a quota increase of 134% by the end of the 10-year transition period. 
The ITCB estimates that the total volume of quotas will increase by 102% in 
Canada, 64% in the EU, and 89% in the United States by the end of the transition period 
(see table 3). These estimations are based on the assumption that the existing quotas will 
remain intact until the end of the transition period. 
With regard to specific developing countries, the ITCB projects that for 
Bangladesh, which enjoyed a 7% growth rate in the United States market, MFA quotas 
will increase from 255 million square metres equivalent (SME) in 1994 to 683 million 
SME in 2004. For India, with a growth rate of around 3%, exports of MFA-restricted 
products to the EU will increase from 176,625 tons in 1994 to 264,304 tons in 2004. 
Brazil, enjoying a growth rate of around 6%, will increase its exports of MFA-restricted 
products to the United States from 303 million SME in 1994 to 706 million SME in 2004. 
For Jamaica, with a growth rate of 6%, exports of MFA-restricted products to Canada will 
increase from 4 million SME in 1994 to 9 million SME in 2004 (see table 3). 
It should be noted that major suppliers have been cut back to low growth rates 
over the last several years; one example is the Republic of Korea, whose annual growth 
rates for the United States market are currently limited to an average of about 1%. Thus, 
in the first three years of the integration programme, a 16% increase in the Republic of 
Korea's 1% annual growth rate will only yield a new rate of 1.16%. In the second stage, 
the annual growth rate will move up to 1.45%, and in the third stage, it will reach 1.84% 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With respect to the application of flexibility provisions, Article 2, paragraph 16, 
of the ATC stipulates that there shall be no quantitative limits placed on the combined use 
of swing, carryover and carry forward. In other words, all such limits applied under the 
MFA had to be removed immediately after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
This amounts to an improvement in market-access conditions for some developing 
exporting countries, since it facilitates the full use of their quotas during the transition 
period. 
3. The phasing out of other non-MFA restrictions 
As discussed, quantitative restrictions maintained by the Members under the MFA 
must be phased out over the 10-year transition period under the ATC; however, Members 
were also required to notify all their other (non-MFA) restrictions on textile and clothing 
products, in detail, whether consistent with GAIT 1994 or not, to the TMB within 60 days 
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. This notification had to specify whether 
or not the restrictions were justified under GATT 1994 provisions. Members are also 
allowed to make reverse notifications in this regard or concerning any restrictions that may 
not have been notified under the provisions of this Article. 
Non-MFA restrictions can be grouped into three general categories, as follows: 
Restrictions falling outside the MFA imposed by some developed MFA- 
signatory countries. Such restrictions include Japan's import restrictions 
against China and the Republic of Korea on silk yarn, and against 
Pakistan on cotton yarn (GAIT, 1990; GAIT, 1992; GAIT, 11984); the 
price surveillance system of Switzerland applied to imports of textile and 
clothing products (GAIT, 1991); and the EU restraints on imports of 
textiles and clothing from Turkey, Egypt, Japan, Honduras, Costa Rica 
and El Salvador (GAIT, 1993a). 
• Restrictions imposed by MFA signatories against non-MFA signatories, 
including EU actions against imports of textiles and clothing from 
Morocco, Tunisia, Malta, some Latin American countries and some 
countries in transition (GAIT, 1993); and the restrictive measures 
applied by the United States against Bahrain, Mauritius, Haiti, Lesotho 
and others (GAIT, 19940 
• Measures applied by other countries (including developing countries), 
whether MFA signatories or not, except those justified under the 
provisions of GAIT 1994. Such measures include restrictive licensing 
systems, State trading, quotas, prohibitions, restrictions, and government 
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assistance plans and schemes (GATT, 1994e; GATT, 1993b; GAIT, 
1984; Stewart, 1992). 
The usual conceptual and definition-related problems have made it difficult to 
determine the extent to which the non-MFA restrictions were applied. In any case, with 
the strengthening of GAiT rules and disciplines, particularly in areas such as safeguards, 
balance-of-payment provisions, and notification procedures, these GAIT-inconsistent non- 
MFA restrictions had to be brought into conformance with GAIT 1994 within one year 
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement or plans had to be initiated to phase them 
out progressively over a 10-year programme (i.e., over the duration of the Agreement). 
Countries affected by these GATI'-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions can also make 
reverse notifications to the TMB. 
The above will undoubtedly bring developing countries increased security and 
predictability in terms of their access to the world textile and clothing market. However, 
in most cases it is unlikely that the restraining countries will bring their above-mentioned 
non-MFA restrictions into conformance with GAIT 1994 by converting them into global 
quotas under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade when MFA 
restrictions on the same products will continue to apply until they are integrated. It is more 
realistic for these countries to phase out the non-MFA restrictions in synchronization with 
the integration programmes for the concerned products. Since there is no provision in 
Article 3 of the ATC requiring restraining countries to provide the increases in annual 
growth rates as in the case of MIFA restrictions, these restrictions may be maintained under 
existing conditions during the phase-out period. Therefore, it is important for developing 
countries to take full advantage of the increases in annual growth rates permitted to them. 
4. Special treatment for small suppliers 
As noted above, the special treatment provisions for certain categories of WTO 
Members are formulated along the same lines as those of the MFA and its 1986 Protocol. 
Most of the special treatment provisions contained in the ATC are of a "best endeavour" 
nature (applying to, for example, least-developed countries, wool-producing countries, and 
countries dependent on outward processing trade); the only new feature is a quantified 
definition of (and the setting of a specific threshold fo a second list of the products it 
intends to integrate in the second and third stages r) small suppliers with regard to MFA 
restrictions and to special treatment for non-MFA-signatory Members. 
The ATC stipulates that small suppliers, defined as those whose exports under 
MFA restrictions represent 1.2% or less of the total volume of the restrictions applied by 
an importing Member as of 31 December 1991, shall be granted "meaningful 
improvement" in access for their exports during the implementation of this Agreement. 
Meaningful improvement is achieved through the advancement by one stage of the growth 
rates provided for products remaining under restriction. In other words, the growth rates 
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of small suppliers will be increased at the beginning of each stage by 25%, 27% and 27% 
respectively, instead of 16%, 25% and 27%. 
The countries that qualify as small suppliers on the basis of their 1991 volume of 
trade under restriction are listed in table 4 (ITCB determinations). Two examples of the 
growth rate progression under these special provisions are provided below: 
Sri Lanka's MFA quota-weighted average growth rate in its bilateral 
agreement with the EU was 7.3% in 1994. As a small supplier to the EU 
market, Sri Lanka's growth rate could rise to nearly 15% by the 
beginning of the third stage of integration, resulting in the enlargement 
of its quotas by more than 170% at the end of the 10-year transition 
period. 
• Jamaica enjoyed a 6% growth rate under its bilateral agreement with the 
United States in 1994; by the beginning of the third stage, its growth rate 
could rise to 12%, resulting in the enlargement of its quotas in the United 
States market by around 152% at the end of the 10-year transition period. 
Table 4. Small suppliers of textiles and clothing 













Source: ITCB estimates, based on specific limits set in the bilateral agreements under the MFA. 
Note: "Small suppliers" refers to those suppliers whose restrictions represent 1.2% or less of the total volume 
of the restrictions applied by an importing Member as of 31 December 1991 (see Article 2, paragraph 18, of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing). 
Allows for group limits in the bilateral agreements. 
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C. TRADING OPPORTUNITIES RESULTING FROM 
TARIFF REDUCTIONS BY QUAD COUNTRIES AND 
FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION MEASURES 
INSTITUTED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. Tariff reductions by Quad countries 
With the gradual phasing out of MFA quotas and the elimination of other GATT- 
inconsistent non-MFA restrictions, tariffs will become the main instrument of border 
protection in this sector; textile and clothing products from developing countries will 
therefore be treated as regular industrial products. As a more transparent form of import 
protection, tariffs ensure predictability and allow market signals to have a greater influence 
on the orientation of textile and clothing production and consumption decisions. In this 
sense, tariff reductions in the markets of the major developed countries will, in the long 
run, effectively improve the market access of developing countries and provide increased 
security and predictability for their trade in textiles and clothing. 
The average tariff level for the textile and clothing sector has always been 
considerably higher than that for all industrial products in the developed countries. In the 
developed countries as a group, the pre-Uruguay Round average tariff for textile and 
clothing products was 15.5%, compared with 6.3% for industrial products. As a result of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, the average tariff level was reduced to 12.1% for the 
textile and clothing sector and to 3.9% for all industrial products; even at the reduced 
level, the average textile and clothing sector tariff still stands at more than triple the 
average tariff for all industrial goods. The depth of cuts in this sector was also 
significantly less, totalling 22% in comparison with 38% for all industrial products 
(GATT, 1994a). 
An analysis of the Quad countries' tariff reductions for imports from all sources 
shows that while Canada and Japan cut their tariffs in the textile and clothing sector by 
37% and 33% respectively, reductions in the EU and the United States amounted to only 
16% and 13% respectively. Among these four entities, the average tariff level for the 
textile and clothing sector in the post-Uruguay-Round period is lowest in Japan, at 8.1%, 
followed by the EU at 9.7%, Canada at 12.6%, and the United States at 13.6% (see table 
5). It is important to note that the reductions were smaller on imports of interest to 
developing countries, and that the average tariff levels in Canada and the United States 
remained higher for imports from developing countries than for imports from all sources; 
this is mainly because the Quad countries did not offer tariff reductions on products of 
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There is some noticeable tariff escalation among the Quad countries; 
disaggregated tariff averages have a clear tendency to rise with the stage of production in 
each of the four countries. The post-Uruguay Round average tariff (on imports from all 
sources) for tops and yarns is around 4% in the EU and Japan, 7.1% in Canada, and 6% 
in the United States. The average tariff for clothing is 9.4% in Japan, 11.5% in the EU, 
15% in Canada, and 15.7% in the United States (see table 6). 
The textile and clothing sector in developed countries is doubly protected—by a 
higher average level of tariffs and by MFA restrictions. According to a 1989 study by the 
USITC, the average tariff-equivalent of MFA clothing restrictions was 28.3%. Without 
the removal of discriminatoty MFA restrictions against developing countries, the reduction 
of tariffs simply provides additional advantages for exporters from (mainly developed) 
countries that are not subject to MFA restraints. Therefore, in the short run, the net trade 
effects of tariff reductions on products covered by the ATC are likely to be negligible, as 
tariffs have not been a major barrier to the expansion of the textile and clothing trade from 
developing countries; quotas have constituted the real obstacle. 
To the last statement somewhat, it should be noted that the tariff peaks in 
the textile and clothing sector have often retarded trade flows to such an extent that the 
need for quotas has been obviated. Nearly one third of the total imports of textiles and 
clothing in all developed countries were facing tariff peaks of at least 15% during the pre- 
Uruguay Round period; most of these peaks applied to clothing products. The tariff peaks 
are supposed to come down for some 28% of total imports, which should certainly lead to 
some trade expansion. 
2. Trade liberalization measures taken by developing countries 
Although developing countries are traditionally considered exporters of textiles 
and clothing, in recent years they have become increasingly significant importers, with a 
number of them emerging as important new markets for textile trade. In 1992, developing 
countries as a whole imported $87 billion worth of textile and clothing products, which 
accounted for over 30% of total world imports of these items; this represented an increase 
of nearly 58% over their 1989 imports, which totalled $55 billion. During the period 
1989-1992, developing countries' imports of textile and clothing products from 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries increased 
41%, or from $19.1 billion to $27 billion, while their exports to OECD countries increased 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































During the same period, the trade between developing countries in these products 
also increased considerably. In 1992, intra-developing-country imports reached a record 
high of more than $59.3 billion, an increase of 73% over the 1989 figure (see table 7). 
Prospects for the rapid expansion of intra-developing-country trade in textiles and clothing 
are strong, particularly for the emerging new markets in Asia and Latin America, as most 
of these countries have simultaneously been taking steps to liberalize their import and 
exchange control regimes, and rising standards of living will further increase the demand 
for store-bought and non-traditional clothing. This expansion of trade in textiles and 
clothing has also created new opportunities for the international trading community, 
particularly for those developing countries that until now have been almost totally 
dependent upon the markets of developed countries. 
In the past, many developing countries protected their domestic textile and 
clothing production from import competition by pursuing an import-substitution policy 
based on the infant industry argument. Since the late I 970s and early I 980s, however, 
more and more developing countries have adopted trade liberalization as a general strategy 
to sustain economic growth. During the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, almost 
all of the Latin American countries autonomously removed restrictions on their imports 
of textile and clothing products. At the same time, several Asian countries opened their 
markets to imports as part of their economic liberalization programmes. 
Within the context of the Uruguay Round agreements, developing countries have 
also made significant contributions by undertaking tariff reductions, tariff bindings and the 
elimination of non-tariff measures with respect to textiles and clothing. It is not possible 
at this stage to calculate the average depth of the reductions in textile and clothing tariffs 
for this group of countries because for many of them the ad valorem equivalents of 
specific duties and the trade-weighted averages of tariffs are not available. However, the 
information that does exits in this regard provides an idea of the general situation. The 
data available indicate that tariff reductions in the textile and clothing sector (in trade- 
weighted tariff averages) range from 9% in Zimbabwe to 52% in India. Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela have bound all their tariffs, while the scope of tariff bindings in China, India, 
Turkey, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Tunisia 
range from 61% to 98%; Senegal and Zimbabwe have also bound 44% and 22% of their 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thailand recently decided to cut its tariffs on nearly 4,000 tariff lines, which will 
bring the country's import duties down from 100% to a maximum of 30% by 1997. The 
new tariff cuts, which became effective on 1 January 1995, will reduce the average tariff 
on all imports except agricultural products from 39.24% to 17.61% when fully 
implemented. For example, the duties on artificial and knitted fabrics will be cut from 
60% to 40% in 1995 and to 20% in 1997. It is reported that the new tariff cuts are 
generally deeper than what is required by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(Financial Times, 29 December 1994). 
India, with the recent conclusion of its bilateral textile agreements with the United 
States and the EU, has also agreed to liberalize its textile import regime by removing all 
yarns, fibres, and some industrial fabrics from its restricted list of imports. For certain 
other fabrics and garments, the removal will start in 1998, and the restrictions for most 
other garments will be phased out by the year 2002. As part of its Uruguay Round 
commitments, India has agreed to reduce tariffs on various textile items to 20% or less 
from the current rate of between 65% and 70%. As an intermediate step, tariffs on these 
products will be cut to between 40% and 50% within three years (International Herald 
Tribune, 1995; Asian Wall Street Journal, 1995; Financial Times, 5 January 1995). 
Recently, the Government of Pakistan decided to phase out its concessional credit 
facility and dual cotton-pricing system, and to improve the access of the textile and 
clothing industry to fibres, yams and cotton substitutes by allowing imports at reduced 
tariffs. The tariffs on selected textile products are to be reduced during the transition 
period of the ATC to 35% for clothing, 25% for fabrics, and 15% for fibres and yarns 
(Pakistan, 1995). Even more recently, South Africa declared its intention to liberalize its 
textile trade (Financial Times, 1 March 1995). 
The above-mentioned commitments by developing countries with respect to tariff 
reductions and tariff bindings, the obligations for phasing out GATT-inconsistent non- 
MFA restrictions, and the strengthening of GATT rules and disciplines (particularly with 
respect to elements such as safeguards, balance-of-payments provisions, and notification 
procedures) will undoubtedly bring about increased security and predictability in terms of 
access to their textile and clothing markets. 
D. MEASURES AND ISSUES THAT MAY AFFECT 
THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
AGREEMENT ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING 
I. The "end-loading" of the integration programme 
The annex to the ATC incorporates all of the textile and clothing products 
contained in Section XI of the HS nomenclature (excluding some fibres); included in this 
list are many products that have never been specifically restricted under the MFA in any 
203 
importing country. The list also contains items from certain other HS sections which, 
strictly speaking, are not textile products but have some textile components, such as soft 
luggage, footwear uppers, umbrellas and seat belts. Some of these products found their 
way into the textile category system of the United States and were covered by its bilateral 
textile restraint agreements under the MFA. The EU currently applies non-MFA 
restrictions to some of these items as well. As previously indicated, these products account 
for more than 34% of the total 1990 volume of imports in the EU, 37% in the United 
States, 47% in Canada, and 83% in Norway. The inclusion of unrestricted items inflates 
the volume of total imports that forms the base level for the integration programme. As 
discussed above, this has enabled developed importing countries to meet the integration 
percentage required by the ATC and to avoid liberalizing the existing MFA restrictions 
during the early stages of integration. Table 9 contains a list of MFA and MFA-type 
restrictions applied by the importing country Members against other GATT Contracting 
Parties/WTO Members. 
With respect to the integration ratio: 
• In volume terms, as laid down in the ATC, only 51% of the products 
covered in the ATC annex will be integrated into GATT 1994 over the 
10-year transition period (during the first three stages), leaving the 
balance of 49% to be integrated on the very last day of this period. 
• In value terms, the United States is integrating less than 30% of the value 
of its 1990 imports of these products during the first three stages, leaving 
more than 70% to be integrated at the very end of the transition period. 
Because the ATC allows each restraining country to choose the range of textile 
and clothing products it prefers to integrate at each of the first three stages, postponing the 
phasing out of the most sensitive MFA restrictions until the final stage is a fairly easy task. 
Such an "end-loading" programme evokes some doubts as to the efficacy of the integration 
programme, as the protectionist forces in the developed countries' textile and clothing 
industries will seize every opportunity to lobby their Governments to delay the integration 
process, and as it will make the process of structural adjustment more difficult in the final 
stage. In this regard, the United States' approach of publishing a list of the products to be 
integrated at each stage 120 days after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement should 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, it should be noted that the categorization systems for textiles and clothing 
in the major importing countries are both complex and different from one another, making 
it very difficult to monitor the various integration programmes." 
2. Transitional safeguards and the influence of the MFA 
As a transitional arrangement aimed at achieving progressive trade liberalization 
in the textile sector, the ATC has succeeded in strengthening the criteria applied under the 
MFA. For example, the ATC has dislodged a divisive element related to low-priced 
imports'2 from the transitional safeguards provisions by introducing a positive new 
approach to determining serious damage or the actual threat thereof, whereby the country 
imposing the transitional safeguard measure should also examine, "on the basis of the level 
of imports as compared with imports from other sources", whether the serious damage in 
question has been caused to the domestic producers of products by the totality of imports 
from all sources. This can be viewed as an important step towards the dismantling of an 
MFA that was based on the concept of "market disruption". In a situation of market 
disruption, the MFA required the determination of causality between the disruptive 
imports and the existence of serious damage. In other words, the serious damage had to 
be caused by a sharp and substantial increase in imports from a particular source at prices 
substantially below those prevailing in the market of the importing country. 
Further, transitional safeguard measures can now only be applied in situations 
where imports have actually caused serious damage or the actual threat thereof. There is 
no possibility of taking preventive action to avoid "real risks" of serious damage, as was 
the case under the MFA. This is viewed as an improvement, as it helps prevent the misuse 
of the transitional safeguards mechanism in practice. 
While the ATC has managed to remove certain disturbing features of the MFA, 
it is in many ways an extension of that arrangement that will continue to influence trade 
in this sector over the transition period. Under the transitional safeguards provisions, 
discriminatory measures can still be applied to products covered in the ATC annex (except 
those integrated into GATT 1994) for up to three years on a Member-by-Member andlor 
a product-by-product basis against former MFA- and non-MFA-signatory WTO Members 
to whom serious damage (or the actual threat thereof) is attributed. Under the ATC, the 
determination of serious damage must be only product-specific (while under the MFA, the 
"For example, the EU has 114 categories under which textile and clothing products are classified 
based on the degree of processing; the United States has nearly 200 categories (including part categories) 
listed under five category series which are classified based on fibres. 
was this element that permitted the developed importing countries to derogate from the GAiT 
rules and to discriminate against developing exporting countries under the MFA. 
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determination of market disruption was both product- and country-specific),'3 and once 
such a determination is made, an importing country can seek a quota against any supplier 
whose exports of a specific product are "increasing sharply and substantially", no matter 
how minimal its exports to the importing country are. As a result, there could be a 
proliferation of very small quotas that might not have been justifiable under the MFA. 
Some new elements such as wages and domestic prices have been added to the list 
of factors for determining serious damage;'4 overall, this may have a negative effect on 
developing exporting countries. In addition, transitional safeguard actions can be taken 
by mutual agreement; following consultation; or unilaterally, subject to examination by the 
TMB. 
The new concept of cumulative damage caused by increased imports from more 
than one source (or by the totality of imports, as referred to above) implies that more than 
one Member can be held responsible for serious damage, and that a transitional safeguard 
measure can therefore be imposed on several Members at the same time. In this regard, 
it is important to note the concern caused by the United States' "calls" against imports of 
underwear and nightwear made of cotton and man-made fibres from eight countries (the 
Dominican Republic, Honduras, Costa Rica, Thailand, Turkey, El Salvador, Jamaica and 
Colombia) based on the concept of cumulative damage (International Trade Report, 12 
April 1995). 
The United States has initiated such calls in spite of the fact that the ATC entreats 
Members to avoid frequent recourse to such actions and to ensure that transitional 
safeguards are applied "as sparingly as possible". In fact, since the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement on 1 January 1995, the United States, under the transitional safeguards 
mechanism, has reportedly made more than 20 calls to institute new quotas against imports 
of textile products from developing countries. Most recently, the United States issued 
three calls against certain wool garments from India, Honduras and Hong Kong 
(International Trade Report, 16 August 1995). In some cases, the United States has even 
tried to impose specific limits on certain textile products (such as cotton and man-made- 
fibre underwear from Thailand) that are already subject to group limits, even though 
Article 6, paragraph 4, of the ATC stipulates that no transitional safeguard measure shall 
See paragraph 11(i). annex A of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles 
(GAIT. 1974. p. 20). 
4 The determination of a situation of "market disruption" under the MFA (annex A) was based 
on an examination of the factors having a bearing on the evolution of the state of the industry in question, 
such as turnover, market share, profits, export performance, employment, volume of disruptive and other 
imports. production, utilization of capacity. productivity and investments. Under the ATC (Article 6, 
paragraph 3). in making a determination of serious damage, the Member shall examine the effect of the 
imports on the state of the particular in changes in such relevant economic variables as 
output. productivity. utilization of capacity. inventories, market share, exports. wages. employment, domestic 
prices, profits and investment. 
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be applied to the exports of any Member whose exports of the particular product(s) are 
already under restraint under the ATC. Such developments have caused major concern 
among many developing countries and could lead them to question whether the ATC 
provisions are being effectively implemented by the major importing countries, and 
whether the WTO Agreement as a whole is credible. 
The ATC is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and is applicable to all WTO 
Members' trade in textiles and clothing. Following from this, some WTO Members, 
including many developing countries whose exports are continuously subject to MFA 
quota restrictions during the 10-year transition period, have decided to retain the right to 
employ transitional safeguard measures against imports of textile and clothing products 
from other countries. Some developing countries may therefore find themselves facing 
transitional safeguards in their export markets (whether or not they were signatories to the 
MFA) while also imposing such safeguards against imports from other developing or 
developed countries. 
3. A TC linkages with commitments under other Uruguay Round agreements 
The provisions of Article 7 of the ATC establish a linkage between the benefits 
of the economic package of the ATC and some of the obligations set forth in other 
Uruguay Round agreements. Within this context, the Members are required to make 
specific commitments to achieve improvements in market access; to ensure the fair and 
equitable application of policies with respect to dumping, subsidies and intellectual 
property protection; and to avoid discrimination against imports of textile and clothing 
products. In the case of non-fulfilment of these commitments by a Member, another 
Member can refuse to apply the growth rate increases. 
Such a linkage, particularly as unilaterally interpreted or defined, could give rise 
to disputes and may pose a threat to the effective implementation of the ATC. In this 
regard, it is important to note that some major importing countries, within the context of 
their national implementing legislation, have linked the integration process, the increases 
in growth rates for MFA quotas, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status, and 
other such considerations with the further opening up of markets by developing countries 
for the former's exports of textiles and clothing. For example, the United States has 
attached a note to Section XI of its tariff schedule which stresses that the concessions in 
its schedule "on all textiles and clothing products covered by the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing, as specified in the annex to that Agreement, are established based upon the 
fundamental understanding that the maintenance of the balance of rights and obligations 
under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, in particular Article 7 thereof, means 
Members will provide effective market access to textiles and clothing entering their 
territory from the United States. An assessment of effective market access is based upon 
the following criteria: (i) the reduction and binding of tariff rates at levels no higher than 
35% for apparel, 30% for fabric and made-ups, 15% for yarns, and 7.5% for fibres; and 
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(ii) the elimination of all non-tariff barriers within three years and a commitment that no 
new non-tariff barriers will be established" (GAIT, I 994d). 
The United States Uruguay Round Agreements Act contains a provision similar 
to the one quoted above. The Act also requires the American Administration, in the light 
of the stipulations mentioned above with regard to the key exporting Members, to review 
the latter's tariff bindings in the area of textiles and non-MFA restrictions (i.e., those 
notified to the TMB under Article 3 of the ATC). The first review was to be carried out 
no later than 120 days after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, with subsequent 
reviews to be conducted periodically. The reviews are to serve as a guide for the 
Administration, which will take measures, as appropriate, to obtain market-access 
commitments from "any signatory to the WTO Agreement that is a significant exporter of 
textiles and apparel to the United States" and has failed to provide adequate access to its 
market for American textile and clothing products. 
The term "significant exporter of textiles and apparel to the United States" is 
subject to unilateral interpretation by that country; thus, it is not clear which exporting 
countries will be targeted. This certainly poses a threat to the effective implementation of 
the ATC. 
During the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing exporting 
countries argued that the concessions they made in this area should be compatible with 
their developmental, financial and trade-related needs, and that as a matter of principle, 
they should not be asked to "pay" for the abolition of what constituted a derogation from 
GAIT. India, however, in order to safeguard its interests, has linked it tariff reductions 
on textile and clothing products to the integration programme for MFA restrictions under 
the ATC. The explanatory notes (iii) for Section II of India's tariff schedule provide a 
detailed description of India's intentions in this regard: 
"In the case of items falling under chapters 51 to 59, the reduction of tariffs to the 
level of 25% or 40%, as the case may be, will be achieved over a period of 10 
years. The reductions will be calibrated to the integration process envisaged in 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. That is, the reduction in duty will be 
achieved by reducing the difference in percentage points between the base rate of 
duty and bound rate of duty to the extent of: 
• "Fifteen per cent on the first of March following the date of the entry into 
force of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
• "Twenty per cent on the first of March following the first day of the 37th 
month that the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is in effect 
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• per cent on the first of March following the first day of the 85th 
month that the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is in effect 
• "Forty-five per cent on the first of March following the first day of the 
12 1st month that the Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization is in effect 
"If the integration process envisaged in paragraphs 6 and 8 of Article 2 of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing does not materialize in full or is delayed, 
duties will revert to the level prevailing on 1-1-90" (GATT. 1994c). 
This is perhaps the first time a developing country has used a "snap back" clause 
to link its tariff concessions with the multilateral trade commitments of developed 
countries. 
4. The implications of trade liberalization in the textile and 
clothing sector for some developing countries 
In the long run, the tariff reductions by developed countries and the gradual 
phasing out of MFA and GATT-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions may have an impact 
on developing countries benefiting from preferential market-access arrangements and/or 
enjoying duty-free treatment, as there will be some erosion in the margin of preferences. 
Included in this group are the Caribbean countries and Mexico as beneficiaries of the 
preferential market measures taken by the United States (relating to United States imports 
under its Harmonized Tariff Schedule Subheading 9802 and the Guaranteed Access Level 
programme); and Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Central and Eastern European countries 
as beneficiaries of the EU passive processing traffic programme (or the so-called "outward 
processing trade"), which, in combination with the Lomé Convention and Mediterranean 
agreements, has extended preferential market access in the form of lower tariffs and higher 
volume allowances under the quantitative restriction arrangements for clothing imports 
assembled from EU inputs. 
5. Conceptual and definition-related problems of the ATC 
Unlike those of the other Uruguay Round agreements, the articles of the ATC are 
without headings. Whether this is accidental or not, it could create problems of vagueness 
and affect the faithful implementation of the ATC. In particular, it could lead to the 
inequable application of the Agreement. For example, some importing countries have 
notified some of their former MFA restrictions as non-MFA restrictions (see table 10), 
with the possible objective of accelerating the phase-out of these MFA restrictions rather 
than gradually eliminating them under the integration programme as stipulated in Article 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. The role of the TMB 
Among the Uruguay Round agreements, the ATC is integral; however, the process 
for settling disputes related to the implementation of the ATC is not very straightforward. 
A partial role in this regard has been assigned to the TMB. Consequently, in matters 
remaining unresolved by mutual consultations, country Members of the WTO are required 
to resort first to the TMB rather than appealing directly to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) under the integrated dispute settlement system. In some cases, this is bound to 
prolong the settlement of disputes, as certain matters may eventually have to be pursued 
under the provisions of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) if the TMB process fails to produce a satisfactory resolution. 
Moreover, in contrast to the DSU provisions, the TMB is required to arrive at all 
its decisions through consensus among its members. Although such consensus does not 
require the assent or concurrence of TMB members appointed by the WTO Members 
connected with an unresolved issue under review by the TMB, the fact is that the lack of 
a consensus among any of the other eight or nine TMB members can potentially block the 
process. This directly contradicts the DSU, under which the adoption of a panel report is 
to be automatic unless there is a consensus not to adopt the report. 
In the final analysis, the TMB process and procedures can effectively prevent 
WTO Members from receiving a speedy and/or satisfactory resolution to disputes arising 
from the implementation of the ATC. The use of such a system could result in a repetition 
of the situation under the MFA, where countries were left to slip into bilateral deals, often 
weakening the multilateral disciplines. 
7. The new EU GSP scheme 
The new EU GSP scheme (Council Regulation, 1994) has a number of developing 
countries concerned; its real impact may need to be analysed in detail. Under the scheme, 
which is drastically different from its predecessor, quotas are replaced by tariff 
modulation: 85% of the MFN duty rate is imposed on very sensitive textile products; 70% 
on sensitive products; and 35% on semi-sensitive products; while non-sensitive products 
are duty-free. 
& The new rules of origin for textiles in the United States 
In Section 334 of the United States Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the United 
States Treasury Department is asked to change the rules of origin affecting a broad range 
of products (including T-shirts, pants and dresses) by 1 July 1996. The rules of origin 
determine which country's quotas should be charged for a particular import when the 
manufacturing of the good occurs in more than one country. The new rules will make the 
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country in which assembly occurs the country of origin; countries that do a great deal of 
assembly work on parts cut in other countries will be greatly affected by the change. 
9. The relationship of the A TC with other GA TT-consistent measures 
The phasing out of MFA and GAIT-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions might lead 
to the increased application of GAIT-consistent trade-remedy measures such as anti- 
dumping and countervailing actions against imports of textiles and clothing.'5 
10. The impact of regwnal arrangements 
While participating in the Uruguay Round negotiations, some countries were also 
engaged in forming or enlarging regional trading arrangements. These developments, 
particularly the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) bloc 
and the enlargement of the EU (through the Europe Agreement), could have a considerable 
impact on the textile and clothing trade of developing countries; a study may be required 
to evaluate their potential effects. For example, EU preferential arrangements for the 
Europe Agreement countries provide for a programme of eliminating MFA restrictions on 
1 January 1998 (WTO, 1995). 
11. Implications of the A TCfor non-Members of the WTO and the impact 
of their non-participation in the multilateral trading system 
The Uruguay Round implementing legislation of both the United States and the 
EU contains different provisions with respect to the application of quantitative restrictions 
against imports from countries that are not Members of the WTO. In most cases, these 
non-Members will not benefit from the trade liberalization programme set out in the ATC; 
in particular, they will not be able to take advantage of the integration programme's 
phasing out of MFA and MFA-type quotas against their exports of textile products, or of 
the increase in growth rates for products still remaining under restriction during the 10- 
year transition period. Non-WTO Members could even be challenged by new restrictions 
applied against their textile exports without any time limits. Further, these countries could 
be affected by the changes in the implementation legislation of the major importing 
countries, such as the new rules of origin for textiles in the United States (discussed 
above). 
Although it is logical that the countries which do not contribute to the trade 
liberalization package should not benefit from it, the existence of such a dual arrangement 
could weaken the multilateral trading system rules and disciplines that have just been 
'51n this regard. it is important to note that Japan recently imposed anti-dumping duties on cotton 
from Pakistan. 
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strengthened through the Uruguay Round—particularly in the area of safeguards, where 
the scope of GATT-prohibited measures such as voluntary export restraints (VERs) and 
orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) could be extended and the efforts to bring these 
measures under GATT control hampered. Even though these countries are small in 
number, they represent a considerable proportion of world textile and clothing trade, both 
as exporters and as importers. Non-WTO Members whose exports of textile products have 
been affected by MFA and MFA-type restrictions are listed in table 11. 
The potential impact of these countries' non-participation on the effective 
liberalization of this sector and on the world trading system as a whole should not be 
underestimated. China serves as an excellent example. As a significant textile-exporting 
countly, a signatory to the MFA, and a full participant in the Uruguay Round, China was 
actively involved in the negotiations leading to the finalization of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing. However, China failed in its last attempt to regain its GAIT 
Contracting Party status before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and its terms 
and conditions for becoming a WTO Member have still not been agreed upon between it 
and the present WTO Members. China will therefore not be able to enjoy the benefits 
deriving from the phasing out of the MFA restrictions and the increases in growth rates. 
Such a situation may create problems for China as well as for WTO Members. Until 
China becomes a Member, it appears that WTO Members will have considerable 
discretion in establishing the terms of trade and the size of the trade volume originating 
from China and entering their territories. They are free to determine their own policies vis- 
à-vis China as a non-Member. Following from this, it is uncertain to what extent China's 
textile exports will influence the implementation of the transitional arrangements. China 
is also free to influence its trade relations with individual WTO Members. The Members 
may need China's cooperation to prevent circumvention by transshipment, even though, 
unlike the MFA, the ATC does not include such a provision. As discussed earlier, in the 
course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Quad countries did not offer tariff 
reductions on a number of textile and clothing products of which China is a major 
supplier; this could also hamper market accessibility for many developing countries that 
are supplying the same products to these markets. It is important, as well, to remember 
that China's import restrictions do not have to be abolished. Finally, China is emerging 
as a new market for textile and clothing trade, and many WTO Members may wish to have 
guaranteed and increased access to the Chinese market—which they cannot obtain while 
China remains outside the WTO. 
12. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation of the 
major developed importing countries 
The effective and meaningful integration of this sector into GAIT 1994 will 
greatly depend on the extent to which the provisions of the Agreement are respected by 
the major restraining countries in their national implementing legislation; the impact of this 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Apart from the elements already discussed with respect to the integration 
programme and the market-access commitments undertaken by other exporting countries, 
the United States Uruguay Round Agreements Act contains detailed provisions on 
transitional safeguards, circumvention and rules of origin. 
In contrast to the detailed American legislation, the European Union Uruguay 
Round implementing legislation simply codifies previous EU practices (under Regulation 
3030.93 on Common Rules for Imports of Textiles) to make them compatible with the 
provisions of the ATC. 
F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, a transitional arrangement with a 
definite life-span, represents an essential step towards trade liberalization in a sector which 
is of enormous importance to developing countries. Such liberalization will be achieved 
through the phasing out of the restrictions applied under the MFA by means of a four-stage 
integration programme over a 10-year transition period, with trade in textiles and clothing 
increasingly covered by GAiT rules and disciplines. By the end of the 10-year transition 
period, the ATC and all restrictions under it will be terminated, and there shall be no 
extension of the Agreement (such was not the case with the MFA). In the long run, the 
ATC will contribute to restoring the credibility of the multilateral trading system and also 
to providing guaranteed and increased market access for developing countries' trade in 
textiles and clothing. 
Carried out concurrently with the integration process, the increases in growth rates 
for MFA quotas remaining in place during the transition period will also bring about 
substantial improvements in market access for developing country Members exporting 
textiles and clothing. Given that the increases in growth rates are calculated as percentages 
of percentages, this could mean significant quota increases for these Members, particularly 
the medium- and small-scale exporters that enjoyed relatively high growth rates under the 
MFA bilateral agreements in effect the day before the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement. 
The elimination of quantitative limits on the combined use of swing, carlyover and 
carry forward is considered an improvement for some developing exporting country 
Members in terms of their access to market opportunities. 
Along with the 10-year phase-out of MFA restrictions maintained by the 
Members, GATT-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions must be brought into conformance 
with GAIT 1994. This was to be done within one year of the entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement, though the option also exists of progressively phasing out the non-MFA 
restrictions under a programme extending over the duration of the ATC. This will no 
doubt increase the levels of transparency, security and predictability in developing 
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countries' access to the world textile and clothing markets. On a more cautionary note, 
because some provisions of the ATC are vague, certain countiy Members may implement 
the integration programme within a different time frame, which could lead to the 
inequitable application of the ATC. 
The ATC provisions for the special treatment of small suppliers, especially the 
quantified definition (or specific threshold) with regard to MFA restrictions, could bring 
about meaningful improvement in access for their exports during the transition period 
through the advancement by one stage of the growth rates provided for products remaining 
under restriction. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations cleared the way for increases in developing 
countries' imports of textile and clothing products from other countries, but most notably 
for increases in intra-developing-country trade in these products. While developing 
countries are traditionally considered exporters of textiles and clothing, in the past several 
years they have, as a group, become increasingly significant importers; a number of them 
have emerged as important new markets for textile trade. Prospects for the rapid 
expansion of intra-developing-country trade in textiles and clothing are bright, particularly 
for the emerging new markets in Asia and Latin America, as most of the countries in these 
regions have been taking autonomous steps to liberalize their import and exchange control 
regimes, and rising standards of living will further increase the demand for fashionable 
clothing. The expansion of trade in textiles and clothing is creating new opportunities for 
the international trading community, but particularly for those developing countries that 
until now have been almost entirely dependent on the markets of developed countries. 
Within the context of the Uruguay Round agreements, developing countries have 
made significant contributions by undertaking tariff reductions, tariff bindings and the 
elimination of non-tariff measures. At this stage, the tariff cuts are not very large, and the 
scope of the tariff binding is limited; nevertheless, these commitments, together with the 
obligation to phase out GATT-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions and the strengthening 
of GATT rules and disciplines (particularly in areas such as safeguards, balance-of- 
payment provisions, and notification procedures) will no doubt make developing 
countries' access to the world's—and each other's—textile and clothing markets more 
secure and predictable. 
It should be cautioned that the ATC integration programme may not bring about 
any immediate trade liberalization. Because the annex to the Agreement contains a 
number of HS lines which have never been specifically restricted in any country, the major 
restraining countries can fulfil their obligations under the Agreement in the first two stages 
without affecting MFA quotas. Thus, trade opportunities may only become perceptible 
from the beginning of the third stage (i.e., from the year 2002)—and even then, only on 
a modest scale. The findings of a preliminary analysis of the integration lists of Canada, 
the EU, Norway and the United States support the foregoing conclusion. Under the 
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specifications of the integration programme, only 51% of the volume of the products 
covered in the annex will be integrated into GATT 1994 over the 10-year transition period 
(i.e., in the first three stages), leaving the balance of 49% of the volume to be integrated 
on the very last day the ATC is in effect. In terms of value, the United States will integrate 
only about 30% of the products listed in the annex over the first three stages, leaving more 
than 70% to be integrated on the final day of the Agreement. The fact that such end- 
loading can occur calls into question the efficacy and credibility of the integration 
programme, given that the process of structural adjustment will be made more difficult in 
the final stage. In this regard, other major importing countries should, like the United 
States, notify their lists of products to be integrated at the later stages as soon as possible 
so that the process of structural adjustment may begin. 
WTO Members should make every effort to avoid frequent recourse to the 
transitional safeguards provisions, and should also make sure that such provisions are 
applied as sparingly as possible. In this context, it is equally important to ensure that the 
TMB can effectively carry out its role in resolving disputes related to the implementation 
of the ATC. 
The linkage between the ATC implementation process and other Uruguay Round 
commitments, including tariff concessions which may be unilaterally interpreted or 
defmed, could give rise to disputes. Because such a linkage may also contribute to delays 
in the integration process, it poses a threat to the effective implementation of the 
Agreement. 
Finally, the phasing out of MFA and GATT-inconsistent non-MFA restrictions 
could lead to an increase in the application of GATT-consistent trade-remedy measures 
such as anti-dumping and countervailing actions against the imports of textile products. 
In this regard, WTO Members should resist pressure from their domestic protectionist 
forces to seek alternative means of restricting trade in textiles once such products are 
integrated into GATE 1994. 
224 
References 
Asian Wall Street Journal (3 January 1995). 
Bagchi, S., 1994. "The integration of the textile trade into GAiT". Journal of World Trade, vol. 
28, No. 6 (December 1994). P. 36. 
Council Regulation (EC), No. 3281/94 of 19 December 1994. Brussels, Commission of the 
European Communities. 
Financial Times (17-18 September 1994). 
______ 
(29 December 1994). 
(5 January 1995). 
(1 March 1995). 
GAIT, 1974. The Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles. Geneva, GATT' 
publication. Annex A, paragraph 11(i), p. 20. 
1984. "Textiles and clothing in the world economy". Geneva, GAIT secretariat. 
Document C/W/440 Spec (84). Pp. 108, 116, and 127-129. 
_,1990. 
Trade Policy Review: Japan, 1990. Geneva, GAIT publication. Pp. 241-242. 
1
Trade Policy Review: Switzerland, 1991. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 165. 
1992. Trade Policy Review: Japan, 1992. Geneva, GAIT publication. Pp. 190-191. 
1 993a. Trade Policy Review: European Communities, 1993. Geneva, GAIT publication. 
Pp. 73-75. 
1993b. Trade Policy Review: India, 1993. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 192. 
1994a. "Increase in market access resulting from the Uruguay Round". Geneva, GAIT 
secretariat, 12 April 1994. Table 4. 
,1 
994b. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.' the Legal 
Texts. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 450. 
225 
References (continued) 
I 994c. Schedules XII. India; Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal 
Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 3,735. 
1 994d. Schedules United States; Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations done at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 6,768. 
1994e. Trade Policy Review: Australia, 1994. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 68. 
1994f. Trade Policy Review: United States, 1994. Geneva, GAIT publication. P. 70. 
International Herald Tribune (3 January 1995). 
International Trade Report, vol. 12 (12 April1995). P. 647. 
International Trade Report, vol. 12, No. 33 (16 August 1995). P. 1,382. 
ITCB, 1994. "The textile integration programme of the first stage". International Textiles and 
Clothing Bureau, document ICIW/88 (14 October 1994). 
Pakistan, 1995. Statement made by a representative of the Pakistan delegation at the meeting of 
the WTO Trade Policy Review Body on 16 February 1995. 
Stewart, T.P. (ed), 1992. The GAIT Uruguay Round, a Negotiating History (1982-1992), vol. 1. 
Deventer, the Netherlands; and Boston, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers. Pp. 275- 
276. 
UNCTAD, 1994. "The outcome of the Uruguay Round: an initial assessment. Supporting papers 
to the Trade and Development Report, 1994". Geneva, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. Pp. 127-129. 
United States, 1994. United States Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Texts of Agreements, 
Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting 
Statements. 103rd Congress, 2nd session, House Document 103-316, vol. 1. Washington, 
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office. Pp. 370 and 771. 
226 
References (continued) 
USITC, 1989. The Economic Effects of US. Import Restraints, Phase I: 
Manufacturing. United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 2222. 
October 1989. Pp. 4-6. 
______ 
1994. The Potential Impact on the US. Economy and Industries of the GAiT Uruguay 
RoundAgreements. United States International Trade Commission, Publication No. 2790. 
June 1994. P. [V-3. 
WTO, 1995. World Trade Organization document WT/TPRJS/3 of3O June 1995. Pp. 99-103 and 
202. 
Yang, Y., 1993. "The impact of MFA phasing out On world clothing and textile markets". 




V. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AND THE TURKEY-EU CUSTOMS UNION ON THE 
TURKISH MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
by Subidey Togan 
Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey 
Introduction 
In 1980, after 50 years of inward-oriented development strategies, Turkey began 
adopting outward-oriented policies. Since then, a number of steps have been taken to open 
up the economy even further. Turkey became a Member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), established on 15 April 1995, and just prior to that, on 6 March 1995, it was 
agreed at the Association Council meeting in Brussels that Turkey would join the European 
Customs Union starting 1 January 1996. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the possible effects of these two major 
international commitments on the Turkish manufacturing sector. The first section 
concentrates on the effects of the new rules and disciplines introduced through the Uruguay 
Round and customs union agreements. The second section evaluates the effects of 
measures relating to market access in the relevant countries. In the third section, the 
implications of the Customs Union Agreement for textiles and steel products is considered. 
The paper ends with a summary of the main findings. 
A. RULES AND DISCIPLINES ASSOCIATED WITH THE WTO 
AND THE TURKEY-EU CUSTOMS UNION 
In signing the Customs Union Agreement with the European Union (EU), Turkey 
has agreed to carry out Herculean tasks relating primarily to the harmonization of 
commercial legislation in the areas of competition policy, State aid, and intellectual and 
industrial property rights, and to the adoption of new rules in connection with customs 
classification and valuation, rules of origin, technical regulations, standards and 
government procurement. Similar considerations apply with respect to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (also known as the WTO 
Agreement). Each of the new rules and regulations connected with these agreements is 
expected to affect the functioning of markets in the Turkish manufacturing sector. 
1. Incentives 
Throughout the 1980s and much of the first half of the 1990s, Turkey focused on 
three different tools of industrial policy: a system of investment incentives, a system of 
export incentives, and a specific policy relating to State-owned enterprises. In each case, 
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the Government tried to preferentially allocate resources, mainly through the use of 
subsidies. From 1985 on, however, Turkey gradually eliminated many of these subsidies; 
as steps were taken to integrate Turkey into the world economy, the country was often 
required to comply with certain rules and principles in connection with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other such commitments. The trend has 
continued: Turkey recently eliminated most of the remaining subsidies, as this type of 
incentive is not compatible with the rules of either the WTO Agreement or the Turkey-EU 
Customs Union Agreement. 
Articles 30 to 41 of the Customs Union Agreement require that Turkey adopt EU 
competition rules (including measures regarding public aid) within two years, that its 
legislation on competition rules be made comparable to that of the EU, and that such 
legislation be applied effectively. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures prohibits Governments from granting subsidies contingent upon 
either export perfonnance or the use of domestic products. According to this Agreement, 
Governments must use caution to avoid granting actionable subsidies that will adversely 
affect the interests of other WTO Members, but they may provide non-actionable subsidies 
for research and development (R&D), regional development and environmental regulation. 
The first three subsections below contain descriptions of the incentives and the 
public enterprise policy mentioned earlier. Again, it should be kept in mind that while 
some are still in use, the vast majority have been eliminated. The details of this major shift 
in policy are covered in the fourth and last subsection. 
(a) In vestment incentives 
Since 1967, the Turkish Government has granted a number of production 
incentives to promote investment in activities and areas regarded as desirable. The 
incentives, regulated by laws and decrees, have been directed at reducing the cost of 
investment, reducing the need for external financing, and increasing profitability. 
There are certain peculiarities associated with the incentive scheme. First, 
incentives are differentiated on a regional basis. For the purpose of granting incentives, 
each area in Turkey falls into one of four categories: developed regions, priority normal 
regions, regions enjoying first priority in development, and regions enjoying second priority 
in development. The second feature of the incentive scheme derives from certain 
conditions attached to lower limits, investment totals, minimum levels of the investor's own 
sources, and exports. The thirds characteristic of the system is that all incentives originate 
from the central Government and are regulated by laws and decrees. 
The agency which administers the incentive scheme is the Undersecretariat for the 
Treasuiy. The scheme operates on the basis of incentive certificates granted by this body; 
only investments made with investment certificates are eligible for incentives. 
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The various types of investment incentives provided during the I 980s and 
1990s—most of which have now been eliminated—can be summarized as follows: 
• Customs exemptions. Capital goods, raw materials and intennediate 
goods used for investment purposes can be imported without customs 
duties; the incentive is equivalent to the amount of unpaid duties. 
• Low-interest credit for investment. To ease the effect of high interest on 
investment borrowing, investment credit was made available at 
concessional rates. The Government also guaranteed foreign exchange 
credit of external origin against unfavourable exchange rate developments. 
Concessional credit was made available to investment certificate holders, 
repayable over five years (with a two-year grace period). The amount 
(proportion) of support varied according to the sector and the type of 
investment. 
• Exemptions from taxes, fees and duties. If an investment was guaranteed 
to generate a certain level of exports, the loan(s) taken out for this 
investment was/were exempt from taxes, fees and duties. 
• Resource-utilization support premium. The resource-utilization support 
premium was created to support investments benefiting from the incentive 
scheme. The support premium was calculated as a percentage of the 
investment financed from one's own sources and varied according to the 
category of the region in which the investment was undertaken. 
Assistance was originally provided in the form of a grant; however, after 
February 1991, it was treated as an advance to investors. The size of the 
advance varied according to the cost, type and location of the investment. 
This credit was repayable—at subsidized rates—in four equal instalments 
over five years, with a two-year grace period. 
• Postponement of the value-added tax (VAT) and exemption from the 
construction fee. The VAT accruing in the importation of investment 
goods is postponed until an actual reduction of the tax is possible. 
Additionally, all factories and manufacturing establishments are exempt 
from the construction fee. 
• Allocation offoreign exchange. Foreign exchange was allocated by banks 
for investments accompanied by investment certificates, up to the amount 
indicated in the document. The allocations were for capital and 
intermediate goods. 
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• Investment incentive allovi'ance. The investment incentive allowance 
represents a corporate tax deduction, the rate of which varies by regional 
category and type of investment. 
• investment finance fund. Corporations could set aside a percentage of 
their taxable income for future investments. The amount set aside at the 
discretion of the corporation was deducted from its taxable income and 
deposited in an interest-bearing account with the Central Bank. It could 
be withdrawn at any time with authorization from the State Planning 
Organization and used for investment. 
• Real estate tax exemption. For investments qualifying for investment 
allowances, real estate taxes were waived for several years. 
• Accelerated depreciation and revaluation. Accelerated depreciation 
could be claimed for machinery and equipment, and assets could be 
revalued at the end of every calendar year. 
• Incentive premiums. This applies to investments in priority sectors. In 
1993, for example, in the sectors of mining, electronics, pharmaceuticals, 
certain electrical and non-electrical machinery, transport equipment, and 
certain types of services, a 22% incentive premium was paid to investors 
when they purchased domestically produced investment goods. This 
investment serves as a counterpart to the customs duty exemption for 
imported investment goods. 
• Land allocation. Land was allocated by the Government for tourism 
investments. 
• Incentive for additional employment. Finns with at least 10 workers were 
not liable for contributions to the housing fund or to the savings- 
encouragement fund related to the employment of workers whose jobs 
were created through new investments. 
• Special incentives for scientific R&D. In 1992 Turkey's expenditure on 
R&D amounted to 0.49% of its gross national product (GNP). In addition 
to the 100% investment incentive allowance for scientific R&D, the 
following R&D incentives were made available: 20% of corporate tax 
could be paid in nine equal instalments without interest over three years 
following the year in which the R&D expenditure was made, provided the 
postponed tax did not exceed the amount of such expenditures made in the 
corresponding year; and corporations carrying out scientific R&D could 
apply for tax-exempt status. 
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Through the application of the investment incentive measures summarized above, 
the Government was able to reduce the effective cost of borrowing for investors, thereby 
reducing the cost of investment and increasing profitability. According to the Commission 
of the European Communities (1989), investment incentives can lead to very high aid 
levels. It has been estimated that up to 77% of the investment cost of a project may be 
covered by aid in developed regions, and the proportion may be even higher in regions 
enjoying priority in development. 
(b) Export incentives 
During the 1980s and much of the 1990s, Turkey has used the following export 
incentives: 
Export tax rebates. Reimbursement of indirect taxes for exporters was 
originally introduced in 1963. In April 1981, 10 different lists of 
commodities became eligible for rebates, with the maximum rebate set at 
20%; in 1988 the maximum rate fell to 8%. 
Foreign exchange allocations. The Export Promotion Decree, dated 25 
Januaiy 1980, specified that exporters who held Export Encouragement 
Certificates granted by the Office of Incentives and Implementation at the 
State Planning Organization or a letter of credit could apply for foreign 
exchange. An exporter with a foreign exchange allocation had the right 
to import raw and intermediate materials duty-free. The policy aimed at 
supplying these inputs to exporters at world market prices; the amount 
was limited to a fraction of the free-on board (f.o.b.) value of the exports. 
The incentive value of the foreign exchange allocation was as follows: 
first, the exporter was not required to pay duties when importing 
intermediate and raw materials; second, foreign exchange during the early 
I 980s commanded a premium over the official exchange rate. 
Payments from the Price Stabilization Support Fund. In December 1986 
a new system of cash incentives for exports was introduced. In general, 
the premium provided through the Price Stabilization Support Fund was 
determined by the weight (i.e., the number of tons) of the commodity 
being exported. When it was instituted, the policy's primary aim was to 
increase the profitability of exports such as consumer durables for which 
Turkey wanted to create greater competitiveness in the world market. 
Duty-free imports of intermediates. Exporters or manufacturer/exporters 
may—without paying customs duties or other, related taxes—import 
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intermediate and raw materials to be incorporated in products that will be 
exported either by themselves or through subsidiary industries. 
• Exemption from corporate income tax. The corporate income tax law 
contains clauses on export exemptions which allow for a portion of the 
profits made on the export of industrial goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, 
and marine products, as well as the revenues from freight to countries 
aborad and tourism revenues in foreign exchange, to be deducted from 
corporate income. 
• Resource-Utilization Support Fund. Towards the end of 1984 (by 
decree), the Government established the Resource-Utilization Support 
Fund at the Central Bank. The original purpose in setting up the Fund 
was to create additional resources for exports and investments in 
accordance with the objectives set in the five-year development plans and 
annual programmes. According to the regulations, all export commodities 
covered by the Price Stabilization Support Fund would receive a 2% 
subsidy from the Resource-Utilization Support Fund, and all other export 
commodities would receive a 4% subsidy. In April 1986, the 2% rate was 
reduced to zero and the 4% rate to 2%. 
• Rebates on freight charges. According to a Money and Credit Board 
communiqué issued in April of 1986, a subsidy was to be paid for the 
transport of export products forwarded from Turkish ports to the ports of 
three groups of countries on the basis of gross tonnage, provided the 
forwarders were domiciled in Turkey. In the early I 990s, different rebate 
rates were applied to different commodity groups. The rates for textile 
products differed from those for steel products, but none were higher than 
20%; in any case, the total rebate could not exceed 15% of the value of 
the exports. 
• Exemption from various taxes. Exporters are not required to pay any 
taxes, duties or fees associated with various required export-related 
procedures; among these are: the credit supplied by banks with the proviso 
that it be used to finance exports; the fees charged by banks, insurance 
companies and public notaries for carrying out export-related tasks; taxes 
on bank and insurance company procedures; and stamp duties. 
• Fuel oil and electricity subsidy. With a supplementary decree published 
in 1989, exporters could import the fuel oil used in the production of 
export goods without paying any customs duties or related taxes, and 
could buy the electricity used in producing exported goods at the Turkish 
Lira (LT) equivalent of $0.01/kilowatt-hour (kWh). This policy was later 
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expanded to cover the use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and natural 
gas in the production of exportable goods, as long as the cost of such 
energy was not less than 5% of the total cost of the good. 
Deduction system. Exporters could claim communication, food, tax and 
transportation expenses as corporate tax deductions as long as they were 
certified. Different rates applied for exporter-manufacturers and for 
exporters. Exporter-manufacturers exporting between $1 million and $10 
million worth of goods could claim up to 4.5% of the value of their 
exports, and up to 5% for exports in excess of $10 million. For exporters, 
the rate was 0.5% for exports valued at between $1 million and $50 
million, and 1% for exports worth over $50 million. 
The Government, through the use of the export incentive measures summarized 
above, was able to increase the profitability of export activities. Table 1 shows the sectoral 
export subsidy rates that prevailed in Turkey over the 1 980s. As indicated in the table, the 
average export subsidy rate in the manufacturing sector was relatively high during 1983 and 
1984 but decreased considerably as the 1980s progressed. 
(c) Policy measures related to State-owned enterprises 
In discussing the policy on State-owned enterprises in Turkey, it should be noted 
that the Turkish public-enterprise sector is very large. For many years, the State had a 
monopoly on tobacco, war weapons, railways, air transportation, airport and seaport 
administration, postal services and telecommunications, and sugar production; in the 
manufacturing sector, State-owned enterprises were heavily concentrated in the production 
of basic metals, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, newsprint, paper, cement and 
textiles, as well as in oil refining. 
State-owned enterprises generally show poor economic performance, mainly 
because of the soft-budget constraints they face. They follow objectives that are influenced 
by political pressure, such as agricultural income support and employment creation. Public 
firms are not subject to the commercial code and are therefore not affected by bankruptcy 
laws. Pricing, employment and investment decisions generally require the approval of the 
Treasurv, the State Planning Organization, and sometimes the ministers themselves. State 
economic enterprises receive subsidies from the Government in the form of direct transfers, 
equity injections and debt consolidation. As mentioned, there are barriers to exit in Turkey; 
public firms are often not allowed to go bankrupt. To protect workers from unemployment, 
the Government subsidizes unprofitable firms. Exit barriers make firms more risk-averse 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) A major shj[t in policy 
The investment incentive schemes were developed to encourage investment—not 
to remove barriers to entry into industry imposed by capital market imperfections and 
therefore not to increase competition in the country. As emphasized by J. Biddle and V. 
Milor (1995), there has been a lot of waste in the system; further, it has been impossible to 
properly monitor the outcomes of the investment incentive schemes. As a result of these 
factors, investment incentives have constituted a barrier to competition and structural 
change. Through the incentive system, established firms have been able to obtain unit cost 
advantages which have helped them to consolidate their market position. New entrants to 
the market, competing for scarce fiscal resources, have been at a disadvantage relative to 
well-informed incumbents. As a case in point, credit incentives, which were supposed to 
promote entry, have often been used to reinforce the position of large incumbents. 
Furthermore, the Government, with its dominant role in the banking system, has directly 
controlled the allocation of credit, and credit from public banks has often been extended 
on the basis of non-commercial considerations. It should also be noted that public-sector 
procurements have often been the product of collusion among preferred suppliers—another 
barrier to competition. 
Table 2 shows the concentration ratios across 50 selected industrial products 
during the period 1989-1990 in Turkey; it is indicated here that concentration ratios were 
relatively high. 
For a long time there was no specific competition legislation or competition policy 
enforced in Turkey. In the 1980s, to promote competition within the country, the 
Government eliminated quantitative restrictions on foreign trade and substantially 
decreased the nominal and effective protection rates, as reported in Togan (1994). 
However, reducing nominal and effective protection rates is not sufficient to ensure the 
proper functioning of the markets. 
Similar considerations in Europe during the 1950s led to the adoption of 
competition policies, the objectives of which were to ensure effective competition and the 
more efficient allocation of resources and to create the best possible climate for fostering 
innovation and technical progress. Europe's competition policies now encompass a vast 
range of economic policies and activities; in principle, any governmental or private-sector 
action that undermines market contestability can be the subject of competition policies. 
These policies aim to create freer markets in the economy by removing entry and exit 
barriers in the industrial sector. 
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Audio electronics 62 88 
Vacuum cleaners 55 90 
Sewing machines 50 100 
Washing machines 80 100 
Refrigerators 53 100 
Electric irons 50 80 
Household cooking ranges with ovens 63 100 
Household heating radiators 47 90 
Electrical porcelain goods 86 100 
Audio tapes 75 100 
Copper pipes and rods 50 80 
Cardboard 50 100 
Corrugated cardboard packaging 18 42 
Sanitary paper products 59 98 
Sanitary cerarnicware 51 94 
Beer 65 100 
Toothpaste 72 99 
Polyester fibre 73 100 
Polyester yarn 36 86 
Acrylic fibre 88 100 
Machine-woven carpets 10 26 
Pencils 95 100 
Ballpoint pens 60 85 
Steel cord and wire 70 90 
LPG 50 75 
Matches 60 100 
Cosmetic goods (tons of production) 57 78 
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Aluminium plates 60 100 
Aluminium rolls and sheets 30 70 
Plate glass 100 100 
Margarine 52 81 
Light bulbs 40 90 
Electrolytic copper 30 70 
Ceramics 39 70 
Newspapers 27 68 
Paints 29 60 
Detergents 35 80 
Pesticides 18 43 
Trucks 46 80 
Pick-up trucks 52 97 
Buses 95 100 
Minibuses 90 100 
Passenger cars 55 100 
Agricultural tractors 43 94 
Automotive batteries 70 85 
Automotive tyre cord 100 100 
Source: M. Dutz, Competition law and its relevance for Turkey," a paper presented at the International 
Conference on Competition Policies for Turkey held in istanbul in November 1992. 
Note: "Concentration ratio I" refers to the share of total domestic sales accounted for by the largest producer, 
while 'concentration ratio 3" refers to the share of domestic sales accounted for by the largest three producers. 
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A similar situation prevails in Turkey, where the need for competition policies 
arises because firms generally face entry and exit barriers and anti-competitive behaviour 
among incumbents. Besides the natural barriers such as economies of scale and financial 
market imperfections, there are barriers that protect incumbents from potential entrants and 
imports. In the light of these considerations, Turkey adopted the Law on the Prevention of 
Unfair Competition in Importation, which contains both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
provisions, in June of 1989; it also implemented its own competition policy, modelled 
largely on EU practice, during December 1994 with the Law on the Protection of 
Competition. The legislation forbids certain practices and contains provisions prohibiting 
the abuse of a dominant market position and regulating mergers and acquisitions. As a 
result of these changes, most of the investment incentives were dropped in 1995; only the 
investment incentive allowance, the customs exemption, the VAT exemption 
(postponement), the premium on domestically produced capital goods, and subsidies that 
fall within the category of State aid have been retained. Within the framework of State aid, 
credit will be provided from the Fund for the Encouragement of Investments and Services 
Providing Foreign Exchange Earnings for investment in R&D and the improvement of 
environmental regulation, for the support of small and medium-sized industries, for the 
improvement of product standards, and for the relocation of plants and equipment to 
regions enjoying priority in development. 
With regard to the export regime, it should be noted that Turkey joined the GATT 
Subsidies Code in 1985, agreeing to eliminate export subsidies by 1989. Considerable 
progress was made both within and following this interim period: Turkey abolished the 
Resource Utilization Support Fund payments in 1986, tax rebates in 1988, Price 
Stabilization Support Fund payments in 1992, and the corporate tax exemption in 1993. 
With the elimination of the difference between the market rate and the official rate of 
exchange during the 198 Os, the incentive value of the foreign exchange allocation schemes 
was substantially reduced. The deduction system and the rebate on freight charges were 
abolished at the end of 1994. 
It is well known that market access has long been a major focus of GATT (and is 
now a WTO priority). Anti-competitive practices pursued by private enterprises have not 
been subject to GAIT rules or disciplines. However, as stated previously, the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibits Governments from 
granting subsidies contingent upon either export performance or the use of domestic 
products. According to this Agreement, Governments must use caution to avoid granting 
actionable subsidies that will adversely affect the interests of other WTO Members, but 
may provide non-actionable subsidies for R&D, regional development and environmental 
regulation. Within this context, Turkey introduced allowable incentives such as research 
and development subsidies and subsidies to facilitate the adaptation of plants in 
conformance with new environmental regulations on 11 January 1995. 
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Over the last decade or so, Turkey has changed its export and incentive schemes 
in conformance with various GATT and EC/EU practices and requirements; recently, to 
comply with the new WTO and Customs Union agreements, Turkey eliminated most of its 
remaining investment and export incentives. In the future, export subsidies in Turkey will 
be restricted to those provided for R&D activities, for environmental projects, and as 
financial assistance for export-promotion activities connected with, for example, 
participation in trade fairs, the contracting of market research, and the organization of 
educational activities such as seminars and conferences. 
It may be remembered that, with respect to public-sector enterprises, there are 
barriers to exit in Turkey, that public firms are often not allowed to go bankrupt, and that 
the Government, to protect workers from unemployment, subsidizes unprofitable firms; 
however, it should also be noted in this context that Turkey does not have a social safety 
net that would facilitate the effective restructuring of industry. In spite of all this, the 
proper functioning of the price system requires that firms be able to enter and exit the 
market freely. One possible way of achieving this objective is through the privatization of 
public enterprises. Since 1983, privatization has been an important part of the Turkish 
structural adjustment programme. However, owing to various difficulties, privatization has 
not been able to gain momentum. A second alternative is to ask State-owned enterprises 
to operate according to market rules. Under such a policy, these enterprises would no 
longer face soft-budget constraints, they would be subject to the commercial code and 
could not escape bankruptcy laws, and they would no longer be subsidized by the 
Government (either directly or through equity injections or debt consolidation). 
It might be useful here to consider the developments in Europe with regard to State 
aid. It was clear from the very beginning, when the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was established in 1952, that the intervention of national Governments on behalf 
of some of their enterprises could threaten the efficient distribution of resources and thus 
the gains expected from the liberalization of trade. The Governments therefore decided to 
give the European Commission far-reaching control over national State aid; thereafter, as 
stipulated in Article 4 of the ECSC Treaty, subsidies and aid granted by States were to be 
abolished and prohibited. However, the strict prohibition against State aid in the iron and 
steel industry could not be sustained. Responding to the mounting pressure for national 
aid, the Commission authorized aid frameworks for the coal industry in 1965 and for the 
iron and steel industry in 1980. The currently applicable rules for iron and steel limit aid 
to R&D, environmental protection, the costs of plant closure, and investments in Greece 
and former East Germany provided they do not lead to an increase in capacity. For the coal 
industry, aid is provided for investment and employment and to cover operating losses. 
State aid is also provided to the agriculture, fishery and transportation sectors. Rules on 
State aid for the remaining sectors are contained in articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty of Rome 
(1957) establishing the European Economic Community. According to these articles, State 
aid, in so far as it distorts trade between Member States, is forbidden unless an exception 
is specifically accorded; possible exceptions are enumerated in Article 92. To obtain such 
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a derogation, Member States have to notify the European Commission of any plans to grant 
aid to their enterprises. If the Commission decides that such aid is compatible with the 
common market, it may be legally granted; however, if the Commission's decision is 
negative, any aid that has been allocated to an enterprise has to be repaid with interest. The 
Commission has issued numerous guidelines to clarify the rules on derogation. As 
explained in European Economy (1991), the rules are mainly concerned with particular 
forms of aid or types of aid schemes (such as regional aid) and with ensuring that the 
Commission has adequate information. 
As previously mentioned, Turkey has adapted its export incentive system to the 
requirements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Further, in applying its competition law of 1994, Turkey should be able to remove entiy 
and exit barriers in industry. Finally, Turkey recognizes that State aid, in so far as it 
distorts trade between Turkey and the EU, may lead to disputes between the parties. To 
comply with the rules of the Customs Union Agreement, Turkey will have to stop 
subsidizing its public enterprises at the prevailing rates, align its State aid policies with 
those of the EU, and apply the same competition policies to all firms, whether public or 
private. This adjustment will certainly be costly, but unless the system of State aid is 
aligned with that used in the EU, and unless competition rules are effectively applied to all 
private and public firms, the EU can use commercial defence instruments (anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties) against Turkey. 
To solve the problems in this area, Turkey could set up an authority to assess its 
aid schemes. It could draw up an inventory of State aid and quantify the amount of such 
aid provided to different industries through investment and export incentives, the covering 
of operating losses, contributions to the capital of enterprises, and the non-pursuit of debts 
owed to the State, employing the same procedures as those used in the EU. In time, Turkey 
should be able to achieve a degree of effective enforcement and transparency which will 
be recognized as equivalent to that of the European Commission. Once this point is 
reached, the EU will probably decide to forego the use of anti-dumping and countervailing 
investigations against Turkish exports. 
The new WTO and Customs Union rules on subsidies will increase competition 
in the Turkish economy. When faced with intensified competition, domestic 
industries—which may have reaped monopolistic and oligopolistic profits in a relatively 
protected domestic market—will be forced to behave competitively. The concentration 
ratios reported in table 2 are expected to decline over time. Furthermore, it is projected 
(following the work of Levinsohn [1993]), that price/marginal-cost mark-ups will decline 
in the private sector after the effective implementation of competition policies. Finally, 
public-sector firms, for which the profit-maximizing framework was inappropriate, would 
also begin to behave competitively after the effective implementation and enforcement of 
these policies. 
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2. Intellectual, industrial and commercial proper4' rights 
Intellectual property is usually defined as information with a commercial value. 
The main legal instruments utilized to protect intellectual property rights are patents, 
copyright and related rights, geographical indications and trademarks. Special forms of 
protection have also emerged for undisclosed information, industrial designs, and the 
layout-designs of integrated circuits. These instruments together form a national system 
of intellectual property rights protection. The institutions in charge of administering the 
system and the means available for enforcing these rights determine the system's 
effectiveness. 
The following outlines the legislation on copyright and patents that prevailed in 
Turkey until recently: 
Copyright. Under Turkey's former Copyright Law (Law No. 5846 of 5 
December 1951), copyright started from the date of publication; it 
belonged to the author during his lifetime and was inherited equally by his 
heirs after his death. Heirs could make use of the copyright for 50 years. 
In the case of infringement, the author could demand prosecution by the 
district attorney and could claim damages. Aliens residing in Turkey who 
registered copies of their work were equally protected under the law. 
However, works published in a foreign language could be freely translated 
into Turkish after a period of 10 years. 
Patents. Until recently, patent matters in Turkey were governed by a law 
dating back to the Ottoman period (23 March 1879), under which patents 
were issued without any verification of accuracy or novelty. Later, 
pursuant to Law No. 6563 of 21 May 1955, the Government could 
forward patent requests to the International Patent Institute in La Haye for 
study and verification of novelty. After the closing down of the 
International Patent Institute, Turkey signed an agreement with the 
European Patent Organization (in 1977) and a protocol with the Austrian 
Patent Office (in 1992). Under the agreements, patent requests made in 
Turkey could be sent to these institutions for study and verification of 
novelty. Within Turkey itself, all patent requests had to be registered with 
the Industrial Property Department of the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce. Patents could be requested for 5, 10 or 15 years, and patent 
infringement could result in civil action as well as criminal prosecution. 
Pharmaceutical formulas, industrial designs and models, and fmancial 
schemes could not be patented. Turkey is a signatory to the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and to the 
London and Stockholm Acts of this Convention (with the exception of the 
first 12 articles of the latter) signed in 1934 and 1967 respectively. 
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The shortcomings of Turkey's former Copyright Law can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Piracy. The piracy of copyrighted works such as books, films, videos, 
sound recordings of musical works and computer software, though banned 
by the Copyright Law, could not be controlled, mainly because of the lack 
of an effective enforcement mechanism; the penalty in 1994 ranged from 
$3 to $75—a relatively negligible sum. 
• Rights related to translations. According to the law prevailing until 
recently, works published in a foreign language could be freely translated 
into Turkish after 10 years. 
• Rights related to cinematographic works. Under the former law, these 
rights were not properly protected. 
• Rights related to computer programs and compilations of data. The law 
prevailing until recently did not cover these rights. 
There were also a number of shortcomings associated with the old patent law. The 
Turkish patent law of the Ottoman period specified that patents would be available for any 
inventions, provided they were new and had the capacity for industrial application. The law 
did not require that the invention involve an inventive step. 
Initially, patents were issued without any examination, and the burden of proof was 
on the applicant. However, after the adoption of Law No. 6563 of2l May 1955, Turkey 
moved towards a system incorporating examination. Under the patent system that prevailed 
until recently, when Turkish citizens applied for patents, the administration would ask 
universities for their opinions on the patentability of the items in question. l-Iowever, since 
the universities in Turkey did not have the necessary infrastructure for the study or 
verification of novelty, the opinions expressed by faculty members were sometimes 
inaccurate or biased. As a result, domestic investors were not willing to invest in new 
inventions, as they were afraid that the patent protection could be lost after some time. The 
Government forwarded the patent requests of foreigners to the European Patent 
Organization or the Austrian Patent Office for study and verification of novelty; thus, in the 
case of applications by foreigners, there was no chance that the patent protection would 
eventually be lost. Based on the above, the system was considered to be biased against 
Turkish citizens. 
As previously mentioned, under the patent law prevailing until recently, patent 
infringements could give rise to civil action or to criminal prosecution. However, there 
were no special courts set up to deal with the settlement of disputes over industrial property 
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rights protection. The Turkish legal system experienced various difficulties in studying and 
evaluating the different issues and causes of disputes, and the settlement of such cases 
usually took a long time. There was a need for industrial property attorneys and special 
courts that could defend property rights, enforce the penalties for infringement, and carry 
out the other necessary functions in this regard in order to strengthen the system's 
credibility. 
The Customs Union Agreement requires that Turkey ensure adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, and 
that it implement the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) by 1999. Furthermore, by 1 January 1998, Turkey must adopt 
legislation to secure the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes. Regarding 
copyright, the Agreement stipulates that counterfeiting, bootlegging and other such forms 
of piracy must be effectively banned, and that the duration of protection in cases of 
translation should not be less than 50 years where the term is calculated on a basis other 
than the life of the person. The 50-year period is also applicable to corporations. For 
cinematographic works, the Agreement requires that title holders be given the right to 
authorize or prohibit the commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their 
copyrighted works. The Agreement also requires that both computer programs and data 
compilations be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention of Literary and 
Artistic Works (1971), which provides protection for 50 years. 
All of the shortcomings of Turkey's former Copyright Law were eliminated with 
the adoption of Law No. 4110 of 7 June 1995. Specifically, the new law increases the 
penalty for piracy to imprisonment for a period of three months to one year, stipulates that 
works published in a foreign language can be freely translated into Turkish after 70 years, 
and protects the rights related to cinematographic works, computer programs and 
compilations of data. 
A number of significant changes have been made with regard to patents as well. 
The new Turkish Patent Law (Law No. 22326) became effective with Decree No. 551 
published in the Official Gazette of 27 June 1995. As was the case with the copyright 
situation, the new law has eliminated all of the shortcomings of the previous legislation. 
Under this new law, a search report indicating the state of the art in the field of the 
invention and its status will be prepared after the patent has been applied for. Thereafter, 
the applicant has seven years to decide whether he wants to initiate a study for the 
determination of novelty; the cost of this study must be covered by the applicant. During 
the seven-year period, the invention is protected under the Patent Law. If the study 
conducted during the seven years confirms the novelty of the invention, the applicant is 
given protection for 20 years, starting from the date of the first application. If the applicant 
does not carry out the study during the seven-year period, he relinquishes his rights. Under 
this new law, the administration is responsible for preparing the search report and, if 
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requested, conducting a study to determine novelty. In order to meet these needs, the 
Turkish Patent Institute was established with Decree No. 544 of 24 June 1994. 
The new Patent Law has a section deriving from French patent law outlining the 
"utility model". A fill-fledged patent is available for any invention, provided it is new, 
involves an inventive step, and has the capacity for industrial application at the universal 
level; however, the utility model requires only that the invention be new within the 
domestic economy. Protection is provided for 10 years. The advantages of the utility 
model are that the costs of application are lower and the time required for evaluation is 
shorter. 
The new Patent Law contains a number of provisions. Rules are established for 
licensing agreements whereby patents must be used or licensed within the first three years 
of their patentability; if they are not, compulsory licensing rules adopted from Spanish 
patent law are applied. The new law also requires that patents be available for all 
inventions in all fields of technology. Finally, the new Patent Law requires that special 
courts be set up and the services of patent attorneys engaged for the settlement of disputes 
relating to industrial property rights. A patent attorney must have a comprehensive 
understanding of natural sciences and the ability to put new technical concepts and 
developments into words. While such an attorney is expected to be knowledgeable about 
a particular area of law, he must also have extensive knowledge in his field of legal 
practice; often, a solid understanding of domestic and international laws and the national 
laws of other countries is required. The patent attorney plays a very important role: he is 
responsible for applying his specialized legal and scientific knowledge in dealing with a 
new technical solution, and for properly wording patent specifications and patent claims 
to lay the foundation for new industrial property rights. The patent attorney is also 
expected to provide advice on know-how licenses, on the drafting of know-how 
agreements, and on the rights of employed inventors, and he should also advise clients of 
technical developments. Within the specially designated courts, judges chosen for their 
experience in patent and other intellectual property matters are required to deliver reliable 
and consistent decisions on issues related to validity, infringement and damages. 
The Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement incorporates the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which 
establishes minimum standards for intellectual property protection that must be observed 
by all WTO Members. According to WTO Agreement provisions, Turkey, as a developing 
country, must implement the TRIPs Agreement by the year 2000; for pharmaceutical 
products, Turkey can delay the application of the provisions until the year 2005. However, 
the terms of the Customs Union Agreement specify that Turkey must implement the TRIPs 
Agreement by the year 1999, and only has until 1 January 1998 to adopt legislation to 
secure the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes. 
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The economic rationale for protecting intellectual property rights is expressed in 
terms of costs and benefits (Hoekman, 1995). The costs include the increased payments 
for proprietary knowledge, the price increases associated with greater market power for 
knowledge producers, the costs of displacing pirating activities, the costs of additional 
R&D, and the costs associated with administering and enforcing the protection of 
intellectual property rights. Potential benefits include the new inventions fostered by higher 
levels of R&D, better technology, increased foreign trade, increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows—and consequently, increased per capita income within the country. 
Within this context, Turkey's main task will be to transform its intellectual property rights 
regime into an effective mechanism for promoting innovation and increasing income. 
3. Customs class Wcation, valuation and rules of origin; technical 
regulations and standards; and government procurement 
Article 26 of the Customs Union Agreement requires that Turkey adopt EU 
customs provisions relating to the following: the origin of goods; the customs value of 
goods; the introduction of goods into the territory covered by the customs union; customs 
declaration; release for free circulation; the movement of goods; customs debt; and the right 
of appeal. Article 8 of the same Agreement specifies that, within five years, Turkey must 
incorporate into its legal system the EU instruments relating to the removal of technical 
barriers to trade. Furthermore, Article 46 of the Agreement requires that negotiations 
aiming at the mutual opening of the contracting parties' respective government 
procurement markets be initiated as soon as possible after 1 January 1996. 
(a) Customs provisions 
The term "customs classification and valuation" refers to the process through 
which customs authorities assign a tariff classification and value to any given import. If 
officials place goods under an incorrect classification to which a higher tariff applies or 
assign goods a value which is higher than appropriate, the valuation process may become 
a non-tariff barrier (NTB). The decision to include transportation and insurance costs in 
(or to exclude them from) the value of goods may also have a significant impact. Finally, 
customs officials may not accept the invoice presented by the importer as a basis for 
valuation in determining the amount of duty to be paid. 
With respect to customs classification, since 1 January 1989 Turkey has classified 
its tariffs according to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 
nomenclature, which distinguishes between 18,610 tariff lines. Regarding customs 
valuation, it should be noted that Turkey ratified the Tokyo Round Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VII (the Customs Valuation Code) on 13 January 1989. The 
Agreement entered into force for Turkey on 12 February 1989; however, there was a five- 
year delay, so the actual implementation of its provisions began in 1994. 
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Valuation is based on the invoice value of goods, i.e., the price actually paid or 
payable for the goods. In the determination of customs duties, the price normally includes 
added freight and insurance charges, commissions, and other expenses incidental to the sale 
of the goods and their delivery to the point of entry into the customs territory of Turkey. 
A rule of origin is a criterion that is used to determine the "nationality" of a 
product. Where two or more countries are involved in the production of a product, the 
origin of the product is taken to be the country in which the last substantial transformation 
took place, i.e., that in which significant manufacturing or processing occurred most 
recently. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin specifies that for substantial 
transformation there must be a change in tariff heading within the specified nomenclature, 
which in Turkey is currently the HS (relevant provisions are contained in Article 19 of 
Turkey's draft customs law). Turkey's obligation to harmonize its commercial policy 
(including preferential agreements) with that of the EU requires it to keep abreast of 
developments relating to rules of origin. The Customs Union Agreement excludes, inter 
alia, the products that fall within the domain of the ECSC; for these products, a free-trade 
agreement was to be signed in 1995, after which the rules of origin would have to be 
applied for steel products as well. 
The customs union can only function effectively if the customs system in Turkey 
is brought up to date; a number of positive steps have recently been taken in this direction. 
A new draft customs law has been prepared to replace the old customs law (Law No. 1615 
of 19 July 1972); the new draft legislation aims for speedy customs release and the 
simplification and full automation of customs procedures. The customs administration has 
recently been involved in extensive training programmes. There are also plans to set up 
computer networks and introduce on-line declaration systems. With computers, each 
customs point will not only have the relevant information available for the collection of 
customs duties, but will also be able to access the information on preferential agreements 
and anti-dumping regulations that will be required to determine the correct amounts to be 
collected. 
(b) Technical regulations and product standards 
Product standards and technical regulations are essential for the functioning of 
market economies. Both are technical specifications for a particular product or production 
process, but they differ in that standards are voluntary and technical regulations are 
mandatory. Certification systems comprise a set of procedures that must be followed by 
producers in establishing that their products or production processes conform to the 
relevant standard(s)/regulation(s). Technical barriers to trade arise mainly because the 
standards/regulations of different countries are not the same, or because some countries do 
not accept the standardization systems (testing and certification) of other countries and 
request these countries to carry out new testing and certification procedures. As a result, 
standards/regulations raise the unit cost of production. 
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The Turkish Standards Institution (TSI) is the only organization authorized to 
prepare national standards for Turkey. Turkey is a full member of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), and is an affiliate member of the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) 
and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC). Roughly 
80% of Turkish standards conform to international norms. There are some 11,000 Turkish 
standards, only a small fraction of which are compulsory. Mandatory standards are 
published in the Official Gazette. According to the Customs Union Agreement, EU rules 
and regulations pertaining to standards will become legally effective in Turkey by the year 
2001. After 2001, the free circulation of goods must be permitted on the basis of the EU 
accord. A large number of European standards have already been adopted at the Turkish 
Standards Institution as TSI standards and were to be made available to the public as 
voluntary standards as of 1 January 1996. 
(c) Government procurement 
Government procurement policies often incorporate preferences for domestic over 
foreign firms bidding on public procurement contracts. The Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Government Procurement essentially prohibits preferences for domestic firms by 
imposing GATT national treatment based on non-discrimination principles. The 
Agreement generally applies to all central government, lower-level government and public 
utilities contracts that exceed 130,000 special drawing rights (SDR), SDR 200,000 and 
SDR 400,000 respectively, and to construction contracts above SDR 5 million. The aim 
of the Agreement is to reduce the scope for single and limited tendering by making the 
tendering process more competitive. Turkey has been an observer to the GAIT Code on 
Government Procurement for some time. Public procurement in Turkey has been regulated 
by the Public Procurement Law (Law No. 2886) since 1984. The law applies to central, 
provincial and local governments but not to State economic enterprises or autonomous 
agencies. After the formation of the customs union, Turkey will probably have to apply the 
rules of the Agreement on Government Procurement (since the EU is a party to the 
Agreement) as well as all of the EU procurement directives. 
4. Foreign direct investment 
In Turkey, the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital of 18 January 1954 
provides the legal framework governing foreign direct investment, together with 
Communiqué No. 1 issued on 25 May 1986, and the Foreign Capital Framework Decree 
published on 4 March 1992. The legislation accords equal treatment to domestic and 
foreign investors and guarantees the transfer of profits, fees and royalties and the 
repatriation of capital. Investment incentives are equally available to foreign and domestic 
investors. Non-residents wishing to invest in Turkey must obtain authorization from the 
General Directorate of Foreign Investment (GDFI) at the Undersecretariat for the Treasury. 
The GDFI authorizes investments of up to $150 million; investments above that amount 
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require the approval of the Council of Ministers. There are no limits set with respect to the 
equity participation ratio; nor are there any limitations associated with assigning managers 
or technical staff The Treasury is required to guarantee the repatriation of proceeds from 
the sale of registered shares. Foreign investors can invest in Turkish securities and may 
remit all capital, dividends, interest and profits. Persons residing abroad are also permitted 
to buy real estate in Turkey, and can remit all proceeds from the rental or sale of properties 
puchased with foreign currency brought into the country. It should be noted that special 
incentives apply to the tourism and petroleum sectors. 
Turkey signed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Codes on Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations and of Capital 
Movements in 1961, lifting its general derogation in 1986; it still maintains reservations 
with respect to the Codes. Since 1987, Turkey has been a member of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multinational Investment 
Guarantee Agency. To date, Turkey has signed bilateral agreements with 27 countries for 
the promotion and protection of investments. 
Turkey is a middle-income developing country with a fairly well-developed 
infrastructure (modem communications, transportation, finance and banking services and 
facilities). Although Turkey is geographically well placed to service a number of countries 
in the region, its FDI volume is low in comparison with that of several other developing 
countries at a similar stage of development. The literature on FDI determinants identifies 
political stability, low efficiency wage rates, natural resource endowments, per capita 
income levels, growth performance, price stability and exchange rate stability as the main 
factors considered in FDI decisions. It seems that the generous investment and export 
incentives provided for FDI in Turkey have not been sufficient to compensate for the 
adverse effects related to the other factors. 
Notably, the Customs Union Agreement is silent on capital movements; the issue 
of FDI is not covered. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) recognizes that certain investment measures pursued by a host country 
restrict and distort trade. In particular, the Agreement on TRIMs identifies the local 
content requirement as being inconsistent with GATT disciplines relating to national 
treatment (Article III), and the foreign exchange requirements as constituting 
quantitative restrictions (thus violating Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade). Turkey, as a developing country, is required to phase out GAIT-inconsistent 
TRIMs over a period of five years. There are no local content or export performance 
requirements in Turkey. However, each individual foreign investor must bring in a 
minimum of $50,000. Only investments worth $500,000 or more are eligible for 
incentives. 
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With the establishment of its customs union with the EU, Turkey can no longer 
subsidize FDI. Before long, Turkey will have to implement the competition policies of the 
EU and to ensure the protection and enforcement of intellectual, industrial and commercial 
property rights within the countiy. These measures are expected to increase FDI flows into 
Turkey. However, Turkey will be adversely affected by the free-trade agreements the EU 
has concluded with Central and Eastern European countries and by those it will conclude 
with Baltic and Mediterranean countries. The scarce FDJ funds will be channeled into 
these countries, and world competition for FDI funds will increase. With the formation of 
the customs union, Turkey will attract more capital inflow than before, as long as the 
country is also able to achieve political, social and macroeconomic stability (price and 
exchange-rate stability and relatively high rates of sustainable growth). Given the 
immobility of labour between the parties, EU investors will seek out the relatively cheap 
Turkish labour force. Capital is expected to flow into sectors where value added and hence 
profitability will increase—particularly the clothing, agriculture and services sectors, which 
until now have been shielded from competition. 
B. MEASURES AFFECTING MARKET ACCESS 
An important feature of both Turkey's Customs Union Agreement with the EU and 
the Uruguay Round agreements is the liberalization of trade. The purpose of this section 
is to study the effects of measures relating to market access in the relevant countries. 
1. The Turkey-EU Customs Union Agreement 
The customs union between Turkey and the EU allows for the free circulation of 
goods between the parties. Turkey must implement the European Union's common 
external tariff on goods from third parties and, by the year 2000, will adopt all of the 
preferential trade agreements the EU has concluded over time. To calculate the effect of 
these changes on the Turkish economy, nominal protection rates (NPRs) for trade with the 
EU and with third countries must be obtained for the periods before and after the formation 
of the customs union. 
Table 3 provides estimates of NPRs for 1994 and for the period after the formation 
of the customs union. According to the table, the manufacturing sector's average 1994 
NPR for trade with the EU amounted to 12.2% when weighted by sectoral import values; 
the corresponding figure for trade with third countries was 18.03%. With regard to the 
frequency distribution of NPRs among the 39 manufacturing industries considered, three 
(four) industries in 1994 had NPRs which were higher than 50% for trade with the EU 
(third countries), and 25 (20) industries had NPRs that were lower than 20% for trade with 
the EU (third countries). An examination of the structure of trade protection reveals that 
the highest NPRs for trade with the EU were granted to the following sectors: fruits and 
vegetables, with the input-output (1-0) code of 12(72.49%); alcoholic beverages, 1-0 code 
17 (72.1%); and non-alcoholic beverages, 1-0 code 18 (56.92%). For trade with third 
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countries, the highest NPRs were granted to the following sectors: processed tobacco, 1-0 
code 19(99.91%); alcoholic beverages, 1-0 code 17 (94.28%); and fruits and vegetables, 
1-0 code 12 (72.62%). 
The Additional Protocol to the Ankara Treaty signed on 23 November 1970 
stipulated that Turkish imports from the European Community were to be divided into two 
groups. Those products in which it was thought that Turkey could achieve international 
competitiveness relatively early were placed on a 12-year list; other manufactured products 
were put on a 22-year list, to which the provisions of a customs union would not apply until 
1995. With the formation of its customs union with the EU in 1996, Turkey has to reduce 
its nominal protection rates for all commodities on the 12-year and 22-year lists to zero. 
There are basically three types of commodities other than those on the two lists: 
agricultural products; products that fall within the domain of the ECSC; and products that 
fall within the domain of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC): 
Agricultural products. To ensure the free movement of agricultural 
products, Turkey will have to adjust its policy and adopt a modified 
version of the common agricultural policy (CAP), which provides the 
main framework for agricultural support in the EU. According to the 
State Planning Organization in Ankara, if Turkey were to adopt a similar 
system, the required annual support would amount to $3.1 billion. Since 
Turkey cannot devote this much of its own resources to the support of the 
agricultural sector, and since the EU will not contribute this amount 
annually, the free movement of agricultural products cannot be achieved 
in the near future. It is therefore to be expected that the NPRs for 
agricultural products will remain unchanged over the next few years. 
ECSC and EAEC. Through a resolution of the EU-Turkey Association 
Council, negotiations for the free movement of ECSC products were 
concluded in 1995, with the hon and Steel Free-Trade Agreement signed 
between Turkey and the EU. Since similar considerations apply to 
products within the domain of the EAEC, it may be assumed that for both 
sets of products, tariff rates will be reduced to zero within no more than 
three years, as was the case with the products on the 12- and 22-year lists. 
The second column in table 3 shows the NPRs for Turkey's trade with the EU that 
are expected to prevail from this point on (i.e., with the entering into effect of the customs 
union). From among the 39 tradeable-goods industries considered, there will be only one 
industry which will have an NPR higher than 50% for trade with the EU, and four (two) 
industries that will have NPRs which are less than 20% (between 20% and 5 0%). In 32 
industries the NPR will be zero. With the formation of the customs union, the average 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the highest NPRS will be granted to the sectors of: fruits and vegetables, 1-0 code 2 
(68.01%); grain mill products, 1-0 code 14 (41.02%); and sugar refining, 1-0 code 15 
(28.79%). 
With respect to trade with third parties, a distinction has to be made between 
European Free-Trade Area (EFTA) countries, Mediterranean countries, Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries, Baltic countries, developing countries enjoying 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) treatment, and Lomé Convention countries. 
The EU has concluded preferential trade agreements with countries from each of these 
groupings. With the formation of the customs union, Turkey will, by the year 2001, have 
to apply the European Union's Common Customs Tariff and accept all of the preferential 
agreements the EU has concluded over time; therefore, within the next five years, Turkey 
will be faced with different sets of tariff rates for different groups of countries. For the 
EFTA countries, CEE countries, Baltic countries and Israel, which have free-trade 
agreements with the EU, Turkey's nominal tariff rates will be identical to those of the 
EU. Thus, the NPRs listed in the second column of table 3 will have to apply to 53.77% 
of imports, which is the average share of Turkish imports from Israel and the EU, EFTA, 
CEE and Baltic countries combined during the period 199 1-1993. For these countries, 
not including the EU member States, the average tariff rate will decrease from 18.03% 
to 1.21%. The share of Turkish imports from developing countries enjoying GSP 
treatment is around 27.54%. Finally, the imports of countries such as the United States, 
Japan and Canada, to which the EU applies the Common Customs Tariff, account for a 
share of 18.46%. The fourth column of table 3 shows the average most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) tariff rates, and column five shows the average tariff rates for GSP beneficiaries. 
It must be assumed that the tariff rates Turkey will apply by the year 2001 are those 
shown in columns two, four and five of table 3. It should be noted that the average NPRs 
in manufacturing will be: 1.21% for EU countries and for the countries with which the 
EU has free-trade agreements; 7.25% for countries such as the United States, Japan and 
Canada; and 1.97% for GSP beneficiaries. 
Economists have long recognized that the profitability of a business activity can 
be changed by measures which affect the selling price of the final product, the costs of 
the intermediate material inputs, or a combination of the two. The literature on effective 
protection maintains that when there are intermediate inputs, effective protection of value 
added is what matters, not nominal protection. Put another way, if both the final product 
and the material inputs used to produce that product could be bought or sold in world 
markets at given prices, under free-trade conditions and at a given exchange rate, this 
would provide a certain value added (the cost of labour, land and capital inclusive of an 
acceptable profit margin). Tariffs and tariff-like charges affect the product price and the 
cost to the enterprise of the intermediate input, thus increasing or decreasing the value 
added. Effective protection is simply the difference between the observed value added 
and what the value added would be under free trade; the effective protection rate (EPR) 
is this difference expressed as a proportion of the free-trade value added. 
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The EPRs for the Turkish economy are calculated here using the average NPRs 
reported in columns one and two of table 4 (weighted averages of the NPRs listed in table 
3), as well as the input-output table prepared by the State Institute of Statistics for the year 
1990. The third and fourth columns of table 4 reveal that the average EPR in 
manufacturing will decline from 22.08% in 1994 to -0.05% in 2001. 
Table 4 shows that during 1994 the highest EPRs were provided to the following 
sectors: fruits and vegetables, 1-0 code 12 (291.43%); grain mill products, 1-0 code 14 
(281 .46%); and petroleum refining, I-U code 32 (180.44%). Ranking the sectors (from 
highest to lowest EPR value) reveals that those numbered 12, 14, 32, 19, 17, 18, 24 and 26 
were the most protected sectors in the Turkish economy in 1994. 
In the year 2001, the highest EPRs will be provided to the following sectors: grain 
mill products, 1-0 code 14 (301.45%); fruits and vegetables, 1-0 code 12 (285.8%); and 
slaughtering and meat, 1-0 code 11(21.36%). Ranking the sectors from highest to lowest 
EPR value reveals that those numbered 14, 12, 11, 22 and 24 will be the most protected 
sectors in the Turkish economy in the year 2001. The data also indicate that the least 
protected sectors in the economy will be processed tobacco (1-0 code 19), non-alcoholic 
beverages (1-0 code 18), sugar refining (1-0 code 15), alcoholic beverages (1-0 code 17), 
shipbuilding and repairing (1-0 code 45), other manufacturing industries (1-0 code 49), and 
paper and paper products (1-0 code 27). 
The effects of the customs union on the value added of individual sectors is 
calculated by subtracting the value of each EPR for 1994 from the corresponding EPR 
value for the year 2001; the results are reported in table 5. The table indicates that the 
formation of the customs union will lead to an increase in value added for the grain mill 
products (1-0 code 14), sugar refming (1-0 code 15) and clothing (1-0 code 22) sectors, and 
to a decrease in value added for the sectors of processed tobacco (1-0 code 19), petroleum 
refining (1-0 code 32), and non-alcoholic beverages (1-0 code 18). 
Turning next to the issue of market access, it may be noted that all countries will 
benefit from the reduction in nominal protection rates in Turkey. Table 6 shows the 
average share of imports from different country groupings, as well as the corresponding 
Turkish NPRS applicable to imports from these country groups before and after the 
formation of the customs union with the EU. For products exported from the EU, which 
constitute 46.02% of Turkish imports, the average NPR will fall from 12.2% to 1.21%. For 
products exported from Mediterranean countries, totalling 1.6% of Turkish imports, the 
NPR could go down from 18.03% to 1.21% once these countries, together with the EU, 
establish a free-trade area. For ESCWA member countries, the NPRs will drop from 
18.03% to 1.97%. The share of the major oil-exporting ESCWA member countries in 
Turkish imports is 8.72%, mainly owing to Turkey's oil imports from the region; the share 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5. Sensitive manufacturing sectors in the Turkish economy 
Input- 
output 
(1-0) code Sector 
Effects of the customs union 
(change in value added, 1994-2001) 
14 Grain mill products 19.99 
15 Sugar refining 18.27 
22 Clothing 9.91 
33 Petroleum and coal products 6.23 
11 Slaughtering and meat 4.55 
13 Vegetableandanimaloil 2.14 
48 Other transport equipment 1.07 
46 Railroad equipment 0.78 
20 Ginning -1.86 
49 Other manufacturing industries -1.95 
28 Printing and publishing -3.39 
30 Pharmaceutical production -4.02 
40 Non-ferrous metals -5.27 
12 Fruits and vegetables -5.63 
43 Agricultural machinery -6.79 
45 Shipbuilding and repairing -7.34 
42 Non-electrical machinery -7.92 
39 lion and steel -8.22 
23 Leather and fur production -10.30 
31 Other chemical production -11.16 
29 Fertilizers -11.85 
44 Electrical machinery -14.87 
27 Paper and paper products -19.24 
16 Other food processing -24.04 
36 Glass and glass production -24.28 
38 Non-metallic minerals -25.49 
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Table 5. (continued) 
Input- 
output 
(1-0) code Sector 
Effects of the customs union 
(change in value added, 1994-2001) 
21 Textiles -26.11 
34 Rubber products -32.66 
41 Fabricated metal products -35.24 
25 Wood products -36.61 
47 Motor vehicles -44.24 
37 Cement -45.37 
35 Plastic products -46.24 
24 Footwear -52.05 
26 Wood furniture -61.00 
17 Alcoholic beverages -159.00 
18 Non-alcoholic beverages -168.72 
32 Petroleum refining -176.69 
19 Processed tobacco -243.96 
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Table 6. The import share of different country groupings in total Turkish 
imports (1991-1993 averages) and corresponding Turkish nominal protection rates 
(NPRs) before and after the formation of the Turkey-EU customs union 





European Union (EU) countries 46.02 12.20 1.21 
Countries with which EU has free-trade 
agreements 
7.75 18.03 1.21 
Generalized system of preferences (GSP) 
countries 
27.54 18.03 1.97 
Countries against which the EU applies 
the Common Customs Tariff 
18.46 18.03 7.25 
Mediterranean countries 1.60 18.03 1.97 
ESCWA member countries 9.40 18.03 1.97 
Major oil-exporting countries 8.72 18.03 1.97 
Other ESCWA member countries 0.68 18.03 1.97 
With regard to market access for Turkish exports in EU countries, it should be 
noted that the EU abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from 
Turkey on 1 September 1971. However, certain exceptions were made. The European 
Community retained the right to impose import duties on some oil products over a fixed 
quota and to implement a phased reduction of duties on imports of certain textile products 
from Turkey. Trade in products that fall within the sphere of the ECSC have been 
protected by the EU through the application of non-tariff barriers and anti-dumping 
measures. 
Finally, it should be noted that one effect of the customs union will be substantially 
reduced import tax revenue. During 1994 the value of imports amounted to LT 683.8 
trillion, with import taxes totalling LT 136 trillion. Subtracting the VAT on imports that 
would be collected at the rate applicable for domestic production from the import tax figure 
of LT 136 trillion produces a net tax of about LT 68.9 trillion. Assuming that the sectoral 
import share vector derived from the 1990 input-output table prepared by the State Institute 
of Statistics remains unchanged, the hypothetical value of net import taxes can be 
calculated using the NPRS reported above. Using the hypothetical approach, the value of 
net import taxes is determined to be LT 90 trillion for 1994. The difference between the 
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hypothetical and actual value of net import taxes amounts to LT 21 .1 this figure 
mainly reflects the various exemptions. As mentioned in the sections on export and 
investment incentives, the capital goods, raw materials and intermediate goods used for 
investment purposes and for the production of exportables can be imported free of 
customs duties, as can most imports for military and educational purposes. According 
to the Uruguay Round agreements, the imports exempt from duty represented about 38% 
of Turkey's total imports in 1992. However, calculations based on the information above 
indicate that the exemption rate was only 23 .47% during 1994. 
Imports, valued in US dollars, increased at an annual rate of 9.2% during the 
period 1980-1994, and it may be assumed that imports will increase at the same annual 
rate over the next decade. Assuming the NPRs calculated for trade with the EU and with 
third countries after the formation of the customs union remain in effect, the loss in 
average annual import tax revenue is expected to be aruond $2,454 million, or about 
10.55% of the total value of imports. The average exchange rate for 1994 was LT 29,704 
per US dollar, translating into a loss in annual import tax revenue of LT 72.9 trillion, or 
9.49% of public-sector revenues. A revenue loss of this magnitude is substantial for a 
country like Turkey. To compensate for the decline in tax revenue, the Government is 
planning to introduce a special consumption tax which will replace a large number of 
excise taxes; one aim is to simplify the collection procedures. The special consumption 
tax will be introduced for a large number of commodities; particularly important in this 
context are petroleum products, alcohol, tobacco and motor vehicles. Since tax rates on 
these commodities are already high, it will not be easy to raise the additional $2,454 
million through the special consumption tax. An alternative solution would be to 
increase the general VAT rate from the current 15%. Since 80% of VAT revenue is 
collected from large corporations, raising the VAT rate would mainly increase the tax 
burden on this particular group. 
2. GATT 1994 
Of particular relevance to market access in GAT'T 1994 are the Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article 11:1(b), which provides for the binding of all duties or 
charges other than tariffs in schedules of concessions, and the Marrakesh Protocol. 
According to the Protocol, the tariff reductions for non-agricultural products agreed upon 
by each Member and recorded in the national schedules of concessions annexed to the 
Protocol are to be implemented in five equal decrements. The first such reduction 
became effective upon the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and the last reduction 
must be carried out no later than four years after that date. 
The outcome of the tariff negotiations for the United States, the 12 EU countries, 
the Middle East and North Africa is reported in table 7, using the results of Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr (1995). The authors start with pre-Uruguay Round tariff rates; these 
are the applied MFN tariff rates reported in the GATT Integrated Data Base. For tariff 
lines where the bound tariff rate (recorded in the national schedules of concessions 
265 
annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol) is above the applied base rate, the authors conclude 
that no actual tariff cuts will take place, as is the case for Middle Eastern and North 
African countries in table 7. In cases where a country has offered to bind the tariff below 
the applied MFN tariff rate, the offered rate is considered the post-Uruguay-Round tariff 
rate. In this context, it should be noted that for developed countries, the rates for most 
manufactured goods were bound prior to the Uruguay Round, and the applied rates are 
generally the same as these bound rates. The data in table 7 reveal that United States and 
EU tariffs are normally below 5%. Tariffs on textiles and clothing imposed in 
conjunction with quotas of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles 
(the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA) are much higher. Kirmani and others (1994) 
report that the tariff commitments of developed countries reflect a 40% reduction in the 
average tariff on imports of industrial commodities, and that the reduction will be less 
than the 40% average cut for: textiles and clothing; leather, rubber and footwear; and 
transport equipment. 
Table 7. Pre- and Post-Uruguay Round import tar jffs 
(Percentage) 
United States European Union 














TEX Textiles 9.4 6.7 8.6 6.4 34.2 34.2 
WAP Wearing apparel 18.6 16.7 13.2 11.5 33.3 33.3 
CRP Chemicals, rubber, plastics 4.3 2.5 7.4 4.6 22.6 22.6 
1-S Primary iron and steel 3.7 0.3 5.1 0.7 16.6 16.6 
NFM Non-ferrous metals 0.8 0.6 2.1 1.7 24.5 24.5 
FMP Fabricated metal 3.8 2.3 5.8 2.8 30.1 30.1 
TRN Transport industry 2.3 2.2 5 25.5 25.5 
MEA Meatproductsand 
livestock 
7.7 2.4 31.9 28.9 14.7 14.7 
ENR Energy and energy 
products 
0.5 0.5 1 0.5 9 9 
MIN Minerals and mineral 
products 
2.8 1.8 1.3 0.9 24.7 24.7 
MAC Machinery, equipment, 
other manufactures 
4.2 2.4 6.1 3.3 24.3 24.3 
Source: G.W. Harrison, T.F. Rutherford and D.G. Tarr, the Uruguay Round', a paper presented 
at the Conference on the Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies held by the World Bank in Washington. D.C.. 
in 1995. 
* Uruguay Round. 
266 
The MFN tariff rates summarized in table 7 fail to reflect the underlying protection, 
as they do not include NTBs. It has been shown by various economists that in most 
industrial countries, the use of "grey-area" measures such as voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) increased significantly during the 1980s and became the key form of protection in 
industrialized countries. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards provides for the 
virtual elimination of grey-area measures within four years of the entry into force of the 
Agreement. The inclusion of non-tariff measures in numerical analysis is not easy; because 
of the limitations on obtaining reliable data on NTBs, empirical studies tend to disregard 
them. The present study is no exception; table 7 shows tariff rates, but does not reflect the 
effects of non-tariff barriers. 
In studying the effects of the Uruguay Round agreements on the Turkish economy, 
one could follow the approach of François, McDonald and Nordstrom (1995) and consider 
the NPRS of 1988 as the base-year tariff schedule. A comparison of these figures with the 
bound tariff rates recorded in the Turkish schedules of concessions annexed to the 
Marrakesh Protocol reveals that the base-year tariff rates are higher than the bound rates. 
One might therefore draw the misleading conclusion that the Uruguay Round negotiations 
and agreements are responsible for the tariff reductions in Turkey, when actually they are 
a result of the liberalization of foreign trade achieved during the I 980s and 1 990s. The 
applied tariff rates reported in table 4 are much lower than the bound tariff rates annexed 
to the Protocol. Hence, the approach adopted in the previous section in analysing the 
effects of the Customs Union Agreement is equally suitable for evaluating the effects of the 
Uruguay Round agreements. Here, it should be emphasized that the MFN and GSP tariff 
rates reported in table do not reflect the effects of the latter set of agreements. Uruguay- 
Round-related considerations can be incorporated into the analysis through a separate 
assessment of the effects of the Uruguay Round agreements on EU tariffs and thereafter on 
nominal and effective protection rates in Turkey. 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS 
FOR TEXTILES AND STEEL PRODUCTS 
In this section, the implications of the Customs Union and Uruguay Round 
agreements for the two sectors with the highest shares in total exports are considered in 
some detail. The first sector comprises a combination of the clothing sector (SITC 84), 
with a share of 20.28%, and the textile sector (SITC 65), with a share of 10.37%; second 
is the iron and steel products sector (SITC 67), with a share of 11.87%. It is well known 
that the textile and clothing industry constitutes Turkey's largest single industrial sector, 
contributing some 20% to manufacturing output and employing about one third of all 
workers in manufacturing. Faced with competition from abroad, the industry has installed 
* Although separate figures may be provided for clothing and textiles, the two industries are 
considered a single sector. 
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up-to-date machinery for the production of high-quality products. The output of cotton 
cloth increased from 504 million square metres in 1985 to 597 million square metres in 
1992, and that of wool cloth from 44 million to 58 million square metres during the same 
period. Cotton yam production has declined since 1987 but amounted to 224 million 
tons in 1992. The State sector accounts for about 30% of cotton textile output. The iron 
and steel industry, on the other hand, has grown significantly, with crude iron production 
rising from 3.1 million tons in 1985 to 4.6 million tons in 1994, and that of steel from 9.4 
million tons in 1991 to 12.2 million tons in 1994. There are three large originally State- 
owned plants and about 20 smaller firms in the private sector. 
As mentioned before, by 1973 the European Community had abolished virtually 
all customs duties and NTBs for Turkish manufactures. An important exception was 
made for trade in textiles and clothing, which came under the regime of the EC textile 
policy within the international MFA framework. Presently, such trade is regulated by 
voluntary restraint agreements concluded between Turkish textile exporters and the 
concerned authorities in Brussels. According to the provisions of the Customs Union 
Agreement, the current arrangements for trade in textile and clothing products (i.e., all 
export quotas) will expire as soon as it is determined that Turkey has effectively adopted 
and implemented the measures required under the Agreement with regard to: 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights; competition (including measures 
relating to public aid); and the alignment of its commercial policy with that of the EU in 
the textile sector. 
The EU is known to protect its textile and clothing sector with relatively high 
tariffs and bilateral restriction agreements with developing countries. Over time, the EU 
has concluded bilateral restraint agreements under the MFA with a large number of 
countries including China, Hong Kong, India and Pakistan. In addition, the EU has 
export-restraint arrangements with Egypt, Malta, Morocco and Tunisia. In order to align 
its commercial policy with that of the EU in the textile sector, Turkey has to conclude 
bilateral restraint agreements and export-restraint arrangements with the same groups of 
countries. Finally, it should be noted that, according to the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing, all of the bilateral quotas negotiated under the MFA are to be 
completely phased out over a 10-year period, after which there will be no quotas on 
textiles and the MFA will cease to exist. As a result of these developments, competition 
in the world textile and clothing trade will increase, and Turkey will have to compete 
with countries such as China, India and Pakistan for a share of the EU market. Diwan, 
Yang and Wang (1995) estimate that as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements, EU 
import prices for textiles will go down by 1.8%, and those for wearing apparel by 5.3%. 
The decreases in North American import prices for textiles and wearing apparel are 
expected to be about 1.6% and 9.5% respectively. Since exports of textiles and clothing 
form 3 8.6% of Turkey's total exports and 56.2% of its exports to the EU, Turkey is 
expected to be adversely affected by these developments in the long run. 
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As emphasized above, products falling within the province of the ECSC are not 
covered by the Customs Union Agreement. Following a resolution of the EU-Turkey 
Association Council, negotiations for the free movement of ECSC products were 
concluded in December 1995, and the Iron and Steel Free-Trade Agreement was signed 
between Turkey and the EU. 
By the early 1990s, it was clear that the steel market had become oversupplied. 
In July 1992 all iron and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty became subject to 
retrospective European Community surveillance. In 1993 the Community introduced a 
programme of capacity reductions in the steel industry. For imports, prior and expost 
surveillance was instituted. State aid to the sector has been replaced with aid for R&D, 
environmental protection, the partial or total cessation of production, and investment in 
certain EU areas such as eastern Germany; in any case, support should not result in 
capacity expansion. As reported by Wang and Winters (1993), the EU has provided the 
bulk of its protection for iron and steel in the form of NIBs. The VERs used during the 
I 970s were eventually supplemented by a system of basic prices. According to this 
system, non-EU countries are required to ensure that the invoiced prices of their 
deliveries of iron and steel products are compatible with the levels of guidance prices and 
basic prices published by the European Commission. Any price under-quotation creates 
a presumption of dumping or of subsidization and exposes the supplier concerned to the 
opening of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy inquiry. 
The 1995 Iron and Steel Free-Trade Agreement covers 630 products. For 498 
of them, the customs duties on imports and exports in trade between Turkey and the EU 
will be abolished on the date the Agreement enters into force. In the case of the 
remaining 132 products, the customs duties will be abolished over a three-year period: 
a 50% reduction will be introduced during the first year of the Agreement, and a 25% 
reduction during each of the second and third years. Other quantitative trade restrictions 
and measures having an equivalent effect will also be abolished on the date the 
Agreement enters into force. The Free-Trade Agreement contains rules similar to those 
on competition policy and State aid included in the Customs Union Agreement; 
according to the former, Turkey must, within two years of the entry into force of the 
Agreement, adopt the rules necessary for the implementation of competition policy, and 
each party must ensure transparency in the area of public aid. The parties recognize that 
until the year 2001 Turkey may, exceptionally, grant public aid to iron and steel 
companies; however, this aid should not lead to increases in capacity for hot-rolled 
products. 
Table 8 indicates that iron and steel products comprised 11.9% of all Turkish 
exports during 1993 and that the share of iron and steel product exports to the EU in total 
exports of the commodity during the period 1991-1993 averaged 6.24%. Turkey has 
been exporting mainly billet and long products, and the main export market has been the 
Far East. The sector has apparently benefited disproportionately from export assistance; 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 shows that the sector will be adversely affected by the formation of the 
customs union. It seems that Turkish exporters of iron and steel products to the EU will 
face anti-dumping inquiries as long as State aid to the sector continues. In order to benefit 
from the Iron and Steel Free-Trade Agreement, Turkey will have to stop subsidizing the 
iron and steel sector completely. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Turkey realizes the importance of both the Customs Union Agreement with the EU 
and the Uruguay Round agreements. From Turkey's point of view, the EU and Uruguay 
Round agreements and their implications are similar, though in many respects the 
requirements of the former are more stringent than those of the latter. Under the Uruguay 
Round agreements, the tariff rates on industrial goods will fall below the applied MFN rates 
centred around 1988, while the requirements of the Customs Union Agreement are more 
demanding. With the formation of the customs union, goods can circulate freely between 
Turkey and the EU, Turkey must implement the European Union's common external tariff 
on goods from third parties, and by the year 2001 Turkey must adopt all of the preferential 
trade agreements the EU has concluded over time. 
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, bilateral quotas 
negotiated under the MFA are to be completely phased out over a 10-year period, after 
which there will be no quotas on textiles and the MFA will cease to exist. Under the 
Customs Union Agreement, the EU will eliminate all of the quotas on Turkish textile and 
clothing exports as soon as Turkey has effectively implemented certain measures regarding 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights as well as those relating to 
competition (including the measures relating to public aid), and has adopted the European 
Union's textile and clothing agreements with third countries. 
Under WTO rules, Turkey will have to adopt the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) by the year 2000, while the Customs Union 
Agreement requires that Turkey implement the TRIPs Agreement by 1999 and that it adopt 
legislation to secure the patentability of pharmaceutical products and processes by I 
January 1998. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures defmes 
three categories of subsidies: prohibited subsidies (those contingent upon export 
performance or the use of domestic rather than imported goods); actionable subsidies (those 
that have demonstrably adverse effects on other country Members); and non-actionable 
subsidies. The Agreement also places restrictions on the use of countervailing measures 
introduced in response to competitors' subsidies. The Customs Union Agreement requires 
that Turkey adopt the competition policies of the EU, which are much more demanding 
than the Uruguay Round agreements' requirements. 
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The effects of the Uruguay Round and Customs Union agreements can be 
illustrated using the "production possibility frontier" (PPF) concept. The new rules and 
disciplines imposed by the agreements will certainly force the Turkish economy to move 
from an inefficient production point within the PPF towards an efficient production point 
on the PPF, and the technical progress to be achieved over time will shift the PPF outward. 
While changes in protection rates will lead to movements along the PPF, the elimination 
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VI. ISSUES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ESCWA REGION FOLLOWING THE 
PEACE SETTLEMENT 
by Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil 
Cairo University and the American University in Cairo 
Introduction 
In the Middle Eastern context, one of the greatest challenges is determining how 
best to handle political contradictions and economic disparities in shaping potential 
regional arrangements which reflect the free will and aspirations of the region's people. 
Various studies have been written on the possible formation of a free-trade area (FTA) in 
the Arab east (involving Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and 
Lebanon), modelled along the lines of the European Union (EU). It should be noted, 
however, that European economic integration has been based on internal trade 
liberalization, and leading Japanese economist Ippei Yamazawa argues that differences in 
the levels of development, stages of industrialization and resource endowments in the 
Middle East militate against integration along such lines, particularly in the light of the 
Latin American and Asian integration experiences (Yamazawa, 1992). 
One of the most distinctive features of intra-EU trade liberalization has been the 
growth of intra-industry trade rather than intra-industry specialization; "economic 
integration in the EEC model [has] led to specialization within industries rather than 
movements of resources from import-competing to export industries" (Sapir, 1992, p. 
1,496). 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) model of regional 
cooperation is more limited in scope, lacking the deeper integration of the European 
Union. With NAFTA, the United States has aimed at enhancing its competitive position 
in world trade through its association with a low-cost supplier—mainly Mexico (Brown 
and others, 1 992b). What has happened, however, is that the differences and disparities 
in the physical capital, human capital and raw labour endowments in the economies of 
Mexico, on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the other hand, have led 
to serious problems in intersectoral specialization between the two groups. Many studies 
have concluded that capital formation in the form of inward-oriented foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has dominated the minor welfare gains from trade liberalization (Brown 
and others, 1 992a). 
As for the Asia-Pacific region, much of the "interdependent" growth in East Asia 
has been achieved without much in the way of a formal integration framework. According 
to Yamazawa, "East Asia has not been enthusiastic about formal economic integration of 
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the EC type. There has been neither a Rome Treaty nor a region-wide free-trade 
agreement. East Asia has not reached that stage of integration yet" (Yamazawa, 1992, p. 
1,527). 
Within its loose economic cooperation framework, "the main mechanism 
underlying the increasing interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region is the transfer of 
industries, particularly manufacturing industries, from early starters to latecomers" 
(Yainazawa, 1992, p. 1,523), or more specifically, from Japan to the Asian newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs), and from the Asian NIEs to the Association of South- 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries—following what is known as the "flying geese 
pattern" in industrial development. 
A. THE VIABILITY OF A MIDDLE EASTERN FREE-TRADE AREA 
In a major policy document circulated by the Brussels-based Commission of the 
European Communities in September 1993, it is stated that "one of the most urgent 
priorities for virtually all the countries of the Middle East, in particular the countries of the 
Mashreq and Israel, is to encourage trade and thereby foster an optimal division of labour 
between them." It is conceded in the same document, however, that a free-trade area 
between the Mashreq countries and Israel seems to inspire more fear than hope among the 
potential partners, especially the least developed ones (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1993). 
This type of analysis, conducted at such a high level of abstraction, conceals the 
real problems of political economy relating to the distribution of potential gains from an 
FTA encompassing the above-mentioned territories. 
A Middle East free-trade area (MEFTA) arrangement might prove to be an 
inadequate means of ensuring dynamic gains in efficiency for all participating countries. 
Given the highly diverse development and per capita income levels among the countries 
which could be expected to participate in a MEFTA scheme, the bulk of intraregional trade 
flows would likely be of the intra-industry variety; a new pattern of specialization in 
economic activities among these countries would evolve over time in response to disparate 
levels of resource and skill endowments. If economies of scale were strongly present (as 
would be the case in high-technology industries), the gains for the advanced participating 
countries would likely be much larger. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a customs union among the Arab countries of the 
Mashreq (including Egypt), Israel would become the "central" country in a MEFTA 
arrangement. The formation of a customs union among participating Arab 
countries—prior to any MEFTA association—would probably increase the bargaining 
power of these countries. Such a step would require a relatively long period of transition 
and adjustment, however. 
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The partner countries in any regional cooperative scheme would need to cross a 
certain threshold of similarity in their economic and strategic objectives before 
surrendering any of their national autonomy. This process would have to occur smoothly 
and voluntarily so that none of the countries of the Arab Mashreq would be subordinated 
or would be subjected to exogenous rules or to the strategic preferences of another, more 
powerful regional player (Israel or Turkey); any set of "forced" regional solutions, 
schemes, or rules of behaviour would run the serious risk of being politically unacceptable 
and unsustainable. 
B. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE SPECTRE 
OF THE "HEGEMONY EFFECT" 
Intraregional arrangements between countries at different levels of development 
may reflect a hegemonic power relationship. "Regional hegemons can exploit bilateral 
asymmetries in interdependence to exercise monopsony power over smaller and poorer 
trading partners and to extract policy changes which favour the regional hegemon" 
(Fishlow and Haggard, 1992, p. 13). Such hegemonic power can ultimately be used to 
accomplish political objectives, as has been the case in the United States-Mexico 
relationship within the NAFTA regional arrangement. 
The sectora! composition of potential intraregional trade and production is an 
equally good indicator of the likely occurrence of the hegemony effect. The composition 
of trade between developing Asian countries and Japan clearly reveals the asymmetrical 
character of such a trade relationship (Fishlow and Haggard, 1992). 
The familiar formula among Israeli strategists of fusing Israel's sophisticated 
technology with high-quality Arab labour conceals the future dynamics of restructuring 
the division of labour within the region for the benefit of the Israeli economy. A Harvard 
study entitled "Securing peace in the Middle East: project on economic transition" (1993) 
validates this perception, with the admission that establishing a free-trade area in the 
region for goods, services and capital would open up enormous opportunities for Israel. 
A free-trade area would "not only wipe out the old Arab boycott but [would also] allow 
the Palestinian entity and Jordan to become Israel's economic doorway to the Arab world, 
just as Hong Kong is the doorway to mainland China" (Hausman and Thurow, 1993). 
While the Israeli economy still has some way to go before it ranks among the 
world's blue-chip economies, it has some underlying strengths and policies which are 
serving to propel the country forward in this respect. Israel's spending on research and 
development (R&D) amounts to 3% of its gross domestic product (GDP)—proportionately 
higher than that of the United States, Japan and other leading industrial economies. The 
booming high-technology sector in Israel owes its improved economic fortunes to defence 
contracting; most of the country's high-tech companies started out as suppliers to the 
Israeli military sector. 
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With the opening of Arab markets to Israeli-based transnational corporations, 
Israel hopes to realize its latent economic potential. This complementarity between 
transnational and local inputs is expected to play a distinctive role in sustaining Israeli 
economic growth. 
A sample survey conducted by a research foundation on American, European, 
Japanese and Israeli multinational corporations indicated a clear bias in favour of Israel. 
All of the companies involved in textiles, food, tourism and light chemicals wished to 
locate in Egypt under a comprehensive peace scenario. In contrast, Israel was clearly a 
preferred location for high-technology companies, as it could offer the benefits of a highly 
skilled labour force, R&D facilities, and better proximity to end-user markets. 
In the light of all this, many transnational corporations can be expected to establish 
their regional headquarters in Tel Aviv. In addition, foreign direct investment flowing into 
Israel for high-tech industries would likely be connected with the substantial transfer of 
technology, leading to significant productivity gains in the long run. Even within the same 
industry (or line of activity), the distribution of gains from potential subcontracting 
arrangements and intra-industry trade would be inequitable for the Arab countries 
participating in an FTA scheme. 
The textile industry may be taken as an illustrative example. It is suggested by 
some Israeli economists (see Hirsch, 1989) that under a new Middle Eastern trade regime, 
Egypt could specialize in the labour-intensive production of cotton yarns and ready-made 
garments, while Israel would specialize in design, printing, marketing and other skill- 
intensive and high-value-added activities. Such an unequal division of labour would not 
be conducive to the development of Arab economies and would only serve to consolidate 
the uneven industrial development within the region. 
Given the initial uneven distribution of manufacturing activities between Israel 
and the Arab countries of the ESCWA region, the creation of a free-trade area which 
included Israel could be expected to lead to asymmetric industrial development in the 
Middle East. Israel would continue to specialize in skill- and technology-intensive 
industrial products such as non-electrical machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, 
transport equipment, and scientific instruments, while Arab countries would continue to 
focus on the production of traditional manufactures such as food products, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather goods and footwear, wood products and furniture. 
In the light of these considerations, movement towards liberalized trading 
arrangements between Israel and the Arab countries of the ESCWA region should not be 
expected any time soon. 
Within any broad regional grouping, uneven levels of development among the 
participating countries generally pose a serious problem for the creation of an FTA. In the 
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case of the ASEAN countries, for instance, while Singapore and Brunei are currently ready 
to join a free-trade area arrangement, other countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines 
need some time, and countries such as Indonesia and Viet Nam need an even longer period 
of adjustment and transition before they are ready to take such a step. 
There are many fears—both expressed and implicit—of Israeli dominance under 
an FTA agreement. The Arab countries of the ESCWA region must make serious efforts 
to initiate schemes which bring them closer together and facilitate greater economic 
cooperation and integration among Arab countly subgroupings—prior to joining any 
regional integration schemes involving Israel. This approach (the strategy of "Arab 
integration first") has a concrete parallel in Latin America. Because of fears of dominance 
by the United States under a free-trade arrangement, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and 
Paraguay formed the Southern Cone Market (Mercosur) in March 1991, and new life has 
been breathed into the Andean Common Market with the establishment of ground rules 
for a free-trade zone by the end of 1991 (Fishlow and Haggard, 1992). 
Within the Arab context, the very least that could be done would be to build Arab 
regional or subregional cooperation from bilateral deals without the benefit of a formal 
regional organization or governance structure. A strategy of "Arab integration first" would 
lead to a gradual deepening of economic relations and the harmonization of 
macroeconomic policies among Arab countries. Whatever form inter-Arab cooperation 
in trade, investment and macroeconomic policy-making might take, the process of Arab 
economic integration would be more likely to follow the model of the Andean Common 
Market or the less structured ASEAN formula. There is no reason to believe that past 
failures in inter-Arab economic cooperation and integration efforts predetermine the 
outcome of future attempts in this regard. 
Prior to any drive towards regional cooperation and integration, coherence and 
coordination among the countries of the region must be improved in all areas of 
macroeconomic policy-making, including credit policy, the exchange rate, investment 
licensing, and the targeting of foreign aid flows; this constitutes one of the most important 
preconditions for effective economic integration. 
The coordination of macroeconomic policies at the regional level would increase 
the externalities resulting from national policy decisions. Coordination and policy 
coherence efforts should mainly be directed towards the control and harmonization of debt 
and budget deficit levels through the adoption of broadly agreed-upon fiscal rules. 
Respecting "convergence criteria" in monetary, foreign-exchange and fiscal 
policy-making would enhance the regional coordination and integration process. The 
gains achieved from macro-policy coordination could pave the way for much closer 
cooperation and integration in the formulation of investment and growth policies. 
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C. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 
The principal document submitted by the Commission of the European 
Communities to the Barcelona Conference held in November 1995 advocates the 
establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership based on free trade to be progressively 
completed by the year 2010, covering most trade, based on the opportunities offered by 
and the obligations connected with the World Trade Organization. 
Within this free-trade area: 
• Manufactured products would move freely, without tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers. 
• Taking traditional trade flows as the basis, and as far as the various 
agricultural policies allow, trade in agricultural products would be 
progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access. 
• Progressive liberalization would also occur with respect to the 
establishment of companies, the provision of cross-border services, and 
capital movements, with due regard for the provisions of the Uruguay 
Round trade agreements. 
To return to an important theme: since regional cooperation is a key factor in 
promoting the creation of FTAs, it is important for trade to develop first at subregional 
levels (for example, among the Arab ESCWA member countries), as this would pave the 
way for wider free-trade areas. 
In 1975, B. Balassa and A. Stoutyesdijk wrote about two methods of achieving 
regional integration: trade liberalization and cooperation in joint regional projects. The 
problem in the ESCWA region relates to the sequencing and interface between the two 
methods. The cross-border subcontracting of industrial activities could also serve as a 
catalyst for strengthening regional integration, and might very well bring about enhanced 
intersectoral and intraregional trade. It is to be noted that the Arab Mashreq 
countries—and the countries of the ESCWA region in general—are weak in this regard, 
and have done very little to develop a system for subcontracting industrial activities 
subregionally. These countries should develop a strategy of industrial redeployment with 
the following goals in mind: 
• Ensuring the efficient production of final and intermediate products 
destined mainly for the regional market 
• Gaining access to the world market through the manufacture of a limited 
range of competitive products 
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These two points will be discussed in greater detail in the section that follows. 
D. THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ESCWA REGION 
The sophistication, complexity and range of manufactured goods vary from 
country to country in the ESCWA region. An industrial structure is normally considered 
mature when it has passed the assembly stage in equipment production and is able to 
produce broad-based equipment (including automotive) manufactures, and when it 
possesses considerable indigenous design capabilities (Lall, 1990). 
Economic cooperation and integration schemes would allow scale-intensive 
industrial processes to expand in an efficient manner over time. More specifically, during 
a transitional period, regional cooperation schemes in the ESCWA region could help 
promote industrial development among the participating members—long before their 
association with any free-trade arrangement. The partners could encourage industrial 
development by means of the following: 
• Joint public investment in key industrial sectors, with strong 
technological spillovers and low financial returns. In this context, R&D 
should be seen as an investment for the "public good". 
• Joint ventures between private industrial businesses that would involve 
the following: 
a. Vertical integration across partner countries for certain industrial 
activities and certain types of production facilities 
b. Marketing arrangements (for domestic and export markets) 
c. Subcontracting and licensing 
d. The building of a cooperation infrastructure 
e. The development of technology and standards for tradeable 
goods and services 
f. The exchange of information on industrial and technological 
developments through networking 
It should be noted that economic liberalization alone will not resolve the structural 
problems of industrial development in the countries of the ESCWA region. The root 
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causes of the problems of unemployment and outdated production facilities and ancillary 
services ought to be tackled through the implementation of long-term measures aiming at 
educating and retraining the workforce, encouraging industrial investment and the 
modernization of the productive base, and promoting R&D at the regional level. It is self- 
defeating for individual countries to try to alleviate the structural problems of industrial 
development by means of financial and monetary measures alone. 
As a matter of sequencing, investment liberalization should precede trade 
liberalization in the context of the ESCWA region. 
In sum, during this post-peace-settlement period, the Arab countries of the 
ESCWA region should develop various mechanisms and measures for closer economic 
integration, such as preferential tariff arrangements (PTAs), joint industrial projects 
(sharing the large-scale production of high-tech industrial projects), and the development 
of common parts supply networks. 
The success of such forms of association depends on the extent of the concessions 
made by the ESCWA member countries. As for other regional partners—Israel, Turkey, 
and ban—a consultative body may be established to discuss and resolve problems related 
to cross-border business and trade and to resolve disputes without any unnecessary and 
unproductive emotional confrontation; bilateral and multilateral consultations are far too 
often marred by geopolitical conflicts. 
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VII. THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE: THE ARAB RESPONSE 
by A.A. Kubursi 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
A. THE DIVIDENDS OF PEACE: WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES? 
Peace is being touted as a comprehensive solution with promising benefits for the 
Palestinians and for the Arabs in general. The presumed "peace dividends" are expected 
to derive from an increase in external aid, the rebuilding of indigenous institutional 
capacities to guide economic and reconstruction efforts, greater and guaranteed access to 
the Israeli market and possibly other Western markets, increased Palestinian control of 
domestic natural resources, the expected increase in international tourism, the decrease in 
militaiy spending, and a reduction in the political instability and general uncertainty which 
in the past militated against foreign investment in the region. The Israeli benefits are less 
discussed but are very likely far more important and certain than the Arab benefits. In 
bargaining situations such as the one that presently exists, the relative net benefits are what 
count; a balanced evaluation of the dividends of peace calls for a thorough and objective 
assessment of both sides of the peace ledger. 
The alleged Arab gains rest on some strong claims which have to be examined and 
evaluated against the background and experience of the Palestinians under occupation and 
also through the traditional economic analysis of opportunity costs and alternatives. This 
calculus of peace is of interest not only to the Palestinians but also to neighbouring Arab 
countries, which are monitoring the events and results closely and carefully. What is 
unfolding in the occupied territories represents a test case and a precedent of what is likely 
to await the Arab economy at large. The general presumption is that the more realistic, 
credible and visible the positive net benefits of peace are, the less sceptical the neighbours 
will be of the peace process and the less inhibited they will be in accepting it and joining 
in. 
The economic problems the Palestinians endured under occupation provide a 
context and a yardstick for judging the promises and achievements of peace. Israel's 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was very costly for the Palestinians and other 
Arabs; this should make even modest achievements under peace all the more palatable. 
These costs manifested themselves in many areas, but primarily in the loss of control over 
water, the loss of prime agricultural land, severance from traditional markets, constrained 
and limited industrial growth, disarticulated and precarious education, inadequate and 
insufficient investment in the physical infrastructure, the loss of an indigenous public 
sector that could have protected and guided the process of development, the subjugation 
of the Palestinian population to the occupiers' tax and import regimes, the transfer of the 
Palestinian social surplus to Israel, the export of local producers to either Israel or the Gulf, 
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and political disruption and violence as people rebelled against the humiliating tyranny of 
their oppressors. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
THE ECONOMICS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION 
While the occupation may not have been strictly a zero-sum game, Israel derived 
enormous gains from its occupation of Arab land by tapping into the Palestinian water 
supply, exploiting a captive export market, drawing upon cheap labour whose income was 
spent primarily on Israeli products, confiscating prime agricultural land and skimming all 
the free rents derived from it, collecting tax revenues far in excess of the occupation's 
administration costs, and scooping up the large foreign exchange flows from Palestinian 
remittances from the Gulf and elsewhere. 
It is natural to expect that under peace most of these negative factors will be 
eliminated, some positive gains will be realized, and the Palestinians will be compensated 
for their losses and suffering; that is why it is imperative that the difficulties and losses 
under occupation be tallied. Justification also exists for tallying all the losses that the 
Palestinians suffered from the loss of Palestine in 1948. Strangely, little mention is made 
of these enormous losses when the economics of peace is discussed.' 
Under occupation, the West Bank and Gaza were forced into an economic union 
with Israel. A small, fragmented, disarticulated, poor and labour-intensive economy was 
confronted with a relatively rich, advanced, capital-intensive, strategy-oriented and highly 
centralized and subsidized economy. Denied both control over their most vital resource 
(water) and unimpeded access to the Israeli market or to their traditional Arab markets, the 
Palestinians were unable to sustain a sufficient level of agricultural production—the 
mainstay of the pre-occupation economy and the largest employer of people. 
Displaced from agriculture and unable to find alternative employment in industry, 
labour from the territories went to work in Israel, generally at higher pay than in the 
territories but at the lowest end of the Israeli wage scale. Although they represented no 
more than 7% of total employment in Israel, they accounted for the majority of 
construction workers and a large share of agricultural labour. They also represented over 
a third of all employed residents of the occupied territories, with their earnings amounting 
to about one quarter of the gross national product (GNP) in the West Bank and 40% in 
Gaza. This export of labour and the rise in labour costs in the occupied territories 
destroyed both existing manufacturing activity and any possibility of developing domestic 
manufacturing production. Earnings in Israeli shekels ultimately went to buy Israeli 
goods; Israeli net exports to the territories were over $1 billion dollars last year. 
For a detailed account of these losses, see Kubursi (1988). 
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Israeli manufacturing could have taken advantage of cheap, unemployed and 
uprooted labour by locating in the territories, but this did not happen. Some 
subcontracting of clothing- and textile-related activities occurred, but only on a limited 
scale; further, such activities were restricted to minor tasks generally performed by women. 
Some have argued that the security situation in the occupied territories and the general 
uncertainty about the future of the areas scared investment away (Kleiman, 1995). The 
territories were held within the tight grip of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) for a long 
time, and no meaningful investment was undertaken there. The insecurity during the 
and the uncertainty about the future fate of the territories might explain the lack 
of investment in the late 1 980s, but what about the lack of investment between 1967 and 
1987? 
The communal pauperization of the Palestinians which occurred as a result of their 
being denied access to their resources (water and land) and ultimately their own labour 
cannot be dismissed as a pure accident of history or as an unintended and incidental effect 
of the occupation. Rather, it was part of the Israelis' longstanding denial of the existence 
of the Palestinians as a people and as a community entitled to lead an independent national 
existence. Improving the economic prospects of the Palestinians requires their 
reconstitution as an independent national community. No amount of international aid can 
make up for the loss of land and water, and water is the most critical economic factor in 
reconstructing the primarily agrarian Palestinian economy, at least in the initial stages of 
socio-economic reconstitution. 
The financial requirements for the development and reconstruction of the 
Palestinian economy are finite but massive; the list of urgently needed roads, schools, 
hospitals, ports, airports, sewage systems and so on is very long. However, fmance 
without real resources will only perpetuate the Palestinians' economic dependence on 
Israel and others. Any large investments made now will go through the Israeli economy 
and will most likely be unsustainable. This pessimistic view follows from a review of the 
fate of the Arab economy in the 1980s, when the growth rate of the region's gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell far below that of other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa. 
C. THE "ARAB DISEASE" 
The collective growth rate for the Middle East and North Africa averaged less than 
0.5% a year between 1980 and 1990, while the third world as a whole grew at an average 
rate of 3.4% during the same period. 
There are a number of underlying structural weaknesses in the Arab economy that 
hamper its ability to adjust to global change, meet the challenges of peace, and protect 
itself from the adverse effects of changes in the international economic environment. Over 
the 1 970s and 1 980s, the "success" of the Arab economy masked many structural 
problems which now have important implications for future economic performance. Those 
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involved in setting up and developing the nascent Palestinian economy are well advised 
to learn from these Arab economic problems. 
The most fundamental problem afflicting the Arab economy is its heavy (and in 
some cases exclusive) dependence on the rent from oil, the region's major natural 
resource. This dependence has propagated an "Arab disease" which has had the effect of 
raising the exchange values of most currencies in the region, thereby hampering the 
development of manufactured exports; inflating production costs and undermining local 
industry and agriculture; flooding domestic markets with large volumes of cheap imports 
that have ultimately compromised the balance of payments of even the richest States; 
engendering unsustainable high-consumption patterns that are unrelated to high 
production; encouraging investments in large (and often unnecessary and unproductive) 
projects which ultimately saddle the economy with large maintenance costs; bloating 
domestic bureaucracies with overlapping rings of rent-seekers; divorcing income from 
production; and exposing domestic economies to the wide fluctuations of the world oil 
market, over which the Arabs have had little control. 
While it might be convenient to attribute Arab economic difficulties in the 1 980s 
to falling oil prices alone, the truth lies elsewhere. The fact that oil prices can affect all 
economic indicators of performance so adversely is itself revealing: the heavy dependence 
on oil rents is symptomatic of general economic failure. 
The Arab economy today remains almost as undiversified as it was in the 1970s. 
Oil exports are still the exclusive economic engine of the region. Rentierism is a 
widespread phenomenon that is not restricted to the oil-rich countries; there is now a 
"secondary dependence" on oil revenues throughout the region. Exports of manufactured 
renewable commodities and services represent a very modest source of external income 
for all Arab countries. 
Non-oil-producing Arab countries have exported their producers to the Gulf and 
have enjoyed the convenience of remittances too much to bother about developing 
domestic exports. Manufacturing activity not associated with oil is limited, disarticulated, 
traditional, inward-looking, and technologically dependent on outside sources. Little has 
been done to develop technological capabilities in the region; there is a strong preference 
for turnkey projects, and expenditures on research and development (R&D) are negligible. 
Regional cooperation is a political slogan unsupported by any real economic interaction 
(even now, Arab intraregional trade exclusive of oil represents only 4% of the region's 
total international trade; with oil, it is less than 9%). Most Arab countries are linking 
themselves to non-Arab economic centres, with little or no concern for their Arab 
neighbours. External indebtedness is massive and is beginning to sap the energies of the 
region. In most Arab countries, "sunset" industries and old Fordist smokestack 
manufacturing activities still prevail; there is little evidence of the "new economy" in their 
industrial structures. Domestic savings are inadequate; they are rarely sufficient to finance 
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investment. High and unproductive consumption patterns have become the norm in most 
Arab societies. Illiteracy is still excessively high, particularly among females; while 
educational levels have increased, they still remain far below those of other successful 
developing countries. Industrial policies are either too stringent or non-existent, and there 
is a tendency to adopt "policy fads" peddled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
which are inappropriate for Arab development and values. 
In short, dependence on the rent from oil has reduced the incentive for Arabs to 
their economies, develop alternative manufacturing capacities, promote export- 
oriented industries, encourage domestic savings, and anchor income on a solid foundation 
of productivity. During the 1980s, traditional economic activities and structures were 
maintained. Dependence on external sources of finance deepened and economic 
performance slipped. Although large oil revenues brought about significant improvements 
in health, education and infrastructure throughout the Arab world, they diminished the 
incentive to capitalize on these achievements. Arab economic performance throughout this 
period was symptomatic of the "Arab disease", which has been fundamentally more 
damaging than the "Dutch disease" that afflicted Holland in the 1 940s following the 
discovery and commercialization of natural gas; Holland had fertile land, abundant water, 
a highly skilled labour force and a European infrastructure and market. 
While the need for foreign aid is urgent, the Palestinians must balance their 
immediate requirements against a negative and potentially disastrous dependence on 
precarious international charity. There is no need for them to repeat the Arab experience 
of the I 970s and I 980s or to contract the crippling Arab disease. The earlier they begin 
developing local and regional financing sources, the better. 
D. WATER ISSUES: THE ARABS' ACHILLES HEEL 
While there are water issues still to be negotiated, none of the agreements 
concluded so far augurs well for sufficient Palestinian control over this vital resource. 
There is a lot of discussion about "unitizing" the management of the water resources 
"shared" by the Israelis and the Palestinians. Indeed, there are efficiency arguments which 
support the joint management of these resources, but before any such mechanisms are put 
in place, it is critical that water-related "property rights" be established. Agreement after 
agreement (Oslo I, the Paris Protocol and Oslo II) has treated Palestinian water as an Israeli 
charity to the Palestinians.2 With each new agreement, Israel raises the Palestinian share 
by a modest amount; this presupposes exclusive Israeli control and management of water 
resources. Peace will be credible and visible only to the extent that the Palestinians are 
2 
The Protocol is formally known as the Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the 
PLO as Representing the Palestinian People. It is incorporated (as annex IV) in the Cairo Agreement signed 
on 4 May 1994. 
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able to reclaim their lost land and water. Even under the third and last phase of Oslo II, 
the Palestinians will have authority over only one third of their land and one fifth of their 
water. 
E. THE PARIS PROTOCOL: A CRITICAL EVALUATION 
With the dismantling of the occupation, Palestinians should be allowed to manage 
their economic affairs as they choose and to protect and guide their economy in the manner 
they believe will best serve their interests. However, the Paris Protocol puts the 
Palestinian economy under the Israeli import and tax regimes. Israel, perhaps fearing that 
the territories could be used to smuggle duty-free goods into Israel (or act as a tax haven) 
moved quickly to impose its own tariff regime (i.e., the same tariffs on all foreign goods 
in both the territories and Israel). Few exceptions are allowed under the well-defined 
schedules, though the Palestinians do have some latitude with respect to goods imported 
from countries that do not (or did not in the past) trade with Israel. This is a definite 
improvement over the previous situation, where the Palestinians were denied the right to 
import from other Arab countries. 
As mentioned above, the Protocol requires the Palestinians to impose the same 
import tariffs as the Israelis. These tariffs have evolved to protect and promote the Israeli 
economy; however, they are not necessarily consistent with the needs or interests of a 
fledgling economy with limited productive capacity. The Palestinians have been promised 
easier and guaranteed access to the Israeli market; even more importantly, however, Israel 
has secured guaranteed and unimpeded access to the Palestinian economy. With this, the 
Palestinians have forfeited any chance to protect their infant economy; the real price is 
apparently greater integration with the Israeli economy. What the Palestinians have 
worked out with the Israelis is a sort of combination customs union and common market. 
While such an arrangement generally involves trade creation and trade diversion, one 
wonders whether giving the Israelis full and unimpeded access to the Palestinian market 
will allow them to build a diversified and productive economy. For all practical purposes, 
this agreement perpetuates and legitimizes the economic structures that emerged under 
occupation. Accepting the trade-diversion implications of the agreement simply means 
that, for the time being, the Palestinian Authority prefers to tie its economic fortunes to 
Israel rather than to the Arabs. 
Defenders of the agreement cite the many advantages that economic theory 
generally predicts will be gained by the poorer partner from freer trade, particularly the 
widely believed supposition that the smaller and poorer countries will benefit most, with 
their access to the markets of richer partners. There are certain elements and conditions 
upon which the theory is built, however, and many of these are missing in the Palestinian 
case, including the mobility of the factors of production. In a broader context, if this 
theory is correct, why are there depressed regions in the most advanced economies? 
(Examples include Appalachia in the United States, Newfoundland in Canada, and Sicily 
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in Italy.) Economists tend to exaggerate the blanket effect of free trade and underplay the 
'backwash effects" described by Myrdal as well as the adjustment costs. Myrdal's ideas 
on backwash effects have been given a new theoretical thrust by Paul Krugman, who has 
shown that under monopolistic competition, strong agglomeration effects tend to develop 
which make regions with limited natural resource bases and low transport costs very 
vulnerable to the dominant region in a free-trade situation. It is only by protecting their 
natural resource bases and raising their transport (friction) costs that the poorer regions can 
ward off the centrifugal forces of the richer and more dominant regions. The implications 
of this theory for the Palestinians are obvious; they need to protect their water rights, build 
their agricultural resource base and increase transaction costs when dealing with the Israeli 
economy until they are able to produce a large array of products over which they have 
some market power. At present they are doing exactly the opposite. 
Actually, bargaining theory is perhaps clearer and more realistic about the 
outcomes of bargaining among unequal partners than the static comparative advantage 
trade theory. The former predicts that the party with many options is likely to dictate the 
terms and impose its interests on the party with few or no options. It does not stretch the 
imagination much to suggest that all of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements to date have been 
concluded between unequal partners and under duress, and that little can be expected from 
them other than benefits and advantages weighing heavily in favour of the Israelis. The 
most alarming prediction, however, is that the Palestinian economy will evolve into—and 
remain—a poor appendant to the richer Israeli economy. 
F. FOREIGN INVESTMENT: WHERE WILL IT GO? 
With peace, the region is expected to attract greater and more certain foreign 
investment flows; however, much (if not all) of this investment is likely to go to Israel. A 
good portion of the foreign investment taking place today is of the tariff-jumping kind. 
The more customs unions the Israelis succeed in forming in the region and the more 
clauses they can eliminate from the Arab boycott, the more foreign investment will come 
to them. 
There are many reasons why foreign investment will be concentrated in Israel 
rather than in the Arab world; the following are among the most significant: 
The Israelis are making a concerted effort to woo investors; there is a 
special minister in Israel (Tulman) and special offices in the major 
Western capitals for this purpose (the American office is run by Mrs. 
Newt Gingrich, wife of the Speaker of the House for the United States 
Congress). Further, they are aiming at the complete convertibility of the 
shekel within two years. 
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• The Israelis have developed a sophisticated network of relationships with 
many multinationals and Jewish-dominated institutions that can be drawn 
upon to encourage new investment in Israel now that there are no longer 
any real barriers. 
• The United States and Europe appear to be providing direct official 
encouragement to multinationals to locate in Israel to service the Arab 
and other Asian markets. 
• The highly skilled Israeli labour force (more than 40,000 of the new 
Russian immigrants hold a Ph.D.) and the advanced research centres in 
Israel are far more attractive to multinationals than the workforce and 
facilities available in many other Middle Eastern countries. 
• The new agreements bring stability to the region and provide Israel with 
a confirmed market and cheap labour flows. Further, the Palestinians can 
be counted upon to serve as experienced intermediaries in selling Israeli- 
made products in the region. 
The Arab boycott was very costly for the Israelis; some estimates place the figure 
at $40 billion, but it could be argued that the amount is even higher, particularly if a real 
present value approach is adopted and if the estimated amount of foreign investment that 
Israel could have attracted in the absence of the boycott is included in the determination 
of the total cost. 
The Israelis have become increasingly concerned about their dependence on 
foreign aid from the United States. As pressures mount to balance the monumental 
American federal budget, foreign aid will most likely be one of the first areas targeted for 
cut-backs. While Israel currently claims the lion's share of American foreign assistance, 
its aid package is bound to be affected sooner or later. Peace will only give Israel some 
breathing space. The one reliable alternative is to secure foreign investment which 
produces annual revenues of around $3 billion to $4 billion. Israel was unable to attract 
much foreign investment in the past (only $200 million to $300 million per year on 
average); however, the picture can be expected to change dramatically with no Arab 
boycott and a few customs unions ensuring unimpeded access to several Arab markets. 
Ironically, Israel's gain here could easily be the Arabs' loss. The benefits are already 
beginning to surface. The Bank of Israel released foreign investment figures for the first 
six months of 1995; by June of that year, foreign investment in Israel had reached $673 
million. Leading American and European companies have been racing to take advantage 
of the new developments with the open encouragement of their own Governments: among 
others, Shamrock is in with $252 million, Volkswagen of Germany with $220 million, 
Cable and Wireless with million, and Intel with a huge amount. The foreign 
investment figures for January through June of 1995 were twice as high as the full amount 
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for with the elimination of the Arab boycott, this figure could easily reach $4 billion 
a year. 
Foreign investment in the Arab region has drastically declined from the high levels 
of the 1950s. The share of the region in total world foreign investment is now less than 
3%. Access to world markets, new technology, advanced management systems and large 
investments are the almost exclusive preserve of multinationals. The Palestinians are well 
advised to take advantage of the current favourable international climate to attract foreign 
investment. The should proceed with caution, however, as foreign investment is not 
always totally beneficial to the host country. There are numerous examples of 
multinationals exploiting the local market, wresting substantial concessions that far 
outweigh their positive contributions, and providing little or no technology transfer. it is 
invariably the case that positive net benefits from foreign investment are derived by 
enlightened Governments that obstinately negotiate favourable terms from these 
multinationals, including product mandates, home base operations, and a systematic 
transfer of technology. However, in the absence of a free and representative national 
Government, the Palestinians are in a weak position to negotiate favourable terms. 
Further, their chances of obtaining a respectable share of foreign investment may depend 
on the extent to which they are able to guarantee access to the wider Arab market. The 
more closely the Palestinians tie their economic fortunes to those of the Israelis, the less 
likely they are to derive concessions from their Arab brethren that might make the 
territories more attractive to foreign investors. 
G. INTERNATIONAL TOURISM: LIMITED GAINS AT BEST 
Greece, which is an hour's flying time from Palestine, attracts 12 million 
international tourists a year; Israel attracts no more than 2 million. With peace, 
international tourism is likely to increase rapidly. Unfortunately, the Arab region is not 
prepared for the expected influx; the Arab tourism infrastructure is limited, and 
international linkages are almost non-existent. Lebanon's once competitive tourism 
infrastructure was destroyed during the civil war; today, it is not even sufficient to meet 
the demands of the Lebanese returning for visits. Egypt is the only Arab country with the 
capacity to benefit from the increased flow, but its share of the total is not yet certain; 
outside Sinai, Egypt's experience thus far is not very encouraging. 
The objective in tourism is to separate the tourist from his or her money. The 
bottom line is length of stay: the longer tourists stay in a country the more they spend and 
the greater the benefits from tourism are to the host country. If the Arabs fail to adequately 
plan and prepare for the time when peace truly "breaks out" in the area, they stand to 
forfeit the benefits increased tourism will bring; there may even be diversion from 
traditional Arab tourist centres, with tourists from Gulf States visiting Israel instead of 
Lebanon or Egypt. 
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The potential rewards from increased tourism would be more certain with 
proactive preparation and planning. The development of a concerted Arab tourism 
strategy is required to mount joint marketing and advertising campaigns and to connect 
tourism flows. In the absence of such proactive planning and Arab coordination—which 
is a tall order under the present circumstances—Israel will get the tourists and will 
determine how long they stay, how much they spend, and where their tourist dollars go. 
At most, the Arabs will get day-trippers and short-term visitors; most tourists will come 
to Israel and make occasional, brief forays into Arab lands. The Jordanians are already 
experiencing some of these negative effects. 
H. BEATING SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES 
For eveiy dollar spent on education in the Arab world, $166 is spent on defence. 
The Middle East has the dubious distinction of having the highest military expenditure as 
a proportion of GDP than any other region in the world. If peace proves to be just and 
enduring, there could be substantial savings in wasteful military expenditures. Israel has 
already reduced its share of defence in GDP; in GNP terms, the defence share has declined 
from 22% before the Camp David Accords to 10% now. Israel stands to benefit far more 
than the Arabs from the reallocation of resources from the military to the civilian sector, 
given the high differential between the average productivity of military resources in Israel 
and those in the Arab world; most of the military resources in Arab countries are surplus 
labour with low or negative marginal productivity in the civilian sector. 
I. ISRAELI EXPORTS AND ARAB TRADE 
The products exported by Israel correspond very closely to those imported by Arab 
countries. The present author's calculation of the concordance indices (indicating 
structural similarity in trade composition, by commodity), shows that the degree of Israel's 
concordance with Saudi Arabian, Iraqi and Syrian trade is twice as high as its 
corresponding concordance with Europe or the United States. These estimates suggest a 
doubling of Israeli exports under peace. Geographical proximity is another advantage for 
Israel, and using the Palestinians as marketing agents can speed up the process and raise 
the growth potential for Israeli trade in the region (Kubursi, 1980). 
Israel has already gained from another trade-related development brought about 
by the mere discussion of peace with the Palestinians. In the past two years, Israel has had 
a booming trade surplus, while Europe and the United States have been facing economic 
difficulties. The reason for this is Israel's increased trade with China, India and 
Japan—countries that would not have dared to do business with Israel if the new 
arrangements with the Palestinians were not in place. 
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J. ISRAEL'S NET GAINS 
The real gist of the arguments presented here is that Israeli peace dividends are 
massive and real, while Palestinian and Arab gains are conditional, precarious and highly 
illusory. Even when these gains are positive, they pale in comparison with those that have 
been or are expected to be realized by the Israelis. The peace agreements concluded so far 
not only guarantee Israel the economic benefits it enjoyed during occupation; they also 
open up new trade vistas, allow for the reduction of defence expenditures and the 
dismantling of the Arab boycott, and create new opportunities for foreign investment and 
international tourism. 
The Israeli-Palestinian playing field is not level; the agreements reflect the vertical 
organization of power and the options in existence. What is concluded under duress 
caimot last. In the interests of peace, immediate and unconditional independence for the 
Palestinians is called for. The Palestinians need massive technical transfers and solid and 
productive foreign investments.; it is only when they have established a firm foundation 
on which to build that they can be expected to conclude meaningful and lasting 
agreements. The Arabs are watching both the Israelis and the Palestinians; what they have 
seen so far is not very encouraging. 
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VIII. THE POTENTIAL FOR ISRAELI MANUFACTURED 
EXPORTS TO ESCWA MEMBER COUNTRIES: 
RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
by Azza El Shinnawy 
Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey 
Introduction 
Progress on the peace front is expected to have a positive impact on regional 
stability once just and comprehensive settlements are reached. Peace will open up areas 
for cooperation between previously contentious neighbours who now share the view that 
for the region to best utilize its resources, protracted conflict must be resolved. New 
economic relations with Israel are, however, expected to involve both risks and 
opportunities. An attempt is made in the present paper to assess the main elements of the 
risks and opportunities associated with the emergence of Israel as an economic partner in 
the region. 
A. THE ISRAELI ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW 
Israel is a small, open economy, poorly endowed with natural resources but 
distinguished from the rest of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region by its 
exceptionally well-educated population and labour force. In 1994, Israel's population of 
5.4 million accounted for 2.1% of the region's total, while its economy was responsible 
for generating 22.7% of the region's gross domestic product (GDP); Israel's GDP totalled 
$78.4 billion, second only to Saudi Arabia ($121 billion) in the MENA region. The 
manufacturing sector accounts for 21.5% of gross national product (GNP)—well above 
the average of 10.5% for the Arab countries—and services account for 45.4%, agriculture 
for 2.4%, and construction for 8.9% of GNP.' 
While the rest of the region went through a period of unprecedented growth during 
the 1970s, Israel experienced its rapid growth phase a decade earlier. Between 1960 and 
1970, the Israeli economy grew at an average rate of 8.1%. Following the 1973 war and 
the two subsequent upsurges in energy prices, however, growth rates started to slide back 
down. 
The economic slump of the 1 970s and early 1 980s cannot be explained in isolation 
from a group of factors that affected the perfonnance of the Israeli economy during these 
so-called lost years. Mainly responsible for the economic backslide were increasing 
1Transport, storage and communications (7.6%), commerce and hotels (11.6%), and ownership 
and dwellings (7.3%) account for the remainder of Israel's GNP. 
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defence expenditures, which by 1980 accounted for 40% of total government expenditure;2 
low and occasionally negative immigration; the negative effects of the two major supply 
shocks caused by the sudden hikes in energy and raw materials prices (1973-1974 and 
1979-1980); and sustained hyperinflation. 
Private consumption was also increasing at the expense of investment during this 
period. Despite falling growth rates, the mounting pressure of debt accumulation, 
inflation, and internal and external economic problems, the standard of living (as measured 
by per capita private consumption) continued to rise. In 1973 private consumption 
accounted for 38% of domestic absorption, while investment accounted for 27%; by 1984, 
the corresponding figures were 49% and 19% respectively (World Bank, 1 Foreign 
loans were increasingly relied upon to finance the emerging gap between the economy's 
productive capacity and the overall level of consumption spending. By 1991, Israel's 
foreign debt stood at $33 billion, accounting for 54% of GNP and 24% of the MENA 
region's foreign debt. 
The Israeli economy experienced a sharp decline following the boom of the 1 960s, 
with the average annual rate of GDP growth falling to 4.1% over the period 1970-1982. 
The inability of the Government to keep spending in check was manifested in a soaring 
budget deficit that averaged 12% of GNP between 1980 and 1984, leading to spiralling 
inflation which reached 304% in 1985. In mid-1985, facing economic deceleration, the 
Government instituted a comprehensive economic stabilization programme4 consisting of 
major price realignments and fiscal and monetary restraints. The key was a remedial 
adjustment in the exchange rate in 1985 whereby the shekel was devalued by 402% 
against the dollar (from 0.29 new shekels [NIS]/$1 in 1984 to 1.179 NIS/$l in 1985) 
(World Bank, 1995). 
Stabilization measures brought some improvement: the government budget deficit 
declined to 0.6% of GNP in 1986, and inflation fell to an annual average of between 10% 
and 20%. The most important benefit of the stabilization programme, resulting from the 
setting of the exchange rate at a more realistic level, was improved export competitiveness: 
exports increased from $5.6 billion in 1984 to some $16.5 billion in 1994. 
The stabilization programme initiated in the mid-1980s failed to bring a 
resurgence of the high growth rates experienced in the 1 960s; the average annual growth 
rate over the period 1980-1993 was sustained at 4.1%. Prospects for the future are none 
the less quite promising; GDP grew by 7% in 1994 and by 8% during the first half of 
2By 1993, military defence expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure had been 
reduced to 20%. 
By 1993, these shares were relatively stable at 45% and 22%. 
4For comprehensive coverage of the 1985 stabilization programme, see Ra.zin and Sadka (1993). 
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Economic targets set for the year 2000 project that GDP growth will be sustained 
at 4.7% per year, so that by the end of the current decade GDP is expected to be 40% 
higher than it is at present. The ability to maintain such a level of growth will require an 
increase of 8.5% per year in commodities and services exports and an annual increase of 
5.3% in fixed investment. 
Future growth is contingent upon the ability of the Israeli economy to capitalize 
on the anticipated positive impact of the peace process. Israeli exports are expected to gain 
access to neighbouring MENA markets, and regional stability will bring about higher 
investment levels, both domestic and foreign. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY 
Among the most distinctive features of the Israeli economy is the depth of 
govermnent involvement through both its institutions and its policies. The share of Israel's 
public sector6 in production, employment and total investment is one of the highest in the 
world. Between 1980 and 1991, public-sector employment remained steady at around 
29% of total employment.7 The Government is a major player in the industrial arena, 
concentrating mainly on military production. In 1990, State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which were valued at some $6 billion, accounted for 7.14% of total employment in the 
business sector. The public sector has traditionally been regarded as an employer of last 
resort and has mitigated the effect of rising unemployment, particularly during periods 
when job creation in the private sector has failed to keep up with the flow of immigrants. 
Israel's 200 SOEs range from small firms to giant corporations;8 they accounted for 13.5% 
of total exports and 15% of total industrial output during the 1 980s (Israel Economic and 
Business Review, 1985). By the end of the 1 980s, the Government of Israel was the owner 
of almost all land, water, energy sources, radio and television facilities, mines, defence 
industries and airline transportation (Aharoni, 1991). 
The Government has played an integral role in contributing to the growth of high- 
technology exports through its support of research and development (R&D) activities. 
According to published statistics, during the period 1989-1991 national expenditure on 
R&D as a percentage of GNP averaged 3.1%, less than half (40.5%) of which was 
provided by businesses (Abdel Jaber, 1995). The Govermnent also provides financial 
support for business investments; between 1974 and 1979, private investors received 
As calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit (1995). 
6 Besides the Government, the Israeli economy is composed of the Histadrut and the private sector; 
more specifically, the Histadrut, the Private Employers Association and the Government constitute the main 
pillars of the political and economic system in Israel. 
Compared with 13% in the Republic of Korea and 22% in Egypt. 
8Examples include the Bank of Industrial Development, oil refineries, the Bezel (telephone and 
telecommunications) Company, Israel Chemicals, and the electric company. 
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roughly half of every dollar invested as a free government grant (Mayshar, 1986). Prior 
to the devaluations of the I 980s, the Government supported export-oriented industries, in 
the face of an inflexible exchange rate, by providing material compensation. An estimated 
$485 million in export subsidies were provided in 1985 (Aharoni, 
C. IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGN AID: THE DECISIVE MIX 
From a macroeconomic perspective, key variables that have influenced the 
dynamics of the Israeli economy include immigration and foreign sources of fmance. 
1. Immigration: the wheel of growth 
Immigration has influenced growth by stimulating demand and by increasing 
productive capacity through the supply of highly skilled and professional labour. Unlike 
other countries in the MENA region, whose most daunting challenge has been to direct 
sufficient investment towards upgrading their human resource base, the challenge facing 
the Israeli Government has been how to best utilize the existing stock of human capital. 
When immigration slowed during the 1 970s the economy almost stagnated, with 
growth in per capita output declining to less than 1%, compared with 10% over the period 
1950-1951 (Razin and Sadka, 1993). The immigration target for the year 2000 is an 
annual average of 80,000 (compared with an average of 20,000 over the last decade) 
(Israel, 1995). Immigration plays a decisive role in the drafting of alternative scenarios 
for the economy's overall rate of growth, and for the future growth of investment, private 
consumption and employment. 
2. Foreign aid: the catalyst of growth 
Unilateral transfers to Israel have mainly been supplied by the German and United 
States Governments and by world Jewry. World Jewry has supported Israel through direct 
contributions and presently finances 10% of the country's import surplus'° (compared with 
28% in 1970). German government reparations and American government loans have 
provided Israel with two other important sources of finance. United States government 
grants and loans have been considered the most important source of foreign finance since 
1973 and have been responsible for financing more than 70% of Israel's trade deficit. 
During the second half of the 1 980s, American aid amounted to $3 billion per year in 
nominal dollars—$1.8 billion for military aid and $1.2 billion for civilian purposes 
An important question becomes whether or not such a form of support can be sustained in the 
light of the Uruguay Round agreements, which explicitly forbid export subsidies but allow R&D-related 
subsidies. 
An import surplus is defined as the amount by which imports of goods and services exceed 
exports of the same. 
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(Aharoni, 1991). Ironically, Israel's "problem in recent years has been what to do with the 
[foreign] money, rather than how to get it" (Mayshar, 1986). 
As mentioned above, foreign sources of finance have played an important role in 
supporting the country's import surplus. Israel's persistent import surplus (which reached 
$6 billion in 1994) has been a central economic issue since the establishment of the State 
(Ben-Porath, 1986). An import surplus can be viewed as a double-edged sword: lowering 
it would result in lowering the total available resources by at least the same amount (i.e., 
a decrease in the import surplus would mean a decrease in essential imports), thus 
lowering domestic product (Halevi, 1986). While foreign exchange reserves and short- 
term borrowing could temporarily maintain a foreign trade deficit in the face of declining 
long-term transfers, the whole economy—in fact, the whole production process—would 
be placed in a precarious position. 
In many economies, the initial development phase was characterized by a high 
import-surplus-to-GNP ratio which later declined; in Israel, however, the import surplus 
fluctuates but does not show any signs of sustained decline. 
D. TRADE POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 
Like most "small" countries, Israelis heavily dependent on foreign trade. In order 
to sustain its imports, the economy has to channel a significant share of its production 
towards export. Since 1950, in acknowledgement of this fact, the industrial sector has 
been producing for export purposes rather than catering primarily to the domestic market. 
At present, 65% of all imports are covered by exports, down from 81% in 1989. 
Israel has emerged with a relatively liberal trade regime; in 1990 import duties 
averaging 10% (weighted average) of the import value were levied (Razin and Sadka, 
1993). This means that there has been little scope for production that does not run along 
the lines of comparative advantage." In this respect, trade policy has served as an 
industrial policy by increasingly driving production along such lines. 
Export-led growth has been characterized by a major shift in production away 
from traditional products towards sophisticated, high-tech products. This structural 
transformation has had a major impact on the commodity composition of exports, since 
the significant rise in exports has mainly been generated by high-tech products, which now 
account for 70% of industrial exports (excluding diamonds). High-tech firms operate 
predominantly in the defence sector (Aharoni, 1991), which falls within the domain of 
H There are, however, a large number of exceptions outside the industrial sector; the most 
commonly cited example is the heavily protected agricultural sector. 
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government ownership. It has been estimated that the defence sector accounts for one 
quarter of all industrial exports. (Israel Economic Business Review, 1985). 
In contrast to the other economies in the ESCWA region, the Israeli economy is 
both open and globally integrated. The ESCWA region's economies can be categorized 
into two groups: non-oil-exporting economies, which are closed and not integrated (with 
the exception of Jordan); and oil-based economies, which are open but are also not 
integrated (see figure). 
The implication here is that the Israeli industrial sector is well-positioned to 
penetrate the ESCWA region's markets once the Arab boycott is lifted. The important 
question, however, is whether the outcome will be a zero-sum game, whereby Israeli 
exports to the ESCWA region increase at the expense of Arab exports. The following 
section attempts to shed some light on the risks and opportunities associated with the 
emergence of Israel as a trading partner in the region. 
E. ARAB FIRMS FACING ISRAELI FIRMS: 
RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The speed (and sometimes secrecy) characterizing progress on the peace front has, 
to a considerable extent, outpaced the expectations of observers who have witnessed the 
frequent deadlocks the process has come up against. In spite of the fact that the protracted 
conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours has been only partially resolved, 
"business" is already under way.'2 While the advent of peace will open up areas for 
cooperation, it has provoked concern over future arrangements that might affect the 
performance of Arab firms in the region's markets. An attempt is made in this section to 
assess the dimensions of the perceived threat posed by the impending entry of Israel into 
regional trade. 
1. Risks 
In analysing the ability of Israeli firms to compete in Arab markets, two main 
determinants must be considered: tariff structures facing individual competitors in markets 
in which competition is likely to occur; and the nature of the competing products. 
'2Qatar has made progress on an arrangement to ship liquefied natural gas to Israel, so that "when 










































































































































































































































































Competition is likely to occur over markets that are open, markets that are 
characterized by less diversified industrial output which does not sufficiently meet 
domestic demand, and markets in which purchasing power is high. In other words, 
competition is likely to occur between Israel and those ESCWA member countries with 
a more diversified manufacturing output (and hence a more diversified commodity 
composition of exports) than the oil-based markets. Competition is likely to be more 
intense between Israel and ESCWA member countries whose intraregional trade forms a 
significant portion of their global exports. At present, intraregional trade accounts for 14% 
of global exports in Egypt, 30% in Jordan, 50% in Lebanon, and 20% in the Syrian Arab 
Republic (Yeats, 1995; Economic Report, 1993). 
In the absence of preferential trading arrangements, Israeli exports will enter the 
ESCWA region's markets on the basis of existing tariff structures. The prospects for 
Israeli exports enjoying preferential access to these markets are at present quite remote. 
The systematic failure of the Arab countries to come up with the preferential trading 
agreements required to take them a step further towards drafting a free-trade agreement 
supports this contention. In the numerous agreements forged by Arab Govenunents to 
promote intraregional trade, preferences have generally been granted to a wide range of 
raw materials, agricultural products, and the products of joint Arab industrial 
projects—leaving out most manufactured goods, which continue to be subject to increased 
tariff barriers. Competition in the short run is likely to be through tariff structures that 
generally do not discriminate between Arab producers in the region. 
Potential enlargements of the proposed subregional trading blocs in which Jordan, 
Israel and the occupied territories constitute the nucleus are equally distant, and hence 
involves no immediate risks. The longer-term prospects for granting Israeli exports 
preferential access to the ESCWA region's markets none the less deserve attention, 
particularly in connection with foreign direct investment (FDI), which is likely to be 
attracted by host countries enjoying preferential access to the region's markets. The 
average annual inflow of FDI into Egypt over the period 1982-1987 was $809 million, 
compared with $110 million into Israel over the same period. If Israel were granted 
preferential access to the ESCWA region's markets, FDI would likely favour locating in 
Israel, where export support services and a highly skilled workforce are available and, 
most importantly, where the "soft infrastructure"3 is already in place. Egypt and other 
ESCWA member countries would continue to attract FDI, but only in accordance with 
their existing comparative advantage in labour-intensive areas. Unless ESCWA countries 
invest in upgrading the existing skills possessed by their workforces, Israel is likely to 
'3The term refers to the institutional settings (such as a legal framework) needed to do business. 
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continue attracting FDI in production areas that are both skill-intensive and knowledge- 
intensive. 
(b) Products 
The production structures of Israel and the Arab countries in the ESCWA region 
are inherently different. Variations in natural resource endowments, factors of production, 
and the endorsed industrial policies underlie such differences (see table 1). 
Table 1 shows that the bulk of manufacturing output is accounted for by petroleum 
refining, food products, industrial chemicals, non-metallic mineral products and fabricated 
metal products. The output of the Israeli manufacturing sector is more evenly distributed 
among various subsectors, with electrical machinery, food products, and fabricated metal 
products accounting for the largest percentage. There is relatively little convergence 
between the production structures of the ESCWA member countries and those of Israel, 
as is reflected by the shaded percentage shares in table 1. 
These variations show that, in reality, Arab countries (both net oil exporters and 
non-oil exporters) have emerged with a commodity composition of exports that is not very 
similar to that of Israel. It is safe to argue that once the boycott against Israel is lifted, 
there will be relatively little competition between Israeli exports and those of the ESCWA 
member countries. To this assumption, an index of export similarity'4 involving 128 
products at the three-digit SITC level was conducted between Israel and some selected 
ESCWA member countries (see table 2). 
Table 2 reveals that the export patterns of the ESCWA member countries are 
becoming only slightly more similar to those of Israel. The implication is that their 
economic structures are coming closer to that existing in Israel; this is particularly true for 
the non-oil-exporting countries. All of this notwithstanding, the most important 
implication of the index figures is that competition is unlikely to be generated between 
Israeli products and those of the ESCWA member countries in the short run. 
In terms of commodity composition, Israel's global exports are currently 
dominated by worked diamonds, which account for 29% of total exports; this is an area 
where potential competition between Israeli and Arab firms is negligible (see table 3). 
"An index of export similarity is calculated using the formula S (abc) = {E, Minimum [Xi (ac), 
Xi (bc)1 } 100, which measures the similarity of the export patterns of countries a and b to market c. Xi (ac) 
is the share of commodity i in a's exports to c. If the commodity distribution of a's and b's exports are 
identical, the index will take on a value of 100. If the export patterns of a and b are totally dissimilar, the 
index will take on a value of 0. 
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Table 1. Structure of manufacturing outputs for 
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311 Food products 20 4.4 16 4.1 11.2 17 8.7 17.5 15.8 
313 Beveriges 2.5 1.2 3 1.2 4.4 2.7 Ii 11 13 
314 Tobacco 53 0 5 - 0 0 4.9 LI 2.6 0.2 
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1.8 0.8 4.5 0 0.9 1.4 2 2.1 2.7 
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2.1 1.2 4.8 0 0.6 1.6 3.4 3.7 17.5 
384 Transport 
equipment 
0.7 0.5 2 
0 
0 








1.4 03 0.1 1.7 0.1 2.8 0.2 1.5 
Source: Compiled from UNIDO data, Information and Research Division, Industrial Statistics Branch, 1994/1995. 
* Classified according to the United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 
ShnwL Table 2. Indices of export similarity 
1970-1972 1980-1982 1990-1992 
Lebanon-Israel 31 37 36 
Jordan-Israel 15 40 32 
United Arab Emirates-Israel 8 20 32 
Egypt-Israel 16 15 26 
Syrian Arab Republic-Israel 24 14 17 
Saudi Arabia-Israel 5 8 16 
Bahrain-Israel 3 9 12 
Source: Calculated using data compiled from Alexander Yeats, "Export prospects of the Middle Eastern countries: 
a post-Uruguay Round analysis", a paper presented at the Economic Research Forum Conference on Liberalization of Trade 
and Foreign Investment held, in Istanbul from 16 to 18 September 1995. 
Note: Exports to OECD countries. 
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Table 3. Israel's largest global exports 
(Thousands of US dollars) 
SITC Item 1980 SITC Item 1993 
667 Pearls, precious, semi- 
precious stones 
1 672 004 667 Pearls, precious, semi- 
precious stones 
4 113 837 
733 Road vehicles, non-motor 369 163 719 Machines n.e.s., non- 
electric 
1 358 759 
051 Fruits, fresh, nuts, fresh, 
dry 
301 897 724 Telecommunications 
equipment 
745 249 
698 Metal manufactures n.e.s. 274 065 733 Road vehicles, non-motor 673 164 
841 Clothing not of fur 247 609 841 Clothing not of fur 571 471 
599 Chemicals n.e.s. 236 885 729 Electrical machinery 
n.e.s. 
522 945 
561 Fertilizers, manufactured 199 915 599 Chemicals n.e.s. 505 702 
734 Aircraft 183 075 714 Office machines 471 105 
719 Machines n.e.s., non- 
electric 
158 998 897 Gold, silverware, 
jewellery 
416 173 
512 Organic chemicals 133 187 718 Machines for special 
industries 
334 468 
292 Crude vegetable materials 
n.e.s. 
105 331 734 Aircraft 333 333 
263 Cotton 101 574 512 Organic chemicals 297 492 
053 Fruits, preserved, prepared 96 117 861 Instruments, apparatus 278 371 
724 Telecommunications 
equipment 
90 808 893 Articles of plastic n.e.s. 273 965 
897 Gold, silverware, jewellery 79 694 512 Organic chemicals 268 219 
698 Metal manufactures n.e.s. 71 360 561 Fertilizers, manufactured 238 125 
514 Other inorganic chemicals 66 931 051 Fruits, fresh, nuts, dry 216 791 
651 Textiles and thread 62 614 722 Elec-pwr mach, switch- 
gear 
186 202 
893 Articles of plastic n.e.s. 57 965 514 Other inorganic chemicals 182 901 
695 Tools 178 737 
Source: United Nations, COMTRADE Database for the years 1980 and 1993. 
Note: Three-digit SITC. 
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The main product groups among Israel's top global exports which overlap with 
Arab export profiles are clothing (SITC 841), chemicals (SITC 599) and fertilizers (SITC 
561). With regard to chemicals and fertilizers, the main export markets of the ESCWA 
region's producers are outside the region. As for clothing, competition is likely to be with 
Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic, the two major exporters in the ESCWA region. 
However, it is questionable whether Israel will be able to maintain such a high share of 
clothing in its global exports. The gradual phasing out of the Arrangement Regarding 
International Trade in Textiles (also known as the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA) will 
mean that Israeli firms can expect to face fierce competition from other global exporters 
in their main export markets, the EU and the United States. In the light of such global 
changes, and given that the wage levels in the Israeli clothing sector are relatively high,15 
it is expected that Israeli firms will gradually lose their shares in their main export markets 
to more competitive producers. The same argument holds for competition in the ESCWA 
region's markets. 
The problem with the above argument is that it rests on the assumption that the 
ESCWA member countries' manufacturing sectors will fail to go through any structural 
changes that might influence the commodity composition of their exports. Potential 
dynamic changes are not accounted for. Dynamic changes wifl be shaped by the impact 
of the post-Uruguay Round tariff reductions on industrial structures and will also be 
contingent upon product groups that are expected to account for the growth anticipated on 
the export front. 
A look at Israel's most dynamic global exports reveals that there is still relatively 
little scope for competition (see table 4). 
Among Israel's most dynamic exports, three areas are of export interest to 
ESCWA member countries, namely medicinal products, woven textiles and woven cotton 
fabrics. Egypt and Jordan are the region's two largest exporters of pharmaceuticals; 
however, unlike Egypt or Israel, Jordan enjoys a strong comparative advantage in the 
production of this commodity. Neither does Israel have a strong comparative advantage 
in the production of woven textiles or woven cotton fabrics. 16 
IS Annual wages and salaries per employee in Israel's wearing apparel industry were $9,307 
(1991), compared with $3,496 in the Syrian Arab Republic (1990) and $1,325 in Egypt (1992). 
'6M measured by the revealed comparative advantage index. For comprehensive computations 
of the region's revealed comparative advantage indices, see Yeats (1995). 
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Table 4. Average annual growth rate for 
Israel's mosfdynamzc global exports 
(Percentage) 
SITC Item 1980-1985 SITC Item 1985-1993 
679 Iron, steel casting, 
unworked 
57 718 Machines for special 
industries 
79 
683 Nickel 49 941 Zooanimals,pets 55 
863 Developed cinema film 32 679 Iron, steel castings, 
unworked 
51 
632 Wood manufactures n.e.s. 29 693 Wire products, non- 
electrical 
45 
714 Office machines 29 691 Structures and parts 
n.e.s. 
39 
731 Rai'way vehicles 29 931 Special transactions 38 
861 Instruments, apparatus 24 554 Soaps and cleansing 
preparations, etc. 
36 
693 Wire products non- 
electrical 
23 671 Pig iron, etc. 32 
663 Other non-metal mineral 
manufactures 
23 685 Lead 30 
726 Electro-medical, X-ray 
equipment 
23 533 Pigments, paints, etc. 28 
724 Telecommunications 
equipment 
21 541 Medicinal and related 
products 
28 
722 Elec-pwr mach, switch- 
gear 
18 553 Perfumes, cosmetics, 
etc. 
27 
725 Domestic electrical 
equipment 
17 864 Watches and clocks 27 
654 Lace, ribbons, tulle, etc. 15 891 Sound recorders, 
products 
26 
897 Gold, silverware, 
jewellery 
14 661 Cement and other 
building products 
26 
581 Plastic materials, etc. 14 653 Woven textiles, non- 
Cotton 
25 
512 Organic chemicals 13 729 Electrical machinery 
n.e.s. 
24 
729 Electrical machinery n.e.s. 12 652 Cotton fabrics, woven 23 
621 Materials of rubber 11 
Total manufacturing 3 Total manufacturing 11 
Source: United Nations, COMTRADE Database for the years 1980, 1985 and 1993. 
Note: Three-digit SITC. 
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While conducting the analysis at the three-digit SITC level serves to illustrate that 
the degree of risk associated with the potential inclusion of Israel as a trading partner is at 
present relatively moderate, a more detailed analysis based on comparisons at SITC levels 
of four or more digits is needed to identify specific products that will be candidates for 
future competition. 
2. OpportunitIes 
Trade flows from Israel to the ESCWA member countries are expected to begin 
immediately after the boycott is lifted: the trade redirection potential is estimated at $2.2 
billion. Cooperation with respect to third-country trade has been identified as one area 
with very good prospects. It has been suggested that Jordan could be the transit country 
for Israeli exports to the Gulf area and Israel the transit country for Jordanian exports to 
Europe and North America (Halbach, I 995b). Opportunities for increased boarder trade 
are also promising, particularly for products that are perishable and products for which 
transportation costs are high. 
In the industrial sphere, opportunities for cooperation are expected to include 
intra-industiy trade'7 and coordination with third parties; with respect to the latter, it has 
been proposed that Arab manufacturers have Israeli firms market their products outside 
the region. Out-sourcing is another area where cooperation between Israeli and Arab firms 
can be mutually beneficial. It is worth mentioning that the establishment of joint venture 
projects is already under way; Israeli entrepreneurs have begun moving some of their 
operations (J)articularly in the food processing and textile sectors) to Jordan, where wages 
are 10% of what they are in Israel, and to Egypt, where wages are even lower. 
Additionally, Egypt and Israel are currently working on securing financing for a $1 billion 
petrochemical refinery—the first major joint project between the two countries—to be 
located in Alexandria. 
G. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
With the existing manufacturing structures dictating the commodity composition 
of exports, competition between Arab and Israeli manufacturers in the ESCWA region is 
not expected to intensify in the short run. However, Arab countries—particularly those 
that are Members of the World Trade Organization—should incorporate in their future 
strategies the potential element of competition with Israeli and other global exporters who 
can be expected to enjoy increased access to the region's markets. Industrial restructuring 
should take the long-term implications of both regional and global challenges into account 
An area of cooperation into which some Egyptian manufacturers have already ventured. 
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Opportunities for cooperation are by defmition based on non-zero-sum 
assumptions; any sign of a zero-sum game evolving is very likely to stall the process of 
trade expansion and cooperation. 
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Part Four 
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IX. INTRAREGIONAL TRADE IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS: 
PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
by Jamal E. Zarrouk 
Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi 
Introduction 
Over the past three decades, there has been considerable interest among ESCWA 
member countries in the role that diversification and industrialization policies can play 
in accelerating growth. 
Two successive strategies have been followed in developing the industrial 
potential of Arab countries. First came the era of import substitution to protect domestic 
industry, which was seen as essential for development. During this period, huge 
investments were made in State-owned industrial enterprises and in the formation of 
human skills, as both were unsuited to a competitive market economy. Since the mid- 
1 980s, however, many Arab countries have shifted from import substitution to a more 
market- and export-oriented policy. Consequently, the focus of discussion has switched 
to the contributions made by industrial exports to raising the growth rate of both 
domestic output and exports. 
The increased interest in industry-oriented export diversification is also linked 
to the efforts of Arab oil-exporting countries to reduce their reliance on one commodity; 
most of these countries have diversified into petrochemical and energy-intensive 
industries whose products are being exported mainly to industrial markets. 
The relative importance of the ESCWA region's trade in industrial products has 
grown fairly steadily since the 1970s, more or less in line with the slightly increased 
share of manufacturing in gross domestic product (GDP). A shift in production took 
place in virtually all Arab countries in the region between 1970 and 1993; notably, in the 
oil-exporting countries, the share of energy products in total output declined (though it 
remains predominant), while that of industrial products expanded. There has been a 
dynamic shift in the region's export structure; however, while the share of manufactured 
exports has steadily increased, these exports have become neither an engine of growth 
for Arab economies nor a basis for regional cooperation in intra-industry trade. In fact, 
trade among the ESCWA member countries has expanded very little during the last three 
decades; its share in total regional trade has never exceeded 10%. Moreover, data on the 
product composition of intraregional exports show that energy products are still the 
largest product group, accounting for more than half of all intraregional exports. 
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There have been major changes in the international trading environment that 
have important implications for both regional and intraregional trade prospects. Many 
countries in the region have embarked on comprehensive liberalization and reform 
programmes to take advantage of opportunities to attract greater foreign investment. The 
global liberalization of trade and services linked to the implementation of the Uruguay 
Round agreements is expected to result in new trading opportunities for countries that 
are well integrated into the world economy. The regional integration efforts in North 
America and Europe and the recent European Union (EU) initiative to create free-trade 
areas with neighbouring southern Mediterranean countries are all directed towards 
increasing competitiveness and facilitating the development of mutually beneficial 
economic relations among the member countries of the respective unions. 
The present paper aims to identify the trends in the evolution of intraregional 
trade in industrial products and includes a discussion of how the aforementioned changes 
may be expected to affect the future direction and development of such trade. The first 
section provides some evidence related to recent trends in intraregional export 
diversification into industrial products. The factors that limit intraregional trade 
expansion are then examined, with particular attention given to the restrictive 
commercial practices affecting intraregional trade in industrial products. The future 
prospects for such trade are examined in the second section: the regional export 
prospects for industrial products are discussed in the light of the ESCWA member 
countries' existing export capacity, then an attempt is made to determine how 
intraregional trading prospects will be affected by both the global liberalization offered 
through the Uruguay Round agreements and the EU initiative to create free-trade areas 
with the neighbouring Mediterranean' countries in the ESCWA region. The paper's 
main conclusions are presented in the final section. 
A. RECENT TRENI)S IN INTRAREGIONAL TRADE 
iN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS2 
This section focuses mainly on how changes in the product composition of 
industrial exports from ESCWA member countries to other countries in the ESCWA 
region compare with changes in the structure of such exports to all destinations, and on 
the extent to which these changes are caused by shifts in underlying comparative 
advantage or in trade policies. 
Including one or more countries (such as Jordan) which do not physically border the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
2 In the present paper, the term "industrial products" comprises chemicals (SITC section 5), 
manufactured goods (SITC section 6), machinery and transport equipment (SITC section 7), and 
miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC section 8). 
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1. Characteristics of intraregional trade in industrial products 
In the following analysis, trends in intraregional trade are examined from the 
export perspective, since by definition3 intraregional imports are equal to intraregional 
exports plus transport and insurance costs. 
The overall trade structure of the Arab countries in the ESCWA region changed 
during the period 1974-1993. As can be seen from table 1 and figure I, the average share 
of energy exports declined, while that of industrial products expanded significantly from 
3.5% in 1974 to around 19% in 1993. This shift in trade partly reflects the growing trend 
towards export diversification in the ESCWA region, especially in the oil-exporting 
countries, where the export share of downstream petrochemical products is increasing 
against that of traditional raw materials such as crude oil, basic chemicals and metals. 
A by-product of the change in the ESCWA region's overall trade structure is the 
increased share of industrial products in intraregional trade. The statistics reported in 
table 2 indicate that while the average share of energy products in intraregional exports 
declined from 78% in 1974 to about 51% in 1993, the average share of industrial exports 
increased almost four-fold during the same period from 8% to 29%. The countries that 
achieved the greatest gains between 1974 and 1993 in terms of their industrial export 
share in total exports to the ESCWA region were Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In 1993, Lebanon's manufactured export share 
in total intraregional exports was highest, at 79%, and Jordan's was second, at 5 1%—an 
indication that these two countries are exporting a wider range of industrial goods to their 
neighbours than other Arab countries in the ESCWA region. 
The flow of intraregional trade in industrial products has been predominantly 
bilateral. Since information on the direction of intraregional exchange in industrial 
products is not available for many ESCWA member countries, table 3 employs a 1993 
matrix of the origins and destinations of all intraregional trade. As the table shows, two 
ESCWA member countries, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, account 
for over 60% of the ESCWA member countries' intraregional exports. Saudi Arabia's 
exports to Bahrain (mostly crude oil) constituted the single largest bilateral trade flow 
(about $1.3 billion), followed by Saudi Arabia's exports to the United Arab Emirates 
($0.9 billion), and the United Arab Emirates' exports to Saudi Arabia (around $0.6 
billion). It should be noted that these figures understate the relative importance of the 
ESCWA region's markets to Lebanon and Jordan, whose intraregional exports accounted 
for 48% and 27% of their respective exports to all destinations. 
3Actually, the trade statistic reported for the ESCWA member countries show wide differences 
between intraregional imports and intraregional exports after the approximate cost of transport and insurance 
are added. It appears that many of the discrepancies are related to the different recording methods and 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. ESCWA member countries: developments in the intra- 
regional exports of industrial products, 19 74-1993 
}xporter 
Value of intraregional 
exports 
Share of manufactured 
exports in all 
intraregional exports 
Share of energy exports 
in all intraregional 
exports 
1974 1993 1974 1993 1974 1993 
(millions of US dollars) (percentage) (percentage) 
Bajirain 217.0 370.0 8.1 9.0 91.0 75.0 
Egypt 73.0 353.0 19.1 13.7 0 1.4 
Jordan 57.0 274.0 39.0 51.0 0 0 
Kuwait 267.0 292.0 30.0 35.0 29.8 35.0 
Lebanon 784.0 318.0 75.0 78.7 0 0 
Oman 1.0 596.8 3.8 6.8 60.3 
Qatar 15.0 263.0 10.1 99.8 87.0 
Saudi Arabia 1242.0 3058.0 0.5 29.5 99.0 61.8 
Syrian Arab Republic 90.0 665.0 26.4 23.8 15.5 16.6 
United Arab Emirates 96.0 1 916.0 





2 843.0 8 174.6 
8.3 29.0 78.3 50.5 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 shows that intraregional industrial exports accounted for only 9% of all 
industrial exports from the region in 1993. The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries in Europe and North America have constituted the 
largest outside market for the region's industrial exports. 
Even more striking is the fact that the ESCWA member countries as a group 
absorb less than 1% of the world's industrial exports. The ESCWA member countries 
therefore appear to be more inclined to trade with each other in industrial products. The 
share of industrial products in intraregional exports was considerably higher for several 
ESCWA member countries than for the group as a whole; some 50% of Lebanese and 
42% of Syrian industrial exports stay within the region, as do between 27% and 29% of 
Jordan's, Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's industrial exports. 
2. The product composition of intraregional industrial exports 
There are a number of industrial products which are of primary importance in 
intraregional trade; these are grouped into the seven main categories shown in table 4 and 
figure II. The basic commodity trade data in the table are classified under various 
headings arranged according to factor intensity; one broad group includes capital- and 
skill-intensive products such as chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, and 
electrical goods, while the other contains the generally more labour-intensive consumer 
goods such as textiles and clothing, leather, footwear and travel goods. 
Table 4 indicates that the capital-intensive product group ranked highest for the 
region as a whole in 1993, accounting for 67% of intraregional manufactured exports. 
Within this product group, the share of chemical exports (including organic 
petrochemicals and inorganic chemicals, both used as fertilizers) had grown rapidly and 
ranked highest by 1993, accounting for more than 38% of intraregional manufactured 
exports. It should be noted, however, that the relative importance of chemicals has 
varied in the intraregional export baskets of individual ESCWA member countries; for 
instance, chemicals accounted for 40% of Saudi Arabia's and 63% of Jordan's 
manufactured exports to the region in 1993, making them the largest intraregional 
exporters of chemicals. 
The share of machinery and transport equipment (also in the capital-intensive 
category) ranked second in intraregional industrial exports, accounting for 19% in 1993. 
Products of particular importance in this category include electrical equipment and 
machinery as well as transport equipment; in 1993, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan 
were the largest exporters of these commodities to the region. Metal manufactures (iron 
and steel) ranked third in intraregional exports of capital-intensive products, with a share 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Within the labour-intensive industrial products group, the share of textiles and 
clothing ranked highest in 1993, accounting for 9.8% of intraregional exports of 
manufactured goods; the highest individual country shares in this regard were Lebanon 
(2 1%), Egypt (18%), and the Syrian Arab Republic (15%). 
The remaining industrial product categories encompass (generally) labour- 
intensive industrial goods produced by import-competing and infant industries in the 
ESCWA member countries. The wood-and-furniture/pulp-and-paper category accounted 
for an 8.6% share in intraregional industrial exports in 1993, while the 
leather/footwear/travel-goods group totalled only 1%. The share of other manufactures 
was 14% (comprising a multitude of unrelated products, each representing a small share 
of the total for this category). 
With regard to the comparative evolution of the intraregional and total regional 
export baskets of industrial products over the period 1974-1993, the data show that a 
similar pattern underlies both. Such a result is consistent with comparative advantage 
expectations, i.e., that countries will export a particular range of goods based on their 
factor endowments. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that the rapid gains in 
comparative advantage in petrochemicals and other downstream energy-intensive products 
by oil-exporting countries occurred not in the regional markets but in the larger and 
relatively more open markets of the industrialized countries. Jordan's share of chemicals 
in its basket of industrial products exported to the region was higher than that of any other 
ESCWA member country in 1993; an explanation might be that Jordan has used regional 
markets as a "launching platform" for chemical exports (mostly pharmaceuticals and 
phosphatic fertilizers) in order to acquire a new comparative advantage in such goods. 
To conclude, although there has been increased regional trading in industrial 
goods (chiefly chemicals, electrical articles, machinery, and clothing and textiles), the non- 
competitiveness and the lack of sophistication and diversity of industrial products in the 
ESCWA region have been important factors inhibiting intraregional expansion. 
3. The effect of trade policies on intraregional trade 
in the ESCWA member countries 
It is generally acknowledged that the level and pattern of intraregional trade in 
industrial products has been influenced by the trade policies of the various Arab countries 
in the ESCWA region. Import substitution pursued with the help of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) has been widely employed. Tables 5 and 6 show the extent of tariffs in 
the ESCWA member countries. Table 5 reveals that the high unweighted tariffs in Egypt, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic range between 90% and 150%, and that 
Yemen's is actually as high as 200%. The average import-weighted tariffs shown in the 
table are generally lower; some were even reduced during the period 198 1-1990. In such 
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cases, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, tariffs which were predominantly used as an 
instrument for maximizing government revenues have been substituted with other internal 
taxes as a result of trade policy reforms. High import-weighted tariffs in the other 
ESCWA member countries might largely be viewed as a form of protection for domestic 
industries. 
Table 5. ESCWA member countries: average 
tariffs on imports of industrial products 
Country 
Unweighted_tariff average Weighted tariff average' 
Low High Tanif year 1981 1988 1990 
Bahrain 5.0 35.0 1993 1.7 3.4 3.0 
Egypt 2.5 120.0 1990 35.3 29.0 14.9 
Jordan 0 50.0 1994 24.6 21.3 17.8 
Kuwait - 4.0 100.0 1993 3.5 7.0 
Lebanon 0 90.0 17.5 
Oman 4.0 20.0 1.5 3.5 2.5 
Qatar 4.0 20.0 1.8 2.6 5.0 
Saudi Arabia 0 30.0 1991 2.5 8.0 11.0 
Syrian Arab Republic 10.0 150.0 12.4 15.1 16.4 
United Arab Emirates 0 4.0 1.2 0.6 0.4 
Yemen 5.0 200.0 1994 19.1 
Average for 
developing countries 81.0' 1987 
Source: Components of the weighted tariff averages are taken from the Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab 
Economic Report Data Base (Abu Dhabi); unweighted averages are from national sources. 
'The weighted tariff averages for each ESCWA member country are obtained by dividing the values of imports 
duties by the total import values. 
The lowest tariff average is found in East Asia (see World Bank, World Development Report, 1991: the 
Challenge of Development (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991). 
'The highest tariff average is found in the southern Asia region (see World Development Report, 1991). 
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Table 6. ESCWA member countries: tariff 
escalation on imports of industrial products 
Country 
Chemicals 





Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Bahrain 0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 
Egypt 0 30.0 10.0 100.0 7.0 80.0 7.0 30.0 
Jordan 0 28.0 20.0 85.0 20.0 85.0 0 25.0 
Kuwait 4.0 20.0 15.0 25.0 0 15.0 0 20.0 
Lebanon 0 28.0 18.0 90.0 18.0 90.0 7.0 90.0 
Oman 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Qatar 4.0 20.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Saudi Arabia 12.0 20.0 12.0 20.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 20.0 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
1.0 40.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 100.0 1.0 40.0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Yemen 0 25.0 50.0 100.0 50.0 25.0 50.0 
Average for 
developing 
countries 0 100.0 5.0 150.0 8.7 150.0 0 34.0 
Average for 
developed 
countries' 0.1 7.2 4.4 105 1.7 14.6 0.4 63 
Average 
(European Union) 0 17.5 24.0 17.0 0.4 15.0 
Sources: UNCTAD, Trade Control Measures in Developing Countries (Geneva, 1987); IMF, Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, several issues; and GAiT, International Trade: Trends and 
Statistics, (Geneva, GAiT secretariat, 1994). 
Pre-Uruguay Round average tariff levels. 
ESCWA member countries also practice tariff escalation, where the tariffs 
imposed on industrial imports increase with the stages of processing. This tariff escalation 
is illustrated in table 6, which reports high and low tariff levels for four industrial product 
categories. The ranges are generally widest and the actual tariffs highest for consumer 
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goods, including textiles and clothing and processed food products. In addition, there 
are wide variations in the levels of tariffs on consumer goods across ESCWA member 
countries. For instance, tariff rates on processed food products range between 5% in 
Bahrain and 100% in the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt and Yemen. High tariff rates on 
textiles and clothing range from 4% in Qatar to between 80% and 100% in Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, indicating that the ESCWA member 
countries have continued to provide high levels of protection for import-competing 
industries. 
ESCWA member countries have also resorted to para-tariffs (non-tariff barriers) 
to restrict imports of industrial products from other countries in the region. The NTBs 
frequently imposed by these countries include high special charges and import fees, 
import prohibitions, import licensing, and government monopolies on imports of 
intermediate products. 
4. Policy intervention and intraregionai trade in industrial products 
In an effort to lower the level of protection in many ESCWA member countries 
and stimulate intraregional trade, a number of Arab countries have signed bilateral and 
multilateral agreements involving the exchange of tariff exemptions on a prod uct-by- 
product basis. However, many Arab countries trade in similar industrial products, and 
such a product-by-product negotiating process allows them to pick and choose, with the 
result that very few Arab manufactured products remain candidates for tariff exemptions. 
Moreover, the disparities in tariff levels among the ESCWA member countries can cause 
difficulties in motivating relatively low-tariff and non-tariff countries (such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, or GCC, countries) to exchange concessions with high-tariff and 
non-tariff countries that are commensurate with the likely gains. 
The apparent reluctance of Arab countries to come up with a complete 
preferential scheme covering all industrial products of Arab origin has limited the scope 
of intraregional trade expansion; however, intraregional coordination could still be 
achieved by means of bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements developed through 
the League of Arab States. 
B. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ThITRAREGIONAL TRADE 
IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
This section contains a brief discussion and assessment of intraregional trade 
prospects in the light of some major new developments in internal and external markets, 
including the move towards greater openness as a development strategy in ESCWA 
member countries, the new trading opportunities created through the global liberalization 
of industrial trade as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations and agreements, and the 
formulation of the European Union's Mediterranean initiative. 
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1. Unilateral trade liberalization in the ESCWA region 
As shown previously, the restrictive trade policy regimes that have prevailed in 
many of the ESCWA member countries over the past two decades have discouraged 
domestic producers from exploiting economies of scale in the larger regional markets. 
More recently, there have been shifts towards liberalizing international trade. Lebanon 
and the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates) have all enjoyed relatively open trading regimes, and now countries such 
as Egypt, Jordan and Yemen are taking serious steps to liberalize their economies and 
make them more "outward-oriented". Such openness constitutes the channel through 
which the ESCWA member countries can achieve greater integration with the world 
economy and with one another. 
Internal liberalization allows for greater competition in products and factor 
markets. Competition is also fostered when an area opens up to foreign producers, and 
when the administrative mechanism of its trade regime is simplified and made more 
transparent. All of these are prerequisites for successful investment and trading activity; 
there must be as little uncertainty as possible with regard to quality control regulations, 
customs valuation, service provision in ports, taxes due, the time spent for customs 
clearance, and other such factors. 
Most ESCWA member countries have taken steps to stabilize their economies 
and are at various stages of implementing trade policies to improve competitiveness. 
Moreover, many countries have dynamic entrepreneurial traditions, and the reform 
incentives may provide the impetus for investment in export-oriented activities, 
particularly those directed towards neighbouring markets in the ESCWA region. 
The recent changes in many ESCWA member countries—specifically, the 
reductions in and increased transparency of tariffs and non-tariff measures and the 
simplification of administrative mechanisms governing trade regimes—constitute an 
incentive for the region's exporters to exploit trading opportunities in other ESCWA 
member countries' markets. Reciprocal market liberalization among these countries 
should improve the transparency and predictability of their trade regimes vis-à-vis each 
other—a prerequisite for substantial growth in intraregional trade in industrial products. 
Most of the ESCWA member countries have similar factor endowments and 
have thus acquired comparative advantages in similar products. In order to expand intra- 
regional trade in the future, these countries should pursue what is commonly called intra- 
industry trade, which involves the exchange of similar but slightly differentiated 
products. 
There is reason to believe that intra-industry trade will become increasingly 
important to the ESCWA region. The importance of such trade tends to grow with rising 
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per capita income and the diversification of industrial capacity. As more countries in the 
region their industries and integrate them into the world markets, growing intra- 
industry specialization will provide the impetus for the expansion of intra-industry trade 
within the region. Finally, intra-industry trade will increase to the extent that the ESCWA 
member countries are able to lower tariffs on imports from one another to levels 
comparable to those applied by industrialized countries. 
2. Global liberalization 
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, commitments were secured for the 
substantial liberalization of manufactured goods. Developed country tariffs on industrial 
products will be reduced from an average of 6.3% to 3.8% (an overall reduction of 40%), 
though tariff reductions will be lower than average for products of importance to ESCWA 
member countries, such as textiles, clothing, footwear and some machinery. 
A number of the preferential arrangements that have benefited most countries in 
the ESCWA region (such as the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, 
also known as the Multi-fibre Arrangement, or MFA) are being phased out under various 
Uruguay Round agreements. Global liberalization is also eroding the preference margins 
which have benefited some of the indusrial exports of ESCWA member countries under 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The region's exports will therefore face 
increasing competition in their traditional developed markets. If they wish to become more 
competitive in world markets and take advantage of the enhanced market-access 
opportunities now offered, ESCWA member countries have to restructure their industries, 
reduce their costs, and improve the quality of their products. 
In the meantime, the likely displacement of ESCWA member countries' industrial 
exports to industrialized country markets raises some questions about compensation 
through other access opportunities. Arguably, the answer might lie in the ESCWA 
member country markets themselves. As shown previously, the ESCWA member 
countries as a group are more inclined to trade in industrial products with each other than 
with the world as a whole. This suggests that there are regional trading opportunities 
involving industrial products which some ESCWA member countries should take 
advantage of. As part of the effort to achieve potential gains in intraregional trade, 
ESCWA member countries should accelerate their unilateral liberalization programmes 
and open up to each other so that domestic firms can take advantage of the enhanced 
regional market-access opportunities and expand intra-industry trade within the region. 
3. The European Union's Mediterranean initiative 
Another major change with important implications for the trading prospects of the 
ESCWA member countries involves the European Union's initiative to conclude free-trade 
agreements with the Mediterranean countries in the region (see table 7). 
338 
Table 7. Proposed Euro-Mediterranean free-trade agreements 
A. Objectives Candidates 
1. Reciprocal free trade in all ESCWA member countries: 
industrial products Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian 
Arab Republic 
2. Preferential and reciprocal access Other Arab Mediterranean countries: 
for agricultural products Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Tunisia 
concluded a free-trade agreement with 
3. Gradual liberalization of trade in the EU in 1995.) 
services and capital 
4. EU support for the integration of 
Mediterranean countries 
B. Trade liberalization for industrial products 
The phasing out of and Duration: 
barriers on all imports: 
1. Intermediate inputs and capital Five-year transition period 
goods (front-loaded) 
2. Consumer goods (textiles, clothing! Twelve-year transition period (back- 
apparel, leather, footwear, furniture, loaded) 
and other items) 
3. Industrial products not mentioned in immediate liberalization (upon the entzy 
one of the categories above into force of the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreement) 
The initiative is expected to bring about improved market access for the industrial 
exports of some ESCWA member countries. Moreover, a key implication of the 
agreements is that the ESCWA region's signatory countries should commit themselves to 
harmonizing their domestic laws and standards with international norms—thereby making 
it easier for the region's domestic producers to penetrate foreign markets. The European 
Union has committed itself to providing fmancial assistance for the adjustment costs 
incurred in connection with the implementation of the free-trade agreements. 
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The expected pay-offs of these free-trade arrangements are improvements in 
productivity, greater specialization in production, and the export of higher value added 
industrial products to the European market. The initiative also provides a way to ensure 
that the Mediterranean countries in the ESCWA region benefit from the growth- and 
income-generating effects of global liberalization. Counterarguments against the European 
initiative stress that "locking in" policy commitments for domestic market access with the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and adopting international (rather than European) 
standards and norms constitutes a superior option which would allow the countries of the 
ESCWA region to take advantage of world market openings. However, it should be noted 
in this regard that most learning-by-doing in export-oriented industries starts with a 
country aligning its production standards with those of one major foreign market for access 
before learning to adapt production to international norms. 
As far as intraregional trade prospects are concerned, it is expected that the free- 
trade agreements with the EU will create strong incentives for ESCWA member countries 
to open up to each other, with intraregional trade expansion the likely result of such a 
process; without intraregional coordination, the individual ESCWA member countiy 
signatories to these agreements could offer market access to EU investors to discourage 
them from diverting their trade to other, more attractive countries in the region. Intra- 
industry integration among the ESCWA member countries, supported by the rules of 
origin provisions in the agreements, could also serve as a deterrent against this type of 
intraregional trade diversion. Such integration could enhance backward and forward 
linkages among ESCWA member countries and usher in intra-industry trade increases. 
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Intraregional trade in industrial goods as a proportion of total regional trade has 
grown slowly over the past two decades, but has none the less stayed relatively small, 
amounting to only 9% of the region's total exports of industrial products. At the same 
time, the ESCWA region absorbs less than 1% of world exports of industrial products. 
The ESCWA member countries therefore have a greater tendency to trade in industrial 
products with each other than with the world at large. 
In the paper's review of intraregional trade in industrial products, several options 
are identified that seem likely to stimulate further increases over the medium to long term: 
• Liberalizing trade and eliminating domestic distortions would enhance 
the competitiveness of industrial products produced in the ESCWA 
member countries. 
• In many ESCWA member countries, similar factor endowments (such as 
oil and oil products) have led to similar processes of product 
diversification; the development of manufacturing and increased intra- 
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industry specialization would provide the stimulus for regional intra- 
industry trade expansion. 
The ESCWA member countries should make every effort to take 
advantage of the new trading opportunities created through the global 
liberalization of trade in manufactured products during this post-Uruguay 
Round period, and those that are eligible to do so should seek increased 
market access in the European Union through free-trade agreements 
under the EU Mediterranean initiative; the gains achieved in these areas 
will create new incentives for ESCWA member countries to open up to 
each other, and greater intraregional trade in manufactured products is 
likely to be achieved. 
The trading environment is becoming more and more favourable, and the time is 
right to promote further regional cooperation in intraregional trade; one promising prospect 
is an Arab free-trade area, through which a solid basis could be established for the regional 
integration of markets for industrial and agricultural production. The formation of such 
a regional grouping would stimulate domestic as well as foreign investment and would 
also strengthen the negotiating positions of individual ESCWA member countries seeking 
integration with the outside world based on reciprocal trade liberalization. 
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X. A NEW MANUFACTURING STRATEGY FOR ARAB 
COUNTRIES: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL MARKET 
by Heba Handoussa 
Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey 
A. THE CHALLENGE 
"For the Arab region, the challenge is to redeploy its significant industrial base so 
that it takes advantage of its installed capacity, restructures its weaker segments 
and turns from its inward orientation to become a dynamic competitor on the 
world market. Actions are needed on the macro and micro policy front, at the 
institutional and incentives levels, both domestically and regionally" (Handoussa, 
1 995a). 
Arab countries vary widely in terms of size, structure, resource base and per capita 
income, yet they all share a common feature: the wide gap between the actual and 
potential performance of their manufacturing sectors. Aggregate figures for the 
contribution of the manufacturing industry to the economy in the Arab region compare 
very poorly with those of all other developing regions except sub-Saharan Africa. In spite 
of the significant investments made in industry by most Arab countries during the years 
of their economic boom, amounting to as much as 20% of their aggregate investment 
expenditure, and in spite of the fact that the share of the region's manufacturing value 
added (MVA) in world MVA has doubled over the past two decades, reaching 3.4% in 
1994 (UNIDO, 1995), the manufacturing sector has yet to become the engine of growth 
for any of the Arab economies. 
Evidence shows that it is only an outward-oriented manufacturing sector that will 
allow the economy to "take off' in the Arab region. Future prospects for the oil sector are 
poor, and the same is true of oil-related revenues that have so far sustained both the oil- 
rich and oil-poor economies of the region. There is a growing awareness that the region 
must turn away from its dependence on rents (oil revenues, aid transfers and worker 
remittances) and move towards dependence on the more reliable activities of production, 
employment and trade in manufactured products. 
Growth trends for the population and labour force point to the need for industry 
to create most of the 47 million new jobs that will be required over the next 15 years 
(World Bank, I 995b). Agricultural indicators also point to the region's growing 
dependence on net food imports, which will have to be paid for through the increased 
contribution of manufactures to export income. Moreover, the manufacturing sector has 
the potential to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and increase the region's share of 
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global FDI from its present 2% in order to secure much-needed capital flows, technology 
transfer and the opening of export markets. 
At the international level, the challenges facing Arab countries relate to the impact 
of the Uruguay Round and the regional blocs on international trade liberalization, and to 
the implications of the revolution in information and communications technologies. 
Passive support of the older, public-sector-dominated development models and insulation 
from the world economy can only bring about the further loss of opportunities and the 
threat of total marginalization for the Arab countries. What is needed is an aggressive 
strategy that aims at maximizing the potential growth of the private-sector and export-led 
industry—one which modifies both the policy framework and institutional support 
measures to accelerate the absorption of new technology and the transition to industrial 
maturity. 
With the growing importance of regionalism, the projected impact of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and the continued ascendancy of the Association of South- 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, trade is likely to be diverted away from Arab 
countries to members of the new and established trading blocs (the European Union [EU], 
the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] countries, and the ASEAN 
countries) and to selected developing countries that are able to respond to the global 
challenges. Arab countries are thus faced with a world market situation in which their 
prospects for growth are not at all promising; these countries must make a concerted effort 
to change the structure of their economies, or more specifically, to shift away from 
dependence on the export of raw materials and low-value-added intermediates towards the 
export of high-value-added manufactures. 
The first section of the present paper provides an overview of the relative 
performance of the Arab countries' manufacturing sectors relative to that of other 
developing regions and outlines the key weaknesses that have hampered the achievement 
of sustainable growth in the manufacturing industry. The second section analyses the 
changing role of the State in promoting industrial development in the Arab region. The 
third section presents what might be considered the region's window of opportunity and 
attempts to sketch some essential features for a new manufacturing strategy for the Arab 
countries, focusing on the potential for cooperation and economic integration within the 
region. The fourth and last section provides some concluding remarks. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE ARAB MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR'S PERFORMANCE 
Arab countries have given special priority to the growth and diversification of 
their manufacturing sectors over the past three decades, with a large proportion of public 
investment budgets allocated to heavy industry and its infrastructure needs. Arab MVA 
has grown at a much faster pace than international MVA, with its share in world MVA 
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more than doubling from 1.5% in 1970 to 3.4% in 1994 (UNIDO, 1995). However, the 
growth path achieved is far from optimal in the sense that it has not incorporated those 
elements necessary to make it self-sustaining, generating its own steam for continued 
growth and diversification. 
In spite of the rapid growth of manufacturing for the Arab region as a whole, 
indicators show that the contribution of Arab MVA to gross domestic product (GDP) is 
still very modest, at 11%, especially when compared with the corresponding (1994) rate 
of 21.3% for the developing world as a whole (UNIDO, 1995). MVA figures range from 
2.4% for Oman to 18.4 % for Morocco, with relatively low rates prevailing for many 
countries in relation to the extensive period during which industrialization has been at the 
forefront of their development plans. The structure of the Arab manufacturing sector is 
also relatively underdeveloped, with 48% of MVA concentrated in the food and textile 
sectors of the non-oil-exporting Arab countries and more than 50% in the petroleum 
refining sector of the oil-based Arab economies (Handoussa, 1995a). 
A second characteristic of Arab countries is that they still rely heavily on the 
extraction and primaiy processing of their raw materials (petroleum, basic chemicals and 
metals in the oil-based economies; and cotton, other agricultural products, phosphates and 
other ores in the non-oil-based economies). The further processing of these intennediates 
(e.g., the production of downstream petrochemicals, synthetic fibres, rubber, plastics, 
metal products, specialized chemicals and clothing) would contribute significantly towards 
raising value added (wages and profits). The Arabs would also benefit considerably from 
a more open intraregional trading system, which would allow for the more efficient 
dispersal and allocation of investments and the creation of new opportunities based on 
location-related advantages and economies of scale. 
A third characteristic of Arab manufacturing activity is its inward orientation (with 
the exception of oil refining and petroleum products). The share of Arab manufactured 
exports (including refined petroleum) in world exports of manufactures is only 1%, 
compared with the region's MVA share of 3.4% in global MVA (UNIDO, 1995). This 
reflects the import-substitution strategy adopted by most Arab countries, a strategy which 
has slowly been discarded since the late 1980s. 
A look at the commodity composition of Arab exports reveals that despite the 
dynamic shifts occurring between the three major export sectors (agriculture, mining and 
manufactures) and the increase in the share of manufactured exports in total exports from 
4% between 1970 and 1974 to 20% during the period 1990 to 1992, the share of 
petroleum in total exports has remained excessively high, accounting for 63% of total 
exports between 1990 and 1992. Excluding petroleum refining (whose exports totalled 
$14.5 billion in 1992), manufactured exports more than doubled between 1982 and 1992 
to reach $17.5 billion, but they still covered only 20% of manufactured imports, which 
amounted to $82 billion in 1992 (UNIDO, 1994). 
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The poor performance of Arab industry in relation to the vast resources allocated 
to that sector can be explained by four sets of policy-related factors: technology 
acquisition, market orientation, industrial policy and regional coordination. 
1. Technology acquisition 
The Arab countries are characterized by a weak technological base and full 
dependence on imported technology and turnkey projects from advanced countries. 
Research and development (R&D) expenditure has been low, fragmented and 
disassociated from industrial sector needs. Educational and vocational training systems 
have not been modernized and suffer from a lack of coordination with the needs of the 
labour market and the development of industry. The mismatching of labour supply and 
labour demand has seriously affected employment and labour productivity in the region, 
and has contributed heavily to the Arab brain-drain. Many countries in the region have 
not instituted the mechanisms necessary to absorb technical progress and maintain their 
competitive edge: the engineering sector was developed early on by some medium-sized 
Arab countries but has failed to keep up with technical developments (the automotive 
industry is one example); additionally, a number of pharmaceutical industries were 
established more than 20 years ago in certain Arab countries, including Egypt, Tunisia and 
the Syrian Arab Republic, but have failed to become exported-oriented or to undertake 
sufficient investment in R&D to increase their domestic market share. In neglecting 
technological development, a large number of industrial subsectors in the Arab world are 
losing their capacity to compete in the international market and to grow along a sustainable 
path that generates employment, savings, and foreign currency. 
2. Market orientation 
As a result of the Arab countries' import-substitution industrialization (IS!) 
strategy, manufactured imports now exceed manufactured exports by a factor of five, and 
industrial expansion is having a negative effect on the balance of payments. The ISI 
policies pursued by almost all non-petroleum-exporting Arab countries over the last few 
decades have resulted in diminishing returns, the reasons for which relate to the following: 
• Domestic markets cannot grow as fast as the production capacity of new 
and existing enterprises. In contrast, outward-oriented industry is not 
constrained by domestic market limitations. 
• Industrial expansion along an ISI path means diversifying into fields that 
require increasing capital, skill and technology intensities which are not 
easily attained. 
• Once IS! continues beyond the stage where the rewards of economies of 
scale and natural advantage (transportation costs) can be reaped, a 
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country foregoes the opportunity to specialize in areas in which it has 
acquired knowledge and skills with which it can enter foreign markets 
and instead diversifies into areas where it has less scope for becoming 
competitive. 
A country which persists in following an ISI strategy actually increases 
its dependence on imports, since it must gradually enter fields in which 
it has fewer and fewer domestic resources that are suited to the 
production of further import substitutes. The experiences of several Arab 
countries give evidence of their having prolonged the IS! phase beyond 
the period dictated by economic viability. 
• Insulation from global competition constrains total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth, a situation for which a country pays dearly in the long run, 
as evidenced by the former socialist economies. Most Arab countries 
pursued IS! with great vigour until recently; in many cases ISI strategies 
were also combined with a heavy dose of socialist-type central planning, 
State-ownership and bureaucratic control. 
• The oil boom is over. Many of the inward-oriented sectors that expanded 
rapidly during those years, especially non-tradeables such as building 
materials, have no further scope for rapid growth; the only alternative is 
reorientation and restructuring. 
• Excessive protection leads to serious price distortions, and the greater the 
departure from a unified level of protection, the greater the degree of 
relative price distortion. Price distortions, in turn, lead to unintended 
biases against particular activities, namely those that are oriented towards 
exports and those related to the production of capital goods and 
intermediates. 
3. Industrial policy 
The Arab countries lack a forward-looking industrial policy that focuses on 
dynamic comparative advantage: As a result, they have continued to concentrate on 
upstream activities which have limited value added and contribute very little to 
employment or revenue generation. The practice of transforming natural resources 
(energy, phosphates, cotton) into intermediates gives clear evidence of their failure to 
move consistently and rapidly into downstream activities. Another side effect is the 
vulnerable position of these sectors in international markets, which are far more volatile 
than downstream industries that cater to fmal consumption. There is strong evidence that 
State intervention has played a significant role in the transformation of those developing 
countries which have "graduated" to become newly industrialized countries (NICs). With 
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respect to the nature of intervention that has characterized successful growth models, 
mounting evidence points to the existence of special features which fit neither the strictly 
neoclassical nor the socialist prescription for growth and development. 
Research is making it clear that dynamic comparative advantage—the key to 
successful industrialization—can only be achieved if enterprises involved in the 
production, trading and services sectors are able to acquire knowledge with sufficient 
speed and adapt to the rapid changes now characterizing the global economy. Several 
elements of the structural adjustment and economic reform programmes currently under 
way in Arab countries will have a positive impact on redirecting industry towards self- 
sustaining growth. Other elements are needed to enhance technical progress and ensure 
adequate support to industry during its transition. These can only be provided by a well- 
designed industrial policy formulated by the Government in consultation with the private 
sector. 
Until recently, the Governments of the advanced market economies believed that 
State intervention in the industrial sector should be minimal and were therefore opposed 
to the concept of an "industrial policy". However, after witnessing Japan's and the 
A SEAN countries' penetration of the global market, even the United States has begun 
instituting new forms of government promotion for technology acquisition, skill formation, 
better organization and management, and export growth in the manufacturing sector. 
4. Regional coordination 
The Arab countries have had no success in integrating their regional industry- 
related markets. In spite of numerous regional efforts to stimulate Arab economic 
integration, neither specialization and trade nor intrasectoral cooperation (in car assembly 
or computers, for example) has taken place. Attempts to cooperate through the creation 
ofjomt ventures have not been successful either (as measured by growth rates and market 
share). Intraregional trade among Arab countries still accounts for only 10% of their total 
trade (excluding petroleum), up from 7% in 1980. In contrast, the share of intraregional 
trade in total trade for the three new regional blocs has increased rapidly, accounting for 
58.9% in the EU, 37.4% in East Asia and 36.3% in North America in 1989. 
Another feature of the Arab countries' industry structure is the similarity in the 
choices that have been made to expand certain subsectors (steel, aluminium, 
petrochemicals, fertilizers and other basic chemicals) and neglect others (capital goods, 
downstream petrochemicals, processed metals and various engineering products). 
Closely linked to the Arab economies' ISI strategies of the past few decades has 
been their narrow investment focus; each country has concentrated on its own domestic 
market rather than on the larger regional or global market. This approach has resulted in 
the replication of many capital-intensive projects across Arab countries and to the 
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increased dependence of each project on the rest of the world. The same resources would 
have been better directed towards the development of regional economies, regional 
interdependence and regional integration. This inward-looking strategy is unsustainable 
for a number of reasons: 
• The rapid pace of regionalization in the rest of the world means that 
Arab countries are facing an increasingly aggressive international 
market characterized by higher real barriers to entry for non-members 
of regional blocs. 
• Net financial flows to Arab countries from the West (especially Europe 
and the United States) are declining as a result of the priority that has 
been placed on responding to the unusually high demands for capital in 
Eastern Europe. 
• Arab countries face the threat of further marginalization in the global 
market if they do not act cooperatively in response to the ascendancy of 
Far Eastern exports (including those of the ASEAN countries and 
China). The share of the seven tigers alone (the Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand) in total developing country exports rose from 21% in 
1980to46% in 1990. 
• The peace settlement with Israel has serious implications for the 
competitive positions of domestic producers—even within their own 
territories. First, with the lifting of the embargo on foreign firms doing 
business with Israel, a large number of multinationals will seriously 
consider shifting their regional bases from Arab countries to Israel, 
diverting significant foreign direct investment away from Arab 
countries. Second, lifting the embargo on Israeli products can be 
expected to result in Israel's exports to the Arab countries exceeding its 
imports from them. Although much of this trade diversion may be at the 
expense of other world exporters to the region, some Arab exporters 
should expect to lose a certain portion of their markets. Third, Israel has 
expressed an interest in forming a regional bloc with its immediate 
neighbours (at least Palestine and Jordan); if such a bloc were 
established, whatever mode of economic integration was chosen would 
place this group in a much stronger position than the rest of the Middle 
East region if the latter were to remain fragmented. 
All of the above factors point to the need for Arab countries to pool their resources and 
take a common stand on a number issues that concern their industrial development. One 
351 
area worthy of policy revision concerns the functions of the State in the realm of industrial 
development. 
C. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE 
IN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
From the 1960s onward, the State played a major role in the industrial 
development of most countries in the Arab region. The initiation of large investment 
projects operated by State-owned enterprises (SUEs) in critical industries was combined 
with the adoption of ISI policies including extensive, protection and a negative stance 
towards the operation of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
This approach persisted until recently; in the last few years, one country after 
another has been reconsidering the size and role of SOEs, and an increasing number have 
begun to recognize the urgent need to reorient industrial policies towards export 
marketing, towards making better use of private domestic capital and developing 
entrepreneurial capabilities, and towards attracting TNCs in order to capture the benefits 
of frontier technologies and international marketing. 
The major challenge to the State in the new global context is to overcome the 
domestic rigidities which have been inherited from decades of over-regulation and the 
insulation of domestic markets. It is recognized in all of the countries of the region that 
accumulated oil wealth and oil-related incomes no longer constitute the engine of growth, 
and that export orientation and reliance on a vigorous private sector are the only viable and 
sustainable options over the next two decades. 
In the ongoing debate over the role of the State in industrial policy, the major issue 
is whether the State should intervene in the market, and if so, in what form and to what 
extent. The interpretation of the Asian success story is at the centre of the controversy 
over the nature and amount of State involvement required. 
1. The role of the State in stabilization and structural adjustment 
The Government's role in maintaining stability has long been recognized as one 
of the most important components of the South-East Asian countries' successful growth 
experience. As part of a country's "growth fundamentals", fiscal, monetary and exchange- 
rate policies must ensure that inflation is avoided and price distortions are kept to a 
minimum—a strategy that serves to promote business confidence, discourage speculative 
investment and prevent the development of an anti-export bias (World Bank, 1993). 
In addition to the negative impact oil price shocks and capital outflows have had 
on the Arab region since the mid-1980s, the continued dominance of the oil sector has 
negatively affected the competitiveness of manufacturing activity. The economies in 
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question have been slow in adjusting, and by 1993 the cumulative debt of the region had 
reached $140 billion Arab Economic Report, 1993). 
Most Arab countries have experienced the artificial appreciation of their local 
currencies as a result of their excessive reliance on petroleum exports, workers' 
remittances and/or related transfers. Dependence on a few large but volatile sources of 
income has created an overvaluation of domestic currencies and a strong bias against 
tradeables other than petroleum. This means that the cost of production in domestic 
manufacturing is often very high relative to competitive international prices, and this 
discourages production for either the export or the domestic market (it is cheaper to import 
many commodities). Other, related problems have been skill shortages caused by labour 
migration to the oil-exporting countries and the corresponding rise in real wages ahead of 
increased productivity, both of which have contributed to the reduced competitiveness of 
manufacturing at home and abroad. 
Economic reform and structural adjustment programmes (ERSAPs) have been 
undertaken by most of the countries in the region, some (Morocco and Tunisia) ahead of 
others (Egypt and Jordan). ERSAPs may be considered the main prerequisite for many 
Arab economies in the sense that they enable these countries to face the challenges of the 
global economy; the short-term costs of restructuring industry will be more than 
compensated for by the large payoff of raising its long-term competitiveness. 
Liberalizing the incentive structure in each economy involves "getting prices 
right" to reflect international prices and opportunity cost. Domestic producers are having 
to restructure their investments and revise their product mix in the face of reduced 
protection, a reduced bias towards import substitution and reduced distortions in the cost 
of intermediates. Industries that do not enjoy a comparative advantage will gradually be 
eliminated, many of them displaced by more competitive export-oriented industries. 
The elimination of price distortions in the market is equally important for certain 
factors of production, including capital, labour and foreign exchange. Domestic interest 
rates have been too low for quite some time in a number of countries; increasing them 
would correct the traditional bias towards excessive capital intensity in production 
techniques and stimulate the adoption of new technologies that are capital-saving and 
hence more internationally competitive. The respective ERSAPs are also working to 
improve labour market flexibility and reduce real wage rates, especially in labour-abundant 
economies, whose industries would regain their competitive edge in labour-intensive 
sectors. Exchange-rate liberalization constitutes perhaps the most important measure for 
solving the problem of overvaluation and restoring the balance of incentives between 
tradeables and non-tradeables. 
Liberalizing trade and exchange-rate regimes is expected to facilitate the process 
of transforming protected domestic industries into competitive export industries. Those 
353 
industries that fail to restructure and remain non-competitive will ultimately be displaced 
as the inflow of competitive manufactured imports increases and as other industrial 
ventures are created which utilize the elements of Arab comparative advantage (labour- 
intensive industries in labour-surplus economies and energy-intensive industries in oil- 
exporting economies) and which are able to benefit from the revision of overvalued 
exchange rates. Such reform measures are expected to enhance the competitiveness of 
manufactured exports, thus increasing the region's potential to attract investment resources 
which can benefit from an expanding regional market and from the use of the region as a 
platform for manufactured exports. 
2. The role of the State as regulator 
The regulatory role of the State relates to its ability to manipulate the policies that 
have both direct and indirect effects on the market mechanism guiding the allocative 
process. Within the context of its regulatory objective, each Arab State must promote 
increased competition in the business sector by relaxing the legal and administrative 
framework governing market entry and exit. The stock of capital held abroad by citizens 
of the region is estimated at about $350 billion (World Bank, 1995b). While in some cases 
productive capital inflows have been discouraged by stringent investment rules, in most 
cases the problem is the absence of an enabling environment: simple bureaucratic 
procedures, transparent legislation, effective information and communications networks, 
and competitive product and factor markets. The State can obviously play a key role in 
providing such an environment and in ensuring the economic stability that will enhance 
business confidence and help raise the level of aggregate investment above the 1992 level 
of $112 billion for the region as a whole Arab Economic Report, 1993). 
One of the Government's basic functions is to provide a set of rules and market- 
supporting institutions through which property rights can be protected, contracts enforced, 
and a stable economic environment established so that productive activity can flourish. 
Stability, predictability and the transparency of policies form the basis of sound 
government action in the economic sphere. Within this framework, the Government can 
establish an incentive structure and support the accumulation of critical productive 
capabilities which will drive the economy towards the efficiency frontier. Even at this 
basic level, there are a multitude of impediments that are encountered in many Arab 
countries. One major problem is that existing laws and regulations tend to be restrictive, 
and there is a high degree of overlap; further, many of them are inconsistent with one 
another. There is a plethora of government departments responsible for implementing the 
laws, and this translates into enormous costs to the entrepreneur in the length of time it 
takes to conduct business. Given the dynamic nature of the global market in which 
enterprises must now compete, there is no possible way for such a slack institutional 
environment to survive. 
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Arab countries must also resolve the issue of the public/private divide in the 
manufacturing sector by reversing the structure of ownership in favour of the private 
sector—a prerequisite for ridding the institutional environment of all vestiges of the 
public-sector monopoly and bureaucratic mentality that have plagued Arab economic 
systems. The region has the highest market concentration of State-owned firms in the 
manufacturing sector outside of the former Soviet bloc (World Bank, 1995 a). Another 
fact that argues for less State involvement in industry is that growth opportunities for the 
future are no longer to be found in large-scale, homogeneous product industries that rely 
on capital-intensive and slow-changing technology. The seven fastest growing 
industries—micro-electronics, biotechnology, new materials, telecommunications, 
aerospace, machine tools and robotics, and computers and software—are all technology- 
and skill-intensive; they require flexible production and organizational structures that are 
neither compatible with nor adaptable to the high degree of centralization found in the 
older generation of industries, to which the style of public ownership and management 
is well suited (Lall, 1995). 
3. The role of the State in "catching up" 
The pace of technological progress in the information and communications 
industries has accelerated the globalization of production and markets. TNCs are 
diversifying the locations of their industrial operations and significantly increasing their 
investments in developing countries. It is worth noting in this context that the Arab 
region captured only $2 billion of FDI in 1993, while $4 billion flowed into Malaysia 
alone during the same year. Moreover, international and regional agreements on trade 
liberalization are making quality competition more intense, and more often than not 
require compliance with industrialized country norms regarding property rights and the 
environment. 
Initiating the process of catching up is one of the most important roles the State 
can play with regard to the industrial sector. It is vital to ensure that total factor 
productivity (TFP) responds to reforms in the institutional and incentive structures so 
that the returns on existing and new investments can be maximized. Enhancing 
knowledge acquisition is the key to future advancement and will determine the level of 
industrial, technological and scientific progress each country is able to achieve. The 
quality of human capital has been mainly responsible for the newly industrialized 
nations' success in achieving modernization and sustained progress. Arab countries need 
to make a serious effort to eradicate illiteracy, upgrade basic education and introduce 
state-of-the-art training programmes. 
Comparative advantage must now be sought in industries where labour is 
abundant and skilled rather than in industries with cheap, unskilled labour alone. Skill- 
intensive and knowledge-intensive industries will be the leaders in the future, and Arab 
countries will find their niche only if they are willing to invest in human resources now. 
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The State can also commit itself to following an active industrial policy involving the 
careful selection of a number of leading sectors and the promotion of their rapid 
development through the choice of appropriate policies in the fields of technology, 
education and training, and market information. The growth model of the South-East 
Asian countries depicts a deliberately interventionist State that has used three major 
approaches to promote rapid structural change and productivity growth: high levels of 
selective protection for targeted subsectors over a limited period; a comprehensive assault 
on all institutional fronts in order to maximize the flow of knowledge to all economic 
agents; and effective measures to transform the bureaucracy from a passive if not 
obstructive player in the economy to an active agent of development via the creation of an 
elite technocracy (Handoussa, 1 995b). 
In terms of its functional role, the State should limit its efforts to eliminating 
market distortions and ensuring a competitive environment (static efficiency) while at the 
same time promoting innovation and change (dynamic efficiency) via its education, 
science and industrial policies. Unless the State intervenes to facilitate the processes of 
catching up, structural transformation, and changing the "inherited" comparative 
advantage, Arab countries will experience very low levels of growth and diversification, 
risking stagnation in a global environment that is now far less benign for developing 
countries than it was during the past three decades. 
Planning is one of the principal institutional tools utilized by developing countries 
to support the process of catching up. State intervention through planning should be 
thoroughly revised. First, public investment expenditure should be reduced so that it is 
confined to the allocation of resources in specific fields where the probability of potential 
market failure is high. Second, the focus of government intervention must shift from the 
planning of projects to the planning of policies. A plan should reflect a development 
strategy that promotes structural change by means of providing correct market signals. 
Policy makers must now design an industrial policy that focuses on a selected group of 
industries and fields of activity which are expected to enjoy evident future comparative 
advantage. Leading sectors would be entitled to State support for technology acquisition, 
training, restructuring, market access and information dissemination to enable them to 
grow and to compete within the domestic market and, more importantly, on the 
international front. South-East Asian economies constitute examples of successful 
government intervention in industry. The important lesson to be gained from their 
experience relates to the adoption of a mode of planning based on a selective 
interventionist policy in the incentive system geared towards minimizing conflict with the 
operation of market forces. 
The current process of structural adjustment, which gives the State's role in the 
economy a new dimension, provides a real opportunity for domestic reforms to translate 
into regional coordination and cooperation----which in themselves would enhance the 
prospects for the accelerated growth and increased competitiveness of the manufacturing 
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sector in each Arab country. Parallel to the ongoing process of economic reform and 
structural adjustment, Arab countries should design effective industrial policies that would 
allow them to respond to new challenges and to take advantage of opportunities to 
expedite the "catching up" of their industrial sectors; the benefits would be even greater 
if these individual industrial policies were well coordinated among Arab countries. 
D. A PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY FOR ARAB COUNTRIES 
If the drive towards industrial development is to succeed, Arab industries must 
overcome the two most critical constraints on efficient growth, namely the lack of foreign 
market access and the lack of access to technological advances and innovations. At the 
national level, two policy options are envisioned to surmount these obstacles: the first 
involves developing indigenous skills and talent in order to penetrate export markets and 
catch up on the technological level; the second involves attracting transnational 
corporations which have the most developed marketing networks and their own frontier 
technologies. 
Global trends imply that Arab countries will soon face fierce competition from 
other developing countries with the opening up of both the advanced countries' markets 
(accounting for 60% of developing countries' exports) and the markets of the developing 
countries themselves. What is equally obvious is that the gradual enforcement of WTO 
rules on tariff and non-tariff protection will pose an enormous problem for non- 
competitive domestic producers in the Arab region. The only viable strategy for each Arab 
country is to pursue a vigorous programme of rationalization, restructuring and 
reorientation. In addition, there are several benefits to be reaped if national programmes 
are deliberately designed to capitalize on regional opportunities via policies and measures 
that enforce the regional harmonization of investment and trade policies, with a view to 
eventual long-term regional integration. 
Three sets of opportunities evolve with the deepening of regional economic 
integration and can be taken advantage of to raise the level of competitiveness and the 
degree of diversification in the manufacturing industry across the Arab world; these 
include opportunities for further import substitution, opportunities for forward integration, 
and opportunities for horizontal integration. With the opening up of Arab markets to 
liberalized intraregional trade and capital flows, every Arab country would enjoy a larger 
share of the region's total trade and capital flows, and the manufacturing activity in each 
country would expand rapidly. In 1992, the manufactured goods imported by Arab 
countries totalled $83.4 billion, only $5.8 billion (6%) of which were from the region. 
This compares with intraregional shares of between 35% and 50% in the total trade of the 
ASEAN, EU and NAFTA regions. Moreover, Arab exports of manufactured goods in 
1992 stood at $32 billion ($17 billion excluding petroleum refming), representing only 1% 
of world manufactured exports ($3 trillion). This figure contrasts with an Arab share of 
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3.4% in world MVA, reflecting the large gap between actual and potential Arab exports 
of manufactured goods. 
Opportunities for import substitution are still important at the regional level to 
allow these countries to take advantage of the vast Arab market as a single market. There 
are a number of industry segments where economies of scale on the supply side have 
prevented any one country from making a viable investment based on its local market 
potential alone. Examples are particularly striking in capital goods, which accounted for 
$30 billion of Arab imports in 1992. 
A second set of industries would benefit from opportunities for the forward 
integration of existing sectors whose resource advantages provide the Arab region with 
low-cost intermediates which can be further processed into high-value-added products for 
both the regional and export markets. This group includes a wide range of petrochemical 
industries for the oil-rich countries and textile and garment industries for the non-oil-based 
economies. 
Regional integration would also create opportunities for exploiting the benefits of 
horizontal rationalization including mergers and subcontracting arrangements among the 
firms of different Arab countries. Taking advantage of this third option would bring about 
trends similar to those observed in Asia, Europe and NAFTA countries, where a single 
location is no longer solely responsible for all the activities of a large finn. The liberalized 
movement of capital and commodities along with a harmonized institutional environment 
across all Arab countries would thus enhance productive efficiency, competitiveness, and 
the scope for rapid expansion to meet the demand of a fast-growing regional market. 
The trade (tariff and non-tariff) and investment (licensing) barriers currently 
imposed by many Arab countries constitute the major reason why the flow of industrial 
capital and trade in manufactured products among the countries of the region has been so 
limited. Removing these restrictions would have positive effects that went beyond the gain 
in opportunities for Arab firms; it would also encourage investments by TNCs seeking a 
larger Arab market to make their operations viable. All of the industries falling into one 
of the opportunity groups described above would benefit greatly from the reduction in 
trade barriers and investment constraints, as both limit the scope for effective competition 
and cooperation among firms across the region. The experience of regional blocs in other 
parts of the world gives evidence of the large gains to be achieved by each member of the 
Arab regional community in both the medium and the long term. 
Arab States could also be proactive in jointly designing a plan that develops a 
number of key industries in the region for which dynamic comparative advantage is 
identified and growth prospects are expected and in which cooperation would raise the rate 
of return. Among the industries and subsectors that deserve attention and study are capital 
goods, downstream petrochemical products, special metals, micro-electronics, and 
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software. In each of these fields, a number of specific lines can be identified as potential 
niches. Collaboration should seek to forge alliances not only between firms in the region 
but also between these firms and TNCs which can be induced to locate their activities in 
the region. 
E. CONCLUSION 
There is a real need for Arab countries to shift away from their traditional concept 
of industrial cooperation—often understood to mean the flow of grants and fmancial 
assistance from the richer to the poorer countries to fmance industrial projects in the latter. 
Arab countries should also avoid implementing joint ventures across the region that are 
motivated solely by political and/or Arab nationalist goals, even though such objectives 
can boost cooperation. Meaningful and sustainable cooperation is only possible if it serves 
each and every member's objective of achieving real economic gains; in other words, it 
should not be a zero-sum game. Such gains include higher commercial profits from equity 
participation in projects, a growing regional and international market share for the industry 
in question, lower operation and technology acquisition costs, and greater leverage in 
negotiating with transnational corporations over regionally focused projects. 
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XI. EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY: 
ITS RELEVANCE AND LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
by Se-Hark Park 
Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan 
A. OVERVIEW 
In recent years there has been a fundamental shift in the way that economists and 
policy makers think about industrialization, and particularly the role of State policy 
interventions, in developing countries. The key factors in this regard appear to be the 
demise of the inward-looking import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy based on 
State intervention, and the ascendancy of the export-oriented industrialization (EO1) 
strategy based on trade liberalization and free-market principles. 
"Getting prices right" is clearly the slogan of the day. Market reforms and trade 
liberalization have constituted the heart of stabilization and adjustment programmes 
supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in developing 
countries. In particular, inward-looking industrialization through aid has been replaced 
by outward-oriented industrialization through trade. Presently, the most crucial questions 
relate to: 
• The universality of free-market and free-trade principles, or more 
specifically, their efficacy across a broad range of economies with widely 
disparate industrialization levels and social and economic conditions 
• The relative importance of trade as opposed to non-trade factors in 
accelerating industrialization 
The neoclassical doctrine based on free-market principles and minimal 
government involvement owes its success largely to the miserable failures of the actively 
State-interventionist "industry first" development strategy pursued in developing countries 
between the 1 950s and the 197 Os. It has become evident that the failure of the 
industrialization drive in many developing countries during this period was primarily 
attributable to the adoption of the wrong strategy, namely 1ST. Conversely, the spectacular 
success stories of rapid industrialization in East Asian countries have shown that an 
appropriate industrial policy, that is, one incorporating the EOI strategy, can make a 
critical difference in the success or failure of industrialization efforts, and more 
importantly, that State policy interventions do matter, which directly challenges the 
validity of the neoclassical doctrine. 
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The East Asian experience—particularly the aspect of State policy 
intervention—has not conformed to neoclassical free-market policy prescriptions, and the 
neoclassical school has been challenged to explain the East Asian success. This challenge 
is accepted by the World Bank in its recent publication, The East Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (World Bank, 1993). The study offers a contrived 
explanation, distinguishing between good policies and bad policies: good policies, which 
contributed to the miracle, include market-friendly functional (or non-selective) 
interventions in such areas as capital formation, human resource development, 
technological upgrading and export promotion; bad policies relate to selective policy 
interventions affecting inter-industry resource allocation in favour of government-targeted 
industries. The study concludes that the selective intervention of picking "winners" is not 
justified on theoretical grounds and has contributed little, if anything, to East Asia's 
success. 
Caution is called for, however. It is often difficult to make a conceptual 
distinction between functional and selective interventions. First of all, any intervention 
that removes market failure, whether it is functional or selective, is market-friendly. 
Second, any market-friendly measure such as skill formation or export promotion can be 
formulated along functional lines or on a selective-industry basis. Finally, because of 
imperfections in capital and technology markets, strong selective policy interventions are 
needed for the acquisition, adoption, adaptation and indigenous development of new 
technologies. 
The debate on industrial policy in general and on selective policy intervention in 
particular is likely to continue unabated for some time in the light of the East Asian 
success. The present paper aims to contribute to the debate. In subsequent sections, the 
study reviews conceptual issues surrounding the State and the market and evaluates trade 
policy interventions geared towards developing export industries, then highlights the 
industrial policy experiences of Japan and the Republic of Korea. The study concludes 
with a summary and evaluation of the main points, with particular emphasis on certain 
lessons to be learned from the East Asian miracle. 
B. THE MARKET AND THE STATE 
In earlier decades, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the strong role of the State in the 
process of economic development was predicated on its perceived ability to protect against 
market failures and externalities. Within the last decade, however, the dominant thinking 
in development economics has focused more critically on the State's central role in such 
development, and the widespread acceptance of a managed and even planned economy has 
been replaced by the supremacy of the neoclassical school's increased reliance on market 
forces and consequent economic and trade liberalization. 
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The case for the free-market system as a means of achieving optimal dynamic 
resource allocation and welfare maximization under a set of restrictive assumptions can 
hardly be disputed. It is equally evident, however, that certain preconditions have to exist 
for the price mechanism to achieve optimal dynamic resource allocation and production. 
As cogently explained by Scitovsky (1954), there must be complete and functioning 
markets, which requires the following: perfect information and resource mobility among 
numerous economic agents, none of which is big enough to influence prices or production 
in all (i.e., product, labour, financial and capital) markets; the absence of economies of 
scale; and complete tradeability. Obviously, these preconditions rarely exist in reality. 
There are numerous specific market failures and externalities which may, in the 
absence of corrective policies, result in a socially sub-optimal allocation of resources. 
Four different types of market failures are identified here. One oft-cited example relates 
to labour market distortions resulting from labour training externalities: labour training 
benefits cannot be appropriated by a firm, since trained labour may move to other firms, 
and this may cause firms to invest less in training than is socially desirable. There are also 
institutional and legally imposed barriers to the perfect functioning of the labour market, 
such as minimum wage and the bargaining power of trade unions, which keep urban and 
industrial wages higher and employment rates lower than would be the case in the absence 
of such barriers. Second, there are informational and technological externalities associated 
with entrepreneurial activities that are related to the development of new production 
techniques or the exploitation of new markets whose benefits can accrue to other 
entrepreneurs at no cost, a situation which may force them to underinvest and 
underproduce. Third, in the case of economies of scale, the firm produces at a level where 
price equals average cost but is less than marginal cost, which means it is producing less 
than is socially optimal. Fourth, the financial and capital markets in many countries are 
inadequately developed to induce long-term industrial investment; this is particularly true 
in developing countries.' 
It is against this backdrop of hotly debated market imperfections that the Latin 
American structuralists and other development economists emerged in the 1950s, 
beginning with the works of Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950) and Hirschman (1958). 
Among other things, they pointed out structural rigidities and institutional barriers which 
interfered with the smooth functioning of free-market systems, and asserted that State 
intervention was required to remove these bottlenecks and create an environment 
conducive to the perfect functioning of free-market systems. They reasoned that such 
intervention was justified particularly during the early stages of industrialization, when 
market imperfections were likely to be more pervasive; the later stages of development 
were generally characterized by greater economic integration. 
For a more complete discussion on the subject, see Roderick (1992). 
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The structuralists' advocacy of an active State role in initiating and accelerating 
industrialization during the I 950s and 1 960s was eventually challenged by an avalanche 
of anti-interventionist reactions, culminating in the recent dominance of neoclassical 
thought, which firmly espouses free-market principles, free trade, and the "minimalist 
Government". The theory of development economics constructed around active State 
intervention has been attacked on various fronts. The central argument of the neoclassical 
critique is that market distortions per se do not provide the rationale for State intervention, 
even if the sources of such distortions are identified and their quantitative importance can 
be gauged—tasks which are extremely difficult to perform. The representative view of the 
neoclassical school is that State intervention not only fails to correct market distortions, 
but that it actually exacerbates the problem; in other words, government failures are worse 
than market failures (Bauer, 1984; Lal, 1985). This view also asserts that State 
intervention creates a breeding ground for rent-seeking or "directly unproductive profit- 
seeking" activities (Bhagwati, 1982). The supposition is that seeking government favours 
and competing for government contracts and other largesse distorts normal economic 
activity, which leads to sub-optimal resource allocation. 
The crux of the issue surrounding the State-versus-market controversy between 
traditional development economists and neoclassical followers seems to relate to the ability 
of the State to "get things right" and bring about the desired structural transformation 
through intervention. The neoclassical camp shows profound distrust in active public 
policy purportedly directed towards correcting market failures, while development 
economists have implicit faith in the State's unlimited capacity to direct the development 
process. In many cases, development economists have correctly pinpointed the causes of 
underdevelopment, but they have contributed little to explanations of how, when and 
where to intervene, or to the development of a coherent theory of policy intervention valid 
for diverse economic and social conditions. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between active State intervention and 
economic development is not conclusive. There are a few economies like that of I-long 
Kong, which has thrived on the relatively laissez-faire free markets and free-trade regimes. 
The other major option, active State economic intervention, has produced a number of 
successes but also some notable failures. Today, it is clear that many of the successful 
East Asian countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, and 
most of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries are strongly 
interventionist. In one particular example, during the early stages of its industrialization 
in the 1 960s and 1 970s, the Republic of Korea heavily supported targeted export industries 
through the provision of export subsidies and other financial incentives, while at the same 
time shielding these industries from foreign competition in the domestic markets, where 
their products could be sold at prices higher than those in the world market. In fact, 
Amsden (1989) argues that the relative prices were manipulated on purpose to shift 
resources to the key targeted sectors. This directly contradicts the principle of "getting 
prices right". 
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The scope for intervention seems to depend on the stage of industrialization at 
which a given economy finds itself. Based on his study of European industrialization, 
Gerschenkron (1962) argued long ago that the nature and extent of State intervention 
changed at different stages of industrialization. At the initial stage, where there are no 
functioning markets, the State has to engage in "pump-priming" in order to mobilize 
resources and create an enabling environment for the smooth functioning of market 
systems. However, as the economy advances along the trajectory of industrialization and 
its structure becomes more complex and sophisticated, the task of selective policy 
intervention aimed at specific sectors becomes increasingly difficult to implement without 
unforeseen distortions in other sectors. In the advanced stage of industrialization, the role 
of the State is restricted to establishing and maintaining a competitive environment for 
private enterprises, and resource allocation is primarily guided by price signals and market 
incentives. 
Important interventions during the initial stage of industrialization include public 
investment in infrastructure for transport, communications and utilities, as well as 
institution-building for the development of an indigenous business class, educational and 
legal systems, and financial and capital markets. Adequate social and physical 
infrastructures and institutions constitute a necessary precondition for building industrial 
supply capacity; the correct price signal alone may not be sufficient to induce or enhance 
such capacity. In this regard, it must be noted that public investment should be viewed as 
a complementary support mechanism for private investment, since the availability of 
adequate infrastructure services may be required to induce private investment; in 
industrialized countries with a well-developed infrastructure and other supporting systems, 
public investment might only serve to "crowd out" private capital and raise interest rates. 
State intervention is obviously not a panacea for extricating an economy from the 
vicious cycle of underdevelopment. As correctly pointed out by the neoclassical school, 
there are many historical cases where bad government interventions have actually 
exacerbated the disease they were designed to cure. However, there are also a number of 
success stories related to active government intervention in the development process, 
particularly in East Asia. The issue is not whether State intervention per se is good or bad; 
what matters is the nature and quality of the intervention. The outcome of an intervention 
is critically dependent not only on strong political commitment to reforms, but also on the 
objective of the intervention (for instance, the development of an inward-looking or 
outward-oriented economy) and, above all, the capability of the State to initiate and guide 
market-friendly structural transformation. In the past, active policy interventions in most 
East Asian countries were targeted at the creation of export industries and an outward- 
looking economy after the initial phase of import substitution. This process was greatly 
facilitated by political flexibility (the willingness and ability to change) and the 
development of a government machinery capable of overriding the pressure from vested 
interest groups and of getting various economic actors to implement technocratic policies. 
In a number of developing countries outside East Asia, State interventions were just as 
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active, but many failed because development efforts were misdirected towards an 
unsustainable strategy such as inward-looking industrialization, and this was compounded 
by the problem of relatively weak government capacity and the lack of a political 
commitment to pursue a coherent policy. 
Finally, the debate on industrial policy should include a comparative assessment 
of the errors of commission and omission that have been made. Bad government 
intervention is clearly an error of commission. Failing to remove market failures through 
selective policy intervention (and therefore possibly stymying industrial development) 
constitutes an error of omission; this can be just as damaging as bad government 
intervention. 
In particular, strong selective policy interventions may be needed to achieve 
industrial and technological "deepening", which is essential to shift the economy from 
labour-intensive manufactured exports to more technology- and skill-intensive 
manufacturing and exports. The failure to act may be costly—an argument for which there 
is some compelling empirical evidence. S. Lall (1995) contends that Hong Kong, which 
is well known for its laissez-faire economy characterized by free trade, the absence of 
selective interventions, and free foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, started and has 
stuck with predominantly labour-intensive manufacturing industries; since there is little 
scope for "learning" with light manufacturing, little industrial or technological deepening 
has taken place in Hong Kong's economy. By sharp contrast, Singapore, a city-State of 
similar size, followed a highly interventionist policy combined with free trade and built a 
far deeper industrial structure than Hong Kong in terms of technological sophistication of 
manufacturing and exports, and it now enjoys steady, sustained industrial growth. 
The Lall study (1995) also cites examples of two non-Asian countries, Chile and 
Ghana, which pursued vigorously market-friendly reforms but did not implement selective 
policy interventions as encouraged by the World Bank and the IMF. By and large, the 
same conclusion is drawn for the two countries: although they enjoyed some success in 
manufacturing light labour-intensive and resource-based products for export, the absence 
of selective promotion stunted industrial and technological deepening, and there was no 
progression beyond low-value-added manufacturing towards the building of a 
sophisticated high-value-added industrial base which would allow them to compete in the 
world market. 
C. TRADE REGIME AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the nature and extent of State 
interventions should differ substantially according to the kind of industrial strategy and 
trade regime adopted. For instance, an IS! strategy by nature relies on market restrictions 
to protect domestic industries from external competition; State intervention thus has an 
anti-export bias. Conversely, EOI may require the kind of State intervention that facilitates 
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the transformation of protected domestic industries into competitive export industries. In 
the light of such divergent requirements, the incentive structures and their implications for 
the rent-seeking activities of special interest groups are likely to differ markedly for the 
two strategies. 
The paradigm of the day is undoubtedly the EOI strategy. It must be noted, 
however, that export promotion in this context usually involves manufactured exports, 
while exports of primary products are excluded. It is well known that the export of raw 
materials is not a viable growth strategy, mainly because of the low price and income 
elasticities of demand for primary goods relative to manufactured goods. Commodity 
exports may be subject to frequent boom-and-bust cycles accompanied by violent price 
fluctuations, and their export revenues may fall short of manufactured import bills in the 
long run. Worse, any productivity increase in raw materials decreases world commodity 
prices instead of generating income and employment gains in the producer country.2 
In recent years, attention has been increasingly focused on the link between 
exports and industrialization in the light of the export-led success stories of East Asia. The 
favourable effects of the EOI strategy are numerous and are extensively discussed in the 
literature. Among other things, this strategy has a proven capacity for promoting efficient 
resource allocation, exploiting economies of scale, removing foreign-exchange constraints, 
stimulating competition, generating production externalities (such as the creation of new 
skills and technological upgrading), facilitating technology transfer, limiting the use of 
quantitative restrictions, removing the distortions of economic incentives caused by such 
restrictions, and above all, increasing productivity growth rates. 
It appears that the link between exports and productivity is central to the EOI 
strategy. Concentrating on manufactured exports can increase industrial productivity by 
means of the following: 
• Improved resource allocation. Exports and foreign competition can force 
a resource transfer from the less productive sectors to those that are more 
productive. 
• Improvements in technical efficiency, involving a potential output 
increase for the same inputs 
2Th1s is part of the so-called Singer-Prebisch thesis, which argues that primary-product-exporting 
developing countries have been experiencing a systematic deterioration in their terms of trade, and have had 
to export increasing amounts of primary products to import the same amount of manufactured goods from 
developed countries. This was considered to be one of the major causes of economic stagnation in 
developing countries. See Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). The present paper is mainly concerned with 
manufactured exports; hereafter, any reference to exports is to manufactured exports rather than to exports 
in general unless otherwise specified. 
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Raising scale efficiency. Increased efficiency in production can result not 
only from greater capacity utilization in industries where the minimum 
efficiency size is large relative to the domestic market, but also from 
moving the optimum scale itself from one level to another as exports 
expand. 
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that industrial perfonnance is likely to be 
affected by trade more through allocative efficiency than through technical efficiency, 
particularly during the early stages of an export orientation (Bergsman, 1974; Leibenstein, 
1966). However, as a country advances along the path of EOI, the potential efficiency 
gain from reallocating disequilibrium factor markets rapidly diminishes, and any further 
gain in real income has to come from improved technical efficiency and/or total factor 
productivity growth, as in the case of the East Asian countries. In short, export-led 
industrial growth from better resource allocation may be limited to the early stages of 
export orientation, while further sustained growth must be driven by increases in 
productivity growth and/or technical efficiency. It should be noted that empirical evidence 
is inconclusive on whether export orientation generates greater productivity growth than 
import substitution (Pack, 1992). 
It is widely accepted that certain preconditions need to be established before the 
launching of an EOI strategy. Above all, export supply capabilities must be built, and this 
can be done by providing a period of protection for infant industries in the domestic 
market. Almost every successful exporter started with import substitution of light 
consumer goods. The rationale for the infant-industry argument is that a period of 
protection is required during which a country can increase its technical efficiency and 
improve its competitive edge in the world market. The argument is based on the premise 
that it is worth taking the risk of "getting prices wrong" temporarily—by instituting tariffs, 
other forms of protection, and domestic price controls—in order to reap the dynamic 
benefits of production externalities associated with economies of scale, learning-by-doing, 
and other elements of growth. The key element in infant-industry intervention is the 
relatively quick transition by protected industries from domestic production to exports, 
supported by the political will to phase out protection for laggards once production 
externalities and the learning-by-doing potential are exhausted, or at least substantially 
reduced. Without such a phase-out, the strategy of infant-industry protection is doomed 
to failure, and the production inefficiency of protected industries is perpetuated. The costs 
of protracted protection can be considerable indeed, in terms of the artificially high profits 
maintained for the protected firms, the higher costs of local inputs induced by the higher 
costs of imported inputs, and the higher protection costs associated with a lower scale of 
production for small domestic markets—added to which are the social and political 
implications of encouraging unproductive rent-seeking activities. 
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The Republic of Korea is often cited as a successful example of the selective 
protection and promotion of infant industries, effected through interventionist tariffs and 
export subsidies and the subsequent rapid graduation of these industries to export 
competition in the world market. The Government made extensive use of a "carrot and 
stick" scheme for export promotion: export targets were set for protected industries, and 
those that achieved or surpassed the targets were generously rewarded, while those that 
failed were severely punished in terms of export subsidies and other financial incentives. 
In fact, the continuation of the protection and incentive schemes was linked to export 
performance. 
It is argued that trade-related reforms, particularly import liberalization, are 
necessary conditions for export promotion because producers cannot be induced to 
compete in foreign markets while protected domestic markets offer them assured profits. 
There is no empirical support for this argument. In Sierra Leone and many other African 
countries, import liberalization was introduced in the 1 980s but was soon abandoned 
following a surge of imports for which no foreign finance could be found (UNCTAD, 
1989). Ghana prematurely exposed itself to intense competition in the world market 
before building a strong enough export capacity, a move which wiped out not only 
inherently uneconomic activities but also a budding labour-intensive manufactured-exports 
industry (Lall, 1995). This problem is typically encountered when a small, undiversified 
economy with a small manufacturing base liberalizes trade. 
What is needed most, before trade-related reforms are undertaken during the early 
stages of industrialization, is the building up of supply capability. The conventional 
wisdom is that import substitution precedes export promotion to develop supply capability, 
which underpins the strong growth of manufactured exports in the long run. In fact, it may 
be logical to introduce import liberalization only after domestic supply capability has been 
sufficiently developed and a successful export drive has been launched. Deliberately 
managing the pace of import liberalization in step with the export drive, as opposed to the 
so-called "big bang" approach to trade liberalization, may warrant serious consideration. 
Well after an export base is firmly anchored, managed import liberalization may 
be achieved through a combination of the following: the time-phased relaxation of import 
controls; the selective opening of domestic markets to foreign suppliers; rationalizing the 
tariff structure; establishing realistic exchange rates; and providing more transparent 
effective protection via tariffs rather than quantitative restrictions. In this manner, a 
foreign exchange squeeze can be avoided: growing export revenues can be used to pay for 
the increasing imported inputs used in the export drive. 
On the other hand, adopting a big-bang approach to trade reform might establish 
the credibility of the reform programme, prevent the build-up of vested interest groups' 
resistance to the reforms, and lay the foundation for sustained growth during the early 
stages of development. However, the success of such a radical approach would likely 
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depend on the existence of a political commitment to undertake drastic reforms and on the 
ability of the bureaucracy to formulate and implement the reform programme, as well as 
on the availability of adequate supply capabilities. In a typical developing country, with 
its relatively narrow manufacturing base and limited domestic supply capability, the radical 
approach could bring about a severe balance-of-payments deficit and macroeconomic 
disequilibrium such as hyper-inflation. In an economy with limited manufacturing 
capacity, the export response to real exchange rate changes would obviously be almost nil. 
It appears that the first step required in an EOI strategy—even before trade reform 
is considered—is the development of export supply capabilities. Price signals such as 
realistic exchange rates favouring production for export are necessary but are insufficient 
for building an export base. There are basic conditions for rapid industrialization which 
must be laid down first; these include many interrelated elements which are not directly 
linked to trade and precede the design of a policy framework for export promotion. For 
instance, a basic physical infrastructure (adequate transport, communications, water, 
electricity, gas and other such resources, services and facilities) is essential for 
manufacturing. Human capital accumulation and skill development through education and 
training, along with the development of an entrepreneurial class, are equally if not more 
important. Also necessary, and closely related to human resource development, is the 
development and continuous upgrading of technological capacity (for the assimilation of 
the latest technology) and product design capacity (through science and technology 
institution-building). Institution-building should include the development of efficient 
public administrators and a corps of competent technocrats. 
The initial task of building human capital, physical infrastructure, and economic 
and social institutions—often from scratch, as in the case of many sub-Saharan 
countries—is a daunting and time-consuming process. Market failures most often occur 
during the development of institutions and human resources, and it is during this period 
that effective State intervention (rather than non-intervention) may be called for. 
However, a large number of developing countries in the initial stages of industrialization 
may lack the administrative capacity to mobilize resources and direct human and physical 
capital formation and institution-building to support or strengthen manufacturing capacity. 
A partial solution to this problem may be the development of a manufacturing industry 
through foreign direct investment. FDI often brings with it not only foreign capital, inputs 
and technical know-how, but also export marketing capabilities. Manufactured exports, 
unlike primary commodities, do not depend solely on price competitiveness and world- 
standard product quality; for manufactured goods, potential export markets must be 
sought, and products must be designed for and targeted towards such markets. FDI may 
facilitate the process of market penetration as well as initial import substitution for 
domestic markets. 
Leaving aside the problem of providing adequate financial and fiscal incentive 
packages, many developing countries may find it difficult to attract FDI unless they have 
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an adequate infrastructure already in place and a reasonably skilled labour force readily 
available; the focus shifts, once again, to the crucial importance of human capital 
formation and infrastructure-building. However, there is another critical factor for 
attracting FDI which is often left out of the analysis: the need for a legal system capable 
of protecting ownership rights, enforcing contractual obligations, granting recourse against 
abuses, and guaranteeing the repatriation of profits. The absence of such a legal 
framework presently constitutes a major deterrent to foreign investment in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, despite the availability of a skilled labour force and a basic 
infrastructure. 
One cautionary note, however: FDI is not a panacea for rapid industrialization. 
Foreign firms bring with them skills, technology, capital, and marketing capabilities, but 
they cannot, by themselves, override the more dominant effects of macro- and micro- 
economic mismanagement. Moreover, there are a number of potential disadvantages 
associated with foreign ownership, relating to the exploitation of natural resources, 
pollution and many other factors and practices which run contraly to the interests of a host 
country. The benefits of an alternative to FDI should therefore be assessed. For instance, 
foreign capital and inputs can be imported through loans, technology acquired through 
licences, and marketing capability built through marketing consultancy and national trade 
promotion agencies. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of China have 
developed indigenous manufacturing industries in this manner, without depending on FDI, 
while China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore have relied heavily on FDI for 
industrial development. The latter group has been highly selective in the FDI choices they 
have made; Singapore, for example, has favoured high-tech, high-value-added investment. 
Once industrial supply capabilities are established through skill development, 
social and economic infrastructure-building, and macroeconomic stabilization, export 
promotion measures can be carefully selected and the machinery for implementing them 
developed. Export incentive schemes involve, inter a/ia, preferential export financing, 
fiscal and investment incentives, export processing zones, bonded warehouses and 
factories, duty drawbacks and tax rebates on imported inputs, credit for new exports, 
preshipment financing, export credit guarantees, and the establishment of export-import 
banks. Meanwhile, protective measures designed for initial import substitution, 
particularly those geared towards infant industries, should be streamlined and rationalized. 
If possible, quantitative restrictions should be replaced by tariffs, since quantitative 
restrictions supplant the price mechanism and yield an economic rent to the winner of an 
import quota or licence, further encouraging rent-seeking activities and possible 
corruption, while tariffs are transparent and revenues go to the Government. However, it 
takes more than the transparency and rationalization of the structure of trade incentives to 
build an export base. What is needed most is the stability and predictability of incentive 
schemes over time, with ad hoc measures and amendments kept to a minimum. A stable 
and predictable policy environment is required to elicit individual responses to trade 
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incentives. Once export competitiveness is established, however, most incentive schemes 
can be dismantled. 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the proper sequencing of the 
various policy reforms is critically important to the EOI strategy. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the process, the following sequence is suggested. First of all, apart from 
setting up the crucially important basic infrastructure, overall manufacturing capacity must 
be developed before export supply capability is built up; this is based on the premise that 
industrial supply capacity leads to export capability and not vice versa. If such is the case, 
then during the early stages of industrialization, the role of manufactured exports in 
accelerating the process becomes less important than non-trade policy measures focusing 
on: the selective industrial targeting and promotion of infant industries; the strengthening 
of intersectoral linkages between manufacturing and agriculture, and between 
manufacturing and services; the creation of linkages within the manufacturing sector; the 
promotion of rural industrialization; and so on. Export supply capability should be built 
up after a reasonably broad industrial base has been developed. At this juncture, 
macroeconomic stability may be necessary to create a favourable macroeconomic 
environment for rapid industrial growth; therefore, macroeconomic stabilization should 
exist before structural reforms (including trade reforms) are instituted. Moreover, import 
liberalization should be introduced well after the upsurge of exports. Finally, the 
liberalization of capital markets should come after the adoption of trade reforms so that 
some degree of control may be gained over international capital flows, which is essential 
for an orderly transition to an export-oriented economy and for stability in financial and 
capital markets. 
D. JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
Much has been written about Japan's industrial policy.3 Broadly speaking, 
Japan's industrial policy encompasses four major areas. The first area includes policies 
designed to facilitate the provision of infrastructure services and facilities such as 
industrial sites, transport and communications, water, gas and electricity to industry. The 
second policy area focuses on resource allocation among industries, targeting certain 
strategic industries and providing the necessary infant-industry protection, including 
import restrictions. In most cases, import barriers have been dismantled as particular 
industries have become strong enough to compete in the world market (such barriers were 
removed for trucks and buses in 1961, for colour televisions in 1964, for colour film in 
1971, for cash registers in 1973, for large-memory integrated circuits in 1974, and for 
computers in 1975). The third area comprises policies that affect industrial organization, 
focusing on such aspects as: industrial restructuring; cartelization among firms during 
recession and for the purpose of rationalization (when, for example, automation and/or 
For a comprehensive bibliography of Japan's industrial policy, see Itoh arid others (1991). 
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labour-saving technologies are introduced); and central coordination in reducing 
operational capacity, plant investment and production in order to prevent "excess 
competition". The last policy area is concerned with the promotion and protection of 
small- and medium-scale industries. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) played a central role in 
designing and implementing specific industrial policies. Japan's industrial policy was 
imp lemented in four different stages. The first stage corresponds to the period of recovery 
and reconstruction after the Second World War in the late 1940s and the 1950s. More 
specifically, during the period 1946-1948, Japan's industrial policy resembled the central 
planning model of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European bloc. The Government 
intervened directly in the market, channelling resources to certain strategic industries such 
as the iron and steel and coal industries. Policy interventions included price controls, 
subsidies, the preferential allocation of domestic raw materials and imported inputs, and 
loans and credits for the targeted industries. In the 1 950s, the emphasis shifted from direct 
resource allocation to the rationalization of selected industries which were focusing on the 
introduction of automated and other labour-saving machinery. For instance, accelerated 
depreciation and tariff exemptions were permitted for machines imported by the targeted 
industries. Initially, the targeted concerns included the steel, coal, shipbuilding, electrical 
power, synthetic fibre and chemical fertilizer industries; in the late 1950s, the 
petrochemical, machine tools and parts, and electronics industries were added to the list. 
The second stage occurred during the 1 960s, as the Japanese economy began to 
integrate itself into the world economy by joining various international organizations such 
as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and by becoming a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)—all of which exposed Japan to external pressure to liberalize and 
deregulate its own economy. As a result, policy emphasis shifted to strengthening 
industrial competitiveness within a strict, externally imposed schedule of trade 
liberalization and economic deregulation. To improve industrial competitiveness, MITI 
concentrated its efforts on merging large companies such as Japan Steel, coordinating 
capital investments to prevent overcapacity, instituting special support measures to 
strengthen small and medium-scale industries, and formulating a comprehensive energy 
policy. 
The third stage covered much of the 1 970s. During this period, new policy 
objectives were added to enhance industrial competitiveness. Policies focused on 
pollution control and environment-friendly industrialization, and on the stricter application 
of anti-monopoly laws. In addition, greater reliance on market mechanisms was facilitated 
through further deregulation. 
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During the last stage, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the MITI industrial policy 
incorporated measures to minimize both trade conflicts with other countries and the 
consequent damages resulting from the rapid growth of Japanese exports. 
To provide a context for the discussion to come, it is important to understand how 
industrial policy has been formulated in Japan.4 Japanese industrial policy is developed 
within a tripartite consultative framework comprising the following: 
• The genkyoku: groups of bureaux, divisions and sections of MITI and 
other ministries and agencies, some of which are responsible for 
particular industries and some of which coordinate inter-ministerial 
affairs 
• Numerous industry associations such as the Japan Iron and Steel 
Federation, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, and the 
Shipbuilders Association of Japan 
• Policy councils, or shingikai. These consultative bodies are made up of 
private citizens (e.g., academics, bankers and fmanciers, industry leaders, 
journalists and former bureaucrats); the function of each council is to 
advise the individual ministries on particular aspects of industrial policy. 
The Industrial Structure Council is one example. 
MITI has nine bureaux which constitute the most important element in the 
formation of industrial policy in Japan. Five of the nine bureaux (Heavy Industry, 
Chemical Industry, Textile and Light Industry, Coal and Mining, and Public Utilities) are 
responsible for drawing up a detailed industrial policy for each type of industry, focusing 
on components such as pricing, market and production sharing, reorganization and 
mergers, and the control of investments. These bureaux are called "vertical genkyoku" 
because each specializes in a certain industry or industries. Furthermore, every bureau is 
subdivided into divisions and then into sections, and many of the individual sections are 
in turn responsible for a particular part of the relevant industry; for instance, within the 
Heavy Industry Bureau, there are sections for iron and steel, industrial machinery, 
electronics and electrical machinery, automobiles, aircraft, and so on. The remaining four 
bureaux (International Trade, Trade Promotion, Enterprise, and Safety and Environmental 
Protection) are called "horizontal Genkyoku", because they specialize in issues that cut 
across industries. The major functions of the Genkyoku include: (a) drawing up and 
implementing various industry laws such as the Petroleum Law of 1961, the Machine 
Industry Law of 1956, and the Electronics Law of 1957; and (b) drawing up various 
regulatory measures related to production and trade, focusing on elements such as special 
This part draws heavily from Komia, Okuno and Suzumura(1988). 
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tax provisions, tariff rates and import quotas, foreign direct investment, patent and 
technological agreements, joint ventures and credit allocation. 
Industry associations participate in the formulation of industrial policy through 
close consultation with each respective Genkyoku to ensure that the policies adopted are 
favourable to their industries. Many of the policy councils are consulted on major issues, 
and their deliberations are taken into consideration in the process of formulating industrial 
policy. In 1970, for instance, there were 27 different councils and advisory committees 
for MIT!; 15 of these advised the Ministry on the respective areas of industrial policy. 
The machinery of industrial policy, and particularly the vertical Genkyoku system, 
played a central role in the 1 960s and 1 970s; however, since the early 1 980s, its 
importance has diminished rapidly, while the horizontal bureaux of MIT! have become 
more important in policy-making. During the early post-War period, MIT! possessed 
tremendous leverage over industries and firms, as it was responsible for the approval of 
import licences, foreign capital inflows, technology import licences, and the use of Japan 
Development Bank loans, and for providing special tax privileges. However, MIT! lost 
most of this leverage during Japan's rapid economic growth period in the 1960s and 
I 970s. In other words, MIT! changes from an industry-oriented to an issue-oriented 
ministry, dealing with newly emerging problems related to trade friction, environmental 
protection and energy conservation, overseas investment and industrial relocation, high- 
tech industries, and so on. Put differently, Japan has graduated from the early stages of 
industrialization, when industrial policy mattered more, to a more mature, advanced 
economy whose complex and sophisticated structure renders the application of selected 
policy interventions extremely difficult and ineffective. To use the World Bank 
terminology, the policy focus has shifted from selectivism to functionalism. 
Finally, there is some controversy regarding the effectiveness of Japan's industrial 
policy; opinions are sharply divided and empirical evidence is inconclusive on this issue. 
Policy supporters point to the fact that most of the key industries targeted by MIII have 
developed as planned (particularly the iron and steel, shipbuilding and computer 
industries), that the cooperative partnership formed between Government and industry has 
eliminated investment duplication and excess competition, and that tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers have ensured a stable domestic market for producers. 
Others offer counter-examples to show that industrial policy in Japan has not 
worked effectively. Many industries have succeeded without government support; during 
the I 960s, for example, the sewing machine, camera, bicycle, motorcycle, piano, zipper, 
transistor radio, colour television, tape recorder, audio equipment, fishing gear, watch and 
clock, calculator, electrical wire, machine tool, textile machinery, insulator, agricultural 
machinery, communications equipment, ceramics, and robotics industries all experienced 
substantial growth and development without government intervention. Moreover, the 
implementation of industrial policy has often been frustrated by the resistance of private 
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enterprises. The most notable case involved the attempt by MITI to cartelize and 
rationalize the automobile industry in the 1950s and early 1960s; stiff opposition from 
automakers stopped the plan. Finally, the direct and indirect costs of supporting the 
declining coal mining, textile, shipbuilding, non-ferrous metals and petrochemical 
industries have been enormous. 
As discussed earlier, the sole economic justification for State intervention is 
market failure. However, Japan's industrial policy has been influenced by non-economic 
objectives such as "catching up with Western countries", improving international 
competitiveness, and facilitating recovery and reconstruction after the Second World 
War—none of which meet the economic criteria for market failure. It is fair to say, 
though, that all countries have industrial policies of some kind—often in disguised forms. 
While they are not designated as such, the Chrysler bailout and the support for the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the United States, along with 
the agricultural support and strategic trade policies typically found in industrialized 
countries, are all part of an undeclared industrial policy. 
It is also important to recognize that Japan's present industrial policy is anything 
but collusive, coercive or interventionist; the capacity of MITI to control and regulate 
industries has diminished to almost nothing in comparison with the Ministry's heyday 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Today, the focus is on creating a vision by encouraging 
cooperation. 
E. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S EXPERIENCE 
The Republic of Korea represents a well-known success story of export-led 
industrialization steered by active and selective State interventions. Having emerged from 
an initial period of easy import substitution, which lasted from the end of the Korean War 
in 1953 to 1960, the Republic of Korea reached a turning point in its industrialization 
drive in 1963, when the first five-year economic development programme (1962-1966) 
was launched espousing a clear shift to an export-oriented strategy. The first programme 
focused on expanding the production and export of light manufactured goods. The second 
programme (1967-1971) was an extension of the first and stressed further consolidation 
of the economic growth and export expansion achieved in the first period. It was during 
the third programme (1972-1976) that the development of heavy and chemical industries 
was fostered to allow the country to broaden its industrial base and upgrade its 
international competitiveness. The progress made in the third programme was further 
consolidated in the fourth programme (1977-1981), evidenced by the increased 
sophistication of the industrial structure, the expansion of capital and intermediate goods 
industries, and science and technology institution-building. The emphasis shifted to 
macroeconomic stabilization in the fifth programme (1982-1986), however, because of 
various macroeconomic disequilibria caused by rapid growth during the previous periods, 
such as price instability and worsening income distribution. 
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The overall picture emerging from this succession of five-year development 
programmes reflects a shift in policy emphasis from the export of light manufactured 
goods in the 1 960s to the development of heavy industries (mainly iron and steel) and 
capital goods industries (especially transport equipment) in the I 970s, and finally to the 
consolidation of these industries' export capabilities, the upgrading of the industrial 
structure, economic stabilization, and trade liberalization in the 1980s.5 
During the period 1975-1985, export-led growth brought about a phenomenal 
structural change in the Republic of Korea. Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 2.7 
times between 1975 and 1985—an average annual rate of more than 10%. The share of 
agriculture in total output declined sharply from 13.6% in 1975 to 7.7% in 1985, while the 
manufacturing share increased from 44.2% to 50% during the same period. The services 
share fell slightly from 33.2% in 1975 to 31.2% in 1985. Particularly notable is the 
structural change within the manufacturing sector. The production of capital goods 
increased rapidly at an average annual rate of nearly 19%, with its share in total output 
rising sharply from 5.7% in 1975 to 12% in 1985 (see table 1). The intermediate goods 
industry also experienced rapid growth, averaging just over 12% per year, with its share 
in output increasing from 18.4% to almost 22% during the same period. By contrast, 
though light manufacturing grew at an average annual rate of around 8%, its share in total 
output dropped considerably from 20.1% to 16.4% between 1975 and 1985. 
Manufactured exports, whose share in total exports increased from 71.9% to 
77.5% between 1975 and 1985, grew by an average of 13.1% per year over the same 
period, or by almost 3.5 times, rising from 6,245 billion won in 1975 to 21,481 billion won 
in 1985 (see table 2). The most striking change in trade occurred, again, in the capital 
goods industry. Capital goods exports jumped six-fold between 1975 and 1985, from 
1,364 billion won to 8,149 billion won; this increase represents an impressive real annual 
growth rate of almost 20%. The share of capital goods in total exports also rose steeply, 
from 15.7% in 1975 to 29.4% in 1985. It would appear that the active policy interventions 
instituted to promote exports, carried out between 1962 and 1986 within the context of a 
series of five-year programmes, cumulatively resulted in rapid economic growth and the 
structural transformation of the country's economy. Such export-led transformation was 
made possible by the existence of a skilled labour force, rapid capital accumulation, and 
most importantly, the State's political commitment to development and its capacity to 
direct the private sector towards export promotion. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Among other things, the Republic of Korea's experience underscores the crucial 
importance of the State's dedication and commitment to economic development and its 
bureaucratic capacity to guide the structural transformation process, especially the shift 
from protected import substitution to a more open, export-oriented strategy during the 
initial stages of industrialization. This experience may not constitute a good model for 
developing countries where the Government's competent stewardship of the private sector 
does not exist. 
At this juncture, it is interesting to note a close historical parallel between Japan 
and the Republic of Korea in the pattern of industrialization and particularly in the 
evolution of industrial policy. Shifting away from light manufactured exports such as 
textiles, Japan's MIII targeted the iron and steel, automobile, shipbuilding and machine 
tool industries for rapid development in the 1 950s and 1 960s. In particular, the iron and 
steel industiy was designated as a strategic sector under the Five-Year Plan for Economic 
Self-Reliance and the New Long-Term Economic Plan in the second half of the 195 Os, and 
the automobile industiy was accorded the same status under the National Income-Doubling 
Plan during the second half of the 1960s. In the 1970s MITT shifted the industrial policy 
focus to high technology, concentrating on the computer, semiconductor, robotics, new 
materials and other such industries.6 The growth of these industries was generally fostered 
by various protective measures such as import controls, restrictions on foreign investment 
in the targeted industries, preferential treatment for selected industries importing foreign 
technology, and various fiscal and fmancial supports. 
The list of strategic-sector industries chosen by the Republic of Korea's 
Government was strikingly similar to that of Japan, whether by design or by coincidence; 
again, the focus was on automobiles, shipbuilding, machine tools, iron and steel, and 
semiconductors. Today, both Japan and the Republic of Korea enjoy a high degree of 
international competitiveness in these sectors. It must be noted, however, that in both 
countries, State intervention and the development of these key industries was greatly 
facilitated by a favourable macroeconomic environment characterized by high domestic 
savings, stable prices, favourable conditions for technological change, and above all, a 
highly skilled labour force. 
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the major conclusions of this paper is that the nature, extent and objectives 
of industrial policy and the consequent implications for State intervention in the economies 
of developing countries may change overtime. Successive policy changes may be viewed 
as an evolution towards a completely functioning free market. This further implies that 
6 
For further details, see Francks (1992). 
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no single optimal industrial policy exists for all developing countries; rather, there are 
different optimal policies for different groups of developing countries at different stages 
of industrialization. Put differently, the initial conditions present in a given country may, 
to a large extent, dictate the kind of optimal policies needed and the nature and scope of 
the State intervention required to implement them. 
During the initial stages of industrialization, when there are no functioning 
markets, State interventions may be quite extensive, including public investment in 
infrastructure and institution-building and forced industrialization, given the inability of 
the private sector to mobilize resources and undertake huge investment projects. In the 
early stages, building manufacturing supply capacity is the primary focus; trade policies, 
particularly trade liberalization, become relevant only after basic supply capacity is firmly 
in place and a strong base for manufactured exports has been developed. 
The East Asian experiences suggest that even after the labour-intensive light 
manufacturing base for exports is firmly established, strong selective policy interventions 
are still needed to achieve industrial and technological deepening. Such policy 
interventions, designed to broaden the industrial base and deepen technological capacity, 
must be selectively targeted at specific industries, since resources are too scarce to extend 
to all industries. 
It should be noted, however, that as an economy advances along the trajectory of 
industrialization and its structure becomes more complex and sophisticated, selective 
policy interventions aimed at specific sectors become increasingly difficult to implement 
without unforeseen distortions in other sectors. At the advanced stages of 
industrialization, the role of the State will be restricted to maintaining a competitive 
environment for private enterprises, and resource allocation will be guided primarily by 
price signals and market incentives. 
The experiences of Japan and the Republic of Korea are cases in point. As 
described earlier, both Governments were heavily interventionist during the early stages 
of industrialization. Today, in sharp contrast, there are visible signs of a policy shift 
towards a diminished State role and greater reliance on market mechanisms in both 
economies. in Japan, MITT no longer has the strong leverage over individual industries 
it once enjoyed. Japan's current industrial policy is more focused on broad cross-sectoral 
issues such as economy-wide deregulation and trade liberalization. In a similar vein, the 
Republic of Korea's next Five-Year Plan for the New Economy (1993-1998), launched 
on 2 July 1993, aims at deregulating fiscal, financial and administrative systems, and at 
accelerating the liberalization of trade and investment.7 Evidently, the Korean economy 
has outgrown the need for State "nurturing". 
7 , 
For further details on the Republic of Korea s new Five-Year Plan, see Yt (1993). 
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It may be that the East Asian export success stories based on selective intervention 
constitute a historically unique experience, and hence may not be replicable in other 
developing countries. As mentioned earlier, the central question is not whether State 
intervention per se is good or bad; what matters is the nature and quality of the 
intervention. The outcome of intervention will depend not only on its objective (whether 
it is geared towards facilitating inward- or outward-oriented industrialization, for 
example), but also on the capability of the State to initiate and guide structural 
transformation leading to the functioning of a free market. The State can play an important 
role in such an economic transformation; it takes an efficient and competent bureaucratic 
machinery to accomplish certain basic tasks in the early stages of industrialization—such 
as creating price stability, establishing a transparent legal framework, promoting 
competition, and investing in education. In this regard, one of the key variables often 
overlooked in the study of industrialization is the need for both a strong political 
commitment to industrialization and the bureaucratic capacity to implement well- 
conceived industrial policies. 
Finally, it should be noted that many industrialized countries are presently 
pursuing a variant of industrial policy—so-called strategic and trade policies set up to 
enhance their national competitiveness in manufacturing. Such policies entail, among 
other things, a wide range of government interventions designed to assist firms in 
developing and adapting new technologies for commercial applications. In most cases, 
high-technology industries are targeted for such proactive innovation and technology 
policies. In contrast to the traditional trade theory based on comparative advantage, the 
new trade theory provides the basic rationale for proactive government intervention. In 
other words, while traditional theories focused on a pattern of trade determined by a 
country's relative factor endowments (comparative advantage), the new theories attempt 
to explain the trade pattern in terms of trade among countries with similar factor 
endowments and the dominance of intra-industry trade in similar products rather than trade 
in different products among countries with different factor endowments. Justification for 
government intervention is derived from theories related to imperfect competition, 
dynamic scale economies, and positive externalities which accompany research and 
development and high-technology industry. it is further argued that in such a world, 
competitive advantage can be created through a wide range of government interventions 
such as the provision of government support for research and development, the targeting 
of knowledge- and technology-intensive industries for support, the creation of access to 
intellectual property, the modification of competition rules to permit national firms to gain 
a dominant position, the restricting of foreign investments in strategic sectors, and the 
placing of restrictions on exports of technology-intensive goods and services. Whatever 
theoretical and empirical validity might exist for strategic technology and trade policies, 
the simple fact is that these policies call for proactive State intervention, and are hence 
basically no different from the industrial policies pursued in developing countries. 
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XII. CAN EGYPT GROW WITHOUT INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS? 
IF NOT, WHICH INSTITUTIONS MATTER MOST? 
by Ahmed Gala!' 
The World Bank 
Introduction 
It is being increasingly recognized that both market reforms and institutional 
reforms are necessary before private agents (as producers) can contribute positively to 
economic growth. A recent World Bank publication entitled The East Asian Miracle.' 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (1993) indicates that the fast-growing economies of 
East Asia have not only got prices "righter" but have also established institutional 
mechanisms such as deliberation councils to reduce transaction costs and enhance policy 
predictability. Micro-level studies (for example, Gala! and Nauriyal, 1995; and Levy and 
Spiller, 1995) suggest that credible commitment is critical for inducing private investment. 
The logic dictating the necessity of combining economic and institutional reforms 
is both simple and compelling. The behaviour of entrepreneurs depends not only on the 
incentive structure provided by markets but also on that provided by institutions. Consider 
the following example. An entrepreneur is considering whether to invest in country A or 
country B. The countries offer two projects which are identical in all respects (including 
size, technology, input and output prices, and market size), but which exist within two very 
different institutional environments. In contrast to that in country A, the behaviour of the 
Government in country B (say, with respect to taxes) is unpredictable, disputes (over tariff 
bases, for example) are not settled fairly, and the costs of or avoiding certain 
regulations (relating to labour hiring and firing, for instance) are high. Other things being 
equal, the entrepreneur will invest in country A rather than in country B. Similar 
institutional variations across sectors within the same country can be just as distorting. 
Saying that institutions matter for private decisions is not equivalent, however, to 
which institutions matter and how they matter. This is not an easy task, for the 
institutional concept is often defined in very broad terms. For example, Douglass North 
(1991, p. 97) defines institutiOns as "the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic, and social interactions. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules and 
regulations (a constitution, laws, and property rights)." In other words, almost all aspects 
of the way society is organized have a bearing on the decisions taken by private 
Special thanks go to Eliana Cardoso and Heba Handoussa for their helpful comments. 
Appreciation also goes to Integrated Development Consultants for assisting in the firm interviews. 
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entrepreneurs. Clearly, this view of institutions is too broad to tackle in the short run—a 
period during which societal features such as traditions are exogenous to policy makers. 
Alternatively, the institutional relationship between firms and a Government can 
be viewed as a contract, where the Government pledges to establish certain rules of the 
game (in the form of regulation), and the agents respond to these rules (see, for example, 
Williamson, 1 989).2 However, this contract is, by definition, incomplete because it is both 
costly and difficult to foresee and fully specify all eventualities. As a result, success in 
motivating firms to invest and operate efficiently is far more likely to be achieved if the 
Government adopts appropriate incentive schemes, ensures that contract enforcement is 
not too costly, and institutes safeguards to protect firms against the expropriation of 
property. Meeting these conditions is particularly critical where investment is specific, in 
the sense that its redeployment to alternative uses by alternative users involves a sacrifice 
of productive value. 
In order to translate this view of institutions into specific reforms, two questions 
must be answered, First, how much regulation or deregulation of business is desirable? 
Second, which regulation(s) is/are the most costly and thus the most worthy of policy 
makers' expenditure of political capital? Neither question is easy to answer. Defining 
optimal regulation empirically is complicated by the difficulties associated with measuring 
the costs and benefits of regulation. Measurement limitations also make it hard to 
determine how restrictive various regulatory constraints are (and to rank them 
accordingly). 
There are, of course, cases where the benefits of regulation clearly outweigh the 
costs. For example, the absence of regulation for weights and measures can lead to chaotic 
and costly market imperfections. Similarly, the lack of regulation for health-threatening 
food additives can have serious consequences. In most cases, however, the net benefits 
of regulation are not clear, be it with respect to labour, intermediate inputs, capital or taxes. 
In each of these cases, there are benefits to be had—from, for example, protecting child 
labour, the standardization of inputs, and compliance with taxes. However, the 
Government (and ultimately taxpayers) incur costs in monitoring and enforcing 
regulations, entrepreneurs expend time, money and effort in complying with or 
circumventing them, and society pays in foregone investment if risk-averse entrepreneurs 
are sufficiently fearful of arbitrary changes in the rules of the game. These and other 
benefits and costs are difficult to identify fully, let alone measure. 
2 
In the language of the principal-agent literature, the problem is that the Government (the 
principal) and private finns (the agents) have different objective functions, differential information (that 
possessed by the agents is better), and differential risk aversion (the agents are more risk averse). The 
principal's task is to devise an ex ante contract to motivate the agents to exert more effort, and to figure out 
a premium to be paid to the agents to compensate them for the added risk. These issues were first elaborated 
by Ross (1973) and Stiglitz (1974), and were recently reviewed by Sappington (1991). 
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To get around this problem, the present paper relies on a survey of the private 
sector to identify the most restrictive regulatory constraints. This approach has certain 
limitations: private entrepreneurs may exaggerate the costs of complying with or avoiding 
government regulations; they are likely to take their own costs into account and ignore the 
benefits of regulation to society; and they may incur transaction costs that vary with firm 
size. Notwithstanding these limitations, the survey approach produces a reasonable 
ranking of the various regulatory constraints from most to least restrictive. This ranking 
can be used by policy makers to determine which problem(s) should be tackled first. In 
most developing countries, business is thought to be overregulated; some deregulation is 
therefore likely to be considered beneficial to society. 
The first section below summarizes the broad changes Egypt has made in its 
incentive structure within the context of a series of economic reforms begun in the early 
1 990s, and provides an assessment of the corresponding performance of the economy. In 
the second section, the most serious constraints on Egypt's private sector are examined; 
the third section contains a ranking of these constraints based on the results of a survey of 
45 firms chosen at random from the food-processing, textile and engineering industries. 
The last section offers some policy conclusions. 
A. MACROECONOMIC REFORMS, INCENTWES 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Up until 1990, the incentive structure which existed for the public and private 
sectors in Egypt was highly distorted. In 1974, the Government had attempted to break 
away from decades of inward-looking public-sector-led development; however, it is 
generally agreed that the "open door policy" brought about only partial economic 
liberalization, leaving the previous development strategy fundamentally in place (see, for 
example, Handoussa, 1995; and Kheir El-Din, El Baradei and El Sayed, 1989). The 
economy continued to be dominated by the public sector, price controls on key goods and 
services, multiple and overvalued exchange rates, negative real interest rates, and 
excessive control over credit allocation and trade flows. During the period 1974-1985, 
gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an impressive average annual rate of 8.5%, but this 
growth was actually a reflection of capital inflow from foreign assistance, borrowing, oil- 
related exports, workers' remittances, tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Most of thesç flows are subject to dramatic fluctuations, which means 
they cannot be relied upon to generate sustained economic growth. 
The distorted incentive structure persisted through the I 980s, during which time 
the economy experienced a number of external shocks, including a decline in oil prices 
and an increase in interest rates. Rather than adjusting the economy to these shocks, the 
Government responded by drawing on external financing and restricting imports. This 
approach proved counter-productive. Import restrictions, high tariffs, and an overvalued 
exchange rate exacerbated the anti-export bias, thereby reducing foreign exchange 
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earnings from exports. The accumulation of foreign debt eroded the country's 
creditworthiness. The continuing increase of public expenditure over revenue led to 
massive fiscal and current account deficits. Eventually, cuts in imports and investment 
brought about a sharp decline in the GDP; by the late I 980s, annual GDP growth averaged 
only 2.5%. At the same time, inflation accelerated from 12% in 1985 to about 20% in 
1990. The inability of the country to service its external debt provided the impetus for 
economic reform, which by that time was unavoidable. 
1. Recent changes in the macroeconomic investment structure 
The year 1990 saw the beginning of significant improvement in the 
macroeconomic incentive structure. There were a number of key reforms. Public 
absorption was markedly reduced to ensure price stability and leave more room for private 
investment (see table 1). The fiscal deficit was reduced from 18% of GDP in 1990 to an 
estimated 2.5% in 1994. The growth rate of both the money supply and government 
demand declined. In parallel, fmancial liberalization was pursued by removing the ceiling 
on the nominal interest rate, phasing out administrative credit allocation, and using 
Treasury Bill auctions to manage liquidity. Foreign exchange controls were abolished, and 
the exchange rate was unified. 
During the same period, Egypt liberalized foreign trade by removing all 
quantitative restrictions on imports (except for those associated with the Multi-fibre 
Arrangement, or MFA) and by reducing and rationalizing import tariffs. The maximum 
tariff was reduced from 160% in 1988 to 50% in 1994, and the average tariff fell from 
31% to 28% over the same period. A global income tax law was passed in December 
1993, under which the marginal tax rate was reduced from 65% to 48%. The new law 
exempts corporate dividends to prevent double taxation. It lowers the corporate tax rate 
to 42%, and the rate for manufacturing even further, to 34%. Finally, the prices of 
tradeable goods were liberalized and those of non-tradeable goods revised upward. The 
domestic selling prices of both types of goods had been lower than their market values in 
most cases; the lifting of price controls on industrial goods and the upward revision of the 
prices of, for example, railway services, electricity, and natural gas meant higher domestic 
prices and signalled better resource allocation. 
As a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies, inflation declined from 17.5% in 
1990 to an estimated 8% in 1994. After a 35% devaluation of the Egyptian pound against 
the US dollar, the nominal exchange rate was kept relatively stable within a narrow band 
by means of an active monetary policy. The current account deficit, excluding official 
transfers, declined from 6.8% of GDP in 1990 to an estimated 1.7% in 1994. International 
reserves increased to about $14 billion (14 months of merchandise exports) in 1993, 
thanks to a significant inflow of private capital. 
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1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199( 
Budgetdeficit -18.1 -18.4 -17.2 -5.2 -4.1 -2.5 
Current account balance (excluding 
official_grants) 
-4.1 -6.8 -0.4 9.9 0.7 -1.7 
External debt (billions of US dollars) 50.9 48.4 38.4 41.7 42.0 42.4 














Maximum tariff rate on imports 
(percentage) 
160 [ .. 
I 
.. 80 80 50 
Top marginal tax rate (percentage) 65 L_65 65 65 48 48 
[liii 
Nominal exchange rate (Egyptian 
pounds per US dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate (1992 
100) 
Percentage change (minus sign 
appreciation) 
Source: World Bank, "Egypt—into the next centuiy,'Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 14O48-EGT 
(Washington, D.C., May 1995). 
Note Two dots (..) indicate that the item is not available. 
* Estimated. 
Nominal interest rate (3-month Treasury 
Bills) 




























The success of the stabilization programme was helped by the forgiveness of 
some of Egypt's debt in the wake of the Gulf war, the result of which was a decline in the 
country's total external debt from $51 billion in 1989 to about $42 billion in 1994. 
Beyond stabilizing the economy, these reforms reduced the "crowding out" effect 
of government borrowing, aligned key prices better with the scarcity of resources, and 
reduced the anti-export bias. Although additional reforms are still needed, at issue here 
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Table 1. The Egyptian economy, selected economic variables, 1989-1994 
(Percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise) 
is whether or not the improved incentive structure has induced the economy to grow, 
exports to flourish, and the private sector to expand. 
2. Economic performance 
The simple answer is no. Egypt's GDP grew at an annual rate of 1.4% between 
1989 and 1994. This modest increase was more than wiped out by population growth; per 
capita income actually declined at an average annual rate of 0.7% during the same period 
(see table 2). Simultaneously, unemployment rose, amounting to over 10% in 1994. Total 
fixed investment (at constant 1992 prices) remained fairly stagnant, and was expected to 
pick up only slightly in 1994. Perhaps even more disappointing was the trend in 
merchandise exports, whose decline in 1992 and 1993 was expected to continue in 1994. 
Inflation (oercentage) 16.7 





















3.0 2.4 2.1 0.3 0.5 2.0 1.4 
RealGDPpercapitagrowthrate 
(percentage) 
0 -0.6 -0.4 -1.4 -1.7 0 -0.7 
Merchandise exports (billions of 
US_dollars,_at_1992_prices) 
3.0 3.1 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.2 3.9 




5.1 19.7 -2.4 -2.9 -10.2 -1.4 
Investment (billions of Egyptian 
pounds [LE] at 1992 prices) 
Investment (percentage growth 
rate) 
0 -0.9 -4.6 -9.8 
Source: World Bank, "Egypt—into the next centuiy," Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 14048-EGT 








Table 2. Selected economic indicators, 1 989-1994. 
(Percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise) 
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Why have growth, investment and exports been so sluggish? One possible answer 
is that stabilization measures typically lead to a recession initially, followed by a recovery. 
This has been the experience of other countries, as illustrated in table 3, and Egypt should 
be no exception. Accordingly, it may be concluded that recovery in Egypt is inevitable, 
and that the country will soon begin to reap the benefits of reform. 
Table 3. Comparison between Egypt and three successful reformers 
















































































































Source: World Bank, "Egypt—into the next centuzy," Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 14048-EGT (Washington, 
D.C., May 1995). 
Note: Two dots (..) indicate that the item is not available. 
While this answer is valid in part, two factors suggest that the expected recovery 
may not be sustainable in the . long run. First, Egypt has yet to undertake significant 
reforms to restructure the "real" side of the economy, especially in the areas of public 
enterprise, education and health (see Shihata, forthcoming; and World Bank, 1 995c). 
Second, Egypt has thus far failed to reform its institutions to make them more compatible 
with a more dynamic market- and private-sector-oriented economy. 
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B. INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
There is increasing support for the view that institutional reforms are critical for 
economic growth. For example, North (1990, p. 54) asserts that "the inability of societies 
to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of 
both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World"; this 
is because insecure property and contractual rights discourage investment, and by 
extension, economic growth. This assertion is supported by a number of empirical studies. 
For example, Knack and Keefer (1994) find that property rights (measured by assessing 
such variables as contract enforceability, the rule of law, and the risk of appropriation) 
have a significant impact on investment and growth.3 Country case-studies (for example, 
World Bank, 1993; and World Bank, 1995a) suggest that the Governments of countries 
where macroeconomic reforms have been successful in bringing about sustainable 
economic growth have also deregulated economic activity, strengthened contract 
enforcement, and taken a firm stand against arbitrary policy reversal. The question is: 
How does Egypt fare on all these counts? 
As will be illustrated below, the Egyptian economy is overregulated, contract 
enforcement is relatively weak and costly, and investors believe the Government's 
commitment to reform to be less credible than is the case in other countries. The 
overregulation of inputs (labour, capital and so on), outputs (especially exports), and tax 
administration, together with the weak enforcement of contracts and uncertainty, increases 
the transaction costs of investment and the operation of firms. 
1. Overregulation 
Although it is difficult to establish a benchmark against which to measure 
excessive regulation, an examination of various regulations in Egypt suggests that the 
economy is overregulated. Two examples—labour regulation4 and tax administration5— 
are presented below. 
Recent growth regressions used other proxies in testing the impact of institutions on 
growth—most frequently political stability and civil liberties (see, for example, Barro, 1991; and Levine and 
Renelt, 1992). 
The discussion of labour regulation here focuses on formal regulations; as will be shown in 
section C below, however, formal labour regulations are not binding in practice. 
Another example of excessive regulation in Egypt's export sector can be found in Schouten 
(1995). 
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(a) Labour regulation 
Law No. 137 of 1981 regulates several aspects of the labour market. Among other 
things, the law places severe constraints on hiring, requires that restrictive conditions be 
met for firing to the point of prohibition, and establishes complicated procedures for 
settling labour disputes. 
By law, firms employing 10 or more workers can only recruit new staff from a 
pooi of candidates nominated by a government agency called the Manpower and Training 
Directorate (MPTD). The process is supposed to work as follows. The employer provides 
the MPTD with a profile of each vacancy within seven days of its occurrence.6 The 
MPTD identifies qualified candidates, giving precedence wherever possible to those who 
registered earliest, to veterans of the armed services, and to the handicapped. The MPTD 
furnishes the employer with a list of twice the number of persons required within seven 
days of receiving the vacancy notice. If the MPTD does not nominate candidates for the 
vacant position(s) within one week, the employer has the right to fill it/them on his own. 
The employer is forbidden to hire through employment agencies or labour contractors. 
By law, firing is permitted without the concurrence of the MPTD only under the 
following conditions: 
• Expiiy of the contract period 
• The end of the season for seasonal workers 
• The completion of casual or temporary work 
• The resignation or death of the worker 
• Unfitness demonstrated during the probation period 
Firing is not allowed without the concurrence of the MPTD when the cause 
involves reasons specified in an organization's regulations and penalty sanctions, or when 
the employee: 
• Is absent for more than 10 consecutive days or 20 intermittent days 
during one year without an acceptable reason. 
• Is completely disabled or has a permanent partial disability which 
prevents him from doing his job in a situation where no suitable 
substitute work exists. 
6 
This process is described in greater detail in a recent World Bank report (Integrated Development 
Consultants, 1991). 
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Has impersonated someone else or submitted forged certificates or other 
documents. 
Causes a grave material loss to the employer, provided that the loss is 
reported to the MPTD within 24 hours. 
Fails to observe safety precautions, even though appropriate warnings 
have been issued to this effect, provided safety instructions are posted in 
a location visible to all workers. 
Fails to fulfil substantial obligations associated with the employment 
contract. 
Releases firm secrets. 
Is found guilty of a felony or of any crime bearing on honour, honesty or 
public morals. 
Is found to be under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. 
Attacks or assaults the employer or the manager responsible for reasons 
associated with work or during working hours. 
In all such cases, the dismissal of an employee requires that a request be submitted 
to a tripartite committee composed of the Director of the MPTD or his representative (as 
chairman), the worker or his representative, and the employer or his delegate. The 
committee reviews the documentation and hears the arguments of both parties. If an 
amicable solution to the dispute is reached, the matter ends; if not, the case may be taken 
to the Court of Urgent Matters for a hearing. The decision of this court is not binding and 
can be appealed further. The process can be very costly and time-consuming. 
(b) Tax regulation 
The regulation of taxation appears to be very costly as well, in that the tax law 
gives tax inspectors too much discretion, induces tax disputes, and relies on principles that 
are too costly to administer. 
Procedurally, commercial and industrial entities are required to file tax 
declarations within 30 days of the General Assembly meeting. Failure to submit the 
declaration on time results in a penalty of 20% of the taxes due, which can be reduced to 
half in cases where a compromise is reached between the declarer and the Tax Authority 
without referring the matter to the Appeals Committee. 
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Tax collection is based on the principle of auditing all taxpayers, a practice seldom 
followed in other countries. The Tax Authority has up to five years for inspection. Tax 
officers receive bonuses on the basis of collected taxes, which may lead them to 
overestimate the taxes due. Further, the criteria for tax assessment are ambiguous at times, 
forcing tax officers and taxpayers into extreme initial bargaining positions. If a tax officer 
does not approve an amount due, a taxpayer has one month to object to the Appeals 
Committee, which consists of three Tax Authority officials (including the head, who is 
appointed by the Minister of Finance), as well as two members appointed by the taxpayer 
(if he/she so chooses). Decisions are taken by majority vote but are not necessarily final. 
Each party has the right to dispute the Committee's judgement before the primary court 
within 30 days of its announcement, whatever the disputed amount may be. Tax disputes 
are known to take years to settle, and the number of cases pending legal resolution is 
increasing. 
2. Contract enforcement 
The settlement of labour, tax and other such disputes is often not very costly if the 
court system is impartial, efficient and consistent; when the opposite is true, contract 
enforcement among concerned parties or between firms and the Government can be very 
costly. The latter seems to be the case in Egypt. 
According to a World Bank study (1995c), the businessmen, lawyers and judges 
involved in administering justice in Egypt all feel that the system is simply too slow, 
expensive and uncertain. In 1993/1994, the clearance rate of commercial cases was only 
36%, compared with 80% in Japan and 88% in Belgium. Moreover, the situation seems 
to have deteriorated over time; the average duration of commercial cases tripled from 
about two years in the early 1970s to more than six years in the early 1990s (Naguib, 
1988). There is about one pending case for every three Egyptians. 
3. Commitment 
Finally, since firms invest today and recover their money tomorrow, the fear of 
future arbitrary policy reversal is critical. This fear is reduced where: the Government 
exhibits a history of maintaining consistent policies; there are internal restraints on policy 
reversal (such as laws or constitutional restrictions, or checks and balances among the 
different branches of Government); and the Government is bound by international 
restraints (such as treaties or aid conditionality). 
On these three accounts, Egypt scores modestly compared with successful 
reformers. According to the 1995 Institutional Investor 's Country Credit Ratings 
publication, Egypt ranks far below Thailand, Chile, and to a lesser extent, Argentina (see 
table 4). Egypt's ranking has improved somewhat during the I 990s as economic reforms 
397 
have proceeded, but at no time has its ranking been comparable to that of Chile or 
Thailand. 
Table 4. Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings 
Country 1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 
Egypt 34.9 32.7 23.1 26.8 32.9 
Argentina 64.3 23.2 23.2 26.2 38.9 
Chile 54.9 26.4 28.9 45.9 55.6 
Thailand .. 53.4 56.0 61.3 63.5 
Source: Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings, various issues. 
Note: Two dots (..) indicate that the item is not available. 
The executive branch in Egypt—unlike that of Argentina, Chile (after Pinochet) 
or Thailand—enjoys considerable influence over policy formation. It rules by majority in 
Parliament and exerts significant influence over other branches of Government. As a 
result, policies can be changed without much opposition. External restraints do not seem 
to curb policy reversal either; foreign aid has generally been tied to political rather than 
economic conditionality. Further, although Egypt signed the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, it is only bound to the less restrictive provisions reserved for lower- 
income countries. 
Uncertainty can be reduced somewhat if the Government and the private sector 
engage in a productive dialogue through organizations such as business associations. 
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of business associations in Egypt is limited, as they are 
largely controlled by the Government or dominated by large firms; their participation in 
policy formulation is thus either limited or biased in favour of more influential business 
groups. 
In sum, important reforms must be carried out on the institutional front if Egypt 
is to reap the full benefits of macroeconomic reforms.7 The question is, in which area(s) 
is deregulation likely to have the biggest impact? This issue is taken up next. 
This general point has also been made by Biblawi (1989) and Handoussa (1995). 
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C. THE PATTERN AND RANKING OF iNSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS: SURVEY RESULTS 
To identify the constraints private firms find the most restrictive, a survey of 45 
randomly selected manufacturing firms was carried out. Fifteen companies were 
selected from each of three industries: food processing, textiles and engineering. 
Representatives of all of the firms answered a series of questions (see annex) designed 
to determine the regulatory constraints on the firms' inputs and output (labour, capital, 
intermediate inputs; and profit), the firms' perceptions of the state of economic activity 
(measured by demand for their output), and the level of uncertainty (arising from both 
economic and non-economic factors). Personal interviews were conducted with each 
representative. The profile of the sample is given in table 5. As expected, the smaller 
firms have a much lower capital-labour ratio than the larger firms (representing 16% on 
average), they rarely export, and their initial debt-equity ratio is much lower than that of 
the larger firms. 
Table 5. Sample profile 
Food_processing Textiles Engineering 
Small Large Small Large Small Large 
I. Number of firms 8 6 8 7 9 6 
2. Fixed assets (thousands of Egyptian 
pounds/firm) 
182 28355 69 5 599 458 18 733 
3. Number of exporting firms 0 5 0 5 2 3 
4. Initial debt/equity ratio (percentage) 
— 
15 51 0 15 10 26 
5. Capital labour ratio (thousands of 
Egyptian pounds/worker) 
II 89 4 48 15 47 
Source: A. Galal, survey of45 Egyptian firms. 
Note: "Small firms' refers arbitrarily to entities with an average of 10 employees or less. 
1. Overall ranking of constraints 
The questionnaire results indicate that as a group, the firms believe the most 
restrictive constraints to be policy uncertainty, tax administration, access to finance, and 
the availability of material inputs, in that order. Labour regulation and demand are 
considered the least restrictive (see table 6). The finding that policy uncertainty is the 
most restrictive constraint is consistent with the analysis of the previous section. 
However, the fact that labour regulation is not as restrictive as the laws suggest is 
somewhat surprising; in the personal interviews, it was revealed that this was the case 
because firms were able to disregard labour regulations on hiring and firing by, for 
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example, agreeing to pay relatively insignificant penalties for violations,8 renewing 
contracts annually, or obligating workers to sign employment contracts and undated 
letters of resignation at the time of recruitment. 
Table 6. Ranking of Institutional consfraints by sector 
Constraint 
Food processrng Textiles Engineering A"erage 
Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
Policy 
uncertainty 
0.85 1 0.72 2 0.74 2 0.78 I 
Tax 
administration 
0.55 2 0.82 I 0.66 3 0.67 2 
Access to 
finance 
0.51 3 0.54 4 0.78 1 0.60 3 
Access to 
material inputs 
0.43 4 0.58 3 0.47 4 0.49 4 
Labour 
regulation 
0.18 6 0.37 6 0.32 5 0.30 5 
Demand 0.31 5 0.39 5 0.18 6 0.29 6 
Source: A. Galal, survey of 45 Egyptian finns. 
Nole: The figures are normalized to a scale of 0 to I, where 0 means that the constraint is not restrictive at 
all, and 1 means that the constraint is prohibitive. 
Another general finding is that the ranking of the institutional constraints is very 
similar across industries; while the severity of an individual constraint varies according 
to industry, the relative ranking is essentially the same. For example, policy uncertainty 
is considered the most restrictive constraint in the food-processing and engineering 
industries, and the second most restrictive in the textile industry. Similarly, labour 
regulation and demand are regarded as the least restrictive constraints by all three 
industries. Economy-wide institutional reform is seen as the key to better performance. 
2. The severity of institutional constraints according to type of industry 
The severity of institutional constraints varies by industry (see table 6). For 
example, tax regulations are more binding in the textile and engineering industries than 
in the food-processing industry; part of the reason for this is that many food-processing 
8 The fines for violating labour laws range between 10 and 20 Egyptian pounds (LE), or $3 and 
$10, per incidence. 
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firms enjoy temporary tax holidays, which means they do not have to deal with the Tax 
Authority on a regular basis. 
Table 6 also indicates that while financing is more problematic for engineering 
firms, textile businesses suffer the most from difficulties associated with labour regulation 
and the availability of intermediate inputs. Labour regulation problems are felt more 
acutely by firms in the textile industry because this industry is more labour-intensive than 
the others. In the same sector, the shortage of of State-owned enterprises in ginning and 
spinning activities; this is discussed further below.material inputs (for weaving and ready- 
made garments) is caused primarily by the domination 
3. The severity of institutional constraints according to firm size 
The impact of most of the institutional constraints discussed here also varies with 
the size of the firm. In general, the smaller the firm, the more restrictive the constraint (see 
table 7). This pattern is particularly apparent with respect to tax administration, demand, 
and access to finance and intermediate inputs. The major exception is labour regulation, 
which the smaller firms in all three industries find less binding than do the larger 
firms—mainly because labour regulation is not as strongly enforced for firms employing 
fewer than 10 workers. 
Table 7. Ranking of institutional constraints by firm size 
Constraint 
Small firms Large firms Average 
Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking 
1. Policy uncertainty 0.77 2 0.78 1 0.77 1 
2. Tax administration 0.78 1 0.67 2 0.73 2 
3. Access to finance 0.68 3 0.60 3 0.65 3 
4. Access to material inputs 0.58 4 0.49 4 0.54 4 
5. Labour regulation 0.25 6 0.30 5 0.27 6 
6. Demand 0.39 5 0.29 6 0.34 5 
Average 0.58 0.52 0.55 
Source: A. Galal, survey of 45 Egyptian firms. 
Note: The figures are normalized to a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 means that the constraint is not restrictive at all, 
and I means that the constraint is prohibitive. 
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The fact that smaller firms have greater difficulty than larger firms in gaining 
access to credit is not surprising. There is ample evidence worldwide to support the 
hypothesis that lending to smaller firms entails a greater risk of default and higher 
processing costs, so banks generally prefer to lend to the larger concerns. 
Variations across industries with respect to the problems encountered in obtaining 
intermediate inputs frequently appear to be industry-specific. As part of the survey, the 
firms were asked to the nature of the problem, or more specifically, whether price, 
quantity, quality and/or delivery time affected their access to intermediate inputs. The 
results, given in table 8, suggest that firms in the textile industry suffer the most, while 
firms in the food industry are the least affected. One explanation for this is that private 
firms in the garment industry get their yarns from State-owned enterprises. Given that 
State-owned enterprises enjoy a monopoly in the ginning and spinning markets, and that 
they only sell what is left over to the private sector after meeting their export targets, it is 
not surprising that downstream private firms suffer. In contrast, finns in the food industry 
are either self-sufficient (chicken farms fall into this category) or have access to multiple 
suppliers in both the private and public sectors, so most of them do not have the problems 
encountered by firms in the other industries. 
Table 8. Constraints on the securing of intermediate inputs by industry 
Food 
processing Textiles Engineering Average 
Quantity 0.02 0.43 0.08 0.17 
Price 0.30 0.57 0.25 0.37 
Quality 0 0.57 0 0.19 
Delivery time 0.17 0.57 0.25 0.33 
Source: A. Galal, survey of 45 Egyptian firms. 
Note: The figures are nonnalized to a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 means that the constraint is not restrictive at all, 
and 1 means that the constraint is prohibitive. 
In sum, the survey results support the broad conclusion that a high-level 
commitment to institutional reform is the most critical element in Egypt's efforts to make 
its institutions more compatible with the recent macroeconomic reforms. The results also 
suggest that tax administration and regulations constitute a key priority for reform. 
Finally, while some institutional constraints cut across industries, others are industry- 
specific; for that reason, a two-track (national- and industry-level) approach to institutional 
reform is desirable. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The upshot of the analysis is that the incentive structure in Egypt has improved 
in recent years. Through the macroeconomic reform programme begun in the early 1 990s, 
the Government has been able to align exchange and interest rates more closely with 
market values, increase competition through trade and price liberalization, and reduce 
inflationary pressures and the crowding out of the private sector by cutting the fiscal 
deficit. Further reforms are still needed on the macroeconomic front to correct for the 
distortions which have accumulated as a result of decades of inward-looking-policies, and 
reforms on the institutional front lag behind as well. Egypt's economy is characterized by 
excessive regulation, weak contract enforcement and policy uncertainty; these problems 
must be addressed, as macroeconomic reforms alone are not likely to bring about 
sustainable long-term economic growth. 
The survey results support this conclusion. Policy uncertainty is seen as the most 
restrictive constraint, followed by tax administration. This ranking suggests that the pay- 
off from institutional reforms is likely to be higher if efforts are focused first on reducing 
policy uncertainty and second on instituting reforms to rationalize tax administration. The 
survey results also show that the severity of the constraints varies from industry to 
industry, which suggests that attention should be given to industry-specific problems; in 
some cases, allowing more competition and facilitating privatization might constitute the 
best solution. 
One final thought: Many of the existing regulations were created with good 
intentions. Tax regulations were created to enhance tax collection and reduce tax evasion, 
and labour regulations were created to protect employees in general, but most particularly 
unskilled, female and handicapped workers.9 The problem is that the current regulations 
do not seem to have achieved their intended objectives; tax evasion is reportedly 
widespread, and labour regulations are often disregarded. At the same time, scarce 
resources are being wasted to follow or circumvent these regulations. A country as poor 
as Egypt cannot afford to spend these resources on dispute settlement, bribery and 
foregone productivity. Institutional reforms constitute the next step on the road to 
economic progress. 
Examples: (a) the current law forbids employing women for tasks representing a risk to health 
or morals. Female workers are entitled to a total of three 50-day maternity leaves at full pay, and are not 
allowed to work during the first 40 days after giving birth. Mothers of infants of up to 18 months may have 
two extra paid daily rest intervals of at least half an hour each. In firms employing 50 or more workers, a 
female worker may take up to three 1-year unpaid leaves to care for her children. Finns employing more than 
100 workers at one location must provide nursery care for the children of these workers; (b) juveniles aged 
12-I 7 may work under restricted conditions, but not for more than four continuous hours or on official 
holidays. Special health care is required for juvenile workers, including a yearly physical exam, maintenance 
of medical records, and the provision of a daily cup of milk of at least 200 grams; and (c) firms with 50 or 






1. Name of enterprise: 
2. Year established: 
3. Nature of activity: 








5. Which company law is your firm registered under? Law No. 
6. Number of employees: 
at start-up 
at present 
7. Value of fixed assets: 
at start-up 
at present 
8. What was the volume of sales in 199-? 
What is the expected value for next year? 
If there is a difference between the two years, what is the main reason? 





__ __ _____  _____ _____  
(d) 
0. What is your estimated domestic market share? (percentage) 
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11. Do you export any products? 
Yes 
___________ 
(percentage of exports in total sales) 
No 
If yes, what are your main export items? 
12. Your production technology is: 
mostly by hand mostly mechanized mostly automated 
13. Why have you selected this production technology? 
labour regulations 
____ _ 
availability of skilled labour 
cheap finance 
other (specify) 









___ ____ ____ ____
16. What are their main sources (percentage of the total cost of material inputs)? 
imported 
local products from the private sector 
local products from the public sector 
17. If imports constitute an important source of inputs, does their procurement 
constitute a problem? yes no 
18. If the answer to the question above is yes, which organizations are the most 
problematic to deal with? 
19. How many sources are available for local material inputs? 
private firms public firms 
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yes, in terms of quantities available 
yes, in terms of price 
yes, in terms of quality 
yes, in terms of delivery time 
Please explain 
21. Is the price of any of your major inputs fixed by the Government? 
yes; specify input and government agency 
22. Can you obtain these inputs at the official price? yes no 
If not, how high is the market price relative to the official price? 
Input Official price as a percentage of market price 
Input Official price as a percentage of market price 
C. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
23. Please rank the severity of the following obstacles on a scale of ito 5: 
Moderate Major 
(a) Tax administration 
(b) Labour regulation 
(c) Access to inputs 
(d) Access to finance 
(e) Demand 
(f) Policy uncertainty 
(g) Other (specify) 
i 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Please explain the major obstacles (if any) in greater detail: 
25. Which obstacle is the most costly? 
Tax administration 
Access to material inputs 
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Labour regulation 
Access to finance 
no 
Minor 
26. For the most costly items, please estimate the added cost of these obstacles 
over the past year (as a percentage of the cost of the item itself, with a 
statement of how this percentage is arrived at). 
Item Estimated percentage Remarks 
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XIII. MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE AND TRAINING TECHNIQUES 
by Antoine Mansour 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
Introduction 
Political conflicts and instability, changes in political systems (with the consequent 
changes in economic systems and policies) and economic turbulences have characterized 
the region during the past 50 years. Most of the changes that have taken place have been 
unpredictable and have adversely affected the operation of industrial enterprises. Regional 
events and uncertainties have created instability in a number of areas, including labour 
mobility and availability, capital transfers and remittances, trade relations between Arab 
countries, economic systems, and national economic planning and policies (see Mansour, 
1995). These factors, which continue to have a negative impact on the operation of 
enterprises, have been affected by economic decisions, but are mainly the result of political 
instability and conflicts in the region. 
Recent global and regional events have created even greater instability and 
unpredictability; many of them pose serious challenges to industrial enterprises. At the 
global level, these changes include the recently concluded Uruguay Round trade 
agreements aimed at globalizing and liberalizing trade, the establishment and strengthening 
of large regional economic blocs, the increasingly rapid advances in the application of high 
technologies, and the application of international quality standards (such as ISO 9000) and 
environmental controls (including the emerging ISO 14000 standards). Regional changes 
are linked to the continuous fluctuations in oil prices and revenues, as well as to the peace 
process and its implications for economic and trade relations and for the operation of firms 
in the ESCWA region. 
In this paper, the term "conditions of change" relates to the radical changes 
witnessed in both the global economy and the region. These changes and their impact have 
already been extensively reviewed and discussed; this paper takes the next step, focusing 
on how best to deal with change at the enterprise level. Presented first is a discussion of 
the concept of change, the relation of change to innovation, the need for enterprises to 
introduce changes, and some guiding principles for successful change. These factors 
formed the basis for a pilot entrepreneurship workshop held by ESCWA and others in 
1994. The second part of the paper offers a summary of the workshop proceedings, 
including a description of the techniques used by ESCWA to train a group of managers of 
industrial firms facing rapidly changing conditions. The aim of such training was to 
upgrade the managers' entrepreneurial skills to enable them to deal more effectively with 
changing conditions, predict change, and introduce appropriate responses. 
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A. THE ENTREPRENEUR AND CHANGE 
In order to stay competitive in the market and deal with the challenges associated 
with trade liberalization, the impact of the peace process and other major events, a firm has 
to adapt to the new environment, introduce appropriate changes, and exploit the 
opportunities arising from the new situation. The ability of a firm to cope with change 
depends to a large extent on the entrepreneurial and managerial skills of the top managers 
and on their capabilities in motivating middle management and other employees. The 
changes that are introduced by a firm to enable it to deal more effectively with a new 
environment may be considered changes within an existing situation (the Austrian mode 
of entrepreneurship); this may be contrasted with Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, which 
brings about the change of an existing situation (see Volberda and Cheah, 1993). In the 
first case, the entrepreneur generally copes with external changes by introducing only 
incremental or limited innovations/changes in the firm; in the second case, the changes 
carried out by an enterprise are reflected in radical innovations and do not merely constitute 
a response or adaptation to major global or regional events. The Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur is able to predict the future, set new and challenging objectives, create new 
opportunities and induce changes. This imaginative creator of new futures is a willing risk- 
taker and increases or creates uncertainty (see Hyvarinen, 1993), while the entrepreneur 
who adapts to change tries to reduce the general level of uncertainty over time. 
Formulating appropriate responses and inducing changes in the environment both 
require that the manager of an industrial firm be innovative and creative. Incremental 
innovation involves the adaptation and/or development of innovations, and can include the 
exploitation of opportunities that may not yet have been perceived by others; activities may 
include the development of adapted products, processes, markets and marketing channels, 
as well as administrative and organizational changes. Inducing changes in the environment 
entails the creation of innovations and new opportunities—or more specifically, the 
creation of a new product, and the promotion of radically different new production 
processes and new technologies. It is worth mentioning in this regard that, though they are 
different, these two forms of innovation and modes of entrepreneurship complement each 
other, in the sense that a firm is required to continuously adapt, develop and renew itself; 
incremental innovations constitute a normal daily concern for the entrepreneur, while 
radical innovations tend to be initiated only every few years or so. 
The innovation process for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) differs 
from that of large corporations. The smaller the firm, the more likely it is that the 
innovation will be produced by the top management or the owner-manager. In larger firms, 
the success of an innovation process depends on the input of top, middle and lower 
managers; in this case, entrepreneurial attitudes and behaviour should work their way down 
through top management to all units and sections of the firm. Human 
relations—motivating employees, expressing appreciation and encouragement, and 
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stimulating enthusiasm (see Hyvarinen, 1993 )—are more important in large firms and can 
be considered a key factor in promoting creativity among employees, better performance 
and the success of the innovation. 
A firm's ability to adapt to changing conditions and/or to induce changes in the 
environment depends on its internal flexibility. In this context, flexibility is determined by 
the variety of actual and potential procedures an organization possesses, as well as by the 
speed with which it can implement any one of these procedures (see Volberda and Cheah, 
1993) and respond to changes in the manufacturing environment. Flexibility enables a firm 
to gain a competitive advantage. The faster a firm is in adapting to change, the more 
competitive and the less vulnerable it is. The type and degree of flexibility will determine 
the extent to which an organization may succeed in bringing about the required changes. 
Firms that do not have the capabilities to cope with changing conditions and/or to 
exploit opportunities might still possess an operationalfiexibility. This type of flexibility, 
found in many firms, applies to routines based on the existing structures or goals of the 
firm, and relates, for example, to the ability of the firm to introduce variations in the 
volume of production and the number of employees. 
Some firms have structural flexibility, which refers to the capacity to the 
organizational structure to suit changing conditions. Such flexibility is characterized by, 
for example, a firm's ability to use multi-purpose equipment, to produce a new product 
design through the efficient conversion of the manufacturing process (product flexibility 
[see Levary, 1992]), and to substitute labour with equipment and export markets with the 
local market. Flexibility also helps managers establish an effective manufacturing strategy 
that will allow them to survive—and even to thrive—in the dynamic global environment. 
Firms that are capable of inducing changes, dealing successfully with uncertainties 
and introducing radical innovations have strategic flexibility. This quality, which is rarely 
found in developing countries, characterizes only those firms which are willing and able 
to make revolutionaiy changes—such as transforming or renewing existing structures and 
processes, and possibly restructuring the firm itself—that will enable them to create radical 
innovations (Levary, 1992). 
B. THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
BY JORDANIAN ENTREPRENEURS 
A 1994 survey of 84 industrial enterprises in Jordan, carried out by ESCWA in 
cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the University of Jordan, revealed that 
many of these firms were relatively inflexible; very few were internally prepared to cope 
with the impact of global and regional events, particularly the Gulf crisis, and most of them 
did not have a strategy for dealing with the impact of the peace process. The flexibility that 
existed—if it existed—was generally an operational flexibility, in the sense that the firms 
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were able to introduce changes in the volume but not in the kinds of activities carried out. 
Only a few had dealt successfully with the events, demonstrating structural flexibility, by 
shifting from the export to the local market or by diversifying the production and/or sources 
of raw materials and equipment. Strategic flexibility was not found among Jordanian 
enterprises. 
It is worth mentioning that the events which have had the most negative impact on 
Jordanian firms during the last 10 years have been regional crises: rated first in this regard 
was the second Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, reported by 88% of the survey sample; second 
was inter-Arab relations, indicated by 70% of the respondents. The Gulf crisis affected the 
production plans of 84% of the enterprises surveyed, the local sales of 82%, the export 
sales of 72%, and the imports of raw and semi-finished materials of 75%. Most seriously 
affected were marketing and sales (reported by 85% of the firms). Most manufacturers had 
been exporting to Iraq and the Gulf countries, and their sales to these countries were 
interrupted. Though many enterprises were able to cope by increasing their sales to the 
local market, those that were totally oriented towards the Iraqi market were forced to close 
down or to operate at very low production capacity. 
Less than a third of the firms surveyed had introduced changes in the kinds of 
activities they were involved in, over and above changes in the volume of production or 
labour. To better cope with changing markets, 28% of the sample had shifted, during the 
three-year period following the Gulf crisis, from single-use equipment to multi-purpose 
equipment, and 21% from lower-quality to higher-quality raw materials. Some 50% of the 
firms showed even greater dynamism and exploited the new opportunities, entering new 
markets by introducing new products after 1991. 
Jordanian managers responded to the impact of regional events by focusing on the 
marketing aspect. About 85% reported that they had paid more attention to the local 
market, and 81% had pursued a strategy of finding alternative export markets. Of secondary 
importance were strategies related to technology: around a third of the firms reported that 
they were employing more modern technologies, improving equipment, and using 
information technology. Rated third in importance was a strategy followed by around a 
fifth of the firms: terminating the production of old products. 
The impact of the peace process was still unclear for most of the managers, 
although the majority expected a significant increase in competition from Israeli products 
(84%), as well as an expanded market (mainly the West Bank and Gaza) for their own 
products (61%). Managers of Jordanian enterprises did not seem to have any vision for the 
future, which they felt was full of uncertainty. This would explain why they had no 
concrete plans for dealing with the peace process, and why they were following a "wait and 
see strategy". Of those who had ideas for the future, 33% indicated that they were 
developing plans to improve the quality of their products to enable them to deal with the 
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increased competition in the local and regional markets, and 27% intended to follow a 
strategy of expanding their sales in the West Bank and Gaza. 
C. PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
CHANGE IN A FIRM: THE ROLE OF TOP MANAGEMENT 
A number of principles must be followed and conditions met if the changes to 
be introduced by companies (to allow them to adapt in response to major events or to 
induce radical innovations) are to be successful. In this respect, the role, attitude and 
actions of top management are crucial. In order to successfully implement a plan for 
change, top management must motivate subordinates, secure their support, and involve 
them in all activities related to the change process, from the planning to the 
implementation stage. Such involvement generally serves to prevent employee 
resistance to the change programme, as it allows them to contribute ideas and to feel a 
certain sense of responsibility for the programme's success. Achieving firm-wide 
participation and support requires that top management set clear and realistic objectives, 
provide only general guidelines and directives rather than detailed instructions, and give 
subordinates considerable leeway to make decisions. Top managers should view 
subordinates as people who can take the initiative, generate new ideas, and 
(independently) find the appropriate ways to achieve the objectives and follow the 
guidelines (see Maynard, 1989). 
Middle management and skilled employees are becoming the principal driving 
force behind successful change programmes. Qualified personnel are becoming more 
important than capital. Human resources are no longer regarded as a mere "factor of 
production", to be managed like other factors. In today's world, knowledge is a vital, 
valuable and scarce strategic resource, and it is becoming one of the most important 
assets of an enterprise, enabling it to adapt to the fast-changing and competitive global 
environment. The ability of top management to exploit knowledge—through direct and 
personal interaction with middle managers and employees, to motivate them and enable 
them to take the initiative—is what gives companies their competitive advantage 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1995). 
Top managers must have an "entrepreneurial orientation" if their change 
programmes are to be successful. They can no longer be mere "administrators" who 
carry out the day-to-day activities of the firm, solve daily problems, carry out planning 
exercises, allocate resources, establish limits for themselves and for the company to keep 
the system operating, and who are just concerned with "doing things right". Modern 
managers need to have entrepreneurial vision and strategic capabilities (see Hinterhuber 
and Popp, 1992), and must be risk-takers if they are to succeed in dealing effectively 
with and/or inducing changes. Furthermore, change, by definition, requires creating a 
new system, which in turn always demands leadership—one of the main characteristics 
of an entrepreneur (Kotter, 1995). The change process, if it is to succeed, requires a 
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certain kind of manager with excellent leadership skills. While a traditional manager 
tends to adopt an impersonal, if not passive, attitude towards goals, leaders adopt a 
personal and active (rather than reactive) attitude, shaping ideas instead of responding 
to them (Zaleznik, 1992), and taking high risks when introducing changes. 
Entrepreneurial vision is more an orientation for the future than a goal, and is 
needed from the beginning of an entrepreneurial activity or any restructuring or change 
programme. Managers should be able to adopt a strategy that allows them to adapt to 
continuously changing conditions. For example, a central element of any strategy is the 
creation of permanent competitive advantages in the market (Zaleznik, 1992). Strategic 
management competence, one of the main characteristics of an entrepreneur, is reflected 
in the ability of top managers to promote creative behaviour and initiative among 
subordinates by reducing the hierarchical structure and the vertical lines of authority and 
communication to a minimum and by facilitating team work and lateral communication 
between the various units and sections of the enterprise. While the manager- 
administrator regards perturbations in the environment as dangerous to the enterprise, the 
entrepreneur has what is called a "tolerance for ambiguity" and sees these perturbations 
as opening up new opportunities and as catalysts for change. 
D. TRAINING TECHNIQUES USED IN THE ESCWA PILOT 
WORKSHOP ON UPGRADING ENTREPRENEURIAL AND 
MANAGERIAL SKILLS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CHANGE 
There is a strong belief that entrepreneurs are made, not born; in response to this 
assumption, a number of programmes involving counselling, training, seminars and so 
on have been initiated to address the upgrading of the entrepreneurial skills of managers 
of industrial firms. It is widely held that managers can, with the appropriate training, 
now be taught not only how to adapt to unpredictable, changing conditions and to cope 
better with instability, but also how to be introducers of positive changes/innovations 
when conditions are stable. 
A training programme, if it is to help managers learn to deal with and/or induce 
changes in the environment, must do the following: 
• Enhance creative thinking and innovative behaviour among managers 
• Increase awareness of the importance of human relations in a firm. 
Managers need to learn how to improve communication within the firm, 
motivate employees, stimulate enthusiasm, and express appreciation and 
encouragement 
• Upgrade personal skills in the areas of risk-taking, leadership, decision- 
making, and strategic management capabilities 
416 
• Help managers learn how to identify, manage and predict changes 
• Teach managers how to see change as an opportunity, not as a threat, and 
make them aware of how important it is to continuously review the 
situation so that they can carry out continuous improvements within their 
firms 
ESCWA was able to apply these principles and practices during the pilot 
workshop described below. 
1. Workshop objectives 
The one-week Pilot Workshop on Upgrading Entrepreneurial and Managerial 
Skills under Conditions of Change, organized by ESCWA in cooperation with Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung and the University of Jordan, was held in Amman from 14 to 20 September 
1994. Jordan was selected as a pilot-case-study country in view of the fact that it has been 
one of those in the region most affected by inter-Arab conflicts and regional wars, and is 
directly concerned with the peace process. Furthermore, the results of the ESCWA survey 
of 84 industrial firms in Jordan, reviewed above, confirmed the need for management 
training, as most of these firms were facing difficulties in coping with and/or inducing 
changes. The Workshop was designed to meet the needs of managers of industrial firms 
operating within fast-changing environments. It was open not only to chief executives, but 
also to functional managers who possessed top management potential and whose positions 
were likely to be crucial to the future of their companies. 
The Workshop aimed at helping Jordanian managers upgrade their entrepreneurial 
skills to enable them to identify, predict, measure, manage and better cope with both 
regional changes and fast-changing global conditions, including the emerging peace 
situation. 
More specifically, the Workshop aimed at the following: 
• Enhancing managers' sensitivity to change and changing environments 
as a prerequisite for the promotion and development of an entrepreneurial 
culture within Jordan 
• Identifying the appropriate strategies for transforming changes and 
changing environments into "investment-grade" business opportunities 
• Creating an action plan to enable managers to tap the hidden 
entrepreneurial and managerial dynamics within their companies under 
conditions of continuing change 
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2. Workshop methodology 
The Workshop included three core modules: "Identifying Change", "Predicting 
Change", and "Coping with Change". Various active learning methods were applied to 
address the participants' expectations in each module. These methods consisted of a 
minimum of lectures and a maximum of role-playing, business gaming and simulations, 
panel discussions, the sharing of experiences and ideas, consensus-generation, and video 
presentations. The number of Workshop participants from private industrial firms was 
limited to 20 (managers) to provide the maximum opportunity for personal interaction and 
participation, as well as confidence- and team-building. 
3. Enhancing entrepreneurial orientation 
The Workshop used various games and simulations, as well as video presentations, 
to enhance the entrepreneurial behaviour and skills of the participants, particularly in the 
areas of risk-taking, motivation, decision-making, leadership, team-building, teamwork, 
creativity and innovation. The concept of "coopetition" (simultaneous cooperation and 
competition) between companies was introduced through various simulation exercises. 
4. Events and changes as defined in the Workshop 
Throughout the Workshop proper, the following terms were defined and applied: 
Events (in this context) happened in the immediate past or are still 
happening now. Many of these events are exogenous to the enterprise— 
occurring within the realm of geopolitical, cultural, demographic, 
technological, economic or other such macro systems, or in the form of 
natural disasters—and are therefore outside the control of managers and 
entrepreneurs. Events, as defined here, do not happen everyday; they are 
generally radical, drastic, and often unexpected. They change the status 
quo and consequently create very high uncertainties for the future. They 
should not be confused with trends (which may still be in the early stages 
of unfolding). Events generally cause future changes to happen. The 
Uruguay Round trade agreements, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Gulf crisis and the recently concluded peace accords with Israel are 
examples of radical events. 
Changes are the future results of events. The changes of concern here are 
those that are rapidly occurring, profound, surprising, abrupt, seemingly 
unpredictable and revolutionaiy. When they happen, they alter the rules 
of doing business. When the rules are changed, more threats (and 
opportunities) are created. While change can have happened in the past, 
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the Workshop concentrated on changes that were expected to occur in the 
very near future. Such changes are interesting to managers and 
entrepreneurs because they can be anticipated and therefore managed 
when they finally happen. Some changes are positive (here, these are 
called effects, and refer to opportunities that can at some future time be 
exploited), others are negative (here, these are called threats, and refer to 
changes that can challenge the very survival of the enterprise), and still 
others can even be neutral (having no effect within the relevant time 
frame). 
5. Anticipating change 
To be able to anticipate change, managers should take the following into 
consideration (based on Canela, 1994): 
• The probability of the change occurring 
• Impact areas or areas affected by this change 
• The time frame for the occurrence of change (When will it occur?) 
• The path that this change is likely to take, or its direction (positive, 
negative or neutral) 
These four elements formed the basis of an analysis that was undertaken by the 
Workshop participants with the aim of formulating appropriate responses at the firm level. 
The approach used in the analysis—the Change Analysis Planning System (CAPS)—was 
employed to ease the manager's task of managing change. CAPS is a structured set of 
techniques, procedures and instruments for: 
• Predicting future changes triggered by events that are presently occurring 
or occurred in the immediate past 
• Describing future changes 
• Planning a systematic response 
The CAPS approach has several advantages: 
It ensures extensive participation by all concerned persons in the task of 
predicting, planning and managing change. 
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• It develops appropriate responses that are transparent and easily 
understood by all concerned decision makers. 
• It defines realistic and definitive responses to changes and turbulence in 
a business environment. 
• It forms a solid basis for an integral approach to introducing and 
managing change. 
• It can harmonize the expectations and opinions of the concerned parties 
through consensus-based event-predicting and change-planning 
processes. 
• It helps managers to visualize future changes, consequential problems and 
scenarios. 
The managers participating in the Workshop carried out the CAPS analysis by 
going through five main steps: 
• Change analysis 
• Spatial analysis 
• Time profile analysis 
• Vector analysis 
• Response analysis 
(a) Change analysis 
Change analysis involves analysing the existing situation by examining relevant 
events surrounding a given business environment, and identifying or forecasting major 
future changes caused by past or present events. 
In undertaking the change analysis, each participant was asked to identify, through 
the use of the card system, two major events that had occurred since 1984 and were 
affecting his or her business in Jordan. The events identified by the participants were 
clustered into 23 major events, the most notable of which were the following: 
• Political events: regional disputes, the peace process, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union 
• Global economic events: the Uruguay Round trade agreements, the EU 
subsidy for meat exports, international standards such as ISO 9000 
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Regional economic events: the Gulf countries' policies towards 
Jordanian labourers, returnees, the relaxing of the Arab boycott 
National economic events: the devaluation of the Jordanian dinar, new 
investment procedures, the easing of the Central Bank's foreign currency 
restrictions, the introduction of sales tax, the economic restructuring 
programme 
• Environmental events: the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
The participants were divided into four groups and asked to list three changes for 
each event. More than 60 changes at the macroeconomic and firm levels were identified. 
Some of these changes were positive, creating new opportunities for the firms; other 
changes were negative, adversely affecting the national economy and the operation of the 
firms (see annex table: "Change analysis: the workshop results"). 
(b) Spatial analysis 
Spatial analysis involves identifying the potential area(s) that may be directly 
affected by the occurrence of an event. Each participant was asked to identify the area 
within the enterprise most affected by change, from a list which included marketing and 
competition, production and technology, human resources, finance and capital structure, 
and R&D, The results indicated that marketing was considered the most affected, 
followed by fmance, production, human resources and R&D (see annex table). Notably, 
marketing was also considered the area most affected in the ESCWA survey of 84 
industrial firms in Jordan. 
(c) Time profile analysis 
The participants were requested to specify the time profile of change, assuming 
that the direction of change curved within each of three time periods: during 1994 (the 
time of the Workshop), from 1994 to 1996, and from 1997 on. On that basis, the 
participants were asked to decide when each of the changes would be most likely occur, 
to estimate the timing for a certain change becoming manifest, maturing and dissipating, 
and finally, to draw a change profile for every change (see annex table). 
(d) Vector analysis 
Vector analysis aims at analysing the directions of the impacts of various 
changes—or in other words, whether a particular change has had a positive, negative or 
neutral effect on an enterprise (an opportunity "+"; a threat to survival "-"; and no 
impact at all = "0"). This analysis was carried out during the Workshop, and the results 
421 
indicated that the impact of the changes that had taken place was considered positive in 
slightly more than half of the cases, while the remaining changes were considered threats 
to the enterprise (see annex table). 
(e) Response analysis 
The participants were requested to undertake a response analysis at the firm level. 
In this exercise, each participant was asked to identify the changes most relevant to his/her 
company, to identify alternative approaches and options for introducing and managing the 
response to a change or set of changes, and to select one or more potential strategic 
responses to be adopted by the enterprise. The final responses formulated by the 
participants concentrated mainly on the following: 
• Developing new products and services to satisfy the needs of customers 
• Providing high-quality products and working towards the implementation of the 
ISO 9000 standard, with the aim of improving the competitiveness of Jordanian 
industries 
• Learning and applying total quality management techniques 
• Searching for new business opportunities, starting businesses in the West Bank 
and Gaza, and forming joint ventures with local companies in these two areas 
• Decentralizing the organizational structure of the companies 
• Cooperating with other local companies to challenge foreign competition both at 
home and abroad 
• Establishing trade and export houses to reduce expenses when entering new 
markets 
• Setting new import and export policies 
• Establishing joint ventures with well-known international environmental 
companies 
• Investing in new technologies to create environment-friendly factories 




There is no doubt that the economies of the region, as well as the individual firms, 
will continue to be affected in the future, both positively and negatively, by radical global 
and regional events; this means that entrepreneurs will have to be continuously prepared 
to adapt to new environments and exploit new opportunities. The factors of instability that 
have characterized the region during the last five decades will continue to prevail to some 
extent (possibly to a large extent) in the future, even under conditions of peace. Inter-Arab 
conflicts and political instability in the region cannot be attributed solely to the existence 
of Israel or to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The factors contributing to instability are inherent 
in the social systems of the Arab countries and are a legacy of the colonialist era: 
colonialist geopolitical machinations have been largely responsible, whether directly or 
indirectly, for Lebanese confessionalism; the conflicts between Iraq and Iran, Iraq and 
Kuwait, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey, Egypt and Sudan, and Algeria and 
Morocco; and the conflicts within some of these countries. The entrepreneurs in the 
region will continue to face instability related to these circumstances, as well as the 
challenges of the peace process and its aftermath. Peace with Israel will bring major 
changes, and unpredictable political events will continue to occur in the region; 
entrepreneurs must be prepared to deal with this reality—to adapt when necessary, but also 
to take advantage of opportunities that may present themselves. 
If entrepreneurs are to do a better job of coping with and adapting to fast-changing 
conditions and exploiting opportunities, much greater emphasis must be placed on the 
upgrading of managers' entrepreneurial skills to enable them to manage change 
successfully and anticipate changes through the introduction of innovations. 
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XIV. TECHNOLOGICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF GLOBAL CHANGE 
by Rustam Lalkaka 
United Nations Development Programme 
Introduction 
The elimination of poverty is a major priority in most countries and in the 
international development dialogue. It is widely recognized that employment creation is 
the most meaningful approach to alleviating poverty. Success in creating the I billion new 
jobs the world will need by the end of this century depends to a critical extent on the 
creation and growth of small enterprises. This, in turn, depends on the fostering of 
entrepreneurship in the private sector within the framework of supportive national policies. 
This paper reviews the process of creating new technology-based ventures and the 
special characteristics of "techno-entrepreneurs". Recent approaches to the promotion of 
such ventures are outlined, together with the roles of the key players. Attention now needs 
to be focused on the practical problems of fostering entrepreneurship, in the same way that 
environmental preservation and social development issues have been placed on the global 
agenda. 
A. THE CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
As an agent of change and progress, an entrepreneur starts by a market 
opportunity and matching this with social or technological innovations, then proceeds to 
mobilize the resources necessary to drive his or her business concept to its commercial 
realization. The development of a product or service with a high-technology content— 
never easy anywhere or at any time—poses a significantly greater challenge for the Arab 
States in today's rapidly changing global environment. It calls for restructuring technology 
and business development systems and developing the skills needed for a new breed of 
techno-entrepreneurs to transform innovations into market opportunities. It also requires 
a reorientation of the present processes and priorities of international technical and 
economic cooperation. 
A torrent of new technology-based goods hits the market every week, improving 
the quality of life while at the same time creating disruption in social patterns and volatility 
in financial markets. The pace of progress in information and space technologies, robotics, 
advanced materials, biomedical sciences and other advanced technologies continues to 
quicken, significantly changing the way the world lives. For instance, it took over a 
century for the invention of photography to be commercialized (1727-1839), 65 years for 
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the electric motor (1821-1886), 10 years for the nuclear reactor (1932-1942), three years 
for the transistor (1948-1951), and only four months for the laser disc (1981). 
How can the industrializing countries keep pace, much less catch up, with the 
industrialized countries when the research and development (R&D) budget of a single 
company, say General Motors (GM) or International Business Machines (IBM), is 
considerably larger than that of even large developing countries such as China, India or 
the Republic of Korea? This predicament reinforces the necessity for cooperative 
research, know-how licensing and joint-venturing between the countries of Western Asia, 
in addition to North-South cooperation in these fields. 
"Trade not aid" is a worthy slogan, given the sharp curtailment and growing 
conditionalities of conventional donor assistance. However, trade itself is in jeopardy. 
The post-Uruguay Round environment has seen the strengthening of regional trading 
blocs. As labour costs rise in one country, the assembly operations of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) move to another, helping exports but not necessarily strengthening 
technological capabilities. 
B. TOWARDS COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE 
In this environment of change, continuous innovation is the only constant: the 
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) Company in the United States plans for 30% 
of its annual sales to come from products less than four years old; Toyota has recently 
opened the world's first post-modern car factory, where only 10 man-hours are required 
per vehicle produced—roughly half the American average; Canon snatched the lead from 
the competition with its ubiquitous copier; and Chrysler did the same with its minivan. 
The pace of advanced new product introduction is relentless. 
The imperative of competitive performance has serious implications for 
developing countries if they are to keep pace and succeed. It calls for national efforts to 
achieve greater systemic efficiency and productivity growth, the move from an investment- 
driven to an innovation-driven economy, and sustained higher-order competitiveness, all 
directed towards enhanced customer satisfaction at home and the penetration of selected 
markets abroad. Concurrently, Governments and businesses have to address such 
intractable problems as alleviating poverty, combating corruption and halting 
environmental degradation. 
Further, technological change is taking place against a background of growing 
intra- and international disequilibria. While the transformation from State-centred to 
market-oriented development is opening up enormous opportunities and options, it has 
also caused severe short-term hardships. In order to survive and prosper in these changing 
times, developing nations and their enterprises need enlightened government policies, 




















































































































































































Traditional production factors are giving way to a new paradigm characterized by 
new patterns of trade, investment and employment, and by informal networking, lifetime 
learning and technological entrepreneurship. The manufacturing sector in much of the 
Arab world continues to be dominated by food products, textiles, chemicals and other 
traditional industries, many of which are in the public sector. Change is coming, albeit 
slowly. State enterprises are being corporatized pending privatization, and the share of 
knowledge-based and information-related activities is rising perceptibly. Restructuring 
policies now place emphasis on the role of the private sector, even if this is often 
rhetorical. The legacy of decades of centrally planned development has generally been 
inimical to private enterprise; in turn, the private sector has been slow to respond to 
economic liberalization and has generally failed to generate the new employment necessary 
to absorb new entrants into the labour force. 
The regulatory problems connected with an onerous tax structure and 
administration, poor access to fmance and raw materials, the over-regulation of labour and 
land use, pervasive bureaucracy, and restricted markets have all been significant barriers 
to entrepreneurial growth. It is vital that the infrastructure for technological 
entrepreneurship be strengthened. While the macroeconomic indicators are encouraging, 
the living standards of ordinary people in many Arab countries are declining. 
Conditions are especially acute in areas such as the occupied territories. Recent 
work done in Gaza and the West Bank has pinpointed the enormous difficulties faced; 
particularly significant are the problems related to the free movement of goods and people, 
personal security and the general rule of law, the fairness and predictability of regulations, 
and the undependability of electricity and communications. Efforts must be made to 
establish stable legal frameworks, incentives and special tax treatment, facilitated access 
to supplies and markets, and appropriate support systems for new venture creation. 
Conditions in Palestine are difficult but not unique; similar barriers to enterprise 
development can be found in a number of Arab countries and in other developing nations. 
The Arab techno-entrepreneur may derive some hope from his historical context: 
this region has been the cradle of some of the richest civilizations ever known. The golden 
years of Islamic science, from around AD. 800 to about A.D. 1100, saw the contributions 
of Al-Biruni and Abu Bakr Al-Razi to natural sciences; Ibn Al-Haytham to optics; Al-Tusi 
and Ulug Beg to astronomy; and Al-Khawarizmi (now pronounced "algorithm"), Al-Jebr 
(now pronounced "algebra") and Arabic numerals to mathematics. The Arab technologist 
might be interested in knowing that Syrian glass-making technology and raw materials 
were transferred by a "licensing agreement" between Behemond VII of Antioch and the 
Doge of Venice—secrets which the Doge then guarded zealously! 
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C. CREATING NEW TECHNOLOGY-BASED VENTURES 
Starting a new business in a developing country is a hazardous task. The 
challenges are compounded when the venture is technology-based: 
Capital requirements are generally larger, and traditional banks are ill- 
equipped to process the perceived risk. Venture capital generally only 
becomes an option when the venture has documented the merits of its 
management, market and innovation. 
• Knowledge-based ventures can benefit from linkages to sources of 
knowledge such as technical universities or research laboratories; such 
mentoring needs to be cultivated. 
• Often techno-entrepreneurs have technical skills but do not possess the 
business management and marketing skills necessary for success; they 
frequently lack credibility and contacts within business networks. 
• In fields where technology is changing rapidly, it is often advantageous 
to make technology-acquisition arrangements. Sourcing such 
innovations, negotiating technology licensing agreements and protecting 
the intellectual property itself require special skills. 
• Knowledge-based innovations are inherently more risky than others. The 
management of this unique risk requires certain assessment techniques 
and vision. 
• Technology-based ventures often have social and environmental 
implications which need to be managed carefully. 
• Penetrating a competitive niche market requires market intelligence, a 
sound strategic plan and good luck. 
While figure I depicted the innovation process from the national perspective, 
figure II outlines the progressive steps to be followed by the entrepreneur himself. 
As a product development cycle moves from concept to full-scale production, 
capital requirements increase significantly; similarly, as a venture progresses from start-up 
through the early stages to growth and maturity, its staff and sales grow. If it crosses the 
threshold of, say, 20 employees and commensurate annual turnover, it becomes a modern 
medium-sized undertaking. Its chances of surviving crises and reaching stability are better 
if its growth is evolutionary rather than explosive. The bulk of enterprises, however, will 















































































































































































































































In agreement with the National Institute of Science and Technology, the National 
Society of Professional Engineers formulated the engineering stages of development for 
a new product. The traditional approach was linear, where different specialist groups 
addressed problems stage by stage. The current practice is to address problems 
concurrently, with a multidisciplinary product team working simultaneously on several 
stages, as shown in table 1. A small business or individual inventor may have to engage 
outside help to accomplish what needs to be done to complete product development. 
Table 1. New product development by a multi-specially project 
team involved in simultaneous engineering tasks at all stages 
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As an enterprise becomes successflul, the focus shifts from planning and surviving 
to managing, and then to managing managers. As it makes the transition from the first 
crisis of leadership to the second of autonomy, the chief executive officer (CEO) has to 
change roles (from promoter to entrepreneurial manager) or to recruit staff with the 
requisite managerial skills (see table 2). 
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Table 2. The changing role of the manager-entrepreneur 
CreEcti vity 


















In many developing countly situations, the optimum national strategy involves the 
following progression: equipment and know-how are imported; higher-level design and 
operating experience is acquired, then adapted, improved and applied; and the final stage 
includes indigenous innovation and exportation, both of technology-based goods and of 
know-how itself. 
The flexibility and creativity of an entrepreneurial techno-venture may lead to 
more incremental and breakthrough innovations than can be generated by larger-sized 
firms in many sectors (see table 3). Clearly, in the chemical, automotive and other such 
industries the enormous research budgets of large multinational corporations are needed; 
however, in some of the advanced information technology and biotechnology fields small 
entrepreneurial groups can still achieve major breakthroughs. This is especially true when 
it comes to quick responses to new technological opportunities. "Time to market" is 
increasingly critical to success in high-technology areas where product life cycles can be 
measured in months. One of the major competitive advantages that entrepreneurial start- 
ups possess is that they can typically rush a new product to market more quickly than can 
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large, established finns. The latter try to generate demand for their products and protect 
their market share through expensive marketing campaigns, intellectual property 
protection, and so on. Small firms often cannot afford these measures, but they can still 
win by being fast on their feet. 
Table 3. Innovations offirms in selected countries 
Country Firm size Breakthrough Major shift Improvement 




























































A number of entrepreneurial groups in developing countries have now achieved 
advanced capacity and are becoming multinationals: the Mittal family has built or 
acquired mini-steel mills based on complex direct reduction technology—first in India, 
then in Indonesia, Trinidad-Tobago and Mexico, and more recently in Canada and 
Germany; Acer, from Taiwan Province of China, is a world force in computing; and the 
city of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, has become a hub for biotechnology companies, many 
started by women entrepreneurs. 
At another level, Malaysia has 600 micro-electronics firms producing $12 billion 
of goods and employing 200,000 workers. Another sector of enormous potential for the 
South is the $400 billion software market; some countries are already significant players. 
This ferment is creating opportunities for professional work abroad—and shortages of 
skilled workers at home. 
D. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNO-ENTREPRENEURS 
Some popular misconceptions about techno-entrepreneurs are that they are born, 
not made; that they take risks with other people's money; and that they fail more often than 
they succeed. Actually, entrepreneurial skills can be identified and developed. The 
440 
entrepreneur is typically an innovator who formulates new solutions to existing problems, 
mobilizes resources, and stimulates others to join the team. These aptitudes develop over 
time, often starting in childhood, as the person faces new challenges and learns from 
failure. One interesting finding is that socio-economic and cultural differences among 
countries affect entrepreneurial activity (see table 4). 
Table 4. Entrepreneurial culture in different societies 
Category Industrialized country Industrializing country 
Business opportunities Plentiful, but contacts help Largely limited to influential 
groups 




Family, home equity, credit cards 
Venture capital 
Family and small credit 
mechanisms 
Development banks 
Management Both professional and family-based Family-based, insecure 
Authority Usually delegated Usually centralized 
Information Easily available, diffuse flow Closely held, top-down flow 
Motivation for growth Strong: to stay competitive, get rich, 
expand 
Constrained: avoid attention, 
protect markets 
Government support Good: SME promotion as a social 
investment 
Often rhetorical, discriminatory 
Entrepreneurial opportunities can be found in every industrializing country, 
community and family. The principal sources of entrepreneurs for knowledge-based 
ventures are often university and government research laboratories, large industrial and 
military establishments, and professional service firms. Reasons for becoming an 
entrepreneur generally relate to the desire to be independent, create value, contribute to 
society, earn recognition, and/or to become rich; quite often, one becomes an entrepreneur 
simply to avoid being unemployed. Value-adding ventures with good growth potential can 
best be developed in an open market and in a culture which supports risk-taking. 
It is not surprising that Arab nationals who overcome bureaucratic obstacles at 
home often flourish as immigrant entrepreneurs abroad. It is also worth noting that in the 
United States—the stronghold of immigrant techno-entrepreneurs—80% of all millionaires 
are first-generation millionaires, and that at any given time there are 3 million people 
starting their own businesses—more people than are getting married or are having 
children! 
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The techno-entrepreneur anywhere faces the challenge of moving a concept 
through the prototype and production phases towards a product which meets market needs 
at a price consistent with the value created and with the ability of customers to pay. 
Equally important, the market itself has to be developed and sustained. It is not enough 
to be first with a better mousetrap if one does not have the skills to educate and reach 
potential buyers and to set the market standard. 
The history of innovation is replete with examples of the latecomer and of the 
second-best overtaking the best, through what has been called the "self-reinforcing 
advantage". Sony's Beta was overshadowed by the longer-playing VHS and the user- 
friendly Apple Macintosh operating system by the standard-setting Windows; however, 
the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, first used in the 1 870s at schools teaching typing, has 
beat back many an improved layout! 
Here, one has to distinguish between the inventor and the innovator. The inventor 
is typically a creative person who pursues his goal of acquiring knowledge and/or 
producing new products, without determining in advance whether a real market exists for 
his inventions. The innovator, on the other hand, draws on existing knowledge and the 
talents of others to develop or adapt a product or service at a volume and cost that can 
capture a significant portion of an identified market. As mentioned before, the flexibility 
and creativity of a small entrepreneurial techno-venture may lead to more incremental and 
breakthrough innovations than can be generated by the larger-sized firms in many sectors. 
There is also the maligned but pervasive practice of "reverse engineering"-.----that 
is, taking a machine apart, analysing each component, and putting it back together, often 
with improved design characteristics. Sir Francis Newton, in describing his proposed 
research laboratory, related that "for the several employments and offices of our fellows, 
we have twelve that sail into foreign countries under the names of other nations (for our 
own conceal), who bring us the books and abstracts, and patterns of experiments of all our 
parts. These we call Merchants of Light." Presently, however, in the interests of both the 
innovator and the consumer, intellectual property rights are best respected. 
E. UNIVERSITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Entrepreneurial attitudes can now be identified and strengthened through special 
techniques as an adult matures, increasing his or her chances of becoming a successful 
entrepreneur. As figure IV indicates, some individuals may prefer to be employees rather 
than business owners, and many of the more enterprising may go broke or stay small. 
Starting with a large potential pool of would-be entrepreneurs, there is attrition at each step 
along the way. A small number survive, and an even smaller number experience strong 
















































































































































































































































Entrepreneurship in technology-based enterprises requires economic incentives 
and socio-psychological reinforcement, together with the institutions to create the science 
and its linkage to production processes, technical products and viable businesses. Most 
technical universities in the South do precious little scientific research and have weak 
linkages to industry; exceptions include universities in Chile and Cuba, and the interface 
mechanism of the Centre for Technological Innovation at the National University of 
Mexico. 
In this context, the terminology used for the research process itself should change 
from R&D to the "r&D" used in Japan, and then to "market-engineering-design-research" 
(MEDR), the term used for today's paradigm, signifying a "market pull-production 
engineering-technological development-scientific research" continuum, which is carried 
out by an integrated team covering these disciplines. 
Hampering the sharing of research, expertise and training opportunities among 
developing countries are the lack of (small) funds needed for triggering interaction, the 
lack of information, and the mutual lack of confidence in each other's capabilities. In an 
effort to break this impasse, the World Association of Industrial and Technological 
Research Organizations has been promoting South-South and South-North collaborative 
research arrangements between laboratories. 
An affiliation or linkage with a strong technical university gives the techno- 
entrepreneur access to faculty, facilities, services and graduate students, as well as the 
cachet of intellectual respectability, which is equally important. Universities can organize 
themselves to meet entrepreneurs' specific needs as businesses move from the concept 
stage to maturity (see table 5). 
Entrepreneurship development (ED) needs and learning programmes vary as the 
potential entrepreneur moves from school to university, from plan to project, and from 
first-stage growth to expansion and diversification. Organizations providing practical help 
to techno-entrepreneurs include the public-private SEBRAE in Brazil and KOSGEB in 
Turkey. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Foundation for 
International Training in Toronto have also been effective in enterprise creation. 
At the international level, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) offers a comprehensive human resource development programme 
of upstream services on policy, communications networks, and learning for enterprises, 
and the Interman programme of the International Labour Organization (ILO) has a useful 
database of selected ED service providers. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) Empretec scheme, based in national banks and managed by 
local foundations, has created hundreds of "empretecos" at both the national and inter- 
country levels. Finally, ESCWA has organized a range of ED programmes for Western 
Asia. 
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Table 5. Starting a technology-based business 
Stage Learning needs 
1. Idea to valid concept 
("conception") 
Information on sources of ideas 
Acquire motivation/commitment 
Technical skill to make it? 
Self-evaluation 
2. Valid concept to 
determining scale, resources ('embryo) 
Market research and pricing 
Testing, developing 
Process planning 
Estimates of know-how 
3. Scale-up to start-up ('infant') Business planning 









Management control systems 
Continuous advisory follow-up 
F. FINANCING THE TECHNOLOGY-BASED ENTERPRISE 
In most of the surveys carried out to determine the type of assistance needed by 
entrepreneurs, particularly those in early-stage technology businesses, mobilizing capital 
ranks as one of the highest priorities. Friends and family usually help get a business 
started. For the next stage, additional capital (say $150,000) can come from short-term 
seed-capital schemes. Then, in the commercialization phase, larger financing is needed 
($200,000 or more), preferably as equity from venture funds. 
Venture capital funds pool $10 million to $20 million from various public and 
private investors, both local and foreign. Active technical and management assistance is 
provided, and investments are carefully made in a diversified portfolio of ventures. In 
liquidating the portfolio over six to eight years, a small proportion of high-flying 
companies can bring in an attractive overall return for investors. 
Countries such as the Republic of Korea and India have had some success with 
venture capital. In Indonesia, there is government venture capital (an oxymoron perhaps), 
with a State company, P.T. Bahana, taking a 20% stake in various provincial venture 
capital companies. Revolving funds are another possibility, where capital is provided to 
match the equity of the entrepreneur, who is committed to paying a royalty of say 1% to 
5% of sales over a defined period. 
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G. TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS INCUBATION 
Of the 1,500 business incubators worldwide, some 20% are linked to technical 
universities and deal with technology enterprises. Interestingly, of the estimated 250 
incubators in the developing and transition economies, perhaps two thirds are technology- 
based. In a business incubator, early-stage entrepreneurial businesses are carefully 
selected, then provided with an affordable package of work-space, shared facilities, 
focused advice on management and marketing problems, and access to networks of other 
professionals. Companies leaving the incubator (they must do so in two to three years) 
have a better chance of survival and success than those set up in the outside world. 
The United Nations development system has helped 25 countries to design and 
establish incubators. In 1991 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Special Unit/TCDC sponsored a workshop in Cuemavaca, Mexico, for the exchange of 
experiences in creating and strengthening technology-based enterprises. Technology 
business incubators have been in operation for a few years now, and UNDP, UNIDO and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) recently arranged for assessment studies to be 
conducted on the incubator experiences in Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and China. In September 1995, a workshop was held in Tianjin, China, 
to discuss the impact of incubators on enterprise creation, employment and economic 
development. 
The preliminary findings are that where an entrepreneurial culture, a technical 
infrastructure and patient State support are available (as has been the case in at least three 
of the seven countries studied), the incubators have helped create a variety of viable 
businesses and good jobs (each worker receives an average of $2,500 per year), they have 
been instrumental in transferring research results to the market-place, and they have had 
a significant impact on enhancing partnerships and the "culture" for entrepreneurship. 
H. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The technology incubation system represents a good example of a strategic 
concept which was initiated under multilateral aegis and implemented in the form of State- 
university partnerships, and is now being assessed, documented and disseminated among 
developing countries. Within the context of these linkages, countries with incubators are 
being made aware of improved practices, while those planning to set up incubators are 
being properly informed of the prerequisites, potentials and problems. 
Cooperation in technology-venture creation can be achieved through informal 
exchanges among peers at international gatherings and trade exhibitions, formal twinning 
between institutions and alliances between companies, commercial franchises and joint 
ventures, and government protocols. Another intervention of value is encouraging 
countries to start national associations for technology-based business-related 
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activities—bodies that can be progressively developed into subregional and regional 
organizations. This is happening in Latin Amei with, for instance, the Comision 
Latinamericana de Ciciena y Technologia (COLCYT), Red de Informacion Technologica 
Latinamericana (RITLA), and the Mexican Association of Technology Parks and Business 
Incubators (AMIEPAT); it is also occurring with even greater urgency in the Arab States. 
The pace and pattern of a nation's economic development now depend in large 
measure on its technical resource base. In this context, success depends mainly on 
whether a country possesses and utilizes the skills required (a) to apply technology in a 
way that will enhance competitiveness and (b) to create technology-based ventures. 
Techno-entrepreneurs have to be supported by appropriate national structures and 
international linkages if they are to survive and flourish in an intensely competitive world. 
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XV. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND ISO 9000 FOR SMALL 
AND MEDIUM-SCALE ENTERPRISES 
by Hassan Char?f and Ferhang Jalal 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
PART ONE 
Introduction 
Summarizing the view of many economists concerned with quality in developing 
countries, a study by A. El-Tawil' on quality management begins with the following 
statement: 
"The improvement of quality of products and services is the key to the solution 
of economic difficulties encountered by most developing countries. Better quality 
of goods and services leads to customer satisfaction, permits the substitution of 
imported products by local ones, and offers better chances of reaching export 
markets" (El-Tawil, 1995). 
This statement echoes the rising concerns about quality, exemplified by the 
increasing requests among suppliers and customers that the producers and providers of 
goods and services comply with ISO 9000 and other quality standards. Applying the 
concept of "total quality management" (TQM) has long been the top priority of managers 
and executive officers in industrialized and other countries worldwide; it is now becoming 
increasingly important to managers in the ESCWA region. A 1993 survey carried out in 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire land (Pike, 1994) revealed that 90% 
of chief executives placed total quality at the top of their agendas. Likewise, recent 
surveys in the United States of America have shown that "producing high quality" ranks 
number one on top executives' lists of the key strategic competitive capabilities needed. 
Why has the concern for quality become the dominant issue for managers 
worldwide, and why should it be the top concern for managers in this part of the world? 
A leading quality expert, Professor R.J. Pike (1994) summarizes the reasons, or "quality 
imperatives", as follows: 
Mr. A. El-Tawil is Director of the Developing Countries Programme at the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
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Increasing competition and the loss of sheltered markets. To survive, 
companies need to improve their competitiveness in the market; this is 
best achieved through improvements in quality and productivity. 
Rising consumer expectations. Customers do not pay for goods or 
services—they pay for satisfaction. What were once regarded as luxuries 
have, for many, become necessities. Companies are forced to add extra 
value to their products/services without raising their prices. 
• "Large consumer" demands for quality assurance. Large companies, as 
consumers of others' products and services, have placed increasing 
pressure on their suppliers to comply with quality standards such as ISO 
9000. 
• Advancing technology—extending what is possible. New technologies 
can have a significant impact on the quality of products and services. 
The principles of TQM—particularly the involvement of all 
personnel—may lead to better decision-making relative to the acquisition 
of new technology. 
• Concern for people and the environment. First, it is vital to enlist the 
support of all employees at all levels, as the involvement and commitment 
of people has a tremendous impact on quality improvement: quality is 
everyone's responsibility. Second, environmental concern is growing 
worldwide. The ISO 14000 international environmental standard recently 
developed to address such concerns is not far from being adopted and 
linked to ISO quality standards. 
• The cost of mistakes—the economics of quality. Making mistakes wastes 
time, effort and fmancial resources; quality management leads to the 
development of a "zero defect" concept. Attention to quality can result 
in considerable savings. Some surveys estimate that the cost of mistakes 
in companies amounts to as much as 25% to 30% of turnover; at the 
national level, that cost may translate into 10% of sales. This is too much 
to pay for mistakes, but the greatest and most important cost to a 
company comes from business and market share losses resulting from 
customer dissatisfaction. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The concepts of quality and the methods of achieving it have evolved over many 
centuries. Until the time of the industrial revolution, quality was the responsibility of the 
individual craftsman who conceived and produced a product or service. With the 
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introduction of machines and factory-based mass production, quality became the 
responsibility of a supervisor or inspector who was usually selected from among the most 
experienced workers, and whose assessments were based on the visual inspection of the 
end-products. 
The setting up of inspection departments in companies came about with the large- 
scale production and widespread manufacturing of interchangeable components. This 
functional separation of the production and quality-assessment processes led to the 
assignment of specialized inspectors and to the development of sophisticated measuring 
and testing equipment to ensure quality control. 
It was soon recognized that the variability of interchangeable parts was inevitable, 
as no two parts were likely to be manufactured to exactly the same specifications. It 
became necessary to differentiate between acceptable variation and unacceptable variation, 
and to introduce a statistical basis for sampling large numbers of exchangeable parts 
(which reduced the work of inspection, but involved the taking of calculated risks for both 
producers and users). This eventually led to the training of qualified professional 
inspectors (Juran, 1989) to supervise quality control, and to the emergence of leading 
quality experts such as W.E. Deming and J.M. Juran. 
In the 1950s Deming and Juran were invited by Japanese top managers to assist 
in defining quality systems for companies involved in Japan's reconstruction effort. Their 
visit led to the development of quality management and continuous improvement concepts. 
In his book Total Quality Control, A. Feigenbaum (1961) pointed out for the first time that 
the concept of quality should not be limited to production processes alone; it had to be 
applied to all aspects of a company's business. 
Shortly before that, military, nuclear and pharmaceutical industries in the United 
States had realized that it was too late to carry out inspection after the component was 
manufactured. They came to understand that, before an order was ever placed, suppliers 
had to be requested to comply with certain standards, or to provide "quality assurance", 
which involved an assessment of a supplier company's overall competence and 
performance rather than an evaluation of the quality of its end-product alone. 
The concept of quality was further developed with the realization that customer 
satisfaction with a product or service was linked to all of the activities carried out within 
a company, and that satisfying a customer began with identifying his exact needs and 
continued through to the assessment of whether those needs had been adequately satisfied. 
The stages of this process constituted what is called the Deming Quality Loop (Deming, 
1988), which inspired the concept of integrated quality control or "total quality control". 
Eventually, ensuring total quality control necessitated the development of a mechanism for 
TQM, which led to the establishment of total quality systems. 
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Most of the industrialized countries devised their own total quality systems and 
standards, and supplier companies found themselves faced with a large number of 
stringent and diverse requirements. This led to the development of the "third-party 
certification" concept. Eventually, the ISO 9000 was formulated to standardize quality 
assurance requirements for supplier firms and certifying bodies. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
To clarify the major concepts related to TQM, it is important to understand the 
following definitions: 
Quality. 
The totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that 
bear upon its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs (ISO 8402) 
• A predictable degree of uniformity and desirability, at low cost and suited 
to the market (Deming, 1988) 
• The total composite product and service characteristics of marketing, 
engineering, manufacturing and maintenance through which the product 
and service in use will meet customer expectations (Feigenbaum, 1961) 
Quality control: 
• The operational techniques and activities that are used to fulfil the 
requirements of quality (ISO 8402) 
Quality assurance: 
• All those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate 
confidence that a product or service will satisfy given requirements for 
quality (ISO 8402) 
Process. 
Any activity that accepts inputs, adds value to these inputs for customers, 
and produces outputs for those customers (BS 7850) 
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Inspection: 
• Activities such as measuring, examining, testing and gauging one or more 
characteristics of a product or service, and comparing the results with 
specific requirements to determine conformity (ISO 8402) 
Total quality control: 
• An effective system for integrating the quality development, quality 
maintenance and quality improvement efforts of various groups in an 
organization instituted to allow marketing, engineering, production and 
service efforts to be carried out in the most efficient and economical 
manner possible, with the ultimate goal of providing full customer 
satisfaction (Feigenbaum, 1961) 
Total quality management: 
• A concept incorporating a management philosophy and company 
practices that aim to harness the human and material resources of an 
organization most effectively to achieve the objectives of the organization 
(BS 7850) 
• Quality management is that aspect of the overall management function 
that determines and implements the quality policy. In this sense it is no 
different from any other set of managerial processes, except that these 
processes are applied to quality rather than to other aspects of business 
(BS 4778) 
C. FROM INSPECTION TO TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT2 
Presenting the concepts covered thus far in a chronology of sorts allows for a 
better understanding of the evolution of quality assessment (Mandl, 1995): 
1. Inspection of the end-product 
Very early on in industrial mass production, it became clear that to gain the 
confidence of customers, certain specifications had to be met, and delivered products had 
to be of an acceptable quality. Inspection mechanisms were installed to assess the quality 
of the end-products before their delivery to customers, as shown in figure I. The 
2 
Adapted from a paper by Mr. Cristoph Mandi (1995). 
453 
inspection control mechanism classified products into two groups: products acceptable for 
delivery; and unacceptable products to be scrapped. 
Figure 1. End-product inspection/control 
Scrap 
2. Quality control 
Inspecting end-products proved to be a very expensive process. First, inspecting 
every deliverable product took a lot of time, money and effort, especially when the number 
of end-products was sizeable. Statistical inspection methods and the acceptable statistical 
risk concept were introduced to address this problem. Second, having to scrap the end- 
product that had gone through the entire manufacturing process was both costly and 
wasteful. To solve this problem, inspection or control mechanisms were installed at 
various stages of the manufacturing process, as shown in figure II. This process allowed 
for the replacement of intennediate parts and for the elimination of defective items (and 
the costs they incurred) very early on in the manufacturing process. 
The "on-line quality control" concept gave rise to two questions: 
• How many inspection points should be installed, and where should they 
be located (keeping in mind that every inspection point entails additional 
cost)? 
• Is it feasible to apply statistical methods at every inspection point? 
































3. Customer-oriented quality control 
Until very recently, quality controls were based on acceptance criteria set by 
designers and manufacturing companies. With experience came the realization that the 
customer paid for his satisfaction, and not for quality as defined by the company. New 
concepts were developed: quality criteria now had to incorporate customer requirements 
in the design and inspection of various parts of the end-products. Marketing and sales 
departments were gradually brought into quality management systems and provided 
companies with the answers to the following questions: 
• What are customer expectations? 
• How can customer expectations be met? 
• To what extent does the delivered end-product satisfy customer 
expectations? 
4. Process control 
Concerns about end-product costs and quality assurance led to further 
improvement in quality control concepts. First, the following questions were asked: 
• Why and where are defects produced? 
• How can defect recurrence be reduced? 
The answers to these questions led to the development of the "process control" 
concept (shown in figure III). Here, whenever a defect is identified, the item in question 
is removed from the production line, and the production process is analysed to identify the 
point at which the defect occurred, to diagnose how and why the defect was produced, and 
to determine what can be done to reduce the probability of recurrence. This created the 
need for product "traceability" along the production line to make it easier to identify 
exactly where the defect occurred, and led to the practice of documenting all processes 































































































5. Quality management 
Efforts to detect and eliminate causes of defects led to further improvements in the 
process control concept and to the development of the integrated approach inherent in the 
quality management concept. Quality control became an integral part of every single 
activity in the production process; any time or anywhere a defect was detected, preventive 
and/or corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence. Within this context, as 
mentioned above, traceability and documentation became part of process control. 
Preventive and corrective actions and concerns were no longer restricted to production and 
maintenance personnel; they became the concern of everyone in the company, including 
the sales department, which was given the task of conveying customer expectations and 
complaints. 
Continuous improvement also became everyone's responsibility. Now, preventive 
and corrective action is taken whenever it is realized that a process might lead to the 
production of an item that does not meet quality requirements, as shown in figure IV. The 
whole control process follows a particular plan and has been formally documented. 
Total quality management (TQM) 
TQM is a management philosophy—an approach focusing on quality, based on 
the involvement of all personnel, and aiming at long-term success through customer 
satisfaction. In TQM the concept of quality relates to the achievement of all managerial 
objectives. The difference between TQM and quality management is that in TQM the 
concepts of quality management are not restricted to the production processes only, but are 
applied to all processes within a firm, including the services provided to both internal and 
outside customers. 
To facilitate comparison of the concepts that have been discussed in this section, 
the table below identifies the major elements associated with each. 
D. BASIC RULES OR GUIDELINES OF 
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
The philosophy of TQM is simple and easy to accept, but there is no unique way 
to translate it into "rules" to be applied and practised. Nevertheless, a series of 
fundamental guidelines has evolved over time, based on the experiences of a large number 























Table. Comparison of quality control, quality assurance, 
total quality control and total quality management 
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inspection 
































Starting point Product 
specifications 
Procedures Design and cost of 
quality 
Customer needs 
Source: Cris Blakeborough, addressing a seminar on TQM held in Damascus in March 1994. 
1. Customer satisfaction 
In TQM the first objective of the management and of all company activities is to 
satis& the customer; this is an orientation that should prevail throughout the firm—at all 
levels, among all personnel and in all processes. An inherent principle of TQM is the 
understanding that sales and marketing departments cannot achieve customer satisfaction 
without support from all of the other departments in the firm, or without customer 
satisfaction in turn affecting the actions of everyone in the firm. 
Furthermore, if it is understood that in a firm everyone is producing or providing 
a service or product for someone else, whether inside or outside the firm, then the 
customer orientation of TQM must be translated into practice through the concept 
"everyone has a customer that must be satisfied". TQM does not work unless everyone 
within the firm does his share in fulfilling the quality requirements of his own customer. 
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2. Continuous improvement 
TQM is not an objective that can be achieved once and for all. It is necessary to 
understand that at all times is an impossible task, and that 
everyone must therefore strive continuously to help the company recognize and fulfil 
customer requirements. Continuous improvement in performance thus becomes the 
concern of everyone, all the time. 
In TQM, dealing with problems or defects is viewed as the most important way 
to improve a company's ability to meet customer requirements; problems must be used to 
increase one's understanding and skills relative to the task undertaken. The aim of the 
TQM continuous improvement approach is problem prevention rather than problem- 
solving, a concept the Japanese call kaizen. 
3. The system approach 
Common sense dictates that any system which depends on human reliability is 
unreliable—a fundamental principle of TQM. Humans are not perfect machines and will 
therefore make mistakes; thus, one basic principle of TQM is that processes fail, not 
people. The task of the manager is not to search for those who commit mistakes and 
punish them, but to find out what can be done to improve the process where the defect 
occurred so that it will not happerf again. 
Achieving the system approach in a firm takes time, as it cannot be copied from 
other firms. It has to be incorporated gradually—through a mixture of preaching, training, 
skill acquisition, technical support and communication—until it becomes common 
practice. 
4. Quality as a shared value 
The statement that "everyone has a customer to be satisfied" has very important 
implications: if everyone assumes responsibility for ensuring that a customer's 
requirements are met, it follows that each and every person assumes responsibility for total 
quality within the firm. However, this important principle cannot be effectively applied 
unless there is a clear and shared understanding of what quality means for the firm as a 
whole, and unless there is company-wide conformance with the "requirements" that follow 
from such a concept. Within the firm, different people may have different concepts of 
what quality means. For example, the production department may consider the most 
important quality requirement to be a defect-free product, while the main objective of the 
marketing department may be to meet defined schedules and deadlines. Although these 
views may not be contradictory, the lack of a common set of priorities can lead to a 
customer's needs not being met. Quality must be a shared value, derived from the 
common understanding of customer requirements. 
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E. THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN TQM 
TQM is a basic philosophy, an integrated approach that requires the involvement 
of everyone in the firm and a common understanding of what quality is meant to be. It is 
geared towards making things happen at different stages—from the design to the 
development, production and delivery of products and services—so that customers get 
what they ask for. This approach entails a number of very important tasks to be carried 
out by the top management of a firm, the most important of which are related to the 
following: 
• Assuming responsibility for the ongoing improvement of the process 
• Diffusing information about quality requirements among all levels of staff 
and facilitating a common understanding of the firm's priorities in this 
regard 
• Encouraging change 
• Communicating with everyone in the company, and remaining open to 
new ideas and suggestions from below 
In the implementation of the TQM approach, the role of top management is to 
systematically create the right atmosphere for the continuous improvement of processes 
so that this concept becomes an integral part of the work ethic of all personnel in the firm. 
Generating such an atmosphere requires what is known as "the three C's": the 
Commitment of top management; good Communication throughout the firm, and an 
appropriate Culture (Blakeborough, 1994). It should be noted, however, that good 
communication and top management commitment cannot create a TQM culture overnight; 
it takes months and possibly years for even a small company, to institute the necessary 
changes and to move smoothly along the track required for TQM. 
What does top management commitment really mean? First, it must be stressed 
that without the commitment of middle management, it is not easy for top management to 
compel everyone in the firm to adopt the culture of continuous improvement and TQM. 
Even more critical, however, is the fact that without the real support and direct 
involvement of top management, middle management cannot carry out the required tasks. 
Top management must maintain its commitment to TQM at all times, at all levels and at 
all stages in order to sustain both the momentum of the approach and the long-term efforts 
needed to instil the TQM ethic, without ever allowing these efforts and the decisions 
needed to become secondary priorities. The commitment of top managers should be 
manifested by their direct involvement in planning, decision-making, diffusing concepts, 
and carrying out all necessary actions within the context of TQM, so that the prevailing 
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attitude of eveiyone in the firm is changed from "Have I done the job correctly?" to "How 
can I do the job better?". 
In building a well-ordered TQM system, the specific tasks of top management can 
be described as follows (Pike, 1994): 
• Create a vision and set the cultural tone. 
• Establish a quality strategy and plan. 
• Establish systems and procedures for all processes. 
• Support and participate in quality education and training. 
• Participate personally in quality-improvement programmes. 
• Promote an error-friendly environment. 
• Base the reward system on being active rather than reactive. 
• Provide the appropriate resources for managing the improvement process. 
Winning the hearts and minds of employees is the most difficult task of managers 
in setting up a quality management system. Managers have to understand the needs of 
people at work—what encourages them to do their best and what demotivates them. The 
needs of a business to set control mechanisms may conflict with the needs of individuals 
to be free to exercise their own judgement, make the most of their abilities, and follow 
their own direction. Continuous quality improvement management emphasizes the 
importance of the facilitation process—empowering people by expanding their areas of 
freedom to exercise responsibility and creativity. 
F. THE TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
As mentioned before, there is no single guideline for adhering to the TQM 
philosophy and approach or for setting up a TQM system. Eveiy firm or organization must 
design its own unique quality management system appropriate to its needs and internal 
structure, so that the best use can be made of its materials, equipment, manpower and other 
resources. 
Many quality systems and standards have been created over the past few decades 
in various countries. In 1987, the ISO 9000 was formulated to harmonize all standards 
into one globally acceptable standard. Its basic concepts can be summarized as follows 
(Pike, 1994): 
• Say whatyou do. 
• Justify what you do. 
• Do what you say. 
• Record what you did. 
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Deming made the point that improvement is not achieved in a single stride, but by 
continuously going round the improvement cycle of "plan-do-check-act", as illustrated in 
figure V; this adds another two concepts to the original ISO 9000 list: 
• Review what you have done. 
• Revise what you will do. 
Figure V. The Deming quality loop 
Act Do 
Check 
Conceptually, a quality system is based on the overlapping of three sub-systems, 
as shown in figure VI. 
Briefly, what the figure depicts is that the ability of an organization to deliver 
quality products and services is a function of the following: 
• A technical system which includes quality control and quality assurance 
systems 
• A social system which is concerned with the attitudes and behaviour of 
employees 
• A management system whose function is to integrate the above sub- 
systems into a well-ordered control system, creating the right attitudes, 
habits, abilities and behaviour among personnel through managerial 
leadership, example and practices. 
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Figure VI. TQM integrates all aspects of the firm 
As has been emphasized, TQM requires that top managers be directly involved 
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G. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND ISO 9000 
The basic management philosophies of TQM and Iso 9000 are the same, and the 
results should be the same if each is implemented correctly. The major difference between 
ISO 9000 and TQM lies in the firm's motivation. The ISO 9000 is a standard that can be 
audited by an accredited "third party" institution (a common customer request). Many 
companies comply with ISO 9000 primarily to achieve certification. Companies often 
require their suppliers to have ISO 9000 certificates, and the Government puts political 
pressure on certain companies to adhere to the ISO 9000 standard, especially those bidding 
for public projects. Companies fulfilling ISO 9000 requirements primarily to be certified 
have a fundamentally different approach from companies that have adopted the TQM 
approach and whose only goal is customer satisfaction. The ISO 9000 also has the 
objective of achieving customer satisfaction, but when certification is the primary goal, the 
emphasis in implementing the company's quality system may be on adhering to the 
certification procedures rather than on creating an environment where customer 
satisfaction ranks first. 
PART TWO 
introduction 
Part one of this presentation dealt with TQM, emphasizing the vital importance 
of quality in achieving success in the highly competitive markets of today. 
Part two looks at another side of the issue of quality and its attainment. Quality 
is a relative rather than an absolute term; to determine whether a product or service is good 
or bad, there must be a reference—or standard—against which it can be measured. 
In the sections that follow, standards and standardization are defined, some 
advantages of standardization are described, and the main elements of standardization are 
explained, with special emphasis on the needs of developing countries. The main focus 
of this presentation is the ISO 9000, a series of international standards designed 
specifically to facilitate the establishment and management of quality systems. 
A. STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION 
Standards can be defined in many ways; for the purposes of this paper, the 
definition provided by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) will be 
used. 
According to the ISO 8402, standards are documented agreements containing 
technical specifications or other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines, 
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or definitions of characteristics to ensure that materials, products, processes and services 
are fit for their purposes. 
The Iso 8402 defines standardization as the activity of establishing, with regard 
to actual or potential problems, provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context. In particular, this activity 
consists of the processes of formulating, issuing and implementing standards. 
Modem manufacturing of any kind is unthinkable without standards. Engineers 
and planners apply standards throughout every phase .of the production process. 
Manufacturers also use standards in contracting, in inspecting their own products, and in 
deciding whether to accept or reject the products they receive from their suppliers. 
The technical content of standards varies considerably according to the type of 
problem the standard is established to solve. Most standards deal with specific products 
such as detergents or services such as the transfer of funds by banks. They may also deal 
with a group of products such as earth-moving equipment or a group of services such as 
banking telecommunications. 
A standard can cover one or more aspects of the subject in question, depending 
on the objectives. For instance, a standard's primary concern may be to rationalize the 
range of product sizes or capacities to satisfy the needs of different users while keeping 
costs and wastage to a minimum; examples of such standards are paper sizes and container 
capacities. The purpose of a standard may be to specify a particular characteristic or 
property of a material or product required for a specific application, such as the tensile 
strength of a certain kind of steel. Further, a standard may relate to the overall 
performance of a product such as a car engine, expressed through a number of important 
parameters such as net power, noises and exhaust emissions. 
Certain standards concentrate on product safety, or more specifically, on the 
amount of protection provided against explosion, electric shock, and fire, chemical and 
radiation hazards. These standards apply to most types of products and equipment, from 
smaller items such as safety belts and children's toys to larger goods such as upholstered 
furniture and bulldozers. Other standards concentrate on the environmental aspects of 
products and processes. Some involve an assessment of their impact, while others relate 
to the monitoring of whter, air and soil quality. Many standards cover the dimensional 
accuracy and interchangeability of parts such as screw threads, or the compatibility and 
interoperability of products such as computers with other products such as peripherals. 
Most standards incorporate testing methods; these may be described separately or 
combined with the specifications of the product characteristics. Sampling methods are 
also standardized when the tests are not performed on all products of a delivered lot. 
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One important group of standards provides rules for engineering functions, to be 
used in the design of concrete structures or in calculations for a building's thermal 
insulation, for example. Such standards greatly facilitate the work of engineers and that 
of the regulatory authorities who check their work. These standards are usually used as 
a basis for national building codes and other mandatory regulatory instruments. 
An important objective of standardization is to facilitate communication and the 
exchange of information. Most standards contain terms and definitions related to the 
product or service in question. Standards devoted entirely to this purpose are known as 
terminology standards. In addition to the terms and definitions, such standards may 
include explanatory notes, illustrations and examples; standardized graphical symbols 
used, for example, in buildings and on equipment serve as an important tool of 
communication. A number of international standards are devoted to the global 
harmonization of these symbols. 
To facilitate contractual relationships, many standards the data that should 
be provided by the suppliers of the product/service in question andlor by the buyers who 
wish to order the products/services or to invite tenders from suppliers. The data to be 
provided by suppliers on consumer products are often regulated by law, and are based on 
the requirements of national and/or international standards. 
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF STANDARDIZATION 
The advantages that can be realized through the establishment and application of 
standards are numerous and have been widely discussed and publicized; they can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Well-prepared standards represent optimum economic solutions to 
recurring technical problems in the design, manufacture, packaging, 
transportation and delivery of goods. 
• Standards protect people's health, safety, property and the environment 
against hazards related to the production, use and disposal of products. 
They provide rules for the prevention and fighting of fires and explosions 
and for controlling chemical, radiation and other hazards. 
• The application of standards facilitates the interchangeability, 
interoperability and compatibility of products and services within an 
industry and between industries. 
• Standards can reduce variety to its optimum level, thus leading to overall 
savings in the design, production, handling, storage, ordering and use of 
goods and services. 
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Standards can provide a solid basis for assessing the quality of products 
and services. Their application facilitates the contracting and ordering of 
goods and services and reduces disputes over specifications and quality. 
In a free-market economy, while most industry- and national-level standards are 
adhered to voluntarily, they are generally observed by a majority of companies. This is 
mainly due to the way standards are set up; they are based on the widest possible 
participation of all concerned parties to achieve true consensus. Manufacturers in a 
competitive market apply standards to gain certain economic advantages and because such 
standards are demanded by their customers. Companies that do not apply generally 
accepted standards risk becoming isolated and losing their share of the market. 
Although abiding by most standards in a free-market economy is voluntary and 
the customer is free to choose which goods to buy based on his assessment of quality, price 
and availability, there are cases where the application of standards is made compulsory by 
the Government through its regulatory bodies to protect individual consumers who have 
no means of assessing certain hazards related to the use of products, or to protect the 
environment and other national and global resources. Examples of such compulsory 
standards can be found for such items and areas of concern as food and drugs, fire 
prevention and fire-fighting, building materials and construction, toys, equipment safety, 
electrical and gas appliances, and environmental protection. 
In industrialized countries, standards bodies exist at the national and industry 
levels; for both, the usual procedure for developing standards involves the following 
stages: 
Establishing the need for a standard based on the industry or trade 
situation 
Drafting the standard. This task is usually entrusted to a technical 
committee that possesses adequate expertise and experience and is 
representative of all major interests in the specific field in question. The 
drafting process represents a distillation of ideas and often involves 
accepting the most reasonable compromise from among a variety of 
conflicting solutions that cater to the various interests. At this stage, 
testing and research is often needed to verify and validate the technical 
content of the standard. 
Facilitating wider consultation among all concerned parties through a 
circulation-and-comment process 
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• Resolving the differences expressed during the consultation by carefully 
studying the comments and, if necessary, the draft 
• If necessary, repeating the consultation and modification procedure until 
consensus is reached 
• Securing formal approval of the standard by the governing body of the 
standards organization, then publishing said standard 
• Carrying out periodic reviews, using the same consultation and technical 
committee procedures to update and revise the standard if necessary 
C. THE STANDARDIZATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
The standardization infrastructure in developed countries includes the important 
function of providing standards information to users. Part of this information is available 
on the spot, since most standards libraries in these countries keep full collections of 
national and international standards and of relevant regional standards. 
Most standards information services in developed countries offer a service known 
as technical help to exporters (THE) which specifically targets this group and caters to 
their needs. Information is made available on foreign standards and technical regulations; 
tailored services are offered such as the carrying out of comparative studies of regulations 
in several countries, and help is provided with respect to procedures and formalities for 
submitting products for type testing and obtaining approval for import into foreign 
countries. The assistance may also include diagnosis of a product to ascertain its degree 
of conformance with the standards and technical regulations it may be required to adhere 
to in foreign markets. 
Testing is the function most closely related to the writing of standards. Initially, 
a certain amount of research and testing is needed before a standard is written to 
the test methods and conditions that will allow for the determination of important 
properties of the product during its use. This testing is often performed collaboratively 
with the industry in question in specialized testing laboratories. After the standards have 
been established, routine testing is done by various parties such as manufacturers, users 
and traders; the tests are carried out in laboratories set up by these parties or in specialized 
private or public testing laboratories that cater to different needs in the particular field. 
Testing plays an important role in national and international trade. Many 
sophisticated products require some form of testing for compliance with specifications and 
safety regulations before their release into the markets of developed countries. Even 
simple products and commodities are traded on the basis of test results. This trend means 
that valid test data produced by reliable laboratories are a necessity of modern trade. 
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A manufacturer or service provider that offers a certain product or service to the 
market often declares that that which is being offered conforms with a certain standard 
(which may be a company, industry or national standard). This so-called supplier's (or 
first-party) declaration of conformity is often sufficient to satisfy buyers. However, in 
many cases, large-scale buyers (second parties) who have access to testing facilities prefer 
to carry out their own conformance assessments of the products/services they buy. 
Specialized certification bodies offer third-party certification to buyers or suppliers 
who want assurance that the products or services they buy or sell conform with certain 
standards but prefer to have the actual certification done by a specialized and independent 
body. The reasons for such a choice might include the lack of appropriate testing facilities 
and experienced personnel, the distance between the manufacturer and the buyer (if 
considerable), the lower costs associated with assessment by specialized certification 
bodies, and the increased credibility attached to assessments made by impartial third 
parties of good reputation. 
Third-party certification offers numerous advantages to the different parties 
involved in the exchange process: 
• It permits manufacturers to extend their markets, based on their enhanced 
reputation and on the advantage they have over competitors who do not 
comply with the same standards; this applies particularly to new products 
and markets. 
• It provides manufacturers with a means of ascertaining that their quality 
assurance systems are functioning properly, in accordance with 
recognized quality management techniques. 
• It provides manufacturers, stockists, and exporters with acceptable proof 
that their products conform with the technical regulations of local and 
export markets. 
• It provides traders/middlemen with assurance of the quality of the goods 
they stock and sell, thus enhancing their reputation and offering them 
protection if there are complaints. 
• It facilitates the establishment of vendors' ratings by buyers and traders. 
• It provides large-scale purchasers with an efficient, economical and time- 
saving means of assessing the quality of the products they purchase. 
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It provides the individual or non-professional purchaser with an unbiased 
assessment of the product he is buying (especially with regard to health- 
and safety-related aspects). 
In many developed economies, inspection, testing and certification services are 
offered by more than one body. This situation entails a certain amount of risk if some of 
these bodies do not operate according to universally accepted rules with regard to 
proficiency and impartiality. Rather than limiting the number of authorized bodies and 
imposing rigid operational rules, the tendency in most developed countries is to allow all 
operators of testing and certification schemes to operate freely, while ensuring the 
proficiency and impartiality of their assessments through some kind of accreditation 
mechanism. Accreditation schemes exist in many developed economies; their main 
function is to check the structures and working procedures of testing laboratories and 
inspection and certification bodies to strengthen customer confidence in the validity of 
independent test and inspection results. 
The role played by accreditation is similar to that of certification—it assures those 
seeking testing or inspection services that the procedures are carried out according to 
recognized standards. From the perspective of testing laboratories and inspection and 
certification bodies, requesting accreditation represents an attempt to gain wider 
recognition of their proficiency and impartiality from potential customers, as well as an 
attempt to ascertain whether their working methods conform to recognized standards. A 
description of such universally accepted standards is contained in a joint publication of the 
ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)—ISO/IEC Guide No. 25, 
entitled General Requirements for the Competence of Calibration and Testing 
Laboratories. 
The past decade has witnessed the emergence of numerous national accreditation 
systems for laboratories, especially in developed countries. Detailed information on this 
subject is provided in ISO/IEC Guide No. 58, entitled Calibration and Testing Laborato,y 
Accreditation Systems—General Requirements for Operation and Recognition. 
The application of universally accepted rules in the field of accreditation clears the 
way for mutual recognition of national accreditation systems and, consequently, of test 
results obtained in other countries; bilateral agreements are currently being negotiated to 
facilitate this process. This is an extremely important development which could lead to 
the effective dismantling of those technical obstacles or barriers to trade related to testing 
and certification. 
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D. STANDARDIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Developing countries have traditionally exported primary commodities and raw 
materials such as agricultural and mineral products. During the last two or three decades, 
however, vigorous efforts have been made by developing countries to expand and diversify 
their exportable product ranges to allow them to meet the increasing demand for the 
foreign exchange needed to support their national development efforts. In most cases, 
these efforts have resulted in the introduction of manufacturing processes. 
In comparison with primary commodities, manufactured goods require more 
complex processes and machinery, more highly skilled labour, and better management and 
control systems. Standard specifications for these products are more extensive and 
demanding. If developing countries are to secure and maintain markets abroad, 
standardization is essential. 
In most developing countries, standardization has been instituted to ensure that the 
weights and measures used in commerce are fair and accurate. This applies primarily to 
scales, thermometers, fuel pumps, watt-hour metres, taxi metres and other measuring 
devices commonly used in daily commerce, and to the measurements used in business and 
government service activities. A second, related reason for introducing standardization has 
been to protect consumers from dangerous products and substances (i.e., to ensure health 
and safety). 
Greater awareness in developing countries of the standardization requirements of 
developed countries would facilitate exportation to such economies. National standards 
in industrialized countries constitute a barrier to exports from developing economies when 
exporters in the latter group do not know, cannot attain, or cannot certify that they have 
attained the performance or safety standards required within the importing country's 
market. To compete effectively in the world market, developing countries must familiarize 
themselves with the standards of the markets to which they will be exporting, establish 
internationally recognized testing and certification organizations, and institute national 
quality assessment systems which operate according to international criteria. All of this 
requires the existence of an appropriate standardization infrastructure, which must include 
or be able to provide the following: standards information services; all metrological 
services; calibration services; testing laboratory accreditation services; testing laboratory 
accreditation; product certification; quality systems registration; and training in quality 
control and quality assurance. One of the most critical—and possibly most 
difficult—functions of such an infrastructure is to make producers and the population as 
a whole conscious of the vital importance of quality. 
In this new international climate of rapid technological change and increased 
emphasis on quality and environment, developing countries must focus on instituting more 
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extensive, dynamic and flexible standardization systems that can keep up with rapidly 
evolving national and international needs and requirements. 
As developing countries become more industrialized and depend increasingly on 
the export markets in developed countries, they must shift the focus of their 
standardization programmes from legallmetrological and basic health and safety concerns 
to the more specific concerns of industry and commerce. Industry standards are needed 
to facilitate interchangeability and interconnection and to promote specialization. 
Standards are also needed which will allow industries to take advantage of economies of 
scale and enable them to sell products in foreign markets. 
As has been mentioned, the content of standards varies considerably; this factor 
largely depends on the type of problem a standard is established to solve. Most standards 
deal with specific products and services; some specify the characteristics of products for 
specific applications. 
One important group of standards provides rules and guidelines for the 
establishment, management and assessment of quality management systems. The need for 
this special group of standards in industrialized countries can be traced back to the Second 
World War. The failure of many military products to perform as required was a matter of 
life and death; the people responsible for procurement began to look more closely at how 
the quality of the products they were purchasing could be improved to reduce unnecessary 
casualties. In the 1960s, quality assurance standards were published in the form of 
military specifications in the United States and the United Kingdom. A number of major 
industrial purchasers evaluated the newly issued defence standards to determine whether 
they could improve their production efficiency through the selection of better suppliers and 
the use of quality assurance principles. This led to a proliferation of quality assurance 
specifications which, although similar, contained requirements specific to each purchaser. 
For example, each of the major manufacturers in the automotive and aerospace industries 
developed its own quality assurance standards which were used as a basis for evaluating 
and selecting suppliers; as a result, suppliers were being forced to comply with many 
different sets of criteria. Additionally, as the specifications were not the same, each 
purchaser felt it necessary to conduct his own evaluation of a supplier, as that of another 
purchaser could not be accepted as equivalent; these multiple assessments caused 
enormous problems. 
In 1973, the British Standards Institution (B SI) produced BS 5179 as a series of 
guidelines rather than definitive standards; other national standards organizations took 
similar actions. In the United Kingdom, the proliferation of quality assurance standards 
issued by various purchasing and second-party organizations, together with the growing 
demand for the application of quality assurance principles in contracts, highlighted the 
need for a national standard. The publication of BS 5750 in 1979 addressed this need, 
providing a common standard for quality systems in the United Kingdom. BS 5750 
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provided obvious benefits, the most practical being that major British purchasers were able 
to apply it in place of their own individual quality assurance specifications; however, as 
BS 5750 was purely a British standard, its relevance outside the United Kingdom was 
limited. 
The benefits of such standards were increasingly recognized. The ISO set up a 
technical committee to develop an international standard for quality management systems, 
and in 1987 the Iso 9000 series of standards was published. 
E. THE ISO 9000 SERIES OF STANDARDS 
The ISO 9000 series is a set of practical standards for quality management systems 
that can be applied by manufacturers, distributors, service providers, and all other types 
of businesses. The two main features of ISO 9000 are as follows: 
• Management's responsibility and commitment to quality should be 
expressed in a formal policy statement and implemented through 
appropriate measures. 
• ISO 9000 contains a set of requirements that apply to each aspect of the 
company's activities and organization that affects quality. 
An important condition for conformance with these standards is the appropriate 
documentation of quality system procedures and instructions which, when put together, 
constitute the company's quality manual. 
The ISO 9000 series of standards prescribes three models for quality management 
systems applicable to three types of companies/organizations: 
ISO 9001 is for organizations engaged in the design/development, 
production, installation and servicing of a product. 
ISO 9002 is for organizations that carry out only the production and 
installation of the product. 
150 9003 is for organizations that produce a product or service but do not 
carry out the design/development, installation or servicing. 
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The models prescribed for the quality systems of these three types of companies 
include requirements related to the various organizational elements and activities affecting 
quality. In the most extensive model (ISO 9001), there are 20 such elements/activities: 
• Management responsibility 
• Quality system 
• Contract review 
• Design control 
• Document and data control 
• Purchasing 
• Control of customer-supplied product 
• Product identification and traceability 
• Process control 
• Inspection and testing 
• Control of inspection, measuring and testing equipment 
• Inspection and testing status 
• Control of non-conforming product 
• Corrective and preventive action 
• Handling, storage, packaging, preservation and delivery 
• Control of quality records 
• Internal quality audits 
• Training 
• Servicing 
• Statistical techniques 
In the other two models some of these requirements are either absent or less 
stringent since the relevant categories do not exist or have a lesser effect on quality. 
Once a company observes the relevant ISO 9000 standards in the areas listed 
above, it is considered to have met the necessary conditions for achieving quality with 
regard to the products/services it offers. The difficult part is evaluating the conformance 
of these different elements with the requirements of the standard, a task carried out by 
means of elaborate assessment and registration procedures. 
F. OTHER INTERNATIONAL QUALITY STANDARDS 
Other important international standards relating to quality include: 
• ISO 8402, which contains a complete vocabulary of quality terms and 
their definitions 
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• Iso 9000, the first standard in the series, which is basically a guide to the 
selection and use of the other four standards (ISO 9001, 9002, 9003 and 
9004) 
• ISO 9004, which provides general guidelines for developing and 
implementing quality management systems. It also contains general 
considerations related to the economics of quality, marketing, 
specification and design, training and motivation, and so on. 
• ISO 10011, which deals with the auditing of quality systems 
G. THE ASSESSMENT AND CERTIFICATION! 
REGISTRATION OF QUALITY SYSTEMS 
The publication of national and international standards for quality systems did not 
constitute the final solution to the problems faced by suppliers. For some time, they 
continued to be subjected to multiple assessments of their quality systems' conformance 
with the new ISO 9000 standards. Gradually, the purchasers themselves recognized the 
absurdity of this situation. Some of them started to exchange the results of their 
assessments with other purchasers. Finally, the idea of having third-party certification 
bodies carry out assessments and issue certificates that would be accepted by all buyers 
presented itself as the most efficient and logical solution. 
Over the last few years, demand for third-party certification has been growing very 
rapidly in all developed and in some developing countries. To satisfy this demand, a 
number of registration bodies have been established, some within the framework of 
existing standards and/or quality bodies and some outside that framework (often as 
professional or industry associations or private registration bodies). This has raised a new 
issue—that of the credibility of certifiers/registrars and the assessment of their competence 
as a basis for their recognition. 
H. THE ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFICATION BODIES 
In industrialized countries, certification and registration is an open activity. 
Accreditation bodies have been established to assess the competence and impartiality of 
quality system certification bodies and to ensure their formal recognition. ISO has 
prepared international guidelines containing sets of requirements for both 
assessment/certification bodies and accreditation bodies. The application of these 
guidelines by the two types of bodies establishes their credibility at the national level and 
paves the way for recognition outside the country. 
The ISO 9000 series of standards provides a framework for the establishment, 
documentation and maintenance of an effective quality system—a sign to customers that 
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a company is committed to quality and is able to supply products and services which meet 
their needs. In many ways, these internationally accepted standards are based on simple 
common sense. The standards are applicable to all sectors of industry and to organizations 
of all sizes. If does not matter whether a company manufactures sophisticated military 
hardware or ball-point pens, or whether it employs two people or 10,000; the requirements 
are equally applicable. 
I. THE ADVANTAGES OF COMPLYING 
WITH ISO 9000 STANDARDS 
Compliance with ISO 9000 can produce numerous benefits for businesses, among 
them the following: 
• A better company image 
• A better employee spirit 
• A greater degree of internal control 
• Reductions in scrapped/reworked items and customer returns 
• Acceptance of ISO 9000 (and what it signifies) by major customers 
• Easier retention of existing customers 
• Reductions in lost business 
• Gains in new business 
• A reduction in quality-related costs 
• Above all, greater cost-effectiveness 
The implementation and independent certification of the ISO 9000 management 
system is becoming a normal part of doing business; it has become the rule rather than the 
exception. In industrialized countries, many large purchasers require evidence that a 
potential supplier can comply with ISO 9000 as a condition of bidding for a contract; the 
companies that cannot provide such evidence, normally through independent certification, 
will not even be invited to bid. 
Obviously, there are costs involved in implementing an ISO 9000 quality 
management system, and these may be significant. There is, however, overwhelming 
evidence that these initial costs can be recouped time and time again through the greater 
efficiency and reduced wastage associated with the standard. Establishing an ISO 9000 
system is not the end—it is only the beginning. The system should be dynamic, with 
improvements being made constantly; the standard encourages this through its 
requirements for corrective action, internal auditing and management review. 
Modern technology is inconceivable without standards; to a large extent, 
technology is expressed through standards, which provide a coherent summary of 
information about current technical practices and serve as a means of conveying 
technological information. Standards define a technology in clear, concise language and 
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represent the best thinking of world experts. They also play a critical role in the process 
of technology transfer, because they help to specify how the technology has to perform, 
they address issues related to the quality and compatibility of materials, components and 
products, and they define various services that are required. 
The ability to compete in global markets is now directly linked to standards, which 
constitute an "international language" for market access. Developing countries in 
particular must take steps to understand and apply the standardization process, as 
international standards represent the conduit carrying a country's products, services and 
technologies into the international arena and the global market-place. Standards and a 
standardization infrastructure form a strategic imperative that simply cannot be ignored. 
Adopting the ISO 9000 standards represents both a challenge and an opportunity 
for developing countries. Adherence to the standards, while voluntary, is becoming a 
prerequisite for doing business in many sectors within the European Union, and this trend 
is expected to extend to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries 
and to the East Asian trade area revolving around Japan. The challenge is that the ISO 
9000 certification process is quite rigorous and demanding; the opportunity is represented 
by the fact that the system spells out proven practices and the essential operational 
elements that constitute a basic but effective quality assurance and quality management 
system appropriate for a wide range of enterprises. 
In developing countries, producers must be motivated to adopt and implement 
these standards and to develop a credible quality assessment and registration component 
within their national standards systems which will be accepted by their trading partners. 
In conclusion, as a leading expert has put it, with increasing competition, the 
question to be asked is not "Can I afford to implement ISO 9000 in my organization?" but 
"Can I afford not to?". 
J. AWARENESS PROGRAMMES FOR QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT IN THE ESCWA REGION 
The ESCWA secretariat (Industry Section), in collaboration with other 
international and regional organizations—especially the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization 
(AIDMO)—has initiated an awareness programme designed to address quality control and 
standardization questions in general, but particularly those related to ISO 9000. The 
programme's first activity was the Regional Seminar on Total Quality Management Based 
on ISO 9000 held in Beirut from 17 to 19 January 1995. 
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The next scheduled activity is a regional workshop in the United Arab Emirates 
in 1996, in collaboration with the General Industry Corporation of Abu Dhabi. The main 
subject of the workshop will be the introduction of total quality management and the ISO 
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